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A SURVEY OF FRENCH AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

A SURVEY OF FRENCH AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

NOTE

Whilst this document was in the press, the French Government was reshuffled on 8th January 1966, on the occasion of the opening of General de Gaulle's second seven-year term of office, following his re-election as President of the French Republic.

As a result of the Cabinet reshuffle, the Ministry of Cooperation and the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs have been suppressed.

The functions of the Ministry of Cooperation have been handed over to a Secretariat of State in charge of Cooperation, headed by M. Jean Charbonnel, and placed under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This new organisation leaves unchanged the administrative structure and financial circuits of the cooperation services, but regroups within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all the services responsible for technical and cultural assistance as well as economic and financial aid to the developing countries.

As for the department of the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs, under the authority of the Prime Minister, this has now been taken over by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Jean de Broglie, who has replaced M. Habib-Deloncle in office. Specific problems concerning Algeria have thus been brought within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Readers are, therefore, asked to note that every reference to the "Ministry of Cooperation" should in fact read "Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs in charge of Cooperation", and that "Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs" should read "Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs".

(A/34/1/66)

A SURVEY OF FRENCH AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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A SURVEY OF FRENCH AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Since the second world war, aid to the developing countries has become one of the major problems of the second half of the XXth century.

The United Nations created technical assistance on an international scale in 1946, but the real point of departure of aid to the countries of the "third world" was Point IV of President Truman's speech of 20th January 1949.

The European States had not waited for international intervention to take action in the under-developed countries placed under their influence. France had been contributing for over a century to the economic and social development of the overseas countries in her orbit. By the time they acceded to independence, considerable funds had been spent by the Government, semi-official and private sources in the mother country, for widely varying purposes : basic capital equipment, railways, roads, ports and aerodromes, education, social schemes, etc. Although certain investments were used for so-called "purposes of sovereignty", most of them were for technical co-operation and aid to developing countries.

At the time of President Truman's call, France immediately joined the aid programme drawn up by the United Nations, and played an important part from the start both in setting up its institutions and in carrying out particular schemes.

I FRENCH AID

At his press conference of 9th September 1965, General de Gaulle described France's role as a leading champion of collaboration : "She is fitted for this role by her nature, which tends to human contacts; by the opinion which has historically been formed of her, and which gives her some kind of latent credit in the universal context; by the fact that she has relinquished all the colonial powers which she exercised over other peoples; and finally because she emerges as a nation with a free hand, whose policy is not determined by any outside pressure."

To these reasons can be added her continued concern for the well-being of the countries formerly linked to her and which have kept up special relations with her, and her interest in the spread of civilization, not only in the French speaking countries, but also to an increasing extent in such areas as Latin America and the Middle East, where close cultural relations have always been maintained with France.

France has also for many years been helping to ensure equitable price levels for these countries' exports by paying more than world quotations for certain products. Association with the European Economic Community will gradually bring this situation to an end, but France is still bridging the gap during the intermediary period before the E.E.C.'s subsidies enable the producer countries to bring their prices into line by increasing productivity. At the Geneva Conference in particular, France strongly advocated the stabilisation of raw material prices as an essential condition of development in the producer countries, for it is obvious that aid for development could not be effective if the prices of tropical raw materials were not guaranteed over a period of time.

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FORMS TAKEN BY FRENCH AID

It is difficult to define the complex role of aid for development, and to enumerate all the forms it can take.

(1) AID CAN BE :

economic and financial

or provided by supplying personnel.

Economic and financial aid : This is generally given by means of funds for investment or equipment, which can take the form either of grants, or of loans for studies and research, major public works, social equipment, mining projects, the building of power stations, agricultural development, etc.

Supply of personnel : This form of aid is called technical cooperation. It can be described as a communication of knowledge, and takes the form of sending out experts and training the countries' nationals to take over responsibility by making arrangements for teaching and cultural activities, granting scholarships and organising courses.

(2) DIFFERENT FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AID
AND OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Economic and financial aid and technical cooperation
can be :

- bilateral,
- multilateral
- or regional.

Bilateral aid is granted by virtue of agreements concluded directly between France and the states concerned, which are for the most part former dependencies.

Economic and financial aid is determined each year in the Budget and where technical cooperation is concerned, France sends teachers and experts to these countries and receives their trainees and scholars, whether on French or on foreign scholarships.

International or multilateral aid : France takes part in the activities of the relevant international organisations - in particular those set up under the aegis of the United Nations - by contributing to their funds, detaching experts to them and receiving trainees and scholars designated by them.

Regional aid : France contributes, together with the other members of the Common Market, to the European Development Fund. She also provides experts for the regional organisations and receives their trainees.

(3) PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AID

Aid from public funds : The public sector of aid covers all multilateral, regional and bilateral aid given by the French Government


In regard to the financial aid, the Budget can be used as a basis for evaluating French aid, but it gives no information regarding loans, advances or underwriting operations. Nor does it show expenditure for purposes other than development (military aid, representation, civil or military pensions), or sums spent in France in connection with the developing countries (administration of services devoted entirely to aid, compensation to persons repatriated from Algeria, etc.).

Aid from the public sector can be given either by means of grants or of more or less long-term loans.

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
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As for technical cooperation, it is paid for by the French Republic unless, as is increasingly the case, the assisted states contribute in varying amounts towards the cost, or even sometimes pay for it in full. France supplies the experts or teachers for whom the various countries make a request - their salaries may be met in part by France, from funds made available for aid and co-operation.

Aid from private sources : The financial aid given by the private sector is dealt with in a separate chapter at the end of this document. Investments in the developing countries and funds spent on financing training programmes are considerable.

The private sector participates in technical cooperation by sending out experts and technicians (who also take on training duties on the spot), and by receiving trainees in France.



EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AID AS A WHOLE

Interesting figures have been published in the report of the Committee for Aid to Development (C.A.D.) of the O.E.C.D., which groups 15 countries contributing 90% of all aid to the developing countries.

There is, however, a significant difference between the C.A.D.'s figures and those listed in the French Budget. The former include aid to the overseas departments and territories which, as part of the French Republic, do not come within the scope of the present study. They also include all flows of capital payments made under the export credit guarantees scheme of COFACE ("Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur"), civil and military pensions and so-called expenses "of sovereignty".

RELATIVE REDUCTION OF AID FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR

According to the C.A.D.'s report, French public aid rose in 1962 to a peak of 977 million dollars (4,790 million francs). It fell in the following year, and by 1964 was back at approximately the 1960 level (841 million dollars, or 4,120 million new francs). Present tendencies suggest that this amount is not likely to increase.

The list of economic uses to which aid was put in 1964 shows an increase in sums spent on specific programmes of investment and technical cooperation and a smaller outlay on economic and financial support.

The geographical distribution of French aid was "redeployed" in 1963 and 1964, to increase the proportion of payments to States outside the franc area.

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INCREASE IN THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR

According to the C.A.D.'s report, the contribution of the private sector in France has increased considerably over the last three years. This increase is due, partly to the larger amount of credit allowed by French exporters through the intermediary of COFACE to their customers in the developing countries, and partly to the rising volume of investments and reinvestments by private enterprise in these countries.

FINANCIAL AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES *		
	1963	1964
Public sector aid		
Bilateral	813.7	821.8
Multilateral	29.3	19.6
Private sector aid	335.3	447.2
Total	1,178.7	1,288.6
* According to the C.A.D. report (in millions of U.S. dollars)		

II BILATERAL AID FROM FRENCH GOVERNMENT SOURCES

A. THE FINANCIAL ASPECT

Ministries responsible

Bilateral aid, which accounts for most of the aid granted by the French Government to the developing countries, is shared between four different ministries according to its destination :

- the Ministry of Cooperation for the African States and Madagascar;
- the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs for Algeria;
- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Morocco, Tunisia, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the "traditionally foreign" states; in the latter's case, aid is organised jointly with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs.

Furthermore, certain technical ministries retain control over expenditure on aid in their own fields.

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- 2,7

- 2,4

* Provisions
aid granted
in 1964 comp

AMOUNT OF AID DISTRIBUTED BY THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES IN 1964 (in million francs)			
Ministries	Countries of the franc area	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and other States	Total
Foreign Affairs	182.45	136.70	319.15
Cooperation	1,030.80	-	1,030.80
National Education	75.50	0.85	76.35
Finance and Economic Affairs	-	80.00	80.00
Interior	3.55	-	3.55
Justice	14.50	-	14.50
Services of the Prime Minister	2.70	-	2.70
Algerian Affairs	1,055.20	-	1,055.20
Public Works and Transport	115.85	0.10	115.95
Posts and Telecommunications	2.35	0.20	2.55
Armed Forces	96.15	-	96.15
Total	2,579.05	217.85	2,796.90

Comparison of totals since 1963

Bilateral aid granted from the national Budget amounted to :

- 3,073 million francs in 1963
- 2,797 million francs in 1964 (-9.1%)
- 2,440 million francs in 1965 (-12.6%). *

* Provisional figure. According to the C.A.D., French public aid granted on a bilateral basis amounted to 4,027 million francs in 1964 compared with 3,987 million in 1963.

The reductions are due, on the one hand, to a fall in credits for Algeria, and on the other to the smaller budget of the Ministry of Cooperation.

Increasing expenditure on technical cooperation

In 1964, the actual amounts paid by the public sector were fairly stable compared with 1963, but a higher proportion of the total was spent on technical cooperation; this trend is continuing in 1965, priority being given to training.

Increasing public aid to countries outside the franc area

A comparison of budget figures shows that the proportion of public bilateral aid granted to the countries of the franc area fell from 92% in 1964 to 85% in 1965.

This evolution is explained by the French policy of "re-deployment" of aid.

Proportion of grants and loans

According to the C.A.D., total grants made by the French public sector under bilateral programmes have fallen over the last three years from 3,708 million francs in 1962 to 3,325 million in 1963 and 3,272 million in 1964.

Total loans have risen from 689 to 1,033 million. Loans are agreed only for those equipment programmes that are considered economic.

(1) AID TO THE AFRICAN STATES AND MADAGASCAR

Nearly half the French public bilateral aid goes to the French speaking African countries and Madagascar, which belong to the franc area and whose currency is guaranteed by the French Treasury.

They are :
Volta, Mauritania,
(Brazzaville), the

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Ministry respon
COOPERATION - total
Including:
- cultural activities research, subsidies specialised organis
- technical assistance budgetary subsidies military aid
- Investment (1)
National education
Justice
Public works and tran
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- (1) Yearly appropriat
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Cooperation.

They are : Madagascar, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic, Gabon and Tchad.

AID TO THE AFRICAN STATES AND MADAGASCAR						
B U D G E T (in million francs) (excluding the cost of running the necessary services in France)						
Ministry responsible	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
COOPERATION - total	992	1,048	1,073	1,093	1,032	948
Including:						
- cultural activities, scientific research, subsidies to specialised organisations	41	40.5	120	147	160	164
- technical assistance, budgetary subsidies, military aid	410	460.5	497	567	557	581
- Investment (1)	541	547	446	379	315	203
National education	34.5	40.8	49.8	68.70	74.15	79.30
Justice	-	-	-	-	13.50	13.50
Public works and transport	87	85	74.3	64.77	88.05	71.55
Interior	-	-	5.5	4.40	3.55	3.75
Posts and telecommunications	4.9	2.6	-	1.98	2.20	2.30
Armed forces (2)	59	140	110.2	79.70	92.85	-
Cultural affairs	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	-
Prime Minister	7.7	16	1.8	8.4	2.40	2.40
TOTAL (rough figures)	1,150	1,333	1,315	1,316	1,308	1,121
Including F.A.C.	992	1,048	1,073	1,093	1,022	869

N.B. Payments to the F.E.D., and civil and military pensions granted to Africans, are not included in these figures.

(1) Yearly appropriations. Long-term appropriations have not been subjected to this reduction, which is explained by : (A) a large F.A.C. credit balance in previous years and (B) the stabilisation plan.

(2) Military technical assistance was transferred in 1965 to the budget of the Ministry of Cooperation.

The Ministry of Cooperation

To meet the new situation created by the African States' and Madagascar's accession to independence, and to enable them to continue to receive administrative and financial assistance free of any political counterpart, France set up in 1960 a new organisation to centralise negotiations with the associated States overseas regarding French aid. In 1961, this became the Ministry of Cooperation which is divided into two directorates, the Cultural and Technical Directorate and the Economic and Financial Directorate, and has its own budget as well as a Fund for Aid and Cooperation (F.A.C.).

The Ministry of Cooperation is responsible for nearly 79% of the French aid budget for the African States and Madagascar. A number of other ministries, such as National Education and Public Works and Transport, also participate in French aid according to their competence, as already stated.

BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF COOPERATION (in approximate figures)						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
TOTAL (excluding the cost of running services)	992	1,048	1,073	1,088	1,032	948
Including F.A.C.	992	1,048	1,073	1,093	1,022	869
F.A.C. expenditure:						
- section III (cultural activities, subsidies to technical assistance organisations)	41	40.3	130	147	160	164
- section IV (technical assistance, budget subsidies)	410	460	497	567	556	502
- section V (French Investments : Cultural Centre and Permanent Missions for Aid and Cooperation (M.P.A.C.))	5.5	3.5	6	6	5	3
- section VI (States' Investments)	541	547	446	379	315	200

The Aid

Budgetary at the same level million francs view of a reduction 1,032 million francs budgets were more military assistance Ministry of the effect on this

Since 19 altered in the

- reduction million francs appropriations

- reduction criticised, often million in 1965

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The fund

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* The F.I.D.E.S. aid to the overseas

The Aid Budget

Budgetary aid to the African States and Madagascar remained at the same level in 1962, 1963 and 1964, but fell from 1,308 million francs to 1,121 million in the 1965 budget forecast, in view of a reduction of the Ministry of Cooperation's credits from 1,032 million francs to 948 million. The other ministries' budgets were more or less unchanged. The fact that technical military assistance, formerly included in the budget of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, has been transferred this year to the Ministry of Cooperation (82 million francs) has also had its effect on this reduction.

Since 1963, the Ministry of Cooperation's budget has been altered in the following respects :

- reduction of yearly appropriations for investment (315 million francs in 1964, 203 million in 1965) and of long-term appropriations (450 million francs in 1964, 363.6 million in 1965).

- reduction of budget subsidies, which have been much criticised, often unjustifiably (131 million francs in 1963, 15 million in 1965).

- increase of staff for technical assistance (396 million francs in 1964, 411.5 million in 1965).

The fund for aid and cooperation

With independence, a number of States found themselves outside the scope of the Fund for Economic and Social Investments (F.I.D.E.S.) * which had spent nearly eight thousand million francs on investment in the colonies and overseas departments and territories since 1946. The Fund for Aid and Cooperation was formed in order to continue to give assistance to these States.

* The F.I.D.E.S. is now a new organisation which grants French aid to the overseas territories.

As its name suggests, the Fund's intervention is not founded on unilateral sovereign action, but is discussed, agreed and carried out in cooperation with fully independent States, and is subject to the consent of both parties.

Unlike the F.I.D.E.S., the F.A.C. finances the various forms of aid : aid for development, cultural cooperation, technical assistance, personnel, etc. It has been part of the Ministry of Cooperation's budget since 1961.

The F.A.C. is intended to contribute realistically to the development of the African States and Madagascar. It avoids investments which might prove a handicap in the future, or weigh too heavily on the public finances or economy of the receiving States.

Its projects are covered by Agreements between the Ministry and the receiving States, stipulating that "the equipment, supplies and materials needed to carry out projects must be obtained in the franc area" wherever possible. To this extent, French aid provided through the F.A.C. is "tied".

About 90% of the F.A.C.'s assistance takes the form of grants. The Fund's resources amounted to 1,093 million francs in 1963, 1,022 million in 1964 and 869 million in 1965. 870.5 million francs have been earmarked for 1966.

From the time it first began to operate until 31st December 1964, the Fund's aid has been distributed as follows : general surveys 4.5%, production 44%, public works 22.5%, health and social equipment 5%, school and university equipment 12%, control expenses 1.3%, cultural and training activities 10%, miscellaneous 0.7%. The cost of technical assistance is not shown in the credits allocated by the management committee.

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The Fund's payments are made through the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (Central Fund for Economic Cooperation) which replaced the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer (Central Fund for Overseas France). This is a public organisation, created in 1946 and controlled jointly by the Ministries of Finance and of Cooperation. It acts as the F.A.C.'s treasurer, carries out operations on its own account, and can be regarded as an investment bank.

Since the first meeting of the F.A.C.'s management committee, the sums distributed by the Central Fund have totalled 3,096.8 million francs, including :

- 1,215.8 million for operations of a general nature, concerned especially with surveys (295.6 million in 1964), agricultural and mining research, cultural and social activities, schools, contributions to directly productive investments by aiding public organisations and, for the first time since 1964, private firms;

- 1,881 million francs towards development programmes (342.9 million francs in 1964), particularly in the fields of production and public works.

Besides the F.A.C.'s credits, the Central Fund gives financial assistance from its own resources (147.9 million francs in 1964).

Miscellaneous financial aid

Assistance is also granted in the following forms :

- short-term loans : to balance the budget of beneficiary states;
- short-term loans to central banks : 27.6 million francs;
- loans to funds for the support of prices of primary products : 13.3 million francs.

Trade

According to the C.A.D., French trade with the developing countries continued to grow in 1964, but at a slower pace than total trade. Compared with 1963, imports increased by only 9.6% (+ 15.3% in 1963), and exports by 6.5% (+ 11.2% in 1963). The main reason for this difference was a slackening of trade with Algeria.

The African States and Madagascar shared to a varying degree in the expansion of sales to France (+ 10.7%).

FRENCH TRADE WITH THE AFRICAN STATES AND MADAGASCAR				
	Imports *		Exports *	
	1963	1964	1963	1964
Cameroon	380,411	452,005	279,189	329,225
Central African Republic	48,098	74,841	64,069	74,026
Congo (Brazzaville)	36,725	34,517	164,858	175,319
Ivory Coast	644,904	680,360	575,042	676,471
Dahomey	51,331	58,028	101,995	88,313
Gabon	254,114	309,897	115,553	132,120
Guinea	40,550	26,463	53,734	56,832
Upper Volta	10,188	16,414	70,006	81,181
Madagascar	268,800	294,958	377,165	409,189
Mali	29,855	12,631	58,683	56,436
Mauritania	26,887	62,698	90,096	46,657
Niger	92,172	110,204	64,532	74,954
Senegal	559,044	572,520	543,853	542,848
Tchad	60,569	68,463	55,216	60,549
TOTAL	2,503,648	2,773,999	2,613,991	2,804,120
* In thousands of francs				

Credit guarantee

The French Insu
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(2) FINANCIAL AID TO

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Algerian Affairs	
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B. military aid	
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Armed forces ...	
TOTAL	

Credit guarantee

The French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade (COFACE) has been guaranteeing exports of capital goods since 1961, in order to protect French exports against certain risks and facilitate the maintenance of existing commercial circuits.

(2) FINANCIAL AID TO ALGERIA

During the years that preceded independence, French aid to Algeria amounted to considerable sums. The Constantine Plan, drawn up in 1958, provided for investments totalling twenty thousand million francs over a period of five years.

The Fund for Equipment and Development in Algeria (C.E.D.A.) was set up in March 1959, and in the five years preceding independence its "operational" outlay amounted to 4,944.2 million francs.

FRENCH AID TO ALGERIA (1) (as granted by the various ministries)		
	1964	1965 (2)
National education	0.80	0.85
Justice	-	6.50
Prime Minister's Department	0.30	0.40
Algerian Affairs	1,055.20	749.40
A. civil aid	1,055.20	744.90
B. military aid - personnel	-	4.50
Public Works and transport ... comprising :		
A. public works and transport	1.25	0.25
B. Civil aviation ...	26	23
Posts and telecommunications	0.15	0.10
Armed forces	3.30	-
TOTAL	1,087	780.50
(1) In millions of francs		
(2) Provisional figures		

Reduction of financial aid

The Fund paid out 204 million francs in 1963 and 186 million in 1964 to carry out major industrial projects initiated before independence. Over 100 million francs were allocated in 1963, and about 150 million in 1964, for new projects.

The C.E.D.A. bases its activity on the two principles of giving priority to projects likely to encourage exports of French goods and services and to have a maximum boosting effect on the economic development of Algeria, and of avoiding excessive dispersal of aid.

Aid in 1964 : 800 million francs

In a general way, French budgetary aid to Algeria has been divided into two sections :

- aid for unspecified purposes ("untied" aid), amounting to 400 million francs per year in 1963 and 1964, put at the disposal of the Algerian Development Fund, and which the Algerian Government may use as it wishes : this amount will be considerably reduced in the future;

- aid for specified purposes ("tied" aid), also amounting to 400 million francs, and put at the disposal of the C.E.D.A.

Stabilisation of exports in 1964

Algeria receives about two-thirds of French exports to North Africa. These fell sharply between 1961 and 1962 (-36.5%) and continued to fall, though only slightly, in 1963 and 1964.

Imports rose in 1962, and have remained since then at an even level, in the region of 2.7 to 2.8 million francs.

(3) AID TO OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES

North Africa (a)

Morocco and Tunisia receiving French aid from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided by the Foreign Office of technical and cultural cooperation.

Besides budgetary aid, since 1964, the Algerian Government has been receiving, since 1964, through the intermediary of the C.E.D.A.,

Where Morocco received 100 million francs in 1963, the rise corresponds, not to the delayed payment of the year, loans have been programmed.

French Treasury has fallen from 60 million francs in 1963 to 40 million francs in 1964.

FRENCH AID TO ALGERIA (as granted)

Foreign Affairs
A. civil aid:
(i) ordinary expenditure
(ii) capital expenditure (investment)
yearly appropriations

B. military aid
National Education
Justice
Public Works and Transport

TOTAL

(1) In millions of francs

(3) AID TO OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES

North Africa (excluding Algeria)

Morocco and Tunisia have a special place among the countries receiving French aid through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This aid is almost entirely provided by the Foreign Affairs budget, and consists essentially of technical and cultural cooperation.

Besides budgetary credits, these two countries have been receiving, since 1964, long-term loans from the French Treasury through the intermediary of the Central Fund (Caisse Centrale).

Where Morocco is concerned, these loans rose from 120 million francs in 1963 to 200 million in 1964 : this considerable rise corresponds, not to an increase of Treasury commitments, but to the delayed payment of certain 1963 commitments. Since that year, loans have been more specifically devoted to industrial programmes.

French Treasury loans to the Tunisian Government have fallen from 60 million francs in 1963 to 9 million in 1964.

FRENCH AID TO MOROCCO AND TUNISIA (1) (as granted by the various Ministries)				
	Morocco		Tunisia	
	1964	1965(2)	1964	1965(2)
Foreign Affairs	112.85	118	69.60	57.90
A. civil aid:				
(i) ordinary expenditure	71.45	77.40	66.40	57.60
(ii) capital expenditure (investments)				
yearly appropriations	4	3	3	-
B. military aid	37.40	37.60	0.20	0.30
National Education	0.40	0.40	0.15	0.20
Justice	-	-	1	1
Public Works and Transport	0.55	0.30	-	-
TOTAL	113.80	118.70	70.75	59.10

(1) In millions of francs. (2) Provisional figures

The Far East : Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam

In 1965, aid was increased for Cambodia, decreased for Laos, and has remained unchanged for the Republic of Vietnam. Long-term loans totalling 37.5 million francs were granted by the Central Fund to Laos and Vietnam.

Under the terms of an Agreement dated 4th July 1964, France is giving aid to the Cambodian Government by means of both export credits and long-term loans, repayable over twenty years at a low rate of interest. 150 million francs have been earmarked for public works programmes.

FRENCH AID TO CAMBODIA, LAOS, VIETNAM (1) (as granted by the various Ministries)						
	Cambodia		Laos		Vietnam	
	1964	1965	1964	1965	1964	1965
Foreign Affairs	32.05	49.20	35.25	31	15.40	15.60
A. civil aid:						
(i) ordinary expenditure	12.90	17.50	10.85	11.10	14.40	15.30
(ii) capital expenditure	1.10	4	0.90	0.70	1	0.30
B. military aid	18.05	27.70	17.50	19.20	-	-
Interior	-	0.20	-	-	-	-
Public Works and Transport	0.10	0.10	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	32.15	49.50	35.25	31	15.40	15.60
(1) In millions of francs						

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Redeployment of aid to "traditionally foreign States"

In connection with the structural reorganisation of French foreign trade, the Government, anxious to broaden its contacts and to intensify its political and commercial relations with foreign States, has decided to "redeploy" French aid. Priority will still be given, however, to the countries of the franc area.

Cultural and technical aid to "traditionally foreign" States is granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and economic and commercial aid by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 435 million francs were set aside for this purpose in 1964, compared with 402 million in 1963.

Where financial aid is concerned, payments by the French Treasury in the form of long-term loans or of settlements in implementation of consolidation agreements rose from 35 million francs in 1962 to 88 million in 1963 and 185 million in 1964.

In 1964, long-term loans were granted to the following countries :

- Turkey - 30 million francs
- Greece - 18 million francs
- South Vietnam (not in fact a "traditionally foreign" State) - 44 million francs
- Chile - 4 million francs.

Agreements covering the consolidation of debts had the effect of lengthening by three years the repayment term of loans granted to Brazil and Chile.

It should be mentioned that the French Government's new commitments in the field of financial aid were less considerable in 1964 than in 1963, but that actual payments increased. This is explained by the inevitable time lapse between the conclusion and implementation of agreements.

The French Government's commitments in 1963 were particularly heavy. They concerned :

- Mexico	- 735 million francs
- Spain	- 735 million francs
- Iran	- 290 million francs
- India	- 100 million francs
- Pakistan	- 50 million francs
- Turkey	- 125 million francs
- Greece	- 125 million francs
- Ethiopia	- 50 million francs
- Yugoslavia	- 5 million francs

Account should also be taken of credit guarantees by COFACE, which more than doubled from 1963 to 1964.

B. THE TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Exchanges of men and knowledge and the training of qualified staff are the bases of technical cooperation, one of the most difficult and most effective forms of cooperation. It is justified only if it prepares the assisted nation for full development, and its elite to take over responsibility. The training aspect is therefore of prime importance. There can be no doubt that French efforts are succeeding in this field, as is evidenced by the growing demand for French specialists and particularly teachers and instructors, which unfortunately cannot always be met.

Priority for training programmes

The French effort in the field of training is second to none. At 1st January 1965, 28,878 French nationals were serving in the developing countries. This figure was lower than that of the previous year (31,410), owing to a reduction of the number of teachers in Morocco and Tunisia.

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The training effort is also pursued in France itself. Out of 35,000 foreign students training in France in 1964, approximately 26,000 were from the developing countries. 11,402 of them were French Government scholarship holders.

Activities and surveys for economic development

Economic development programmes take the form of sending out teams of experts, undertaking surveys, exchanging information and taking part in research.

In 1964, 15,262 experts took part in 14,631 mostly long-term assignments on the most varied subjects.

Technicians and economists help to draw up development plans. The ministries in charge of programmes obtain the necessary specialists from the various services specialising in co-operation at the Ministries of National Education, Public Works and Transport, Public Health and Agriculture, as well as from the relevant institutes, consultant firms and industry.

The surveys are mainly concerned with large-scale projects : public works, development, agricultural or industrial production.

Information is exchanged on a huge variety of subjects, by means of conferences, past students' and trainees' associations, distribution of books and magazines, information centres and libraries, etc.

France has taken a special interest in research work, through the intermediary of specialised missions or institutes.

Responsibility for technical cooperation is divided between four ministries according to countries : the Ministry of Cooperation, the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Other technical ministries also take a direct part in cooperation programmes concerned with their own fields.

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In order to develop higher education in these countries, France has given assistance for the foundation of universities in Dakar, Abidjan, Tananarive and Yaoundé; four teaching establishments in Equatorial Africa; an Institute (for academic teaching in Brazzaville (Congo); a Zootechnical Institute in Fort Lamy (Tchad); an Institute of Agronomy in Bangui (Central African Republic) and a Polytechnic Institute in Libreville (Gabon). Over 7,000 students were trained in these establishments in 1964-65, and about 450 French nationals are teaching in them. The Government's aim is gradually to reach a stage at which these countries' students will go to universities in France only for the final stages of higher education.

The number of students sent to France on scholarships (higher education, "grandes écoles", higher technical education, etc.) in 1964-65 was 3,315; 867 of them were F.A.C. scholarship holders. The largest number came from the Cameroon (627), followed by the Ivory Coast (460) and Madagascar (387).

Activities in all fields

A great number of French assistants are still serving in the administrations (452 at 1st July 1965); in order to accelerate take-over by the countries' own nationals, about 600 students are being trained each year at the Institute of Higher Overseas Studies.

947 French doctors, chemists and surgeons are practising under the aegis of French assistance. French personnel are serving in large numbers with the police forces (563), and as technicians (559 for production, 734 for public works, etc.).

Special efforts are being devoted to rural training: the Office for the Development of Agricultural Production (B.D.P.A.) has trained 1,700 students locally, including 400 up to the higher levels of qualification.

2,348 trainees were in France at 1st March 1965, at the expense of the Association for Courses and for the Reception of Overseas Technicians (A.S.A.T.O.M.).

Theoretical and practical courses have been organised with the F.A.C.'s assistance, both for the technicians of the official and semi-official services overseas and for those of the private sector (Berliet Centre, Renault, C.E.D.I.M.O.M. courses, mechanical and electrical industries, etc.).

France also provides such cultural facilities as books, newspapers, radio, cinema, television, youth organisations, the training of leaders and of technicians, and in cultural and sports activities.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE AFRICAN STATES AND MADAGASCAR						
	Personnel serving in the African States and Madagascar (at 1st July 1965)			Scholarship holders and trainees in France (1964-1965)		
	Teachers	Experts	National servicemen	F.A.C. scholarship holders	State scholarship holders*	Trainees at 1.3.65
Cameroon	377	403	61	182	445	383
Central African Republic	176	302	66	5	165	84
Congo (Brazzaville)	269	198	43	9	174	134
Ivory Coast	831	527	191	52	408	267
Dahomey	106	100	32	111	173	153
Gabon	134	233	62	9	146	121
Upper Volta	161	191	58	60	127	101
Madagascar	980	722	137	161	226	388
Mali	200	111	48	111	163	143
Mauritania	61	147	22	15	12	53
Niger	117	211	64	16	38	74
Senegal	862	517	123	32	218	186
Tchad	152	299	78	10	47	125
Togo	58	53	20	94	106	136
Joint organisations	-	249	2	-	-	-
Congo (Leopoldville)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ruanda and Burundi	-	17	3	(?)	(?)	397

* These state scholarships are granted by the states from which the students come.

New technical

Since the demand is greater than the possibility has inaugurated to designed to increase

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(2) ALGERIA

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New technical assistance schemes

Since the demand for technical assistants is invariably greater than the possibilities of supply, the Ministry of Cooperation has inaugurated two new forms of technical cooperation, designed to increase their number.

With the agreement of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, it has decided to send a number of young national service volunteers to the African States and Madagascar, to work as technical assistants according to their specialities. At present, 1,800 are employed in this way.

The Volunteers for Progress are young people who, after a stringent selection process and suitable training, go out to work among the African rural communities. This is a really "down to earth" form of cooperation, practised in simple conditions by farmers, breeders, craftsmen. 200 such volunteers are now working in Africa, and their number will have doubled by the end of 1965.

The African Governments have welcomed these new schemes, which may encourage vocations for overseas service, and help promote understanding between the young people of the various countries.

(2) ALGERIA

Towards the end of the school year 1963-64, the French Government, after two years spent meeting the most urgent needs, was able to determine the principles of its technical cooperation with Algeria.

The two Governments agreed to pursue and intensify the efforts undertaken under the Constantine Plan, by concentrating French cooperation mainly on the training inside Algeria of qualified administrative and technical staffs and on education.

Emphasis on education

8,000 of the 12,000 French nationals engaged in technical cooperation in 1964 were teachers.

A French public organisation, the "Office Universitaire et Culturel", runs 8 lycées and over 600 primary classes, and employs a staff of 2,200.

Nearly 900 French nationals are teaching in private schools.

French activity will continue in this field until a sufficient number of French-speaking Algerians are available to take over. These are being trained partly by means of courses in France, and to a greater extent by local means, with the help of the cooperation staffs and teaching teams sent out from France.

Replacement of French personnel

Outside the field of education, Algerian nationals are being trained for senior posts, both in France and in Algeria.

In 1964-65, 520 scholarship holders (including 246 for industrial and technological training) and 613 trainees studied in France.

In Algeria, nearly 7,000 persons took part in 1964 in various training programmes, which are now carried out preferably as grouped schemes or under overall plans. This applies to the aid given by France to the National School of Administration which has been opened in Algiers, and to the administrative training Centres set up in Algiers, Oran and Constantine. It also applies in such fields as professional training, railways and rural engineering.

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A large number of special programmes have also been carried out since independence, concerning agriculture, justice, public health, public works and telecommunications.

Besides training, other forms of technical cooperation are being pursued in certain essential sectors such as the Algerian electricity and gas Authorities (310 officials), railways (458), telecommunications (399), public works (339), rural engineering and medicine; here again, France's main purpose is to enable the Algerians to take over administrative or financial responsibility as soon as possible.

Other very considerable efforts are being made by French technicians in two Franco-Algerian organisations : the Organisation for Aeronautical Management and Safety (411 officials) and the Saharan Organisation (201).

In 1964, a French police team trained 3,500 Algerian policemen. 171 instructors are employed in two police schools in Algeria. 55 French army doctors are helping to staff the hospitals, and 8 members of a French medical team are practising in the Sahara.

During the past year, 127 Algerian nationals were trained in various military schools and establishments in France.

Growing selectivity

In the coming years, France will continue to put large numbers of teachers at Algeria's disposal, but in other fields, French technical cooperation will become increasingly selective, with the eventual aim of reducing personnel and credits.

The Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs intends to make greater use of national servicemen, 900 of whom are now serving in Algeria, including 700 teachers.

(3) OTHER STATES AND "TRADITIONALLY FOREIGN" STATES

MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS French teachers and experts in the developing countries and French Government scholarship holders (at 1st January 1965)			
	Teachers	Experts	French Government scholarship holders (students & trainees)
Countries having had special links with France:			
Morocco	8,303	2,117	915
Tunisia	2,399	291	524
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	841	226	336
Other countries:			
Europe	315	67	886
Africa	373	150	744
Middle-East	252	182	668
Asia	173	91	555
Latin America	384	189	1,378
TOTAL	13,040	3,313	6,006

French technical cooperation placed under the aegis of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs is available, not only to the developing countries, but to all foreign States.

Since 1956, responsibilities have been divided, according to types of activity, between the Directorate General for Cultural and Technical Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the

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Directorate for Foreign Economic Relations of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, to whom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates each year a part of its credits for cooperation.

1964 : 435 million francs shared by two Ministries

Credits granted to the Directorate General for Cultural and Technical Affairs in its 1964 budget totalled 435.3 million francs. 503 million francs were provided in the 1965 budget.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for :

- general planning
- administrative activities
- social activities
- higher, scientific and technical education
- assistance in agricultural matters.

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs is responsible for :

- economic development
- industrial development (capital equipment and production)
- professional and technical training.

Redeployment of technical cooperation
in the second five year plan

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' second five year plan for cultural expansion (1964-1968) provides for a deployment of French cultural activities, for linguistic understanding is one of the bases of expansion in technical cooperation.

The demand for French teachers is rising constantly throughout the world, and is restricted only by insufficiency of funds, for the plan's financial proposals have not been granted in full.

13,000 teachers

13,000 of the 14,303 French teachers working in the "traditionally foreign" States are in the developing countries. 6,205 have been detached to lycées and colleges.

General de Gaulle's visits to Mexico and South America were followed by a marked renewal of interest in French culture in Latin America, and cultural agreements of considerable scope have been signed, in particular with the Argentine and Uruguay. 384 French teachers are working in Latin America in various capacities: 96 in Brazil (12 are detached and 10 are visiting university teachers); 77 in Mexico, at the Franco-Mexican Lycée, the French Institute in Latin America, the five Centres of the "Alliance Française" and the Centre for Pedagogic Studies; 40 in Chile, which has asked for 7 French teachers for its Faculty of Science; 38 in Columbia, etc.

In the Near-East, the "return" of French culture to the Arab countries was confirmed in 1964, when the number of French teachers in the United Arab Republic (55) more than doubled in comparison with 1963. Excluding Egypt and the Lebanon, 103 teachers are working in 7 States.

In 1964, 303 French teachers were detached to Cambodia, 210 to Laos and 346 to Vietnam despite the political situation. 38 young national servicemen were sent to Cambodia and 20 to Laos. In India, 44 French teachers are engaged in higher education.

The reduced number of French nationals residing in Morocco has led to a fall in the number of French teachers serving in France's missions in that country; assistance is being given with a view to enabling Moroccans to take over gradually, and this process may be carried out very swiftly, for large numbers of teachers are engaged in primary education. However, 8,303 French teachers were still in Morocco in 1964-1965.

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For similar reasons, French cultural activities are being reorganised in Tunisia, where the number of French nationals working in State education is 2,399.

Activities are being pursued in other parts of Africa (other than the African States and Madagascar) that are dealt with by the Ministry of Cooperation : in Guinea, 192 French teachers are engaged more particularly in higher and technical education, and in the senior grades of the secondary schools; 14 teachers are in the Congo-Leopoldville; 14 in Burundi and 20 in Ruanda, under the terms of cultural and technical cooperation agreements.

The English-speaking countries of Africa are showing an increasingly marked interest in the French language. French teachers have been detached, and audiovisual centres set up in Nigeria (16 teachers), Ghana (7), and this country is also asking for university teachers), Sierra Leone (4), Liberia (6), Uganda (7), Kenya (3), Tanzania (7), Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, Sudan (7) and Libya (6).

Finally, in Ethiopia, where the French language ranks as a "main subject", 70 French nationals are teaching at present, and their number is due to increase from year to year.

Respectively, 16 and 83 of the 43 French Institutes and 100 Cultural Centres are situated in the developing countries. The same applies to 13 of the 14 Research Institutes specialising in archeology or linguistic studies.

Refresher courses have been organised, both locally and in France, for foreign teachers of French.

Out of 38,000 foreign students pursuing their studies in France in 1964, 2,500 came from Vietnam, 1,500 from Tunisia, 1,100 from Iran, 1,055 from Morocco, 300 from the Congo, 200 from Laos, etc. 2,193 were technical cooperation scholarship holders.

Over 3,300 experts

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent 3,020 experts to the developing countries, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 293.

Cultural and artistic exchanges, distributions of books and magazines, despatches of photographs and films for the cinema or television, and subsidies for French language courses on the O.R.T.F. (French Radio and Television Organisation), complete the cultural activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Two specialised organisations : A.S.T.E.F. and A.S.M.I.C.

In order to promote cooperation with industry, whose help is indispensable to technical cooperation, the two Ministries have formed two organisations, the "Association pour l'organisation des stages de techniciens étrangers en France" (Association for the Organisation of Foreign Technicians' Courses in France, or A.S.T.E.F.) and the "Association pour l'organisation des Missions de coopération technique" (Association for the Organisation of Technical Cooperation Missions, or A.S.M.I.C.).

The A.S.T.E.F. was founded in 1958 by the two Ministries and 11 major French nationalised or private industrial companies. Today it has more than 50 members, and over 400 companies and organisations collaborate with it.

The A.S.T.E.F.'s trainees are not students, but qualified persons who have already held responsible positions in their own countries.

The A.S.T.E.F.'s financial needs are met by the two Ministries and by the subscriptions of member companies.

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TRAINEES RECEIVED BY THE A.S.T.E.F.				
Originating from			1964	1958 to 31 December 1964
AMERICA			730	3,345
including:				
Argentina	...	...	134	
Brazil	...	...	176	
Mexico	...	...	64	
Peru	...	...	53	
EUROPE			784	2,870
including:				
Spain	...	...	153	
Greece	...	...	115	
Turkey	...	...	154	
Jugoslavia	...	...	128	
Poland	...	...	76	
FAR-EAST			445	1,910
including:				
India	...	...	138	
Japan	...	...	83	
MIDDLE-EAST			356	1,425
including:				
Iran	...	...	204	510
AFRICA			180	
including:				
Congo	...	...	29	
Tunisia	...	...	31	
Ethiopia	...	...	16	
			2,495 (1)	10,060

(1) 303 of these were either "Third Training Programme" scholarship holders of the American Government in Europe, or holders of scholarships given by international organisations.

It grants scholarships for study or refresher courses, receives and houses trainees in its Centre at Cachan, organises both individual and group courses and remains in close touch with past trainees.

The demand for its services continues to be high in the Latin American countries, and is growing in Mediterranean Europe (Spain and Greece) and Eastern Europe.

The number of trainees received by the A.S.T.E.F. has more than doubled in three years, rising from 1,083 in 1961 to 2,495 (from 88 countries) in 1964; the maximum number will probably be 5,000 per year, according to the host companies' ability to receive them.

The A.S.M.I.C. was founded in 1961 and is financed, like the A.S.T.E.F., by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs, and by the subscriptions of 12 nationalised or private member companies.

The A.S.M.I.C.'s methods regarding expert missions are highly perfected. It is responsible for all the practical problems involved in sending out these missions, for preparing the experts, for implementing the results of their assignments, and for the attendant information and publicity work.

Experts are recruited from the Civil Service, consultant firms and private or nationalised companies. The professional training missions work in about forty Centres, specialising chiefly in electricity and mechanical engineering, but also in such varied activities as building, maintenance of agricultural machinery and fisheries. A great number of these Centres already exist in Latin America, and the number is growing in the Middle- and Far-East. In Eastern Europe, there are as yet very few outside Jugoslavia.

The consultant missions usually consist of a single expert seconded to an official or semi-official organisation. Their assignments range from establishing specifications for projects

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Textiles (I.R.C.)

or invitations for international tenders, to carrying out expertises for irrigation schemes, for instance (Peru).

For its study missions, the A.S.M.I.C. makes use of consultant firms. The organisations requesting this service in the developing countries are always required to contribute to its cost.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of assignments carried out each year, for some last only a few weeks while others take several years to complete. In 1964, the A.S.M.I.C. sent 319 experts to 49 countries on missions concerned with 17 different fields of activity.

In the final analysis, the A.S.T.E.F. and A.S.M.I.C. are tending to become "consultant engineers" for the organisation of technical cooperation.

(4) RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND SPECIALISED ORGANISATIONS

France has concluded aid and cooperation agreements for scientific research with the African States and Madagascar, designed to grant aid by means of ten of the major research organisations, which employ approximately 650 research workers.

Under the joint control of the Ministries of National Education and Cooperation, the F.A.C. is giving financial support to the Overseas Scientific and Technical Research Bureau (O.R.S.T.O.M. Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer), which specialises in fundamental research.

The Fund also assists two public Institutes, the Technical Centre for Tropical Forestry (C.T.F.T.) and the Institute for Breeding and Veterinary Medicine in the Tropical Countries (I.E.M.V.T.), and subsidises six private Institutes: the Institute for Tropical Agronomical Research and Food Producing Crops (I.R.A.T.), the Research Institute for Oils and Oleaginous Products (I.R.H.O.), the Research Institute for Cotton and Exotic Textiles (I.R.C.T.), the French Institute for Coffee, Cocoa and

Total F.A.C. contributions in this field amount to 65 million francs.

These institutes do not limit themselves to the African States and Madagascar, but are also active in the overseas departments and territories and other tropical countries.

In order to improve the conditions in which technical projects are carried out, the Ministry of Cooperation and other ministries have developed the activity of twelve official or semi-official specialised bodies, such as : the Agricultural Development Bureau (B.D.P.A.), the Geological and Mining Research Bureau (B.R.G.M.), the Central Study Bureau for Overseas Equipment (B.C.E.O.M.), the Office for Cooperation in Broadcasting (O.C.O.R.A.), the Overseas Posts and Telecommunications Study Bureau (B.E.P.T.O.M.), the Central Office for Overseas Railways (O.F.E.R.O.M.), etc.

(See facing table showing total strength of technical assistance staff for the year 1965).

TOTAL STRENGTH OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STAFF FOR THE YEAR 1965 (1)									
Sectors of activity and categories of staff	French-speaking Black Africa & Madagascar	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Cambodia	Laos, Vietnam	Other countries	Total	
1. TEACHING									
Primary ...	2,112	6,541	2,765	812	-	-	-	12,358	
Secondary ...	1,933	1,657	1,913	1,381	368	195	83	7,653	
Higher education ...	465	242	79	70	16	-	45	1,679	
Various (administrative etc.)	623	1,314	327	138	4	6	9	1,668	
Totals	5,133	9,754	5,082	2,401	328	201	92	23,358	
2. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION	871	601	376	17	14	11	3	1,950	
3. ECONOMY AND FINANCE	446	279	272	24	3	3	-	1,051	
4. HEALTH ...	1,020	733	434	122	16	9	45	2,472	
5. AGRICULTURE, CATTLE BREEDING AND RURAL ENGINEERING ...	597	274	298	56	27	-	12	1,370	
6. POWER ...	71	257	-	-	-	-	-	328	
7. BUILDING, PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS	1,399	1,165	636	62	31	11	6	3,319	
8. MILITARY STAFF ...	1,674	303	753	-	344	339	-	3,431	
9. MISCELLANEOUS ...	256	10	73	8	2	-	9	408	
10. NATIONAL SERVICE MEN	1,061	957	37	7	5	-	3	2,118	
General Totals	12,558	14,333	7,961	2,697	770	575	445	39,803	

(1) Taken from the 1966 Finance Law

NOTE :

Page 39 - TOTAL STRENGTH OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STAFF FOR THE YEAR 1965

These figures are estimates for the year 1965/1966.

III MULTILATERAL AID FROM FRENCH GOVERNMENT SOURCES

Multilateral aid, given in the framework of international organisations, involves a vast number of assisting and assisted parties who have no special connection with each other. The organisations are financed by contributions calculated in relation to the participants' national revenue, be they industrialised States or developing States. Responsibility for France's multilateral cooperation rests with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The worldwide scope of the international organisations' activities makes it difficult to assess the extent of the share received by the developing countries.

In the United Nations, the framework of technical cooperation is provided by the Enlarged Technical Assistance Programme, founded in 1949, which groups the specialised agencies of U.N.O. (see table). About 71% of the Programme's resources are set aside for the services of international experts, 18% for scholarships and 11% for supplies of equipment.

To these organisations should be added the United Nations Special Fund, which exists to speed up economic development in underdeveloped countries, the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) which assists economic development and its affiliated organisations: the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.) and the International Development Association (I.D.A.), the United Nations Regional Commissions, etc.

The Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (O.E.C.D.), which groups 19 States (plus Yugoslavia which participates in the technical cooperation programme) is also included among the world institutions.

FRENCH TECHNICAL COOPERATION

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Organisation
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International
Organisation f
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FRENCH TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
	Experts & consultants on mission assignments	Scholarship holders & trainees in France
United Nations Organisation	254	84
International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.)	184	120
United Nations Food & Agricultural Organisation (F.A.O.)	148	31
United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)	306	211
World Health Organisation (WHO)	89	187
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)	14	13
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)	18	40
Universal Postal Union (UPU)	6	15
Civil Aviation Organisation (CAO)	23	7
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	12	24
Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (O.E.C.D.)	81	158
Miscellaneous, including the United Nations Children's Fund (U.N.I.C.E.F.)	13	65
Total in 1964	1,148	955

FRENCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (1)						1962	1963	1964
United Nations Enlarged Technical Assistance Programme	...	...	...	...	...	1.9	1.9	1.9
United Nations Special Fund	...	...	...	...	...	1.1	1.1	1.2
I.B.R.D.	...	...	...	...	...	24.3	11.1	-
I.D.A.	...	...	...	...	...	10.2	10.2	10.2
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	...	...	2.5	3.6	3.3
Total	...	...	...	...	...	40.0	27.9	16.6
(1) In millions of dollars								

Reduction of French financial participation

In 1964, French contributions to the international organisations represented 2% of the country's total public aid; it amounted to 71.3 million francs, compared with 137 million in 1963. This reduction is caused by the completion since 1963 of the French subscription to the capital of the I.B.R.D. The figure rose again in 1965, when the French contribution to the I.D.A. was doubled and participation in the United Nations' technical assistance organisations was increased.

1,148 French experts engaged in international technical cooperation

The number of French experts at the disposal of the international organisations rose from 962 in 1963 to 1,148 in 1964. Most of them were sent to Africa (696) and Latin America (113). The Training Centre for international technical cooperation experts has trained 650 experts to the highest level between 1957 and 1964.

These organisations have sent 1,153 scholarship holders to France : 557 from Africa, 351 from Europe and 70 from Latin America.

In 1957, Rome instituting that the overseas dependent upon the Community. The sovereignty of the European Dev cooperation betw

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IV REGIONAL AID AND THE COMMON MARKET

In 1957, when the six European States signed the Treaty of Rome instituting the Common Market, France upheld the principle that the overseas territories, which at that time were still dependent upon her, should be associated with the European Economic Community. These territories, and those that were under the sovereignty of other member States, thus became beneficiaries of the European Development Fund (F.E.D.), which is the instrument of cooperation between themselves and the Six.

French contribution to the first F.E.D. :
980 million francs

During its first five-year period (1958-1962), total endowments to the F.E.D. amounted to 581 million dollars (unit of account), of which France contributed 200 million dollars (980 million francs). The Fund is designed to supplement, not to replace, existing bilateral arrangements for aid.

With a certain time-lag, the first F.E.D. has now allocated almost the whole of its endowment to 384 projects, but the orders actually placed so far total only 370 million dollars. 27% of the first F.E.D.'s expenditure was devoted to social projects, the remainder to economic ones.

As far as technical cooperation is concerned, the E.E.C. Commission has financed from its budget 1,400 scholarships at all levels (intermediary, higher, technical) for the associated countries' citizens. 65 African and Malagasy nationals have undergone long training courses in its own services, and 5,000 have taken part in seminars or study weeks organised by the Common Market.

The number of French experts put at the disposal of the E.E.C. is estimated at 200.

At 31st December 1962, the renewal date of the F.E.D., 18 African and Malagasy territories had become independent States (*); they confirmed freely and in full sovereignty their adherence to the E.E.C. as associated States by signing a new Convention at Yaoundé on 20th July 1963.

French contribution to the second F.E.D. :
1,200 million francs

The funds available to the second F.E.D. total 800 million dollars (\$730 million in grants, and \$70 million in loans by the European Investment Bank). France contributed 1,200 million francs, or about one-third of the F.E.D.'s funds.

The 800 million dollars provided under the terms of the new Convention will be drawn upon only as the need arises. This explains why France made no contribution to the F.E.D. in 1964. The French contribution in 1965 was 100 million francs.

One of the effects of the new Convention will be an alteration of the distribution of the F.E.D.'s activities : economic and social investments in the form of gifts and loans; preparatory technical assistance, simultaneously with and following investment; studies on the economies' prospects of development; dispatch, at the request of the associated States, of experts, consultants, technicians and instructors on specific missions; training programmes for supervisory and management grades and professional training; aid for agricultural, industrial and commercial production and diversification, etc.

The activities of the F.A.C. and F.E.D. are coordinated, and the two bodies sometimes act jointly over important projects.

In the framework of O.E.C.D., France participates in a Consortium for aid to Turkey (French contribution : 34.6 million dollars for the years 1963 and 1964), and in another for aid to India and Pakistan (French contribution : 20 million dollars for India, 10 million for Pakistan in 1964).

(*) Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) Congo (Leopoldville), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Ruanda, Senegal, Somalia, Tchad and Togo.

The private sector, the public sector's, and technical cooperation in these States brings

Although private return, they are nonetheless development : they pay living, and taxes which ever a large company es grow up around it for s Finally, private enterprise ability and initiative, be instructors, bring w

It is not easy to involve, but in 1964 a answer to this problem.

Increase of French

This capital comes from the savings, and of credit granted under the COFACE credit involved were significant

According to the sector's total long-term francs in 1962 to over

V AID FROM PRIVATE SOURCES

The private sector's aid to the developing countries, like the public sector's, takes the two forms of financial assistance and technical cooperation. Any private firm establishing itself in these States brings with it its capital and technical know-how.

Although private investments are always required to show a return, they are nonetheless an important factor of economic development : they pay wages which help to raise standards of living, and taxes which swell the States' budgets. Also, whenever a large company establishes itself in an area, smaller firms grow up around it for such purposes as maintenance and conversion. Finally, private enterprise sets an enduring example in organising ability and initiative, and its experts, who must also necessarily be instructors, bring with them modern techniques.

It is not easy to evaluate the amount of private capital involved, but in 1964 a new method of assessment produced a partial answer to this problem.

Increase of French private investments

This capital consists of private investments and reinvestments, and of credit granted by French exporters to their clients under the COFACE credit guarantee scheme. In 1964, the amounts involved were significantly larger than in previous years.

According to the C.A.D.'s assessment, the French private sector's total long-term operations have risen from 1,368 million francs in 1962 to over 1,700 million in 1964.

The increasing rôle of COFACE

During the same period, the amount of credit for exports guaranteed by COFACE rose from 541 million francs to 821 million(*).

According to the C.A.D., investments increased chiefly in countries outside the franc area and, inside it, in the French overseas territories.

The growth of guaranteed credit is mainly due to contracts comprising terms of payment which provide for settlement more than five years after delivery (prolonged medium-term).

There has been a recovery of credit guarantees granted for exports to the Middle-Eastern countries, and the number of contracts concluded with Mexico, the Latin American countries, Southern Asia and, to a lesser extent, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco has increased.

In order to encourage the investment of capital, French industrial leaders have many times asked for an investment guarantee, such as is enjoyed by competitors in Germany, America and Japan. This question has been studied at national level by the C.N.P.F. (National Committee of French Employers), and at international level by the European organisations and the I.B.R.D., but no solution has yet been found.

Most of the Governments of the developing countries, for their part, aware of their need for capital, have issued investment codes, but only confidence that capital and profits can be repatriated and that normal working conditions can be ensured will attract investments to these States. This necessitates permanent negotiations between private investors and the representatives of the developing countries.

(*) Credit over periods of 1 to 5 years and over more than 5 years.

Training

A similar sector to continue personnel in the t

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Training efforts

A similar collaboration is required to enable the private sector to continue and develop the training of responsible personnel in the technical and economic spheres.

The private sector's technical cooperation takes the form of training within the companies and in specialised centres locally, and of studies and company courses in France. These activities have developed to a very considerable extent - in 1964, for instance, one Federation of French industries received in France 6,000 students, who attended lectures given by 400 teachers.

Furthermore, as has already been seen, industry collaborates closely with the A.S.T.E.F., the A.S.M.I.C. and the Research Institutes.

Taken as a whole, the efforts of French industry, pursued at great expense, represent an important contribution to training in the developing countries.

1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100	2101	2102	2103	2104	2105	2106	2107	2108	2109	2110	2111	2112	2113	2114	2115	2116	2117	2118	2119	2120	2121	2122	2123	2124	2125	2126	2127	2128	2129	2130	2131	2132	2133	2134	2135	2136	2137	2138	2139	2140	2141	2142	2143	2144	2145	2146	2147	2148	2149	2150	2151	2152	2153	2154	2155	2156	2157	2158	2159	2160	2161	2162	2163	2164	2165	2166	2167	2168	2169	2170	2171	2172	2173	2174	2175	2176	2177	2178	2179	2180	2181	2182	2183	2184	2185	2186	2187	2188	2189	2190	2191	2192	2193	2194	2195	2196	2197	2198	2199	2200	2201	2202	2203	2204	2205	2206	2207	2208	2209	2210	2211	2212	2213	2214	2215	2216	2217	2218	2219	2220	2221	2222	2223	2224	2225	2226	2227	2228	2229	2230	2231	2232	2233	2234	2235	2236	2237	2238	2239	2240	2241	2242	2243	2244	2245	2246	2247	2248	2249	2250	2251	2252	2253	2254	2255	2256	2257	2258	2259	2260	2261	2262	2263	2264	2265	2266	2267	2268	2269	2270	2271	2272	2273	2274	2275	2276	2277	2278	2279	2280	2281	2282	2283	2284	2285	2286	2287	2288	2289	2290	2291	2292	2293	2294	2295	2296	2297	2298	2299	2300	2301	2302	2303	2304	2305	2306	2307	2308	2309	2310	2311	2312	2313	2314	2315	2316	2317	2318	2319	2320	2321	2322	2323	2324	2325	2326	2327	2328	2329	2330	2331	2332	2333	2334	2335	2336	2337	2338	2339	2340	2341	2342	2343	2344	2345	2346	2347	2348	2349	2350	2351	2352	2353	2354	2355	2356	2357	2358	2359	2360	2361	2362	2363	2364	2365	2366	2367	2368	2369	2370	2371	2372	2373	2374	2375	2376	2377	2378	2379	2380	2381	2382	2383	2384	2385	2386	2387	2388	2389	2390	2391	2392	2393	2394	2395	2396	2397	2398	2399	2400	2401	2402	2403	2404	2405	2406	2407	2408	2409	2410	2411	2412	2413	2414	2415	2416	2417	2418	2419	2420	2421	2422	2423	2424	2425	2426	2427	2428	2429	2430	2431	2432	2433	2434	2435	2436	2437	2438	2439	2440	2441	2442	2443	2444	2445	2446	2447	2448	2449	2450	2451	2452	2453	2454	2455	2456	2457	2458	2459	2460	2461	2462	2463	2464	2465	2466	2467	2468	2469	2470	2471	2472	2473	2474	2475	2476	2477	2478	2479	2480	2481	2482	2483	2484	2485	2486	2487	2488	2489	2490	2491	2492	2493	2494	2495	2496	2497	2498	2499	2500	2501	2502	2503	2504	2505	2506	2507	2508	2509	2510	2511	2512	2513	2514	2515	2516	2517	2518	2519	2520	2521	2522	2523	2524	2525	2526	2527	2528	2529	2530	2531	2532	2533	2534	2535	2536	2537	2538	2539	2540	2541	2542	2543	2544	2545	2546	2547	2548	2549	2550	2551	2552	2553	2554	2555	2556	2557	2558	2559	2560	2561	2562	2563	2564	2565	2566	2567	2568	2569	2570	2571	2572	2573	2574	2575	2576	2577	2578	2579	2580	2581	2582	2583	2584	2585	2586	2587	2588	2589	2590	2591	2592	2593	2594	2595	2596	2597	2598	2599	2600	2601	2602	2603	2604	2605	2606	2607	2608	2609	2610	2611	2612	2613	2614	2615	2616	2617	2618	2619	2620	2621	2622	2623	2624	2625	2626	2627	2628	2629	2630	2631	2632	2633	2634	2635	2636	2637	2638	2639	2640	2641	2642	2643	2644	2645	2646	2647	2648	2649	2650	2651	2652	2653	2654	2655	2656	2657	2658	2659	2660	2661	2662	2663	2664	2665	2666	2667	2668	2669	2670	2671	2672	2673	2674	2675	2676	2677	2678	2679	2680	2681	2682	2683	2684	2685	2686	2687	2688	2689	2690	2691	2692	2693	2694	2695	2696	2697	2698	2699	2700	2701	2702	2703	2704	2705	2706	2707	2708	2709	2710	2711	2712	2713	2714	2715	2716	2717	2718	2719	2720	2721	2722	2723	2724	2725	2726	2727	2728	2729	2730	2731	2732	2733	2734	2735	2736	2737	2738	2739	2740	2741	2742	2743	2744	2745	2746	2747	2748	2749	2750	2751	2752	2753	2754	2755	2756	2757	2758	2759	2760	2761	2762	2763	2764	2765	2766	2767	2768	2769	2770	2771	2772	2773	2774	2775	2776	2777	2778	2779	2780	2781	2782	2783	2784	2785	2786	2787	2788	2789	2790	2791	2792	2793	2794	2795	2796	2797	2798	2799	2800	2801	2802	2803	2804	2805	2806	2807	2808	2809	2810	2811	2812	2813	2814	2815	2816	2817	2818	2819	2820	2821	2822	2823	2824	2825	2826	2827	2828	2829	2830	2831	2832	2833	2834	2835	2836	2837	2838	2839	2840	2841	2842	2843	2844	2845	2846	2847	2848	2849	2850	2851	2852	2853	2854	2855	2856	2857	2858	2859	2860	2861	2862	2863	2864	2865	2866	2867	2868	2869	2870	2871	2872	2873	2874	2875	2876	2877	2878	2879	2880	2881	2882	2883	2884	2885	2886	2887	2888	2889	2890	2891	2892	2893	2894	2895	2896	2897	2898	2899	2900	2901	2902	2903	2904	2905	2906	2907	2908	2909	2910	2911	2912	2913	2914	2915	2916	2917	2918	2919	2920	2921	2922	2923	2924	2925	2926	2927	2928	2929	2930	2931	2932	2933	2934	2935	2936	2937	2938	2939	2940	2941	2942	2943	2944	2945	2946	2947	2948	2949	2950	2951	2952	2953	2954	2955	2956	2957	2958	2959	2960	2961	2962	2963	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VI THE FRENCH POSITION IN THE WORLD STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT

LONG-TERM PUBLIC FINANCIAL AID GRANTED BY THE C.A.D. COUNTRIES (1)									
					1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
PUBLIC SECTOR									
Federal Germany	...	...	...	...	324	589	427	422	460
Austria	...	...	...	...	-	2	9	4	13
Belgium	...	...	...	...	101	92	80	91	80
Canada	...	...	...	...	75	62	54	98	129
Denmark	...	...	...	...	6	7	7	10	11
United States	...	...	...	...	2,850	3,535	3,713	3,842	3,534
France	...	...	...	...	842	943	977	843	841
Great Britain	...	...	...	...	406	458	418	414	491
Italy	...	...	...	...	75	66	67	64	56
Japan	...	...	...	...	125	214	165	172	178
Norway	...	...	...	...	10	9	7	21	17
Netherlands	...	...	...	...	47	69	91	38	49
Portugal	...	...	...	...	37	30	37	47	63
TOTAL FOR C.A.D. COUNTRIES					4,898	6,076	6,052	6,065	5,921
including:									
bilateral	...	...	...	...	4,242	5,264	5,388	5,681	5,554
multilateral	...	...	...	...	655	812	664	384	367
PRIVATE SECTOR					2,513	2,658	2,088	1,949	2,734
including:									
direct investments and loans					2,420	2,437	1,820	1,722	2,344
commercial credits over more									
than 5 years	...	...	...	...	93	221	268	227	390
TOTAL FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR					7,410	8,734	8,140	8,011	8,655

(1) In millions of dollars

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French aid to the developing countries is contributing to a considerable extent to raising the standards of living of millions of human beings. The value of French technicians and experience is generally recognised, and, in the international organisations, French is spoken almost as much as English, and a great deal more than other languages.

The C.A.D.'s report shows that France's financial aid is second only to that of the United States in absolute values, and second to none in relation to the country's income. Where technical cooperation is concerned, the number of experts and volunteers serving in different parts of the world under the aegis of the French Government is three times greater than that of the United States and four times greater than that of Great Britain. Students and trainees on French Government scholarships are more numerous than those on American Government scholarships.

This effort has the support of the country as a whole, as is evidenced by the fact that the budget of Cooperation was approved unanimously in Parliament. This support is confirmed by all public opinion polls and, among the younger generation, by their increasing readiness to serve in cooperation schemes.

Speaking of aid to the developing countries, the Prime Minister, M. Pompidou, once said : "If there is a subject on which men aware of France's duties should agree, it is this one. There is no doubt that France's prosperity, world relationships and future depend largely on cooperation".

TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (by country giving the assistance) (1)										
	Financial contributions (in millions of \$)				Number of persons					
	Bilateral expenditure		Multilateral expenditure		Teachers and experts		Trainees and scholarship holders			
	1963	1964	1963	1964	1963	1964	1963	1964		
Austria	0.69	1.64	0.50	0.76	21	32	118	100		
Belgium	23.62	27.70	2.25	1.29	2,660	3,277	2,134	2,495		
Canada	5.85	8.26	2.82	6.81	242	409	970	1,118		
Denmark	1.20	2.10	3.19	4.10	39	139	112	229		
France	298	328	4.39	2.97	51,197	44,194	11,567	11,392		
Federal Germany	63.50	79.67	8	7.94	928	1,357	8,549	7,610		
Italy	5.21	10.07	4.50	-	275	1,939	1,965	1,686		
Japan	4.50	5.84	2.43	2.80	264	311	602	761		
Netherlands	1.73	3.40	5.64	5.60	105	216	202	274		
Norway	0.74	0.93	3.78	4.06	73	124	86	100		
Portugal	8.78	7.42	0.02	0.04	981	1,056	1,013	-		
Great Britain	67.68	69.92	10	10	13,548	12,689	3,918	5,350		
United States	368	377	28.61	56	11,512	14,242	10,692	10,998		
TOTAL	849.50	922.15	76.13	102.37	81,895	79,985	41,928	43,196		

(1) Taken from the C.A.D. report.

(1) Taken from the C.A.D. report

The fol
issued by the
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No. A/1
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No. B/4	Defence and the Armed Forces
No. A/4	French Industrial Expansion : Facts and Figures (out of print). See A/33/12/5
No. B/5	The National Assembly
No. A/5	Trade Unionism in France
No. A/6	The Future of the Paris Region
No. B/6	French Trade Unions : A Short History and an Assessment
No. A/7	The French Budget and Finance Act for 1963
No. B/7	Some Aspects of Scientific Research in France
No. B/8	The Population of France
No. A/8	French Agriculture
No. A/9	French Health Services
No. A/10	The Technical Education and Vocational Training of the Young in France
No. A/11	"Social Promotion" : The Technical and Vocational Training of Adults in France
No. A/12	Electricité de France (The French National Electricity Company)
No. A/13	Social Welfare Work in France
No. B/9	The Development of the Rhône Valley
No. A/14	French Air Transport
No. B/10	France's Expenditure on Research and Development
No. A/15	French Cooperation with Developing Countries
No. A/16	The S.N.C.F. and the French Railways
No. B/11	France's Economy in 1963
No. A/17	The Problems of Higher Education in France
No. A/18	A Survey of Political and Economic Affairs in France, 1959-1964
No. B/12	The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development : Statement of French Policy
No. B/13	French Foreign Policy : Statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly, 28th April 1964
No. A/19	The State and Education in France

No. A/20 The Tidal Power Station of the Rance
No. B/14 Press Conference held by General de Gaulle
in Paris on 23rd July 1964
No. A/21/10/4 French Administrative Reform
No. A/22/11/4 The French Press
No. A/23/11/4 French Foreign Policy : Statement made by the
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Assembly, 3rd November 1964
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of Women in France
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Organisation
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No. B/17/3/5 The Young in France : A Survey of their
Spending Habits
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No. A/28/5/5 The French Judicial System
No. B/18/5/5 Foreign Workers in France
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Minister of Foreign Affairs in the National
Assembly, 16th June 1965
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A/34/1/6.

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT

CRS A1536/2, Item no. 25/1/1 P 8
is OPEN WITH EXCEPTION / ~~CLOSED~~ * for the reasons set out below.

* delete whichever is inapplicable

~~The item described above~~ ^{films 100,191 - 198} contains information that has been exempted under sub-section 33(1)(a) & (b) of the *Archives Act* 1983.

Facts on which the decision is based:

The documents contain information communicated to or shared with the Australian Government by a foreign government. It is possible that information in this file, if disclosed, could cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Reasons for the decision:

Section 33(1)(a) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.

International relations are dependent upon an appropriate flow of information in confidence between one country and another. If disclosure of information were to lessen the confidence of another country in the Australian Government, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations.

Section 33(1)(b) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organization to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth, being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence.

Decision maker	:	Jay
Designation	:	AS 5
Date	:	5/3/02

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Folio/s numbered 100, 191-192, 193-195
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Series/Accession No.: A1838/2 Item No.: 25/1/1 Pt 8

Document description: France Foreign Policy - General

Reason for removal: s33(1)(a) & b

A ~~copy~~/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s 100

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PT. NO. 8

FILE CLOSED

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SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE

4859/63

De Gaulle cold to West in new outbursts

PARIS, Friday.—President de Gaulle last night defined France's aims as "progress, independence and peace founded on freedom of action outside the two major world powers."

The President, in a 20-minute national television speech, attacked critics of his Administration as "apostles of decline."

His speech came amid signs of widespread discontent over his latest domestic and foreign policy moves.

He declared that by following an independent line and backed by an effective nuclear deterrent France would no longer automatically be a battlefield for the expeditionary forces of the two world giants in the event of a conflict between them.

"By quitting the system of the blocs, France has perhaps given the signal for a general evolution towards international détente," he said.

President de Gaulle said that without renouncing her friendship for the Anglo-Saxon nations, France had been able to adopt a strictly French position on a series of international issues.

This was the case, he said, for the Vietnam war, the Middle East conflict, the construction of a European Europe, the disruption that the admission of Britain and four or five other countries would cause for the Community of the Six, relations with the East, the international monetary question; and — as recently as yesterday — the unanimous and indisputable will to emancipation which the French Canadians have shown around the President of the French Republic.

The fact that France could do all this had stupefied and outraged the apostles of decline, he said.

President de Gaulle said it was in the interests of a lasting peace that France had ended the fighting in Algeria and established fraternal relations with the former African colonies.

"That is why, not with-

"That is why, even if the immediate advantage may not be very apparent, we have objectively made contact with Peking."

"That is why, however strong the prejudices, we condemn on the part of any state any unilateral intervention into the territory of others, just as has occurred in South-East Asia and in the Middle East, because nowadays a fire is detectable from its beginning and once started it threatens to spread far afield."

"This was also why France had equipped herself with a deterrent force of such a kind that no country in the world would wish to strike ours without knowing that, if it did, it would suffer terrible damages."

President de Gaulle said that a foreign policy and armed forces were not enough on their own. They must be accompanied by modern development.

In this field of national progress, the President cited the strengthening of the European Common Market, the stabilising of the French franc, education reforms, aid to agriculture, scientific research and technological achievements.

He also mentioned briefly in this category the two new social measures approved by the Government yesterday: a reform of the social security system and a profit-sharing scheme (A.A.P.-Reuter).

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President de Gaulle said it was in the interests of a lasting peace that France had ended the fighting in Algeria and established fraternal relations with her former African territories.

"That is why, not without merit, we relegate to history our conflicts with Germany and now engage in friendly co-operation with her," he said.

"That is why, however powerful America's attraction over Europeans, we are working to see that the community of The Six shall become, in its own right, a political reality and therefore an essential element in the peaceful equilibrium of the world.

"That is why, despite preconceived ideas and pre-established tendencies, we are replacing yesterday's dangerous tension with Eastern Europe by cordial and fruitful relations.

"That is why, even if the immediate advantage may not be very apparent, we have objectively made contact with Peking.

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

FRANCE
21 March, 1967
Section 1

THE FUTURE OF THE FRANC ZONE

Sir Patrick Reilly to Mr. Brown. (Received 21 March)

SUMMARY

France need not at present make fundamental changes in the Franc Zone system, and will seek to maintain her special economic ties with the Franc Zone States South of the Sahara. But the system of joint management of their monetary affairs may eventually become unacceptable. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

The Franc Zone is evolving rapidly. The metropolitan franc having been made convertible France has recommended to the States South of the Sahara that they follow suit and dismantle their exchange controls. All but the Congo (Brazzaville) are likely to do so. They had to be reassured that this would not involve loss of control of their commercial policies. (Paragraphs 4-7.)

Changes in the technical arrangements. The "operation accounts" will continue, but France has proposed the abolition of the "drawing rights accounts". (Paragraphs 8-10.)

France's exclusive preferential position has been largely eroded, but she retains other effective advantages. France is less well placed than heretofore to urge the Franc Zone countries not to import from outside the Zone (or the Six) when it is in their interest to do so. Problems of United Kingdom access to the Franc Zone Markets in a negotiation for admission to the EEC should be less difficult than they were. (Paragraphs 11-13.)

The changes in the Franc Zone exchange control arrangements now proposed involve a gamble; but no serious risks are foreseen. (Paragraphs 14-16.)

The Franc Zone has moved a long way in the direction of liberalisation. The French have been careful to move with the tide, so as to retain the substance of their favoured position, and in particular the advantages of joint management. The economic education of the African States will be stimulated by the changes now proposed; this would facilitate the withdrawal of one or more of them if the need should arise. (Paragraphs 17-18.)

(No. 14 E. Confidential) Paris,
Sir, 16 March, 1967.

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Tahourdin's despatch from Dakar, No. 1 of the 13th of February, in which he offered some observations on developments in the Franc Zone and on the possibility that the monetary arrangements under which France guarantees the convertibility of the CFA franc might eventually be modified. Mr. Tahourdin's conclusion was that although a point could be reached

at which the continuance of the Franc Zone in its present form would not be to French advantage, France need not make fundamental changes in the system so long as the metropolitan franc remained strong and the intrusion of other countries into the markets of the countries of the Franc Zone can be retarded.

2. I agree with this conclusion, but would go further. The continuance of her special links with the countries of the Franc Zone is important to France not

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merely because of the economic advantages which it brings her, but for political reasons and for reasons of prestige. I think therefore that France will seek to maintain these links broadly in their present form as long as the system remains workable. To this end she is I think following a policy of acquiescence in the evolution of the formal arrangements of the Franc Zone proper, by which I mean Africa South of the Sahara—her relations with the North African States of the Franc Zone are already on a quite different footing—in order to preserve the substance of the economic and political advantages which the system brings her. The French guarantee of the convertibility of the CFA franc, carrying with it the need, as a safeguard for France, for a substantial measure of joint management of the monetary and credit policies of the member states, is the keystone of these arrangements. This joint management is the essential point which in future the French wish to maintain. The preferential arrangements in France's favour which were once the most conspicuous feature of the Franc Zone system are being rapidly eroded. French officials attach less importance to them than they did. It seems to me, subject to the views of Her Majesty's representatives in the countries concerned, that the entrenched position of France in the markets of African countries South of the Sahara is now safeguarded not so much by formal preferential rights as by other advantages. I shall return to these later.

3. It is over joint management however that friction is most likely to arise. It implies a considerable derogation of sovereignty by the African States concerned. French officials are anxious not to offend national sensibilities and are acutely conscious that the time may come when joint management as it at present exists will no longer be acceptable; and if even two or three of the economically stronger members, whose balance of payments with the outside world is in regular surplus, were to revolt against joint management the convertibility guarantee could become too great a risk and the Franc Zone South of the Sahara as we now know it could break up. There might be left only a residue of client States whose economies France felt bound to support for historical reasons.

4. As Mr. Tahourdin points out the Franc Zone is evolving rapidly. Indeed

there has just been a revolutionary development. By making the metropolitan franc freely convertible France has put an end to the concept, already out of date, of the Franc Zone as a closed monetary system operating for the mutual benefit of France and the member States behind a wall of preferential tariffs, quotas and exchange controls. Francs are in general freely transferable within the Zone, and once in France can now be exchanged for foreign currency without restriction, not as hitherto only by banks, but by individuals. Short of a reinforcement of controls within the Zone which, as will be seen from what follows, France has no intention of suggesting, the exchange control barrier has been almost wholly swept away.

5. The Franc Zone arrangements do not require that the exchange controls of the members should be identical, but do require that they should be harmonised. At a meeting in Paris in the second half of February French officials explained to representatives of the 13 African member States South of the Sahara the consequences of the freeing of the franc, and urged them likewise to make their currencies convertible and to dismantle their systems of exchange control. They have done this partly because they are anxious that French banks should not have to exercise residual controls in order to comply with regulations of Franc Zone countries which are not in harmony with the French rules, but also because they believe that greater liberalisation is in the interest of the African member states. If the African States agree to do so the obligation on both banks and individuals to repatriate their foreign exchange earnings will lapse. Both banks and individuals will be able to hold foreign exchange abroad. An incidental consequence will be that the process called "ratissage" through which all available foreign exchange could be concentrated in the central accounts in Paris will no longer be possible. In fact it has not been insisted on for a considerable time.

6. It appears from what we have been told that these proposals caused some consternation, at least to the representatives of certain of the less advanced States. They were disposed to think that abandonment of their exchange controls would carry with it loss of control over their commercial policies. It was explained to

them that this was not to their obligations under the Convention and the they were told, retain action over quotas. I that it was some advantage exchange control measures to the reports, to which refers, that the lead delegation to the Franc talks had said that liberalise entirely her Franc Zone.

7. French officials of African States, with the of the Congo (Brazzaville) next few months follow perhaps retaining control done, only over such capital movements as foreign investment in the expect that the hesitations necessary to follow the neighbours, since foreign discouraged if controls earnings or the realisation are maintained.

8. The consequences workings of the Franc general move towards exchange controls are not surprisingly we are told to the agreement and the member States, the French Treasury at France, will be necessary however that the "open" (comptes d'opérations) which the three banks of the Zone conduct their exchange will continue to be used, but will be able to effect payments against their foreign exchange, only the debit) passing through account.

9. A further change in the which has been proposed is that the statistical "accounts" (comptes de détail) which have hitherto been maintained in Paris for individually showing its exchange position since the opened. The French propose a system should be worked the external transactions of will be recorded partly from

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them that this was not the case. Subject to their obligations under the Yaoundé Convention and the GATT they would, they were told, retain their freedom of action over quotas. I am inclined to think that it was some advance warning of these exchange control measures that gave rise to the reports, to which Mr. Tahourdin refers, that the leader of the French delegation to the Franco-Senegalese trade talks had said that France intended to liberalise entirely her conception of the Franc Zone.

7. French officials expect that all the African States, with the possible exception of the Congo (Brazzaville), will over the next few months follow France's example, perhaps retaining controls, as France has done, only over such things as outward capital movements and direct inward foreign investment in key industries. They expect that the hesitant ones will find it necessary to follow the example of their neighbours, since foreign investors will be discouraged if controls over the transfer of earnings or the realisation of investments are maintained.

8. The consequences for the technical workings of the Franc Zone system of a general move towards the removal of exchange controls are not yet clear. Rather surprisingly we are told that no amendments to the agreements between France and the member States, or those between the French Treasury and the Banks of France, will be necessary. I am told however that the "operation accounts" (comptes d'opérations) in Paris through which the three banks of issue of the Franc Zone conduct their external operations will continue to be used, but that the banks will be able to effect foreign exchange payments against their current receipts of foreign exchange, only the net surplus (or debit) passing through the operating account.

9. A further change in the present system which has been proposed by the French is that the statistical "drawing rights accounts" (comptes de droits de tirage) which have hitherto been maintained should be abolished. These are accounts maintained in Paris for each country individually showing its net foreign exchange position since the account was opened. The French propose instead that a system should be worked out whereby the external transactions of each country will be recorded partly from the workings

of the operation accounts and partly from the accounts of the banks in the individual countries. The statistics so collected would, I am told, be more comprehensive than those now available. They would for example show more clearly the amounts of unofficial holdings of francs by residents in the African countries, and give more comprehensive details of transactions between Franc Zone countries, as well as of foreign exchange transactions proper. This system would presumably be inspired by the new arrangements in France under which all foreign exchange transactions must be reported to the authorities. Not only France but the African countries would benefit from improved statistical information.

10. It is often believed that these "drawing rights accounts" imply some limitation on the right of the countries concerned to convert francs into foreign exchange. The French are however emphatic that it is not the case. It is they say an essential principle that each Franc Zone country can convert francs into foreign exchange on demand, without limit, and without explanation. Nevertheless some of the countries whose "drawing rights accounts" have shown a surplus feared that by the abolition of the accounts they would in some way be losing rights over foreign exchange that they had earned. The French had to exert themselves to persuade them that this was not so.

11. Meanwhile, since the Yaoundé Convention came into effect on the 1st of June, 1964, the formal preferential position of France in the markets of the Franc Zone countries have been largely eroded. Tariff discrimination as between the Six has already been abolished and most tariffs applicable to imports from the Six are being reduced by 15 per cent each year. Quotas for imports from Common Market countries other than France are to be abolished by the 1st of July, 1968, when they will enjoy the same position as France, imports from which have in general always been free from quota restrictions. Thereafter quota restrictions on imports from the Six will apply, on a non-discriminatory basis, only where an associated State deems them necessary for the development of its economy or to protect an infant industry. The African States I understand make considerable use of this safeguard, as they do of the right to impose fiscal duties from which their own infant industries are then

exempted, so that the duties have the effect of customs tariffs; but discrimination specifically in France's favour is rapidly disappearing as the benefits are extended to the rest of the Six.

12. This however does not mean that France has lost her competitive advantage over the other Common Market countries. Tradition, the language, the presence of French advisers and of French officials in the African Governments, the tying of French aid, the stronger local representation of French companies, and the considerable French export effort for example through the provision of advisory services through officially supported organisations of consultants, give France substantial continuing advantages. I suspect that they may already be more important to the maintenance of French exports than the dwindling relics of her exclusive preferential position.

13. The aspect of the Franc Zone system which has changed least is however that of greatest interest to the United Kingdom; the maintenance of tariff barriers and quotas against imports from the outside world. But even here I believe that the system is less restrictive, at least as regards its motivation from Paris, than is often believed. The import programmes of the African States are the subject of consultation with the French aid missions in the framework of the joint management of their monetary and economic policies, but the decisions rest, so French officials continually assure us, with the states themselves. This does not mean that French officials do not express their views. We know for example that they have urged on African States that it was not in their interest to import cheap textiles from Japan, which buys little from them. The converse, that the French urge on them the advantages of importing from countries which buy their produce, and hence from the EEC countries, and France in particular, is no doubt also true. But we also know that the French are anxious that remaining quotas, other than those established to protect infant industries, should be increased. The French say that it would not be appropriate for them to urge the increase of quotas intended to protect infant industries, though I believe they have in fact done so in the past. France thus has requests to make and is less well placed than she was to suggest to

the African countries that they should not import from third countries if it is in their interest to do so. Furthermore the specifically French systems of price support for the produce of African States are being phased out, and replaced, if at all, by more modest schemes operated by the EEC. Subject again to the views of Her Majesty's representatives in the countries concerned I am inclined to think that French advisers and negotiators now find it less politic to urge on the African States as a matter of course that they should import from France to the virtual exclusion of non-EEC countries; though I suspect that the views of the men on the spot may have progressed less far in a liberal direction than have those of the Ministries in Paris. Problems of United Kingdom access to Franc Zone markets in an eventual negotiation for admission to the Common Market should, if this view of French attitudes is justified be less difficult than they were.

14. The French admit that in relation to the Franc Zone their decision to make the franc convertible implies a gamble, though they deny that there is any real risk. With the freeing of the exchanges, the progressive disappearance of specifically French preferences, and the growing independence of their associates in matters of commercial policy there could arise an unrequited drain on French reserves. But if this were to happen, they say, it would not be through the traditional means of tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls that corrective action would be taken. It would be taken rather through the monetary and credit policies of the States concerned: and here the French will, so long as the system of joint management continues, have an effective voice, to which of course is added the influence that they can wield through their aid policy.

15. Crises of this kind are not however expected. The official holdings of the Franc Zone States South of the Sahara in Paris have been stable at the equivalent of about £100 million for a considerable time, and since the French have not thought it necessary to insist that all their reserves should be centralised in Paris this is not the total of their resources. There is a very long way to go before there is any risk of France having to draw on her own resources in order to meet their demands for foreign exchange.

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16. But France's special tie with her ex-dependent territories are already said, important to her or indeed mainly, in terms of advantages. They are one of the remaining examples of France's role, and at the same time a factor for French political influence in countries of the third world. In reasonably competent economic management in those countries, with some disappointments, France has placed to ensure, they will not throw a burden on the French payments. Further it may be expected that despite the loss of preferential advantages, the French aid, direct or channelled through the EEC, will continue to be supported by her exports and reverse flow to France.

17. If the above analysis of the Franc Zone's arrangements is correct, a long way in the direction of a new arrangement can be seen. It can no longer be called a Franc Zone and France's built-in dependence on increasingly dependent local arrangements than on the international exercise through joint management positions of confidence and authority held by French advisers. The French have, very wisely, moved with the tide of change among member States of the Franc Zone to keep a little ahead of it and seek to maintain formal built-in advantages, which since Yalta have in any case disappearing, the freedom of decision of the member States while at the same time remain the benefits that have flowed from the association with France.

18. Linguistic and cultural ties are the foundation of French influence in Africa, and these are not purely economic links. The French, an élite educated in France, have mainly to France for educational assistance, is a

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16. But France's special ties with these ex-dependent territories are, as I have already said, important to her not only, or indeed mainly, in terms of economic advantages. They are one of the principle remaining examples of France's civilising role, and at the same time a solid nucleus for French political influence with the countries of the third world. Given reasonably competent economic management in those countries, which, despite some disappointments, France is well placed to ensure, they will not collectively throw a burden on the French balance of payments. Further it may reasonably be expected that despite the erosion of her preferential advantages, the burden of French aid, direct or channelled through the EEC, will continue to be largely offset by her exports and reverse flows of funds to France.

17. If the above analysis is correct the Franc Zone's arrangements have progressed a long way in the direction of liberalisation. It can no longer be called a closed system, and France's built-in advantage is increasingly dependent less on formal arrangements than on the influence she can exercise through joint management and the positions of confidence and responsibility held by French advisers. As I see it the French have, very wisely, been careful to move with the tide of opinion in the member States of the Franc Zone, and even to keep a little ahead of it. Rather than seek to maintain formal built-in preferential advantages, which since Yaoundé are in any case disappearing, they are stressing the freedom of decision of their associates while at the same time reminding them of the benefits that have flowed and will continue to flow from their co-operative association with France.

18. Linguistic and cultural ties are the foundation of French influence in francophone Africa, and these are likely to outlast purely economic links. The existence of an *élite* educated in France, and looking mainly to France for cultural and educational assistance, is a solid basis for

continuing association. But the Franc Zone system is important too. Even if its more obvious economic advantages to France are considerably diluted, as in theory if not in practice they have been, it will remain in France's interest to preserve these special links. To ensure this the French are ready, without positively accelerating the process, to see the Zone evolve in the direction of greater liberalisation. In particular, in order to retain that discreet joint management of monetary and credit policy which is essential to a system whose key-stone is the monetary link, the French are I think being careful to do all they can not to offend feelings of national pride and to avoid any head-on collisions with their associates over their commercial policies. I suspect, though I cannot be sure, that French policy is to ensure that the institutional arrangements of the Franc Zone are such that the reasonable wishes of their associates can be accommodated without the need for drastic and perhaps difficult readjustments. The changes which France has proposed as a result of the decision to make the metropolitan franc convertible are a step in this direction. At the same time, and looking to a more distant future, a decision by the African States to make their own currencies convertible implies a substantial further step in their economic education, and will facilitate the withdrawal of one or more of them from the Franc Zone arrangements if the need should ever arise.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Abidjan, Bonn, Brussels, Dakar, The Hague, Lomé, Luxembourg, Rome, Tananarive, Washington, and Yaoundé; to the United Kingdom Delegation to the European Communities at Brussels, the United Kingdom Delegation to the OECD; and to the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Export Credits Guarantee Department and to the Bank of England.

I have, &c.

D. P. REILLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS RELEASE

/pc

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE EN AUSTRALIE
Press and Information Service

Canberra, 14th August, 1967.

EXTRACT FROM THE ADDRESS BY GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC BROADCAST OVER FRENCH
RADIO AND TELEVISION ON AUGUST, 10th, 1967.-

Ordinarily every one - and it is quite normal - is absorbed in his daily life and circumstances and only once in a while takes an overall look at what can become of our country. And, yet, everything depends on that. For who could doubt that the fate of each French person is bound up with the fate of France? Inversely, where would France head if the French took no interest in her? Because in the rather tense situation in which the world finds itself, what our people do, weighs heavily on France's future, and there is reason to point out today - that is, at a time of the year that lends itself, perhaps, to reflection - what goals are being sighted in the conduct of the nation and what path is being followed to attain them.

The first of these goals, which governs the others, is peace. This is not said, as it has often been, to flatter, rather commonly, everyone's instinctive desire. For peace is in no way ensured by making statements. And proof is the fact that, since the beginning

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of the century and up to recently, although we were governed by eminently peaceful schools of thought and political groups, we never fought so much. While during that period, everything in our country, official or unofficial, relentlessly proclaimed, "war against war", we had to wage two world wars, unprecedented in extent, before which, during which and after which we did not cease, in addition, to fight in Africa, in the Middle East or in Asia. Certainly, the principal cause of these dramas was an Empire's ambition to dominate. But, faced with the threats that it was lengthily preparing, our generous entreaties did not drive away the storms, while our political inconsistency and our military weaknesses drew the lightning down upon us.

For, what peace requires is, on the outside, energetic and constant action, action all the more difficult that, in the midst of the conflicting of ideologies and the clashing of interests that fill the world, it must be free of foreign allegiances and episodic swayings of opinion. At the same time, peace demands, on the inside, the preparation of defense means suited to their time, which, for the same reasons, is also very difficult. This means that today, for France, peace should be not only desired but rigorously sought. After the enormous losses that we experienced in fighting for some fifty years, considering the state of a dangerous and upset world, taking into account the unheard of capacity for destruction of nuclear arms, nothing, absolutely nothing, is so important to us as to rebuild, through peace, our substance, our influence and our power.

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That is why, despite burning passions and painful consequences, we deliberately put an end to the

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vain fighting in Algeria and established with our former territories of Africa, new independent, fruitful and fraternal relations. That is why, and to our credit, we class our conflicts with Germany as past history and practice friendly cooperation with it. That is why, however powerful may be America's attraction for the Europeans, we are working to convince the Community of the Six to become, for its part and on its account, a political reality and, thereby, an essential element of a peaceful world equilibrium. That is why, despite preconceived ideas and preformed inclinations, we are replacing the dangerous tension of yesterday with Eastern Europe with cordial and fruitful relations. That is why, even if the immediate advantage may not be very apparent, we have objectively made contact with Peking. That is why, however clamorous may be the stands taken, we condemn, on the part of whatever State all armed intervention on the territory of others, precisely as it is taking place in South East Asia and the Middle East, because, in our times, the fire is from the start detestable and, once lit, it risks spreading afar. But also, this is why we are equipping ourselves with a deterrent weapon so that no country in the world can strike our's without knowing that, in the event, it would endure terrible destructions.

However, for France to have a hold on peace : as regards herself and, as much as possible, as regards others, she must have independence. Therefore, she has ensured it for herself. As America and the Soviet Union - colossal in their size, their population, their resources, their nuclear forces - are permanent rivals everywhere and in all areas, each has naturally formed around itself a bloc of States which are directly tied to it, on which it exercises its hegemony and to which it promises its protection. As a result, these States conform their policy willy-nilly to that of their great ally, submit their defense to it, confide their destiny to it.

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By withdrawing from NATO, France, for her part, extricated herself from such subjection. Thus she would not find herself drawn, eventually, into any quarrel that would not be hers and into any war action that she would not herself have wished. Thus she is capable of practising - as she considers right, from one end of Europe to the other - entente and cooperation, the only means of achieving the security of our continent. Thus she can uphold, in a world that many old and new abuses hold in a state of ferment, according to her vocation, the right of each people to self-determination, a right that is today the necessary foundation of any confederation, the imperative condition of international agreement, the indispensable basis of a real organization of peace.

But in order to keep and make the most of her personality, it is not sufficient for France to have her own policy and armed forces. The spirit and the movement of our era also force her to achieve modern development ^{which} without failing to cooperate actively with others, she is to make a national task. For independence, today, must go hand in hand with progress. Now, as it is difficult, in diplomatic and military matters, to break with the insidious theories and the convenient practices of subordination thus it is not without difficulties that, despite the accumulated routines and contrary pressures, we are seeing to it that in economic, social, financial, monetary, scientific and technical domains our country follows its own road by walking at its own pace.

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When, in order to achieve expansion and productivity, we plunge into competition, organizing the European Common Market and concluding a world agreement on customs barriers reduction, when, in order to drive out the inflation that would place our activity at the mercy of outside lenders, we give ourselves a strong and stable currency., when, in order to broaden to the dimensions of our young people the field that is to yield us the increasingly numerous human values, indispensable for our development, we reform education from top to bottom., when, in order to facilitate the adaptation of our agriculture to the conditions of the times, we distribute to it a broad system of subsidies, and credits., when, in order to relieve the growing deficit which was leading social security to bankruptcy, we balance its receipts and its expenditures., when, in order to strengthen the motives of French workers for associating more and more closely and thoughtfully in the national production effort, we see to it that the standard of living of each rises with the total, that employment is as much as possible protected against the consequences of our transformation and that the employees of enterprises are interested in the fruit of their expansion., when, in order to guide and draw our economic mechanism by our own forces, we work hard at acting in research, technology, the advanced industries - atomic energy, electronics, computers, aviation, space launchers and satellites, etc. - in short, when we transform all French activity in accordance with our Plan, it is because we want our country, in its progress, to be itself within and without.

Progress, independence, peace, these therefore are the combined goals toward which our policy aims. .../.

VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
TO POLAND

General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic is to make an official state visit to Poland from September 6 to 12. This will be the first visit by the French chief of State to an east European country since his trip to the Soviet Union last summer.

General de Gaulle will be accompanied by the French foreign minister, M. Maurice Couve de Murville. On his very first day in Poland, the French President is due to make a speech. This will come at the end of the dinner given in his honour by the President of the Polish council of State, Mr. Edward Ochab. Political talks with Polish leaders will occupy much of September 7 and General de Gaulle will make another speech on the 8 at the University of Jagellone. The next day the French President will visit Silesia, the rich coal mining region of present day Poland and it is probable that he will make personal contact with the people on this stage of his visit. On the 10th he will visit Gdansk (formerly Danzig) where he will see the westernplatte, a site of great Polish heroism, for it was here that the first shots of world war 2 were fired. On September 11, General de Gaulle will make a speech to the Polish nation which is to be broadcast and televised. The 12th, the last day of the State visit will be mainly devoted to political discussions and afterwards the final joint communiqué will be published.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No. 915
File No. 221/4/14

10th August, 1967

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

25/1/1

French Views on ASPAC

We left with M. Delahaye (Far East Branch of French Foreign Ministry) on 7th August, 1967, a copy of the final communiqué of the recent ASPAC Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok and drew on your Savingsgrams AP 94 and 96 to explain the value which Australia attached to the emergence of regional groupings such as ASPAC, among other reasons because they afforded an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on a range of matters at Ministerial level. We took the opportunity to try and find out whether the Foreign Ministry had been following the emergence of regional organisations in South-East Asia with any interest and to see whether they had formed any views on this subject.

2. Although it is possible that M. Manac'h, the head of the Asia/Oceania Branch of the Ministry, who is at present on leave, has developed his own ideas on regional groupings, our impression is that these developments have not attracted much interest in the Ministry as a whole. M. Delahaye observed that ASPAC would certainly be unwelcome to the Chinese, and that the Organisation had done well to keep off controversial political issues and concentrate on economic and other matters. We pointed out that, while the Organisation was not directed against Communist China or anyone else, it certainly would provide a forum for exchanging views on matters of political importance such as Vietnam and ways of preserving the political independence of the countries of the region.

3. It seems to us that despite the established French attitudes on Vietnam and the need to recognise Communist China, the French are quite prepared to recognise and welcome the significant progress made in non-Communist countries in Asia such as Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, particularly in the economic sphere, and to welcome the emergence of regional groupings amongst these countries as long as they do not serve in the French view simply as vehicles for the extension of U.S. influence in the area.

Original on 54/1/12.

- 1. *[Signature]*
- 2. *[Signature]*
- 3. *[Signature]*

[Signature]
(J. Piper)
First Secretary

25/1/18.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Name of Paper TIMES

Published at LONDON

File No.

Date

25/1/1

6-7-67

GAULLIST POLICY AIMS QUESTIONED

From CHARLES HARGROVE, Paris, July 5

The anniversary of American independence, to which France made so notable a contribution, has inspired some Frenchmen to search their consciences and analyse with misgiving the anti-Americanism of the France of General de Gaulle.

In pursuit of a policy of "independence" towards the United States, France has withdrawn from Nato's unified command and the last American soldier officially left three months ago.

It might have been thought that, once these unpleasant and far-reaching decisions had been carried out, France might revert to the cultivation of the traditional friendship with the United States to which General de Gaulle pays lip service whenever the occasion requires.

War wounds

In fact, he has not ceased to rebuke and condemn the exercise of American power throughout the world, making American armed aggression in Vietnam the root cause of all disorders of the world, in terms from which Russia has shrunk.

One is assured in Paris that General de Gaulle's policy and outlook towards the United States are not inspired by any emotional anti-Americanism. The wounds inflicted during the war and at Yalta have, it is true, not yet healed—the General never forgets.

But whatever his personal feelings, he would not allow them to influence

what he conceives to be the true interests of France.

What is euphemistically termed in official circles the policy of "disengagement" towards the United States is dictated by General de Gaulle's conviction that American and French interests are diametrically opposed throughout the world, and that there can be no compromise between them.

"Disengagement" to the extent that it reduces the risk of France being involved in other people's quarrels and other people's wars, especially the Vietnam war, is assuredly popular. It is popular also to the extent that it leaves France at liberty to be on good terms with everybody, whether Russian or American, Jew or Arab.

But it begins to provoke sharp criticisms when this "disengagement" or this "neutrality" appear, as they have done recently, to mean hostility to one's traditional friends and friendship with those who, until quite recently were regarded as a deadly menace to one's civilization and society.

Le Figaro comments: "One proclaims that France is a great country, and as such must pursue a policy of total independence towards everyone, and this is a way of justifying hostile stands against the United States."

"The tragedy is that the balance is less and less equal between our gestures of independence towards the United States—who, on two occasions, saved us from disaster—and towards Russia, who, if she contributed to victory, bound her fate with Germany in 1939."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

MAB.

I.53101

FROM:

DATED: 11TH AUGUST, 1967.
1800 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 12TH AUGUST, 1967.
0455 LT

3732. CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 3732 REPEATED LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL) 989
WASHINGTON 157

SAVINGRAMS BONN 38 BRUSSELS 29 OTTAWA 6 ROME 34 THE HAGUE
30

STATEMENT BY DE GAULLE.

DE GAULLES TELEVISED ADDRESS TO NATION ON 10 AUGUST (TEXT BY
BAG) WAS DEVOTED TO DEFENCE OF GOVERNMENTS POLICY OF QUOTE PROGRESS
INDEPENDENCE AND PEACE UNQUOTE IN THE USUAL TERMS, WITH MAIN
EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

HE DID NOT TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND IN ANY DETAIL ORDINANCES
ON SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND ON PARTICIPATION OF WORKERS IN
INDUSTRIAL PROFITS OR HIS ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS IN CANADA.

LAST SECTION OF ADDRESS WAS DEVOTED TO A SHRILL ATTACK ON HIS
CRITICS WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE SCHOOL OF NATIONAL RENUNCIATION
UNQUOTE AND INCLUDED FOLLOWING PASSAGE - QUOTE THUS, THE FACT
THAT FRANCE, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY REPUDIATING THE FRIENDSHIP THAT
SHE HAS FOR THE ANGLO-SAXON NATIONS BUT BREAKING WITH ABSURD
AND OUTWARD CONFORMISM OF SELF-EFFUCEMENT, SHOULD ADOPT A STRICTLY
FRENCH ATTITUDE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, OR THE
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE THAT
WOULD BE EUROPEAN, OR THE DISRUPTION OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE SIX
TO WHICH THE ADMISSION OF BRITAIN AND OF FOUR OR FIVE OTHER
STATES WOULD LEAD, OR RELATIONS WITH THE EAST, OR THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY QUESTION, OR - NO LATER THAN YESTERDAY - THE UNANIMOUS AND
INDESCRIBABLE WILL FOR EMANCIPATION WHICH THE FRENCHMEN OF CANADA
DEMONSTRATED AROUND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THIS
STUPIFIES AND ROUSES THE INDIGNATION OF THE APOSTLES OF DECLINE
UNQUOTE.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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- 2 -

I.53101

3. REACTIONS HERE TO DE GAULLES STATEMENT HAVE IN GENERAL SIMPLE REFLECTED POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS.

IT IS OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, THAN QUOTE HUMANITE UNQUOTE CARRIES THE HEADLINE QUOTE IT IS NOT BY SACRIFICING THE FRENCH THAT ONE DEFENDS FRANCE UNQUOTE (A REFERENCE TO THE NEW MEASURES AFFECTING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM) TOGETHER WITH AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE CONTRADICTIONS OF DE GAULLES FOREIGN POLICY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S

12TH AUGUST, 1967.

SEC DS FAS(1) SEA M DL FAS(2) UN PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3)
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Leroy, Rap and Balthazar Now there's black apartheid

No one really knows yet what happened in Detroit on Sunday and Monday. The physical facts are plain enough. The United States, which is one of the world's few genuinely open societies, lets reporters and television crews go where they want and describe what they see: in no other country would the details of a riot have been reported so quickly and so thoroughly. But what the reporters and television cameras could not see was what the rioters thought they were rioting against. It goes without saying that this was an explosion of protest from the bottom layer of the American economic order, which happens at the moment to be mainly a black layer, against the squalor and indignity of being at the bottom. This is what happened at Rochester and Watts and Hough and San Francisco between 1964 and 1966. It has happened in other countries where no question of race is involved. It may be all that is happening in Newark and Detroit and other American cities this summer. But it is also possible that something else has now crept into these riots. Some of the advocates of black power (see pages 395 and 409) claim that the riots are no longer a demand for equality: they say they are the breakaway revolt of a black nation against the white nation around it. If they are right, it is not just a few blocks in Detroit that have gone up in flames this week. So has a century of liberal ideals about racial integration.

For the past century liberals have believed that in a country where two or more races live side by side the racial minority can get along happily enough provided the majority gives it equal access to whatever good things the society has to offer. This is the principle, if not necessarily the practice, on which Britain and Kenya and Malaysia as well as the United States are run. It is a principle that pretty well every racially mixed society pays lip service to, except South Africa and now Rhodesia. It is true that it can be one hell of a problem to make sure that the majority comes across with the right of equal access. The Asians in Kenya and the Chinese in Indonesia, as well as the Negroes in America, have discovered that. But it is a manageable problem; it is a matter of political accommodation, and once the minority has got the vote it can use its political power to make sure that the majority opens at least some of the doors to it, at least some of the way.

It may be that what has happened in America is that the majority has just not opened the doors fast enough. It is bad enough to be a member of the bottom layer of an industrial society whatever the colour of your skin is. The work is menial and meaningless. Home is as bad: a city slum can be a worse place to live than a peasant's hut. Family life begins to dissolve. There are no longer the consolations that the church and the village used to provide in a rural society. Worst of all, the pleasures enjoyed by those who are better off are infuriatingly visible if you take a trip downtown or up west. When the younger members

of this bottom layer of society are getting just enough money to feed themselves properly, and buy a motor-cycle or a second-hand car, and get a few drinks inside them, they become a very explosive force indeed. These are the people who have rioted dozens of times in the last ten years in Europe as well as in America, in communist countries as well as capitalist ones. Often race has nothing to do with it at all; white and black were looting side by side in Detroit this week. The explosion just happens to be worse if racial antagonism is added to all the rest: if the people in the bottom layer feel that the colour of their skin helps to keep them down there. And the explosion is worst of all if the society in which these tensions are built up is also one that provides easy access to guns and to the means of finding out, by television and newspaper, what is happening in other trouble spots. In other words, if it is America.

This may be a sufficient explanation of what has happened in Newark and Detroit. Pray that it is; for difficult though this problem is to solve, a rational solution does exist, and politicians who know what is good for them will get down to the job of trying to put it into practice. But the whole liberal programme of race relations blows up in our faces if Leroy Jones and Rap Brown and the black separatists are right. For what they are saying, in effect, is that different races cannot coexist within the same society. They believe the sense of racial antagonism goes so deep that the majority will never agree to share its privileges with the minority, and that in any case the minority would not want to be assimilated into a society shaped by people of a different race. Leroy Jones and Rap Brown are obsessed by the black-white relationship. But, if they are right, what they are saying is just as true of other relationships as well. They can certainly find as much evidence for their ideas in the places where brown and yellow meet in Asia, and brown and black in Africa, as they can in Europe or America. And if they are right then Balthazar Vorster is too: it's apartheid or inter-racial street-fighting, and that's that.

This is not what the majority of American Negroes have believed in the past; they have wanted equality within the American society. Quite possibly some of the Negroes who support the black separatists do so not because they agree with them but because the frustration of their desire for equality makes them look for a leader, any leader, who promises to use violence. Certainly nobody who knows an inter-racial marriage will believe that separatism makes sense. But wild ideas are apt to catch on when there's shooting in the streets. It would be nonsense if the process by which the races are slowly growing more familiar with each other were to be reversed. The culture of the Atlantic world would lose as much as the economies of Africa and Asia would. Yet this is what is going to happen if the ideologists turn these American troubles into a straight racial war. Mr Jones, Mr Brown meet Mr Vorster.

A Fey Old Man General de Gaulle has carried his foreign policy off into an imaginary world of his own

General de Gaulle has passed over into the land of make-believe. Mr Lester Pearson did not exactly order him out of Canada. He just described his invitation to Quebec to break away from the rest of Canada in terms that left the general little choice but to go home. It is a major humiliation. General de Gaulle provided every justification for being sent packing: he talked about Quebec's national destiny, shouted out the separatist slogan, and dropped dark hints about

"liberation" (see page 396). But Mr Pearson's relative gentleness is justified. Even in France many people realise that the president of France is now living in a state of mind where words have become a substitute for action. It is a bit like some old, famous and slightly fey Cornishman going to Brittany, where the local separatists blew up another power relay station this week, in order to rally the Bretons to the memory of King Arthur.

It was only last month, after all, that General de Gaulle put out the declaration blaming the Americans for everything from the Arab-Israeli war to the Chinese hydrogen bomb. Yet in the United Nations Assembly that followed France was unable to carry a large part of French-speaking Africa with it in the voting about the Middle East.

Is this hardening of General de Gaulle's attitudes just the result of a hardening of his arteries? The question has to be asked. During the Middle East crisis many people came to the conclusion that President de Gaulle had lost touch with the reality of international affairs and had abandoned that "just proportion between the end pursued and the forces of the state" which he so admires in the policies of France's *ancien régime*. The result was what many Frenchmen felt to be a national humiliation. No wonder that M. Raymond Aron asks whether the anti-Americanism of the general does not resemble the anglophobia of Vichy.

But it is more likely that the ageing of the man merely reveals the weaknesses that were always inherent in his view of France's place in the world. To meet the charge that hatred of the United States is the motive-power behind present French policy the general's supporters have offered a rationalisation of the events of the last two months. President de Gaulle, it is said, is convinced that America has gained so many advantages over Russia recently that, to restore the balance of power, France must take Russia's side. But what power can France exert? Its diplomatic influence got it nowhere in the emergency General Assembly in New York. In the nuclear balance it possesses very little weight indeed. It cannot offer Russia bases that would give Russian forces more strategic mobility. If France were at the head of an integrated Europe, or still a working member of Nato, its voice might have influence in Washington. But gaullist policy has passed from wanting to influence Americans to wanting to annoy them. The idea of a reversal of alliances remains purely symbolic.

This is the nub of it. The policy of French greatness pursued by President de Gaulle is a policy of symbolic action. It is a prestige campaign directed above all towards other Frenchmen. The stately progresses abroad, the biting comments on France's allies, the world-historical surveys, the brutal negatives at press conferences—all these gaullist rites serve to maintain the "great national dream" without which, so President de Gaulle believes, a people cannot remain active or united. It is the systematic creation of a myth that has served the general's purposes in French domestic politics. It can also be the systematic exploitation of chauvinism and xenophobia.

But abroad the myth is less effective. A carefully calculated toast in Bonn wins German applause. It is unlikely to change the cool assessment of reality that has led Herr Franz-Josef Strauss to ignore the general's wishes and come out for British entry into the common market. Nor will it remove the disquiet created among Germans by France's abandonment of its obligations to Israel. Have Latin Americans given a real response to the appeal of President de Gaulle's 1962 visit: "*Marchamos mano en la mano*"? Has French influence in Africa been increased by his assurance to Mr Kosygin that France could swing the French African votes in the UN?

Sometimes it seems as if General de Gaulle himself expects no real results from his policy of gestures. He has spoken of "the old world . . . which from century to century was profoundly marked by France and which secretly waits for it once again to show the way." But in the second half of the twentieth century the influence of France can be only a cultural influence, not a political one. For the general, France's "rare and precious harmony"

is the basis for its claim to a sort of spiritual hegemony. So French foreign policy does not have to produce any immediately visible effect on the world around. France does not have to engage in a sweaty power competition with other countries. It proposes an example to them. Gaullist foreign policy is a sort of diplomatic levitation designed to astonish the world more than to influence the course of events. In France itself, where cultural superiority has always been taken for granted by the majority of educated Frenchmen, this concept of moral leadership is easily acceptable. Abroad there must be few who see in the statement that France's greatness is "the condition of the peace of the world" anything except rhetoric.

It is rhetoric because modern France does not have the power to make it real. General de Gaulle calls on history to make good what France lacks now. The legions of dead French kings, statesmen, soldiers, artists and writers are brought in to redress the present unfavourable balance. An implacable urge to power is taken for power itself. At the basis of his view of France lies a myth which, as he grows older, seems more and more indistinguishable from reality in his mind. The result is that he risks isolating France and drawing down reprisals for the pettiness with which French policy is sometimes conceived and executed.

It is unlikely that President de Gaulle's foreign policy will survive him, and this fact gives to his old age some of the tragic quality of a twilight of the gods. But, before he leaves to his successor the task of rebuilding broken bridges, there is a danger that he may go farther along the path of tragic romanticism. The increasing extremism of gaullist policies presents a grave threat to such European unity as has already been achieved. He is said to have announced once before his intention of destroying European supranational institutions, but to have been dissuaded by advisers who pointed out the economic consequences for France. Is he now in a mood to listen, if another such occasion arises? Or will he seize upon an opportunity of disposing once and for all of the danger of France becoming a nation "integrated, that is, blotted out"?

It is probably a mistake to talk of General de Gaulle's foreign policy in terms of success or failure. His policy is an act of faith which now seems to be parting company even with the idea of national advantage. French foreign policy has certainly reached a point of take-off. But its progress into outer space is that of a satellite whose signals to the rest of the world are becoming fainter and fainter. A distant *non* to Mr Wilson is the most audible message at the minute. The bleeps come in from Canada. It is little enough result for the dream of a country whose "rare and precious harmony" makes it "the vanguard of a civilisation founded on the law of peoples and the respect of the human person."

MOTOR BUSINESS

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The Paper TIMES

Published at LONDON

File No.

Date

France bemused by de Gaulle's foreign policy

From CHARLES HARGROVE, Paris

Condemnation of the "act of war" of Israel, multiplication of gestures of friendship towards the Arab states, support for the Yugoslav resolution in the United Nations at the side of Russia, and finally the scarcely veiled rebuff to Britain's application to join the Common Market—there is no doubt that General de Gaulle has once again been playing for very high stakes in foreign policy lately.

At the Cabinet meeting on June 21, to which he read his shattering statement linking the war in Vietnam with the Middle East crisis, he again quoted to his Ministers the words he had used before the Evian agreements on the independence of Algeria in 1962: "Gentlemen, the ship of France is heading for a very rough passage. Those who are prone to seasickness had better get off. As for the others, let them lash themselves to the handrail."

The waves of protest, perplexity, and dismay which have battered on the Elysée in the past few weeks, sweeping even loyal Gaullists along with them (including a number of ministers), found General de Gaulle imperturbably serene, detached and withdrawn, as always in epic situations. "Are you not worried of the consequences on the domestic plane of your foreign policy?" he was asked, to which he replied: "Do you think I bothered about public opinion on June 18, 1940?" And he allegedly remarked: "As usual, I have against me the bourgeois, the officers, and the diplomatists, and for me only the people who take the metro."

He is, after all, the man of dramatic contingencies and apparently irretrievable situations, and he thrives on them. They stimulate him. He really feels under such circumstances that he is shaping history in his own image. The routine business of government with cast ir-majorities in a world free of p.p. basically bores him.



© New York Review—Opera Mundi, 1967.
Stirring the pot caricature by the American artist David Levine.

But even loyal Gaullists have begun to ask themselves whether the leader was getting old and losing his grip. However bewildering and disconcerting his performance in the past, it was always crowned with a sufficient degree of spectacular success to justify confidence in his clairvoyance and skill while all other statesmen were grovelling in the dark. But France has recently suffered two monumental rebuffs—over the Glassboro meeting, which he confidently expected would not happen; and over the rejection of the non-aligned resolution in the United Nations.

In fact, none who have approached him recently detect any trace of senility. Of course he has aged, and his capacity for work is not what it was. But his command of the situation is still complete. Only advancing years have brought with them an aggravation of earlier symptoms, a certain hardening of standpoints, a deepening of prejudices and *parti-pris*, and an increased tendency to take decisions alone and ignore advice, however expert. It was most clearly the case over the Middle East crisis. But there is no trace of failing powers in the virtuosity of the series of bewildering foreign policy moves and public statements in recent weeks, and in the precarious balancing acts that would tax an experienced diplomatic tightrope walker.

One can do two things with the Gaullist cosmology: dismiss it as the absurd fantasy of an aging and cynical megalomaniac; or, without accepting all its basic premises, attempt to understand its motives and its aims, and perhaps to influence it. Fortunately for those who prefer the second approach, it is always well documented by the General himself. The gestation of Gaullist policy may be wrapped in secrecy, but its mysteries are disclosed at the appropriate time, and usually

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with irreproachable clarity. "You know", he is quoted as saying to an ambassador who ventured to disagree with him, "of what we do there will only be left what we shall have written of ourselves."

In Bonn last week, where he arrived amid reproaches for consulting his German partner after the event, and for leaning rather too obviously towards the Russian camp, his position was delicate. "At the bottom of things, one fact dominates reality: the United States have become the greatest power [in the world] and are automatically driven to extend their power. I do not say to dominate, but to exercise a preponderant action, that is to say, a hegemony over others", he told German ministers. "Hence there are two possibilities: one can accept things as they are... that is to say, form part of a grouping where American power will predominate. It is the easy way. Or there is the second possibility (and I say it without hostility towards the United States), that is to safeguard our own personality. The first condition of this is that French and Germans should not drift asunder, otherwise American preponderance cannot be avoided. The second is that what we have built for six years in the economic field be maintained, and not allowed to become disrupted, or else it would be engulfed in a system under American predominance. The third is that with eastern Europe we should move towards entente and cooperation, so that there may be something else in world policy than the system of two blocks."

This was a policy which, he added, meant support for German reunification. It was also a policy which implied exclusion of Britain from the Common Market so long as she had not become truly European, in other words, had not herself accepted it in turn. On the Middle East General de Gaulle declared that he had told the Israelis not to start the conflict, but they had done so using the Aqaba affair as a pretext. Now France did not acknowledge Israel conquests. "We were led to adopt a position similar to the Soviets' for different reasons. Our policy is to maintain good relations with the Arab countries so that they should not have good relations with Russia alone."

The fact is that General de Gaulle considers the equilibrium between the two super powers, upon which hitherto the peace of the world and the independence of smaller nations from both ideological blocks depended, has been sharply disrupted to the advantage of the United States. "Russia, pilloried by China, bogged down in Indo-China, morally defeated in the Middle East,

overridden at the United Nations and retreating in Latin America, is everywhere outclassed", M. Maurice Duverger, a prominent left-wing critic of General de Gaulle's domestic policy and admirer of his foreign one, wrote last week.

The aim of France is to restore that equilibrium, and this means leaning out of centre, towards the Arab and Russian side. It means that only an alliance between the non-communist and communist Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals", can provide an effective counterweight to the United States. France is still a member of the Atlantic alliance but she regards it mainly as a fire insurance policy against a Soviet attack in which she no longer believes.

To bring Germany into this pattern seems akin to squaring the circle. The Russians seek mainly to prevent, through their alliance with France, what the Germans want to achieve through theirs—the reunification of their country. De Gaulle's argument is that Russia must agree to reunification—at some hypothetical date in the future—as a counterpart for the alliance of non-communist Europe, including the permanent de-nuclearization of Germany and the inviolability of existing frontiers. A friendly and open Europe can provide Russia, in meeting the Chinese threat and guaranteeing her against a revival of the German one, with a reliable alternative to an arrangement with the United States and a non-proliferation treaty. As for Britain, she comes along like a man intent upon telling his life history to another with an urgent appointment.

Many Frenchmen do not agree with the Gaullist scarecrow of American hegemony. More still disagree with its assessment of Russia's harmless, diminished state, and consider that far from being the loser in the Middle East, she has through the Arab defeat implanted herself in an area which only 10 years ago was regarded as a western preserve. Against this, Arab friendship for France weighs little, however real it may be. A vast majority are shocked by the cynicism which involves calling upon the Israeli "friend and ally" to turn victory into defeat by withdrawing without guarantees (even if a purely gratuitous gesture) and voting with Russia against one's friends. They observe that Germany shows scant inclination to succumb to French wooing to detach herself from the United States and Britain in return for the guarantee of a hypothetical reunification. They are not convinced that the best way in which to turn Britain into a good European is to keep her out of Europe, especially at the risk of another major crisis between France and her five partners in the Common Market.

Above all, many Frenchmen who applauded the policy of "independence" and the withdrawal from Nato, feel dizzy at this undiplomatic high flying. France has not the power to sway world events alone, and the General's policy seems to aim at doing so by estranging one's traditional friends in exchange for acquiring very doubtful new ones. They admire acrobatics, but not without a net.

M. Duverger admits that the Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" will seem "a strange and inapplicable idea so long as public opinion has not become conscious of the new situation in the world". And yet, for all the virulence of the critics, of the right and of the left, in spite of the murmurings and rumblings in the ranks of the faithful, General de Gaulle would probably win another referendum if he stood for one tomorrow. "You never know the devil of a man", Gaullists at least are quoted as saying. "He may pull it off again." In any case, there is no one else ready to take his place.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.49678

FROM:

Dated: 27th July, 1967.
1930 LT

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

Rec'd: 28th July, 1967.

3403. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra 3403, repeated Ottawa OP143.

De Gaulle's Visit to Canada.

Press re-action here (except for Communist "Humanité") has been one of dismay at De Gaulle's statements in Quebec (especially "Vive Le Quebec Libre") at response they brought from Canadian Government and at De Gaulle's decision to cut short his visit without going as planned to Ottawa. A number of the Leaders of the Main Opposition Parties (except the Communists) have issued statements critical of De Gaulle's behaviour, which is regarded as lacking restraint and propriety, serving no discernibly useful purpose, and representing a violation of principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries (which France has strongly supported).

2. While the Canadian Government's statement to the effect De Gaulle's remarks in Montreal were "unacceptable" has been described in the press here as "Harsh", there is general recognition that it is De Gaulle's fault if the good relations that existed between France and Canada should now be seriously compromised.

3. There has been no official French comment yet but a statement will no doubt be issued after Cabinet meeting on 31st July. Foreign Ministry yesterday was taking attitude that De Gaulle had been "misinterpreted". Much of the domestic concern over outcome

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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of visit may be dissipated over the summer holiday period, but it has served to confirm in their views those who question his sagacity in Foreign Affairs and suspect him generally of losing his touch.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M's DEPT
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28th July, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) PACAM AMSP@ FAS(3) ICR PIO
FAS(4) EAMEC E@
OTTAWA WASHINGTON

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
97/67

Little friend of all the world!

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of the Australian Embassy JP
for SAME Branch
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See.
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Paris
Mr Phillips



Le Monde
15/7/67


LE GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE A REÇU PLUSIEURS MESSAGES

Outre celui de M. Podgorny, le général de Gaulle a reçu, à l'occasion des fêtes du 14 juillet, des messages de l'empereur du Japon, du président Nasser et du président Ho Chi Minh.

Le président Nasser écrit notamment :

« En vous adressant nos vœux les plus sincères, nous voulons exprimer notre appréciation pour l'attitude généreuse que vous avez adoptée au nom de la France et de son peuple, aux côtés du droit et de la justice. Votre attitude est d'autant plus appréciée que vous l'avez adoptée dans un contexte international dans lequel il est difficile pour une opinion libre et indépendante de résister aux influences de la propagande et des fortes pressions. »

Quant à M. Ho Chi Minh, il déclare : « Je vous remercie sincèrement d'avoir supporté fermement la juste lutte du peuple vietnamien contre l'agression américaine, pour la défense de ses droits nationaux conformément aux accords de Genève. »



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

Memo No.: 731

20th June 1967

File No.: 211/1

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

*French original on
25/1/1*

Foreign Minister's Statement to
National Assembly on 15 June 1967

.... I refer to our telegram No. 2539 of 16 June 1967 and attach the text of the Foreign Minister's statement opening the two-day debate on foreign affairs in the National Assembly on 15 June 1967. About half the statement was devoted to the Middle East and the main points are set out in telegram No. 2510. In the rest of his statement M. Couve de Murville referred to Viet Nam, Germany, relations between Eastern and Western Europe, the Common Market and the British application to join it.

Viet Nam

2. The Foreign Minister's reference to Viet Nam was very brief (see bottom of page 6 of the text attached) and he described France's view as being that the war "can only be ended by a negotiated settlement, with the participation of all interested parties, on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954". The mildness of this statement is due no doubt in large part to its brevity; but it does contrast with more recent French statements on Viet Nam (see for example our telegram No. 3 of 3rd January 1967 and our memorandum No. 46 of 10th January 1967).

Germany

3. In Europe, M. Couve de Murville said, there remained at least one problem of capital importance, the German problem "which others call that of European security" (see also paragraph below). He went on to say that a first step towards a solution had been taken in that everyone now recognized that a solution could be found only by means of an agreement freely discussed among the interested parties as a whole, in other words that "détente, of which we have often said that it must lead to co-operation and entente", rather than the cold war, was the appropriate context for the negotiations which must one day occur. He ascribed to the German Government the view he had expressed; and he welcomed Bonn's attempt to normalize its relations with Eastern Europe,

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(orig. on 18/1/72/4)*

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Page 2.

which could only provide an additional reason for pursuing the Franco-German co-operation treaty. He looked forward to the further meetings with the German leaders which would take place on 12 and 13 July.

Relations between Eastern and Western Europe

4. The Foreign Minister mentioned, as evidence of the satisfactory state of France's relations with Eastern Europe, France's developing but still insufficient trade with the countries in question, the efforts made towards teaching and speaking French, and the system of committees and regular meetings between France and the Soviet Union on co-operation in industry, science and technology. General de Gaulle's visit in the autumn to Poland and a little while later to Rumania and the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union in July were evidence of the renewed development of relations with Eastern Europe.

Common Market

5. M. Couve de Murville described "la construction européenne" that is, the close association, in the economic field to begin with, of a certain number of the countries of Western Europe, as the third aspect, after Franco-German co-operation and détente with the East, of French policy in Europe. This close association was no longer inspired by the idea of adding to the defence of Western Europe but rather was a "useful, if not indispensable, factor in the peaceful and balanced Europe which we wished one day to attain after the settlement of the German problem". After referring to the deep and painful changes which the development of the Common Market would cause France, and to the conclusion of the Kennedy Round (with a complementary word for M. Jean Rey's role) the Foreign Minister asked why the potential for political co-operation among the Six had not been reflected in any action or organization. He found his answer in the different traditions, outlook and preoccupations of E.E.C. members, and in particular the differences between the Benelux countries on the one hand and France, Germany and Italy on the other. The Benelux countries did not indicate that their first care was a properly European policy and their tradition and outlook were much less Continental than those of their three partners. "No doubt this is also the reason why Belgium and the Netherlands, among the Six, are those who, as it were, regard it as an imperative for Great Britain to join the Common Market, Great Britain in whom they find much of the outlook of their own policy and whom they see as an element of balance in their favour with respect to France and Germany."

Britain and the E.E.C.

6. On Britain's application to join the Common Market, M. Couve de Murville had little new to say that General de Gaulle had not already said or implied at his press conference

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Page 3.

in May, although in certain respects, notably Britain's relationship with the United States and agriculture, the greater clarity of the Foreign Minister's exposition leaves a rather sharper impression of French attitudes than did General de Gaulle's press conference. Great Britain had moved further forward with indispensable economic and monetary changes and was more anxious to find her place in the world, which would be characterised to a greater extent than in the past by her European "appartenance". It was not France, but those of her friends in Europe and Britain who were the sharpest critics of France's current policies, who said that Britain must cease to be excessively tied to the United States.. Apart from the political problem, which was, however the essence, there were other problems: first, the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market with Ireland, Denmark, Norway and perhaps others would transform the Common Market into something quite different from what it was today, the present relatively homogeneous system would be changed into something nearer a free-trade area; second, it had to be established whether the policies of the Common Market could become those of Britain. The sterling zone arrangements were difficult to reconcile with the functioning of the Common Market; and as to agriculture, France could contemplate modifications neither in the Common Market principles nor in the terms of application of a policy which was for her an essential feature of the whole.

7. As to the future, the Foreign Minister said that it was for the Council of Ministers, having received the advice of the Commission, to decide unanimously on the reply to be made to the British request. A first discussion would take place at the Council meeting in Brussels on 26th June and it will be pursued subsequently. "We shall have to ask for the opinion of the Commission, the new Commission certainly, as soon as it is definitely constituted after 1st July." Discussion would be prolonged and complicated.

8. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Bonn, Brussels and London.

E.B.F.
(G. B. Faakes)
Counsellor

F25/1/1
ref. Memo 731 of 20th June ex Paris

DISCOURS PRONONCE PAR M. COUVE DE MURVILLE
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
DEVANT L'ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE
le 15 juin 1967

La déclaration que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire le 7 juin dernier devant l'Assemblée Nationale au nom du gouvernement a défini les vœux et la position de la France au sujet de la crise du Moyen-Orient, qui était alors, du moins pour ce qui est des combats, à son point culminant. C'est à mettre à jour et à compléter cette déclaration, même si nous n'avons pas encore le recul qui serait nécessaire, que j'entends consacrer la première partie de mon exposé d'aujourd'hui. Je parlerai ensuite des autres questions principales qui intéressent notre politique extérieure, à commencer par les affaires européennes.

La guerre, hélas, ne s'est pas arrêtée sitôt l'appel unanime au cessez-le-feu lancé par le Conseil de Sécurité. Les combats les plus durs, les plus sanglants aussi, ont même été livrés après, en territoire syrien et se sont prolongés jusqu'à dimanche au prix de lourdes pertes. Pendant cette période, de quelques jours seulement, mais où les heures étaient longues, les Nations-Unies ont été, disons-le franchement, dans l'incapacité de jouer vraiment leur rôle, parce qu'aussitôt après l'unanimité réalisée le 3 juin et que j'avais saluée l'autre jour en en marquant la portée, les oppositions se sont manifestées à nouveau et ont rendu toute véritable action pour le moment impossible. Déplorable situation, qui ne nous fait que regretter davantage que n'ait pas été entendue la suggestion faite le 25 mai par la France en vue d'une coopération des quatre puissances, laquelle peut-être en s'exerçant à temps, aurait pu changer le cours des événements et orienter vers ce règlement négocié des problèmes de fond qui, de toutes manières, reste indispensable, parce qu'il est la condition d'une paix véritable.

Mais rien ne sert d'épiloguer sur le passé. La situation est désormais radicalement transformée, et pour longtemps. C'est ce qu'il faut maintenant considérer, quant aux données immédiates et quant aux perspectives d'avenir.

Pendant les quelques jours de son attaque foudroyante, l'Etat d'Israël a remporté la victoire militaire, annihilant les forces armées adverses et occupant un territoire énorme, en proportion du moins du sien propre, péninsule du Sinaï de Gaza au Canal de Suez et à Charm el Cheikh,

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Jordanie ou Palestine arabe y compris la vieille ville de Jérusalem, enfin confins occidentaux de la Syrie le long de sa propre frontière. Par là même il a pris en charge une population musulmane, qu'il n'est pas possible de chiffrer exactement pour le moment, mais qui est considérable par rapport à sa propre population et qui comprend notamment environ trois quarts de million de ces réfugiés de Palestine que les Nations Unies entretiennent dans leurs trop célèbres camps depuis l'armistice de 1949.

L'on sait les conséquences que le gouvernement israélien tire d'une pareille carte de guerre. Elles ont été succinctement définies dans la déclaration faite le 12 juin devant son Parlement par le Président du Conseil M. Eshkol. Israël vainqueur entend régler directement les conditions de la paix avec chaque Etat arabe intéressé successivement. Il ne s'agit plus d'en revenir aux procédures des Nations-Unies qu'il estime avoir fait la preuve de leur inefficacité. Les conditions de la paix, cela semble d'ailleurs signifier beaucoup, beaucoup plus en tout cas que ce qui était dit auparavant, lorsqu'il s'agissait avant tout de la liberté de navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba.

Du côté des Arabes, la défaite des armes a tout bouleversé, jusqu'au fond des choses et jusqu'au fond des âmes. Je ne vise pas tant la situation politique et le régime de chacun, dont il ne m'appartient évidemment pas de parler à cette tribune, et dont je me bornerai à dire que la porte est ouverte à toutes les éventualités. Je pense au choc créé par les événements, au traumatisme qui frappe tous ces peuples, dont les effets n'apparaîtront qu'à la longue, qui sont difficiles à mesurer en durée et en profondeur.

.../...

Ce que l'on peut dire dès à présent, s'agissant des positions arabes vis à vis d'Israël, c'est que le dialogue est devenu encore plus difficile que par le passé. Il faudra tenir compte d'autre part des réactions passionnées qui ont conduit à la rupture complète des Arabes avec les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, à l'arrêt du fonctionnement du Canal de Suez, au boycott du pétrole. C'est un aspect de la situation dont les conséquences ne peuvent encore être évaluées.

A côté d'Israël, à côté des pays arabes, les grands puissances elles-mêmes ne sont pas pour le moment en mesure de jouer le rôle qui est le leur de par les responsabilités générales qui leur incombent et que j'avais cherché, la semaine dernière, à esquisser devant l'Assemblée Nationale. Bien au contraire, il résulte de leurs oppositions un élément supplémentaire de division, sinon de conflit. Je viens de dire que les Etats-Unis se trouvaient, provisoirement peut-être, mais complètement, coupés du monde arabe. L'Union soviétique de son côté, suivie par la plupart des pays de l'Europe orientale, a rompu de son propre chef ses relations diplomatiques avec Israël et nous serions les derniers à sous-estimer pour le présent, mais surtout pour la suite, les conséquences d'une telle décision. En d'autres termes la guerre froide, en admettant qu'elle en ait jamais été éliminée, risque de reprendre en force dans le Moyen-Orient.

Ainsi, après la crise militaire violente, mais localisée, qui vient de prendre fin, tous les éléments d'une crise politique d'une exceptionnelle gravité sont-ils maintenant réunis.

C'est à la prévenir, parce qu'il n'était pas difficile d'en prévoir les conséquences, que tous les efforts de la France s'étaient employés au cours des dernières semaines. Maintenant qu'elle est devant nous, quelle peut être notre politique ?

Il est clair tout d'abord que personne ne peut songer à prendre quelque initiative dans l'immédiat dans le sens d'une action d'ensemble.

Certes il y aura des manifestations, parfois spectaculaires, sur la scène internationale. Telle sera la réunion qui se tiendra sans doute bientôt de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Cela est normal et nous y avons donné notre accord. A défaut de pouvoir amorcer

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un règlement, il s'agit d'organiser un large débat, qui permettra d'enregistrer les rancœurs profonds créés par la guerre du Moyen-Orient au sein de la Communauté des Nations ; le choc a été profondément ressenti et sera long à guérir. Dès qu'il y aura lieu cependant d'engager une action, donc de prendre des décisions, la parole reviendra au Conseil de Sécurité. C'est la Charte des Nations Unies.

Le fait est, en attendant, que la poussière des combats n'est pas retombée et que les passions sont toujours à vif. Si nous voulons être utiles, attachons-nous en premier lieu, à établir définitivement le cessez-le-feu qui, dans les circonstances où il est intervenu, demeure fragile. Une reprise des hostilités serait non seulement déplorable, mais vaine ou injustifiée suivant le cas. Des problèmes humains se posent très vite ensuite, non seulement parce qu'il y a 250.000 réfugiés dans la zone de Gaza et 500.000 dans la Palestine arabe, mais parce que l'exode semble recommencer, si l'on en juge par les nouvelles qui parviennent de Jordanie et qui font état déjà d'une centaine de milliers de réfugiés. Dans ce domaine, et sans aucune arrière-pensée politique, la coopération internationale devra s'exercer. Nous ne sommes plus ici ni dans la passion, ni dans la politique. Il s'agit d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants vis à vis desquels, si Israël est maintenant le premier à en assumer, nous avons tous, directement ou indirectement, des devoirs. J'entends par là bien entendu leur propre survie, non le règlement de leur sort final, qui reste le premier point du contentieux israélo-arabe.

Au-delà, et c'est l'essentiel, je le disais l'autre jour ici même, il faudra reconstruire. La France persiste à penser, même si cela est aujourd'hui et pour longtemps du seul domaine de la raison et du sentiment, qu'une solution réelle, je veux dire durable, ne peut être imposée par la force aux uns ni aux autres, mais qu'elle doit résulter de l'accord de toutes les parties. Un accord qui tienne compte sans doute des réalités de toutes sortes, mais qui soit consenti. C'est là, me semble-t-il, le sentiment, non seulement du gouvernement, mais de l'opinion tout entière. Mais comment, raisonnablement, envisager une telle solution dans les conditions présentes et peut-on imaginer que ces conditions puissent changer ?

Ce problème, c'est d'abord aux belligérants, ou anciens belligérants, qu'il est posé. Rien dans l'immédiat ne peut être raisonnablement espéré bien entendu. Tout au plus observera-t-on qu'il apparaîtra vite qu'une prolongation de la situation présente risque

.../...

d'entraîner, au cours des mois et des années, une dégradation, un pourrissement, dont les conséquences seraient redoutables. On peut dire aussi qu'à défaut d'une reprise des violences, qui ne semble être, encore une fois, de l'intérêt de personne, pour ne pas parler de l'intérêt de la paix en général, il est difficile de concevoir que les parties puissent un jour se rapprocher de leur propre mouvement, autrement dit que quoi que ce soit puisse intervenir, dans la direction lointaine sinon d'un règlement, du moins d'un début d'accordement, qui ne soit facilité, sinon inspiré de l'extérieur, toutes précautions étant prises bien entendu, car il s'agit de pays indépendants et qui entendent le rester.

Aller plus loin aujourd'hui serait présomptueux. C'est assez cependant pour montrer une fois de plus les devoirs de ceux qui détiennent des responsabilités générales. Sans doute, les Nations Unies, dont l'intervention, je l'ai dit, serait d'ailleurs récusée par l'une au moins des parties en présence, seraient-elles mal placées pour offrir leurs services. Mais on peut penser que les grandes puissances joueront plus tard leur rôle, et de toutes manières nous savons bien que rien ne se fera durablement contre l'une d'entre elles. Ce sont donc ces puissances en définitive, qu'on le veuille ou non, qui orienteront l'avenir, même encore une fois s'il ne s'agit en aucune manière de régler comme elles l'entendent les problèmes des autres.

La France pour sa part, dans le concert qu'il s'agira de rétablir, sera toujours disponible pour travailler à l'entente et à la paix. Son attitude, qu'elle veut objective, quels que soient les sentiments, et sereine, qu'elles que soient les inquiétudes, peut lui permettre de jouer ce rôle. Nous n'avons pas d'autre ambition, et nous serons assez récompensés, si la crise qui mena ce de durer et de s'amplifier peut se dénouer sans que jamais la paix, au Moyen Orient ou dans le monde, soit à nouveau mise en péril, et si un jour, lointain sans doute, mais un jour quand même, Juifs et Musulmans en Orient peuvent parvenir à n'être plus ennemis, si Israël peut acquérir ce sentiment de sécurité qui lui manque depuis les origines, et les Arabes regagner, dans leur dignité retrouvée, les moyens d'un indispensable développement.

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La crise du Moyen Orient depuis des semaines maintenant occupe à tel point le devant de la scène internationale qu'elle a en quelque sorte jeté le voile sur tout ce qui ne s'y attache pas directement. Le drame vietnamien lui-même est de ce fait moins présent dans les esprits, même si cependant il se poursuit sans qu'apparaissent aujourd'hui davantage qu'hier les perspectives d'un règlement, alors qu'au contraire les opérations militaires, et d'abord les bombardements, poursuivent impitoyablement leur escalade. La position de la France est trop connue et a été trop souvent exprimée pour qu'il me soit nécessaire de m'en expliquer à nouveau au fond devant l'Assemblée Nationale. Qu'il me soit permis simplement de dire, encore une fois, qu'à notre avis cette guerre ne peut être terminée que par un règlement négocié, avec la participation de tous les intéressés, sur la base des accords de Genève de 1954

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La situation en Europe offre un contraste frappant avec les violences qui se déchaînent en Asie à l'Est comme à l'Ouest. Pour la première fois depuis longtemps, peut être depuis toujours, ce n'est pas pour le moment du moins, dans notre continent que risquent d'apparaître les germes d'un conflit mondial, je veux dire d'un conflit qui opposerait les grandes puissances militaires de notre époque.

Ce n'est pas dire que tous les problèmes y soient réglés. Il en demeure au moins un, dont l'importance est capitale et dont le règlement final commande en définitive notre avenir à tous, je veux dire naturellement le problème allemand, que d'autres appellent celui de la sécurité européenne. Même si tout à cet égard reste ouvert, du moins un premier pas a-t-il été fait : il est maintenant admis par tous, de part et d'autres, qu'une solution ne peut être trouvée que par la voie d'un accord qui serait librement discuté entre l'ensemble des parties intéressées. En d'autres termes la guerre froide, avec ce qu'elle comporte d'affrontements, sinon d'épreuves de forces, n'est en aucune façon le contexte approprié pour les négociations qui devront un jour intervenir, mais bien la détente, dont nous avons dit souvent qu'elle devait conduire à la coopération et à l'entente.

Telle est en particulier la position adoptée par la République Fédérale allemande depuis la constitution, en novembre dernier, du gouvernement du Chancelier Kiesinger. Nous avons attaché de l'importance à cette affirmation, qui rejoint notre propre conception, comme nous avons ^{soit} à ce moment salué également avec satisfaction la volonté en quelque ^{sorte} corrélatrice marquée par Bonn de chercher à normaliser ses rapports avec l'ensemble des pays de l'Europe orientale. Le gouvernement connaît bien entendu, comme chacun, les difficultés d'une telle entreprise, les obstacles qui s'y opposent encore, et il sait qu'il ne peut s'agir que du début d'un long processus. Mais il est important déjà qu'une évolution soit amorcée.

Pour ce qui concerne la France, elle ne peut y trouver qu'une raison supplémentaire pour poursuivre, dans un esprit renouvelé, l'application du traité de coopération franco-allemande de Janvier 1963. Nous nous félicitons à ce sujet des contacts déjà noués avec M. Kiesinger et M. Brandt et nous envisageons avec intérêt la nouvelle rencontre, dite au sommet, qui doit prendre place les 12 et 13 Juillet prochains

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Une telle coopération, si elle est fondée sur des vues parallèles concernant les réalités internationales, n'est nullement en contradiction, bien au contraire, avec la politique qui est celle de notre pays, depuis plusieurs années déjà, dans ses rapports avec l'Union soviétique et les autres pays de l'Europe orientale, politique que nous avons affirmée à maintes reprises, et qui est aujourd'hui très largement pratiquée aussi par l'ensemble de nos partenaires de l'Europe occidentale et reconnue par eux comme la seule qui soit présentement à la fois désirable et possible.

C'est maintenant devenu un lieu commun de dire que nos rapports avec les pays de l'Est sont tout à fait satisfaisants et se développent régulièrement. En témoignent les chiffres, encore très insuffisants certes, mais toujours croissants, de notre commerce, les efforts faits pour l'enseignement et la pratique du français, enfin ce complexe de comités et de rencontres régulières que nous avons mis sur pied avec la Russie pour travailler dans tous les domaines de la coopération industrielle, technique et scientifique. Il s'agit d'une action d'ensemble qui portera ses fruits à terme, parce qu'en réalité tout était à faire ou à refaire, mais dont les débuts ouvrent des perspectives sérieuses.

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Après les voyages effectués l'an dernier par le Général de Gaulle en Union soviétique et par M. Messyguine en France, le Président de la République se rendra au début de l'automne en Pologne, un peu plus tard en Roumanie, deux nations qui, à des titres divers, sont unies à la nation française par des liens particulièrement amicaux. Le Premier Ministre, d'autre part, se rendra en juillet en Russie. Ainsi se poursuivent de manière constante des contacts qui attestent le renouveau de nos rapports avec l'Europe orientale.

Après la coopération franco-allemande, après la pratique de la détente avec l'Est, le troisième aspect de notre politique en Europe est ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler la construction européenne, c'est-à-dire l'association étroite, sur le plan économique d'abord, d'un certain nombre d'Etats de l'Ouest du continent. Ici encore il n'y a nulle contradiction avec ce qui précède, dès lors que ce que nous faisons est voulu pour lui-même, et par conséquent n'est plus, comme jadis, animé de l'esprit de la guerre froide, ni inspiré fondamentalement par l'idée qu'il s'agit de bâtir un élément supplémentaire de défense de tous les Occidentaux, Européens ou non, contre les périls venant de l'Orient. Tout au contraire, cette construction est appelée à devenir un facteur utile, sinon indispensable, dans l'Europe pacifique et équilibrée à laquelle nous voulons aboutir un jour après le règlement du problème allemand.

Pour le moment, il s'agit du Marché commun et celui-ci, dont nous venons de célébrer les dix ans accomplis, est dans l'ensemble une réussite. Tout le monde le reconnaît, à tel point qu'alors qu'il ne se trouvait personne pour en contester les mérites lorsque l'on était dans les virtualités plutôt que dans les réalités, les critiques et les craintes commencent à apparaître au moment où la libération des échanges devient effective et est prévue pour être totale dans un an d'ici. La politique agricole elle-même risque, dans l'avenir, de n'être plus considérée comme une fleur entièrement dépourvue d'épines. En d'autres termes, à la veille de l'ouverture complète des frontières entre les Six et de la création d'un marché agricole unique, la France commence vraiment à se rendre compte du cycle révolutionnaire dans lequel, en acceptant de

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s'ouvrir complètement à la concurrence internationale, elle s'est engagée en 1957, sans imaginer vraiment qu'il irait à son terme. Notre pays comprend peu à peu les transformations profondes, et par conséquent douloureuses, qui en résulteront nécessairement en ce qui concerne son industrie, son commerce et son agriculture.

La grande négociation tarifaire mondiale, connue sous le nom de négociation Kennedy, qui vient d'aboutir à Genève est, par ses résultats, de nature à accélérer ce mouvement de modernisation économique et de participation toujours accrue aux échanges internationaux. Il était nécessaire, alors qu'un ensemble économique aussi massif que l'association des Six du Marché Commun allait être définitivement constitué, qu'il ne devînt pas autarcique, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne se coupât pas du monde extérieur, et d'abord des autres grands ensembles industriels comparables que sont l'Association européenne de Libre Echange, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Japon. Autrement dit, il était fatal que son régime de protection fût largement plus libéral que celui qui existait auparavant chez ses divers membres pris individuellement. Telle est en définitive la raison profonde pour laquelle la négociation Kennedy a été imaginée. Elle est aussi la raison pour laquelle nous ne pouvions en refuser le principe et avions en définitive intérêt à la faire aboutir.

La seule condition que nous étions en droit de poser - et c'est ce que nous avons fait - était que rien ne fût conclu que sur la base d'une stricte réciprocité, autrement dit qu'aux concessions de notre communauté correspondent des concessions équivalentes de nos partenaires, sous la réserve bien entendu de ce qui pouvait être prévu de particulier en faveur des pays insuffisamment développés. Je crois pouvoir affirmer que, dans l'ensemble - et c'est la raison pour laquelle le gouvernement l'a approuvé - ce qui a été convenu est bien équilibré, en même temps que les secteurs sensibles de notre production ont été suffisamment ménagés.

Tout au long de cette négociation, la Communauté a discuté comme une entité, sur des bases convenues d'un commun accord entre les gouvernements, lesquels n'ont à aucun moment même imaginé que l'on pût, pour les définir, recourir à des décisions prises à la majorité, c'est-à-dire contre l'un d'entre eux. Les Six se sont ainsi affirmés comme un interlocuteur valable et d'une importance essentielle. Voilà sans doute une bonne performance pour leurs premiers pas dans la vie internationale.

C'est pour moi un devoir d'ajouter qu'ils ont été, tout au long d'une très dure négociation, représentés par un membre de leur commission, M. Jean Rey, dont la compétence, la loyauté et les efforts ont été pour une bonne

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part dans le succès final. Le gouvernement est heureux à l'occasion du présent débat, de lui en rendre publiquement témoignage.

Peut-être ces mérites ne sont-ils pas tout à fait étrangers au fait que c'est sur M. Rey que s'est en définitive porté le choix des six gouvernements, lorsqu'il s'est agi de désigner le premier président de la Commission unique qui va, à partir du 1er juillet, se substituer aux commissions existantes du Marché commun et de l'Euratom et à la Haute Autorité du Charbon et de l'Acier. A leur récente rencontre à Rome, rencontre dont ils sont redevables à l'heureuse initiative de l'Italie, nos gouvernements se sont en effet finalement mis d'accord pour donner effet à cette date au traité sur la fusion des institutions communautaires qui avait été signé par eux au début de 1965 et dont la précédente Assemblée Nationale avait autorisé la ratification il y a plus de deux ans. Ce sera une mesure de bonne administration, prélude à la fusion, reconnue par tous nécessaire, des trois Communautés elles-mêmes.

Ainsi, tous comptes faits, la coopération économique entre les Six qui découle en quelque sorte organiquement de l'existence du Marché commun, se développe-t-elle à la satisfaction de tous les membres, dans le sens de leurs intérêts individuels et collectifs. C'est un fait essentiel dont nous pouvons nous féliciter, et parce qu'il contribue de manière effective à notre propre développement économique, et parce qu'il contient à l'évidence, par la solidarité même qui se crée peu à peu, des virtualités politiques.

Comment expliquer que ces virtualités ne se soient traduites encore par aucun commencement, je ne veux pas dire même d'action, mais d'organisation, ne fût-ce que par ces consultations et ces discussions que nous avons ébauchées il y a six ou sept ans ? Les motifs en sont apparus clairement, une fois de plus, à la réunion de Rome que je mentionnais à l'instant, même si nous avons pu nous mettre d'accord pour une nouvelle rencontre d'ici la fin de l'année, ce qui n'est naturellement pas sans signification.

Tous les partenaires, en effet, n'ont ni les mêmes traditions, ni les mêmes orientations, ni les mêmes préoccupations. Avec l'Allemagne et l'Italie, deux autres nations continentales d'importance comparable, la France pourrait facilement s'entendre sur l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à chercher à définir une politique européenne et à s'organiser en conséquence. Elles comme nous, par exemple, regrettent certainement que la crise du Moyen-Orient n'ait pas été l'occasion de définir une attitude commune et d'ailleurs les positions qu'elles ont prises tout au long des événements ne se distinguent guère de la nôtre.

Les pays du Bénélux ne semblent pas avoir le sentiment que tout ceci soit possible, ni même souhaitable. Ils ne manifestent pas qu'une politique européenne, qui soit vraiment telle, soit leur premier souci. Ils ont une tradition de réserve et une orientation beaucoup moins continentale qui les distingue de leurs trois principaux partenaires. La crainte de s'engager avec eux-ci les maintient donc dans le doute, sinon la négation, alors qu'au contraire, dans le domaine économique, tous leurs intérêts les poussent à s'associer de la manière la plus étroite.

Sans doute est-ce aussi la raison pour laquelle la Belgique et les Pays-Bas sont, parmi les Six, ceux qui considèrent en quelque sorte comme un impératif l'adhésion au Marché Commun d'une Grande-Bretagne chez laquelle ils retrouvent beaucoup des vues de leur propre politique, et qu'ils voient comme un élément d'équilibre, en leur faveur par rapport à la France et à l'Allemagne.

J'en viens ainsi au dernier point, non le moindre, que je dois évoquer à propos de la Communauté Economique Européenne. C'est un problème qui est posé depuis le début, c'est à dire depuis que le Marché Commun a été créé sans la Grande-Bretagne, parce qu'elle avait refusé de s'y joindre, et même avant qu'il ait commencé à fonctionner, alors que certains voulaient, c'était en 1958, créer une grande zone de libre échange dans laquelle il se serait confondu. Nous devons d'ailleurs objectivement reconnaître que, du point de vue économique comme du point de vue politique, le problème existe en effet et c'est pourquoi il se présente à nous constamment depuis dix ans, même si c'est dans des formes successives. Après la rupture de décembre 1958 à propos de la zone de libre échange, une première tentative d'entrée dans le Marché Commun avait été faite - qui ne s'en souvient - entre le milieu de 1961 et le début de 1963. Chacun alors avait mis la France sur la sellette parce qu'après des mois de discussions sans conclusion, elle avait le courage de dire que les conditions n'étaient pas réunies pour une adhésion de l'Angleterre à notre communauté. Maintenant que le temps a passé, tous ceux qui jugent objectivement, y compris beaucoup de nos amis britanniques, reconnaissent que nous nous étions alors bornés à constater un fait.

Le temps a passé, en effet, et voici que, quatre années plus tard, un autre gouvernement britannique soulève à nouveau la question. Bien des choses ont changé depuis, non seulement dans le jugement des actuels gouvernants à Londres, mais en ce qui concerne la Grande-Bretagne elle-même. Elle semble bien davantage engagée dans les réalités des transformations économiques et monétaires qui lui sont indispensables, bien davantage anxieuse de trouver dans le monde d'aujourd'hui la place qui sera en définitive la sienne, et qui, sans doute, sera plus que par le passé marquée par son appartenance à l'Europe. Oserai-je ajouter que ce n'est pas nous, mais ceux de nos amis d'Europe et d'Angleterre qui sont les plus à même de critiquer la politique de la France d'aujourd'hui, qui disent que la Grande-Bretagne doit cesser d'être liée de façon excessive aux Etats-Unis, affirmer davantage son indépendance et qu'elle ne peut le faire qu'en se rattachant à l'Europe et en pratiquant avec celle-ci une véritable politique européenne.

Quoi qu'il en soit, cela a été répété bien des fois, la candidature britannique soulève, suivant l'expression de M. Harold WILSON lui-même, des problèmes formidables. En dehors du problème proprement politique, qui est cependant essentiel, même s'il n'est pas dans la discussion proprement dite, ils sont schématiquement de deux ordres.

En premier lieu la Grande-Bretagne se présente à nous accompagnée d'autres candidats, l'Irlande, le Danemark et la Norvège, peut-être d'autres. L'entrée de cet ensemble de pays - ils sont malaisément séparables - ferait de la Communauté quelque chose de tout-à-fait différent de ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui. Le nombre à lui seul rendrait sa gestion beaucoup plus difficile et par conséquent la transformerait en un ensemble infiniment plus lâche. La diversité beaucoup plus grande des intérêts rendrait la conciliation plus ardue et donnerait un tour tout-à-fait différent à ce que nous appelons les harmonisations économiques. Enfin des orientations économiques et politiques toutes différentes opposeraient sans doute les nations continentales et les autres qui seraient groupées autour du Royaume-Uni. Bref, le système relativement homogène que nous connaissons serait complètement transformé, se rapprochant sans doute beaucoup d'une zone de libre-échange. Il aurait à coup sûr ses mérites propres. Mais nous devons bien voir qu'il s'agirait de tout autre chose.

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En second lieu la question est de savoir si, dans les domaines essentiels, la politique de la Communauté peut devenir celle de l'Angleterre.

Il s'agit d'abord de la monnaie puisque, même indépendamment de ses soucis récents ou actuels, le système de la zone sterling paraît difficilement compatible avec le fonctionnement de notre Marché Commun. Il s'agit ensuite de l'agriculture, car nous ne pouvons envisager de modifications dans les principes ou les conditions d'application d'une politique qui constitue un élément essentiel de l'ensemble, qui nous a coûté tant de peine à établir et que la France n'envisagera jamais de laisser se dégrader.

Tels sont les éléments de base qu'il s'agit maintenant pour les Six de mettre à l'étude. La Grande-Bretagne a fait officiellement acte de candidature, alors qu'en 1961 elle avait simplement demandé à engager une discussion pour déterminer si les conditions d'une accession éventuelle étaient réunies. De ce fait les procédures du Traité de Rome, en l'espèce son article 237, doivent entrer en jeu : le Conseil décide à l'unanimité sur la réponse à faire, après avoir pris l'avis de la Commission. C'est ce que nous allons faire. Une première discussion s'engagera à Bruxelles à la réunion du Conseil du 26 juin. Elle sera poursuivie par la suite et nous aurons à demander l'avis de la Commission, la nouvelle Commission bien entendu, dès que celle-ci sera définitivement constituée après le 1er juillet.

Nul ne se dissimule qu'il s'agira d'une discussion compliquée et prolongée et que la décision à prendre par les Six est d'une grande importance. C'est cette importance même qui doit nous conduire à mesurer à l'avance avec le plus grand soin toutes les conséquences ou toutes les implications de nos conclusions.

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Ainsi, dans l'immédiat et à court terme, nombreux sont les domaines où doit s'exercer l'action internationale. Cela signifie, bien sûr, que beaucoup de difficultés sont devant nous. C'est le cas d'abord du Moyen-Orient, où la crise est ouverte et durera longtemps. Défendre la paix, éviter les incidents graves, prévenir le conflit des puissances, préserver pour l'avenir les chances d'un règlement pacifique et travailler à en préparer les conditions, telles sont les tâches auxquelles la France peut apporter une contribution positive.

En Europe, où il n'y a pas de crise, nous devons essentiellement poursuivre ce qui a été entrepris. D'abord, bien entendu, la détente et la coopération qui sont les conditions du règlement d'ensemble que nous attendons depuis vingt ans. Aussi poursuivre la construction européenne, dans l'esprit que j'ai dit quant à son inspiration politique générale, comme un instrument de prospérité, d'indépendance et de paix. C'est dans cet esprit que nous aurons à considérer la candidature britannique, comme tous les autres problèmes relatifs au développement de la communauté existante.

Il y aurait encore beaucoup à ajouter, notamment pour tout ce qui a trait à l'aide au développement. Mais j'en ai dit assez pour montrer que la France, au dehors, a des tâches qui lui sont vraiment propres et doit, par conséquent, avoir une politique qui lui soit propre, toujours orientée vers le rapprochement des peuples et vers la paix./.



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Memo No.: 512

File No.: 202/2/1

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
18th April 1967

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Europe Test
(To retain C. on
of file 15/19/7)
[Signature]

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Francophonie

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Attached are some notes that we have prepared on the subject of francophonie. They cover some of the same ground as memorandum No. 137 of 30th March 1967 from Accra, but from the French point of view. They are based on a conversation in the relevant section of the Foreign Ministry and on press reports, particularly two articles on francophonie which appeared in the November 1966 and February 1967 issues of the Revue de Défense Nationale. (The former was written by M. Philippe Scipion, who is attached to the presidency as secretary-general for the Community and for African and Malagasy affairs, that is, the office mentioned in paragraph 9 of Accra's memorandum No. 137.)

2. The statements on 3rd November by M. Couve de Murville and on 8th November by M. de Broglie, the then Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry (paragraph 6 of the attachment) show clearly enough that the French Government accepts the idea of co-operating in francophonie, as does the participation of MM. de Broglie and Charbonnel in the new Association de la solidarité francophone. Indeed, after the idea of francophonie had been fully launched, as we understand it was, by the O.C.A.M. meeting of June 1966, it is difficult to see how the French Government could have continued to hold aloof or would have wished to do so.

3. Once the idea had been launched, the early reticence of the French, and their continuing caution, are sufficiently explained, it seems to us, by their desire to avoid charges of neo-colonialism. The Foreign Ministry tells us that, to the same end, the Government will continue to avoid taking any initiative to give effect to francophonie, but that it will strongly support "appropriate" initiatives from others. Other factors which may well continue to make the French cautious include the wish to avoid involvement in internal disputes of other countries where French language and culture are an issue (Belgium and Canada) and the political difficulty of deciding which countries are eligible for membership of francophonie and which not. The question arises whether the proposals for giving substance to francophonie have been inspired by the

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French behind the scenes. We have no evidence of such inspiration and, from what we have seen of President Senghor (on the television here) it does not seem likely that he would need any urging from the French to launch his ideas. Even if the French inspired certain specific proposals to advance francophonie (for instance, multilateral co-operation in the field of education) it is difficult - given the caution of French public attitudes on the question - to see such proposals going far unless they were entirely acceptable to the Africans.

4. One element in the French attitude towards francophonie is worth drawing your attention to particularly and that is the French view on the possible extension of francophonie beyond the cultural field. Francophonie is most often regarded as the idea of (or the organization or organizations for) co-operation among French-speaking peoples in the cultural field and in the related fields of technical assistance and economic development. It is apparent that President Senghor envisages it as wider in scope than this; and it is of interest that in both the main French speeches on the subject the idea of an extension of francophonie beyond the cultural field is by no means excluded, although it would have been easy for MM. de Broglie and Couve de Murville to confine the concept to cultural co-operation if they had wished.

5. What would the French stand to gain from development of francophonie? The intellectual and emotional attractions to Frenchmen of the opportunity which francophonie offers to extend and consolidate the influence of French language and culture can scarcely be exaggerated and this point is illustrated by M. de Broglie's concluding remarks on 8th November translated in the attachment. In particular, Frenchmen lament the present tendency to subordinate French to English as an international language and there is no doubt that the French would see francophonie as a means of ensuring French its rightful place in international usage. Second, the development of co-operation among French-speaking countries may help to ease the burden on France of aid, especially technical assistance, for the former African colonies. The second of the Revue de Défense Nationale articles mentioned above devotes a good deal of space to the teaching of the French language in the former African colonies. According to the article, although France was successful in educating elites in the African colonies between the two world wars, mass education is going ahead only slowly and there is also the problem that new generations of leaders have to be trained. The French or certain sections of French opinion may see francophonie as a means of increasing the supply of teachers of French from developed countries other than France. The Foreign Ministry has spoken to us in terms not of any increase in aid as the result of francophonie but rather of the harmonization of technical assistance that is being sent to Africa by developed countries such as the French themselves and the Canadians.

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6. As will be apparent we consider that the French have a clear interest in continuing to encourage the formation, as part of the development of francophonie, of various organizations bringing together representatives of French-speaking countries. The effort in providing representation to new organizations is for them (as distinct no doubt from the Africans) marginal and the meetings will provide, if nothing more, opportunities to put French points of view. It is true, as is pointed out in Accra's memorandum No. 137, that francophonie as a cultural grouping already exists but there is obviously much scope for the further organization of relations among French-speaking countries (and the recent attention to francophonie has undoubtedly given that organization a new impetus). Some remarks by supporters of francophonie could be interpreted to imply that their aim is the creation of an inter-Governmental organization which would have some co-ordinating role in relations between French-speaking countries in the cultural field (at least to begin with). The development of new organizations bringing together French-speaking countries will itself presumably increase the cohesiveness of the French-speaking world.

7. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Accra, Brussels, Cairo, Geneva, Lagos and Ottawa.

G. B. Feakes
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor

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Statements of Attitudes towards Francophonie

The idea of francophonie was first put forward by President Léopold Senghor of Senegal. In a speech on 9th July 1965, he said: "I value francophonie highly I do not understand why we French-speakers should be subject to some inferiority complex and refuse to group ourselves. That is a problem with which I am very preoccupied." In November 1965, during a visit to Senegal and the Ivory Coast, President Bourguiba of Tunisia enthusiastically took up the idea. In a speech at Dakar University he said: "Francophonie represents a reality in Africa. Not only because it facilitates contacts between countries where French is the official language and those where it is a working language, but also because it better enables these countries, participants in the same cultural world, to discover, even beyond language, what it is that unifies. It is thus a sort of Commonwealth which I should like to see established among them, a type of community respecting the sovereignty of each and harmonizing the efforts of all." A few days later, in Abidjan, President Bourguiba and President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, stressed in an official communiqué the cohesive factor which a community of language, of culture, and of outlook would provide. From Mali (in the person of M. Jean-Marie Kone, Minister of State) came favourable comment on the President Senghor's idea.

2. The first public French reaction to President Senghor's idea came from M. Charbonnel (who was then Secretary of State for Co-operation, that is, aid to the former African colonies). In Abidjan in June 1966 he said: "We think that it is a fruitful idea which we can consider only with much sympathy. For this cultural community will bring closer together ... peoples who speak the same language. All this is considered with much sympathy but equally with much discretion by the French Government. It is not for the French Government to make proposals. In order not to create problems and to avoid giving rise in the rest of the world to the feeling that the French Government wants to mount some sort of neo-colonialist operation, we consider that it would be better that the African States should say what they want. The French Government wishes to be perfectly discreet and very open to all suggestions which will be made to it."

3. At the conference of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache, held in Tananarive at the end of June 1966, President Senghor put before the Heads of State the idea of a French-speaking community to be developed in stages and to extend beyond the boundaries of black Africa, to include the states of the Maghreb, Canada and Asia (Cambodia, Laos). He envisaged as a beginning an exchange of cultural and, in particular, educational information and proposed the establishment of an African council of higher education comprising representatives of all the O.C.A.M. states and of Burundi, France, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and the States of the Maghreb. He also saw francophonie as playing a determining role in the economic and financial relations of the countries in question. He realized that, in this economic

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and financial field, exploratory talks between national representatives would be necessary but did not hesitate to contemplate that they might lead to the formation of an enlarged Franc zone. He also advocated inter-parliamentary meetings which would have for study the whole range of possibilities for co-operation and he envisaged the creation of a French-speaking inter-parliamentary union with a secretariat to be situated in Paris.

4. The Council of the O.C.A.M. approved the concept of a French-speaking community and entrusted M. Hamari Diori, President of Niger with the task of putting it before President de Gaulle.

5. M. Diori was received by General de Gaulle; and on 9th July he and the presidents of and ministers from a number of other former French colonies in Africa were entertained to lunch by General de Gaulle. The speech which the General made on that occasion though extremely cordial avoided mentioning francophonie. Afterwards M. Diori said that General de Gaulle had shown "beaucoup de compréhension" for the idea and M. Senghor explained: "France, certainly, is not against francophonie. However, General de Gaulle has decolonized. He does not wish to go back on his policy of decolonization. To the extent that francophonie is not a step backwards, he is not opposed to it. Moreover, we have not asked General de Gaulle to take initiatives in this respect which it is for us to take. We shall continue our consultations and some time in the future we shall take initiatives which, I am persuaded, France will accept."

6. The French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, in the course of the budget debate in the National Assembly on 3rd November 1966, said that while the French Government was very interested in the concept of francophonie "the Assembly will understand that we should be anxious, in a matter which may be a little delicate, to show a certain reserve. Decolonization being, after all, a recent operation, it is proper that France should not thrust herself forward. And this is one of the reasons, again, that we are happy to see our friends taking the initiative ... The essential factor in francophonie is, of course, the cultural aspect. We think that to the extent that this movement which begins to be apparent has a future - and we believe that it has one - it is in this field that it will be able to develop. The cultural field, moreover, is not defined ... and it happens that culture spills over into economic and political affairs. If this happens, we will be happy but, once again, the question is essentially one of cultural affairs."

7. On 7th November 1966, in a speech to the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris, M. Jean de Broglie (then Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry) went a good deal further. He said: "Whether it is a question in the immediate future of a possible meeting in Luxembourg of parliamentarians of French-speaking countries, of a meeting of the association of French-language universities

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contemplated for Quebec, or of a round-table at the level of executive authorities, France will reply favourably to invitations that might be extended ... We have a cultural base to develop and to strengthen. Its extension is a question of opportunity, of imagination, and indeed of the matter's maturing. One can certainly think that one day perhaps it will be necessary to have a cultural body, a centre for planning, perhaps a secretariat. But to be sound, such initiatives will have to come in their own time from the (i.e. African) French-speaking countries themselves." M. de Broglie went on to indicate one main source of the attraction that the idea of francophonie has for France. "Languages and cultures are never things definitively established. Without adaptation, they decline. In the face of the changes in the world, it is necessary continuously to rejuvenate, to purify and to nourish them. In our time, it is necessary even to organize their formation and development ... For us the use of French, the propagation of French culture, appears one of the genuine means of human progress. The fact of speaking French imposes a certain discipline of thought itself ... We therefore consider that the logic of the French language and the equilibrium of its thought remain of a significance essential for the future. We consider in consequence that a community of French language and culture has a justification, desirable for all. We consider ... that its possible extensions merit our attention."

Scope of Francophonie

8. The states or territories eligible for participation in francophonie include, according to M. Diori Hamani, those where French is the national or official language, those where French is the language of communication (e.g. North Africa) and those where French is one of the official languages (Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada). The whole list of territories where French is spoken would include in Europe: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Val d'Aosta (in Italy); the Lebanon and Syria in the Middle East; Algeria; Morocco and Tunisia; the fourteen former colonies in West and Central Africa, Congo (DR), Ruanda, Burundi, Djibouti, Madagascar, Reunion, the Comores; Mauritius and Seychelles; Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia; New Caledonia and French Polynesia; Newfoundland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Quebec; French Antilles, Haiti and French Guiana. Altogether the French-speaking populations are estimated to number 150 millions.

Attitude of Other Countries

9. By no means all the countries in question are interested in co-operating in francophonie: some are openly opposed. It would seem that even among members of O.C.A.M. there are certain who are very cautious about francophonie. The Ivory Coast is anxious that no new political organization should be formed. The Mauritanian Government feels the attraction of the Arabism of Mauritania's northern neighbours. According to the French

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Foreign Ministry Mali is 'theoretically' in favour, particularly since taking steps to rejoin the Franc zone. Guinea is, of course, openly hostile to the whole idea attacking it (in French) as a "disguised form of neo-colonialism". As for Algeria, when it was presented to him by M. Diori Hameni last year, Premier Boumedienne was not very receptive to the idea: his interests lie far more in the pan-Arabic movement, though he might be persuaded to join if he could foresee material benefits from the organization which he does not already possess. (France already has a fairly extensive cultural and educational programme in Algeria, but is finding it increasingly difficult to recruit the teachers, etc., which Algeria wants.) For Algeria also, the organization would have to be free of any political overtones. The present difficulties between Morocco and France would seem to preclude Moroccan participation in francophonie.

10. In Asia, Cambodia and Laos have expressed interest in the organization of francophonie though it has gone no further than that. France has no diplomatic relations with the two Viet Nams and may find it difficult to be associated with either in any organization; at least at the Government level.

11. In Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada, only a part of the population is French-speaking, and each has its own linguistic difficulties. It remains to be seen to what extent Belgium in particular will find it possible to participate in francophonie.

Stage Reached with Francophonie

12. So far as it emerges from the statements of its supporters, as we understand them, francophonie is the idea of furthering co-operation in various fields among French-speaking states. The word tends also to mean the various organizations considered as a whole that give expression to that co-operation. Francophonie already exists to the extent that the idea of co-operation among French-speaking peoples, for its own sake, has wide currency and in the sense that cultural, educational and linguistic relations between certain French-speaking countries (notably France and certain African countries) are already organized on a multilateral basis. The question now is whether that organization will be further developed, whether it will include other countries and whether it will extend into other fields (notably economic and political). It also remains to be seen whether some central co-ordinating body in the cultural field (at least to begin with) will be set up with Governmental representation from various French-speaking countries.

13. Within France, even if uncertainty remains as to what more should be done about it, the idea of francophonie is now a current and accepted one, as witness the recent establishment of the Association de solidarité francophone (of which MM. de Borghie and Charbonnel are patrons).

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There are already in existence here, and have been for some years, certain other bodies which serve the ends of franco-phonie (e.g. l'Association des universités entièrement ou partiellement de langue française, and le Haut Comité pour la défense et l'expansion de la langue française dans le monde). The most significant recent manifestation of franco-phonie is, however, the French-speaking group at the U.N. which, according to the French press, has representatives of Belgium, Congo (DR), Dahomey, France, Haiti, Mali, Senegal and Tunisia and is devoted to promoting the use of French. As we understand it, the group achieved some successes at the last session of the General Assembly. The Foreign Ministry tells us that two further steps are envisaged in the next few months. First, there is to be a meeting of parliamentary delegates from francophone countries, which will probably be held in Luxembourg, with a view to establishing a Union interparlementaire francophone. France and some other countries have already designated representatives. Second, there will be a meeting of Ministers of Education (on a wider basis than the consultations between France and certain African countries); and they may well be followed up by a meeting of Foreign Ministers or perhaps Heads of State.

13th April, 1967

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION.

ACCRA.

Europe sent

To retain. O. on
15/1/77 *In reply quote No. 212/24*
1/7/77
1/7/77

Memorandum No. 137

30th March, 1967.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

FRANCOPHONIE

A good deal has been published during recent months in French-language newspapers and periodicals on the subject of "Francophonie" (my despatch No. 1/67 of 13th March 1967, para. 11). The material and comments which follow represent what we have been able to discover about the nature of this concept, and the way in which it is viewed by a number of French-speaking politicians in Africa and elsewhere. Because our sources of information in Accra are limited, we would be interested in the comments of other Australian missions, particularly those in Paris and Ottawa.

The Origins of the Concept

2. Francophonie has been in the air for some time. In March 1966, after private discussions with President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal during his visit to that country in November 1965, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia suggested publicly the establishment of a world wide community of states having French as the national, official and working language. Though Bourguiba's proposal was couched in the vaguest terms, the idea was enthusiastically taken up and named francophonie by Senghor, who took the opportunity to discuss it at length with Bourguiba during his return visit to Tunisia in May 1966. Since then, Senghor has been the most vociferous exponent of the concept.

Proposals for a Conference

3. Our confusion about the role of the French Government in the promotion of francophonie has recently been compounded by newspaper reports that a preparatory meeting would take place in Paris during April of French-speaking countries interested in the proposal of Presidents Senghor of Senegal and Bourguiba of Tunisia for the establishment of a Commonwealth à la française, based on the French language and appropriately dubbed francophonie. These reports said that the meeting was expected to be chaired by President Hamani Diori of Niger, current president of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). Hamani Diori has been charged by OCAM to enlist for the project the support of other French-speaking countries, particularly France and North African states. We checked these reports with the French Embassy here and were told that such a meeting would take place. Confirmed participants, according to the French Embassy, included France, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast and Tunisia; and Canada and Cambodia had also expressed interest. The Canadian High Commission in Accra, however, which has accreditation in Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Togo, and whose government has brought forward a number of proposals concerning francophonie, had heard nothing of the proposed meeting, although it had seen some press coverage. According to our Canadian colleagues, their government, in fact, is already planning a meeting of francophone countries in Canada (see para. 5 below). This apparent confusion about meetings

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is symptomatic of the diffuse nature of the proposal, of the differing interpretations which it may bear, and of the lack of co-ordinated development which has characterised it so far.

What is Francophonie?

4. Despite a number of public pronouncements on the subject by both Senghor and Hamani Diori, the concept obviously means different things to different people. Initially it appeared to be a purely cultural concept like Senghor's other favourite theme, négritude, but it has since developed an economic aspect as well. My impression, distilled from the public utterances of its African exponents, is that francophonie has the following main features :

- (a) It is to be a grouping of all states in which French is used, so that it should include not only France and the French-speaking countries of Africa (including former Belgian territories), but also Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Despite the inclusion of the Indo-Chinese states, African proponents of the concept appear to view francophonie as essentially an Afro-French affair. (There is an obvious analogy in the tendency of African Commonwealth states to view their membership of the Commonwealth solely in terms of their relationships with Great Britain).
- (b) There is to be a gradualist approach to the establishment of francophonie. The first institutions to be established under the concept are to be of a cultural and educational nature; namely, an association of French-speaking universities and extension of the present regular meetings of French-speaking African ministers of education to include all French-speaking countries. The gradualist approach is certainly favoured by Bourguiba, who has said that he believes the first step should be the establishment of formal channels for educational co-operation and that economic and political consolidation should follow only gradually. Senghor differs from Bourguiba and believes that the first steps should be the immediate establishment of francophonie in "non-controversial" fields of interest: parliamentary union, university association, meetings of ministers of culture. This also appears to be the French view.

5. The Canadian view of francophonie, according to our colleagues here in the Canadian High Commission, is clear and unambiguous. The Canadian Government sees the concept as doubly serving Canadian interests: first, as a means of helping dispel the sense of isolation of French-speaking Canadians by the establishment of close links with other francophone countries; second, as a convenient peg on which to hang the proposed increase in annual Canadian aid to francophone Africa from \$Can.8 million to \$Can.12 million, as part of the doubling of Canadian aid in all areas. In addition, the Canadian Government has offered an annual grant of \$Can.50,000 to AUFELF (Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue Française), which was founded in 1961 and now has 55 members; and will provide an annual grant of \$Can.100,000 to AUFELF's International Fund for University Co-operation, the major aim of which is assistance to French-speaking universities in under-developed countries. The Canadians exclude any political collaboration. In a major speech on francophonie on 11th March, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, said: "Nobody sees francophonie as taking on a political aspect". He went on to propose that institutional francophonie take the form of an international non-government organization based on national associations, independent of governments but working in co-operation with them and with their support. This proposal is at present being put to the various francophone governments, and provided a favourable response is received, the Canadian Government has announced its willingness to convene a meeting to discuss it.

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The Antecedents of Francophonie

6. Although its promoters assert that francophonie is to embrace all those countries whose official language is French, including such bilingual and multilingual states as Canada and Switzerland, the concept appears to be in fact another in the long series of attempts to redefine the relationship between France and its former African territories and among the territories themselves. It differs from earlier experiments in that it is an African rather than French initiative and in that it is characterized by a great flood of well-phrased but often ill-considered rhetoric with which its promoters seek to sweep away the doubters. It has been unkindly but not perhaps inaccurately suggested that francophonie has its roots in the African leaders' fears for the future après de Gaulle, when they expect to lose the advantages of the long-standing personal sentimental interest in Black Africa which de Gaulle is assumed to feel.

7. At least four distinct attempts to re-organize and re-define France's links with its African overseas territories were made between 1945 and the independence of the West African states in 1960. The first was the French Union, set up with the Fourth Republic in 1945/46, instituting territorial assemblies in each of the African colonies, which, except for Madagascar and the trust territories of Cameroun and Togo, were grouped into two federations, Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF). There was direct representation for the overseas citizens in the French parliament in Paris, and African representatives (including Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny) participated directly in the administration of both France and the colonies. The Union persisted in this form until 1956, when mounting demands for independence in the colonies brought about the Loi-cadre, which maintained the French Union, but transferred much power to the colonial parliaments, thus weakening the two regional federations. Senghor strenuously opposed this "balkanisation" of the Union, which he feared would be to the detriment of the poorer African territories, like his own Senegal, while Houphouët-Boigny played an important role in the drafting of the Loi-cadre, which he saw as giving greater scope for development in the better-endowed territories such as his own Ivory Coast.

8. The Loi-cadre increased the local autonomy of individual territories, but pressure for independence continued to increase, so that the French Government, in the referendum of September 1958, offered all AOF and AEF states, as well as Madagascar, Cameroun and Togo, the choice either of individual federation with France in a French community with no formal regional links, or immediate independence with severance of all links with France. The Community, accepted by all states except Guinea, was essentially a federation, with a common president and senate, and common nationality. But at the same time, it contained such "commonwealth" elements as bilateral treaties within the Community and prime ministers' conferences.

9. Too cumbersome to last, the Community collapsed when Houphouët-Boigny (by then Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast) demanded immediate independence for the Ivory Coast outside the Community. The rest of the Community rapidly followed his lead, and by the end of 1960, it had broken up, all member states proceeding to full separate independence. The sole remnant of the Community is an office directly under the French President, the Office of the Community and Afro-Malagasy Affairs, the main function of which appears to be the facilitation of contact between the African heads of state and de Gaulle. We understand that this office, a sort of French C.R.O., is gradually being absorbed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We would be grateful for whatever information the Australian Embassy, Paris, can provide on its structure and operations.

10. The centripetal pull of Paris has continued to be strong. Since 1960, the francophone African states have experimented with a variety of regional organizations of both a political and a functional

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nature. The first such was the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), a political grouping, formally established in September 1961, which developed out of the meetings of the Brazzaville Group (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville and Madagascar). The UAM, dominated by Houphouët-Boigny, was the prime mover in the "moderate" Monrovia Group, which confronted the "progressive" Casablanca Group of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Libya, the U.A.R. and Algeria (the P.L.N. Provisional Government). Following Algerian independence (a prime question of conflict between the groups) and the establishment of the OAU, the UAM was dissolved. The former member states of UAM soon drew together again, however, in the supposedly non-political Union Africaine et Malgache de Co-opération Economique (UAMCE), which in turn was replaced in 1965 by the overtly political Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), which is now promoting the francophonie project, the first attempt since 1960 to re-involve France in Africa institutionally. The instability evident in the parent organizations does not appear to have affected the functional organizations, such as the West African Monetary and Customs Unions, and their Central African counterparts, nor the stable and successful Conseil de l'Entente, a political and economic grouping of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo and Dahomey which has survived since 1960, despite the series of coups d'état in Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta. I believe that it is in the context of these various experiments in co-operation by the economically weak and on the whole politically primitive French African states - experiments which are a search for the economic and international security which the bulk of them cannot hope to attain individually - that francophonie should be viewed.

Sponsorship of the Concept by OCAM

11. In July 1966, the Heads of State of the member states of OCAM met in Tananarive to adopt the Organization's Charter. This meeting (several times postponed because of coups d'état in member states) presented Senghor with an ideal forum in which to urge the francophonie project on his colleagues. Apparently he did so, both before and during the conference, with sufficient energy to obtain its complete endorsement. The president of OCAM, Hamani Diori of Niger, was instructed to discuss francophonie with French-speaking governments both in Africa and elsewhere, concentrating on France and Maghreb.

12. OCAM's adoption of the francophonie project has provoked a good deal of opposition from the governments of the French-speaking African states which do not belong to the organization. President Sekou Touré of Guinea condemned the proposal outright, professing to see in it the "neo-colonialist hand of the French Government". The Algerian Government press attacked it violently and even the increasingly moderate Modibo Keita of Mali has obliquely criticised both OCAM and francophonie. Addressing the National Assembly, he is said to have commented that "to divide Africa into clans is to prepare the continent for recolonization". President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania has not condemned francophonie, but has observed that it appeared to be superfluous in view of the links which already bind French-speaking states.

French Reactions

13. The French Government is reported to be treating the proposal with a great deal of caution, partly, no doubt, with an eye to the public purse. Press reports quoted M. Jean Charbonnel, then French Secretary of State for Co-operation, as commenting in Abidjan in June 1966 (after discussing the proposal with President Houphouët-Boigny) that the French Government viewed it "with sympathy" but was reluctant to play a leading role or even to endorse it wholeheartedly to avoid accusations of "neo-colonialism". This has not, of course, prevented such accusations being voiced and the long procession of African Heads of State returning from the OCAM conference via Paris, and in particular via the Elysée, lends at least superficial credibility to them. As late as mid-September, seven French-speaking African

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Heads of State, including Senghor and Hamani Diori, were in Paris at the same time.

14. However, the French Government since appears to have committed itself at least to participation in discussions on francophonie, though taking care to emphasize its essentially cultural character. Speaking in the National Assembly in November 1966, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Couve de Murville, said: "We are being careful, in a matter which could be a little delicate, to show a certain reserve. Decolonization being after all a quite recent operation, it is proper that France not thrust itself forward The Government will reply affirmatively to invitations which might be issued by one country or another, or by the whole group of friendly francophone countries". Nonetheless, the French lost little time in moving into the francophonie field; in February 1967, an Association de Solidarite Francophone was launched. Theoretically a non-government body, its patron is M. Jean de Broglie, Secretary of State for Black Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and prominent in its membership are cabinet ministers, parliamentarians and senior officials.

Recent Developments

15. Since the OCAM summit meeting in July, both Hamani Diori and Senghor have been very active in the promotion of francophonie. The former has travelled throughout the Maghreb for this purpose, and the latter, besides frequent public statements, took the opportunity of his visit to Canada to enlist the support of that country, in addition to extracting from it a grant of \$US500,000 for emergency food aid and a \$US5.6 million educational assistance programme. The Canadian High Commission in Accra has told us that though Senghor discussed francophonie with the Quebec Government, he was careful to keep substantive discussion to the federal government, and indeed warned the Quebecois to leave foreign affairs to its care. He has also discussed francophonie with the Algerian President, Colonel Boumedienne.

16. The present situation of the francophonie concept is obscure, and it is not easy to forecast future developments. Despite OCAM endorsement, very few member governments of OCAM appear to have commented publicly on the concept, and one may fairly suspect a fairly general apathy on the subject on the part of African leaders who, in theory, have given it their support. It seems likely that most African leaders will hold their peace until the exact scope of francophonie, particularly its economic aspect, is made clear.

Comment

17. I am inclined to think francophonie will be an extravagance, even if the Canadian view of it prevails, because it is wasteful of time and energy that might be more effectively applied to the immediate problems confronting the countries involved. The fine words uttered by the exponents of francophonie have concealed some woolly thinking, such as Bourguiba's contention that it is "not a step back towards colonialism, but a step beyond independence", and Jean de Broglie's that "France is no longer just a land, a people, a state; it is a spirit, one might almost say a calling". Establishment of francophonie in an institutional form would add further demands on the time and money of the developing French-speaking African states without providing appreciable compensatory benefits. As so far revealed, the attitude to francophonie of the French Government, which already has a complex and efficient aid structure, makes it unlikely that additional aid funds will be provided. Of the other aid-giving countries eligible for membership only Canada appears so far to have exhibited any interest. An increase in Canadian aid to French-speaking African states would have occurred with or without francophonie. In practice francophonie, as a cultural grouping, already exists and has, in fact, a semi-institutional form, particularly in regard to relations between France and Black Africa, in the regular meetings of finance,

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education and health ministers; most francophone African states have special economic, military and often political relations with France. Through the vestigial Office of the Community and Afro-Malagasy Affairs, African presidents apparently already have a direct line to de Gaulle. AUPELF is a going concern, and a source of aid, and the francophone parliamentary union will soon be in existence.

18. Copies of this memorandum are being forwarded to the Australian missions at Paris, Ottawa, Brussels, Geneva, Lagos and Cairo.

JER

(J. E. Ryan)
High Commissioner

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM



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FH:

I. 44108

Dated: 27th June 1967

Rec'd: 5th July, 1967.
1430 LT.

FROM:

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, PARIS

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Savingram No. 17 to Canberra

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Repeated: Belgrade 9; Bonn 29; Brussels 23;
Cairo 10; Dublin 6; Geneva 25;
The Hague 25; London (for
External) 20; Moscow 16;
Noumea 13; Rome 29; Stockholm 22;
Vienna 17; Washington 37.

France: Monthly Political Summary for May 1967

The main event of the month was General de Gaulle's press conference on 16th May. It was awaited especially for the statement it was expected to include on his attitude towards British membership of the European Economic Community, as well as for his defence of the Government's decision to seek special powers to introduce a wide variety of economic and social measures by decree.

External Affairs

Press Conference and British entry into the E.E.C.

2. The President made it clear in his press conference that he was opposed to British entry into the E.E.C. at least for some years to come. While denying that there was now (or had previously been) any question of a French veto, he outlined the economic obstacles to British entry along familiar lines (difficulties that acceptance of the Common Agricultural Policy would cause for Britain, weakness of sterling and its position as a reserve currency). General de Gaulle also set out at some length the more purely "political" objections that he saw to British entry. These included British relationships with the U.S. and the Commonwealth, Britain's "special commitments" overseas, and the radical transformation of the E.E.C. that would follow entry of Britain and of other countries in her train. He concluded by indicating that, in the event that it was agreed to change Britain's relationship with the Six, three courses were possible:

- (a) to accept the transformation of the E.E.C. into something like a free trade zone which Britain's entry would entail, given the alterations to existing rules that she would require and the other countries that would enter with her;

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- (b) to establish a form of association between the E.E.C. on the one hand and Britain and various countries on the other to facilitate their economic relations;
- (c) to wait before making any change until the economic and political transformation of which Britain was showing signs was completed.

3. In the period immediately after General de Gaulle's press conference, proceedings in the National Assembly provided deputies with ample opportunity to take issue with him on the question of British entry into the E.E.C.; but few did so (see paragraph 11 below). The Socialist leaders MM. Mollet and Defferre briefly criticized his attitude; and M. Mitterrand, the leader of the Fédération de la Gauche subsequently affirmed support for British entry in a press conference on 26th May. During the month the Independent Republicans, on whose votes the Government relies in the National Assembly, appeared to be moving closer to support for British entry. The Communists' attitude has hardened against the Common Market in general and they are now considered to oppose British entry. Even among those in France who favour British entry, support is conditional on Britain's accepting fully the Treaty of Rome and the rules of the Common Agricultural Policy. In general this is the attitude of French agricultural and (with some exceptions) industrial interests.

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*Savingram 15x Paris
19 May 1967*

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7. Attached to Minister for Social
Affairs:

Jacques Chirac*
(Employment)

3. Because of complicated constitutional provisions restricting the voting rights of deputies on their appointment as ministers, the composition of the Government was not announced until after the elections for the principal posts in the National Assembly. The re-election on 3rd April of M. Chaban-Delmas as President of the Assembly was generally expected, but the ease of his election, by 261 votes to 214, though delighting the Gaullists, exaggerated the effective strength of the Government. Subsequent elections for posts in the Assembly suggested that the Government probably has a working majority of between ten and twenty seats. An important qualification is that this majority is vulnerable on economic and social matters, which was confirmed by the Prime Minister's decision not to seek a vote on his general declaration of policy before the Assembly on 18th April.

4. In the course of the month it seemed that the committed supporters of the Government in the Assembly would total only 242 out of 486 seats so that on paper it would no longer have the assured, though bare, majority of 244 which emerged from the elections. Subsequent changes, however, restored the Government's majority of 244. This total includes the Independent Republicans, who chose to continue as a separate group in the National Assembly, while the remainder of the Gaullists were incorporated in a group entitled Union démocratique pour la Ve République. A new centre group, based on M. Lecanuet's Centre Démocrate, was formed under the title Progrès et Démocratie Moderne. The composition of the new groups is as follows:-

(a)	<u>Union Démocratique pour la Ve République</u>	200
(b)	Independent Republicans	44
(c)	<u>Progrès et Démocratie Moderne</u>	41
(d)	<u>Fédération</u> (including M. Mendès-France & other P.S.U. members)	121
(e)	Communists	73
(f)	Deputies not members of any group	8

TOTAL:487

5. The Prime Minister's statement to the Assembly on 18th April of the new Government's policy provided important background to the Government's decision announced on 26th April to seek absolute legislative powers in social and economic matters for the next six months. The burden of his statement was that, bearing in mind the disappearance on 1st July 1968 of tariff barriers within the Common Market

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and the reductions in tariff protection against countries outside the Common Market which would possibly result from the Kennedy Round, the Government had an "absolute obligation" to place agriculture and industry in a position to withstand foreign competition. A certain amount had already been achieved to enable French agriculture to take advantage of the market of 200 million people which would open to it but much remained to be done. The same was true of French commerce. Industry was the sector causing the most anxiety. M. Pompidou attributed the present slight easing of economic activity to economic conditions in Britain and Germany. He went on to mention the Government's intention to reform the social security system and to associate labour in the "progrès de l'économie", by which it is generally assumed he meant that the Government would introduce some measure with an effect similar to that of M. Vallon's scheme for giving workers a share in industrial profits.

6. The decision, announced on 26th April, to seek powers under Article 38 of the Constitution to introduce by Government decree reforms in certain economic and social fields came as a complete surprise. A bill to this effect has been laid before the National Assembly and discussion of it is expected to be concluded before the end of May. In the announcement of its decision the Government stressed its concern at the very short period remaining in which to take measures of adaptation to the conditions of competition which will obtain among the states of the Common Market as from 1st July 1968.

7. Predictably the centre and left wing groups in the National Assembly have all expressed hostility to the Government proposal. Two days after the announcement M. Edgard Pisani, Minister for Equipment and Housing, resigned in protest at the Government's demand for special powers and was replaced by M. François Ortoli, an influential civil servant whose most recent post has been Commissioner-General for the French economic plan. M. Pisani has indicated that in resuming his seat in the Assembly he will support the action of the majority. M. Pisani, a left-wing Gaullist, has in the past expressed views similar to M. Giscard d'Estaing's recent statements about the desirability of a renewal of the influence of Parliament in the political life of the country.

8. It has become increasingly evident that economic problems and the uncertain degree of support which the Government enjoys in the National Assembly do not provide a sufficient explanation of the Government's action. The idea of recourse to Article 38 no doubt appealed to General de Gaulle and M. Pompidou as a means to achieve a number of political objectives: reform of the structure of industry, share for workers in the profits of the firms for which they

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work; re-establishment of the executive's predominance over the legislature; limiting the influence of (and administering a rebuff to) M. Giscard d'Estaing and others like him whose support of the Government is conditional. (As Chairman of the Finance Committee of Parliament, M. Giscard d'Estaing would have been in a key position if the new measures had been processed through Parliament in the normal way. But he could not assert his Parliamentary members to reject the special powers without provoking a dissolution and possibly a further growth in the strength of the opposition.) In addition, the President was no doubt attracted by the idea of providing a convincing demonstration that, whatever the image suggested by its flimsy Parliamentary majority, the Government is firmly in control and does not intend to be shaken. The manner in which the Government has chosen to act, although it is perfectly legal, can only confirm in their views those who voted against it at the last elections out of a dislike for the arbitrariness of certain of its proceedings. Raymond Aron observed in *Le Figaro* that to take away power from a newly elected Parliament manifestly violates the spirit of the constitution even if permissible under the letter. On the other hand, although some of the measures that the Government may be planning will be unpopular, their effect, if they serve to reduce causes for economic and social discontent, may be to rally support to the Government. What it intends to do under each of the headings included in its announcement of 26th April is as yet unknown.

Economy

9. Increasing concern has been manifested at the growth in unemployment (now approaching 2 per cent of the labour force), the stagnation of industrial output in certain sectors and gradual diminution of France's very comfortable reserves through an unfavourable trade balance. In addition to the references above by the Prime Minister, these weaknesses have attracted critical comment from the *Patronat Français*, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the European Economic Commission.

External

10. In the little time devoted to foreign policy in his general statement of 18th April, M. Pompidou, after noting that France's decision to withdraw from N.A.T.O., while remaining a member of the Atlantic Alliance, had been given effect with none of the dire consequences that the Government's critics had foreseen, dwelt on relations among countries of Western Europe and between them and the Eastern Europeans. He said that France intended to pursue the construction of Europe, as witness its initiatives to further the Economic Community, the fusion of the executives,

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the harmonisation of policies in the fields of taxation, energy, transport, and company law. He added that General de Gaulle would be accompanied by himself and M. Couve de Murville to Rome for the Common Market summit. M. Pompidou referred to Viet Nam only to draw a contrast with Europe: " ... if the prosecution of the Viet Nam war, besides the unjust suffering that it inflicts on the peoples of Indochina, continues to cast a shadow over international relations and to pose a threat to peace, developments of recent months allow one to hope for happy prospects for Europe."

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Re-enter on the Left: Mendes-France, Hoping

By SANCHE de GRAMONT

The time is the evening of March 12. The place is the apartment of a prominent antique dealer. Past a painted Louis XV sedan chair, hunched in front of a marble fireplace like a weary but diffident owl, Pierre Mendes-France is appraising the first scattered returns of his run-off election against a Gaullist incumbent for the Grenoble seat in the National Assembly. His eyes are ringed with dark smudges and his complexion is the color of floor wax, but at 60 his hair is black and bristly and his aides grumble that he still inflicts 100-hour weeks upon them and insists on keeping the windows of his office wide open in the dead of Grenoble's Alpine winter.

Campaign volunteers on Empire chairs are totting up votes with the help of a slide rule. At 8 P.M., radio station Europe No. 1 unofficially announces that Mendes-France has won, and moments later the telephone begins to ring. "You're early," Mendes-France says in a voice raspy from speech-making. "I'm suspicious of machines; my friends keeping score with pen and pencil are more accurate."

In his moment of victory, the screen that separates this most puzzling of French political figures from his fellow men seems to lift. He permits himself the luxury of a broad smile. He warmly embraces his running mates. He drinks a glass of champagne with the Communist candidate whose support has insured his victory.

He says, almost becoming gleeful, that this is the hardest campaign he had fought since 1932 when, at the age of 25, he became the youngest deputy in France, also in a second-round runoff with Communist support.

If, as Mendes-France believes, the March election was "a turning point in French political history," one of the reasons is surely that it has returned him to national prominence after nine years. "He is an aging bull nostalgic for the barbs of the pleaders" is the unfriendly comment of the Gaullist evangelist, François Mauriac. But in the words of a youthful admirer, a student named Christian Michel, "Mendes-France is the only alternative to de Gaulle. He is the most prestigious figure of the French left, the only one with true national and international appeal. He is the only one who has remained pure."

Whatever the interpretation, one thing is sure: With his election in Grenoble, the Mendes-France myth has been resurrected full-grown, for his strange political destiny has conferred upon him the aura of those who walk through fire unscathed. During the 12-year life span of the Fourth Republic, he was Premier for only 7 months and 17 days, but he accomplished more than the 18 other men who headed governments during that dismal era combined. He was, acknowledged a prominent Gaullist, "the only statesman of the Fourth Republic." But just as he refused to be associated with the futile dealings of revolving-door governments, he opposed from the start the seizure of power by General de Gaulle



MAN OF DESTINY?: Mendes-France, the man who ended the Indochina war, is back in politics and is being called by some de Gaulle's "only possible successor." This is a 1954 photo of him.

recuse, the rest of the non-Communist left formed a united federation, which ran François Mitterrand in the 1965 Presidential election. Mitterrand made a very creditable showing. The federation had a renewed success in the March elections and controls a block of 116 seats in the new Assembly. It insists on party discipline from those who wish to join it. But will Mendes-France, who has no serious backing, remain what de Gaulle once called him, "a horse

lion. So far relations have been cordial and there is even talk that he will accept a portfolio in Mitterrand's shadow cabinet.

When Mendes-France is asked about his strained relations with the other leaders of the left, he stresses the urgent need to draft a common program, and here he faces his second dilemma. For he is unequivocally opposed to the Presidential system instituted by de Gaulle. The federation leaders are more realistic. They say that de Gaulle has abused the Fifth Re-

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Mendes-France had lost his Normandy seat in the 1958 Gaullist tide and had run again and lost again in 1963. He had held to his views against drinking and illegal distilleries in a region where infants are still given up of cloth To campaign against the liquor

of National Economy in September 1944. Government result, Mendes-France is on few men ever able to tax without surrendering to pressures.

He had presented the with a fiscal program ending war profiteering action, which called for bank accounts, calling in the French currency issue and rationing. De Gaulle, attuned French hatred of any fiscal sition, turned down the plan later wrote that it risked ing the French nation into ous convulsions." Mendes in a sharp letter of res charged de Gaulle with sa the nation's needs to poli pedency. But this was of reaction the general c derstand, and he wrote kept my respect for this ally valuable collaborator."

During the parliamenta of the Fourth Republic, the only method of sur governments seemed to be ertia, Mendes-France ad role of Cassandra, and attacked the Government china policy. Events pro right. After the disaster bienphu, and after the Fr opened negotiations with minh in Geneva, he was opportunity to head a gov

Ends the War

He was invested on 1954, and refused "the gift" of Communist sup startled France by prom resign if he did not end the china war by July 20. Jeau vel, the principal French tor at Geneva, informed minh vis-à-vis Pham Van this deadline, and Pham V muttered: "The 20th, the if it is not the 20th, it will 22d or the 24th." "It's eas you don't know this man, vel said. "If he says he wil on the 20th, I believe he is of doing it." Mendes-Fran coded in overcoming the Indochina lobby and the re of the Vietminh. The war e the 21st and Vietnam was on the 17th parallel.

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Mendes-France decided to retrace and not an advocate been ratified by four co the Assembly without stak

A black and white photograph of a man, likely a writer, sitting at a desk and writing. He is wearing a suit and tie. The desk is cluttered with papers, a bottle, and other items. A lamp is visible in the background.

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Edu. Mendes-France wants no part of the Presidential system. "The French aren't ready for it," he told me on the last day of his visit. "I don't think they will be."

National Archives

One of the least known but most



A black and white portrait of a man with dark hair, wearing a dark suit, white shirt, and dark tie. He is looking slightly to the right of the camera. The image is grainy and has a high-contrast, somewhat somber tone. In the bottom right corner, the text "NAA: A1838" is printed in a white, sans-serif font.

Gaullists are fond of underlining the similarities between the general and Mendes-France. One gave autonomy to Tunisia, the other to Algeria. One presided at the death of the E.D.C., the other would like to give the *comp de grace* to NATO. The great themes of the Fifth Republic—decolonization, France as an atomic power and nationalistic resistance to a United Europe—were hatched under the Mendes-France Government, which, logically, makes de Gaulle a *Mendésiste*.

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His Time Has Come

Now, Mendès-France's supporters believe that the time has come to claim the reward for such consistent intransigence. General de Gaulle's term of office will be up in 1972, and no one expects that at the age of 82 he will re-enlist for another seven years. Nineteen-seventy-two will also be the year for new legislative elections. His supporters see Mendès-France as a man with an unblemished past and a rich fund of unspent political credit, who can best lead the left in a successful siege of Gaullism without de Gaulle.

A more dismal view is that Mendès-France will never be more than a magnificent promise, that he is, in the words of a former sympathizer, "like one of those young men in love Stendhal writes about, who desire a woman but always find reasons for not consummating their passion."

There are, it is true, two dilemmas facing Mendès-France before he can don his mantle as leader and conscience of the left. The first is his relationship with the rest of the French left. While he was a



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recluse, the rest of the non-Communist left formed a united federation, which ran François Mitterrand in the 1965 Presidential election. Mitterrand made a very creditable showing. The federation had a renewed success in the March elections and controls a block of 116 seats in the new Assembly. It insists on party discipline from those who wish to join it. But will Mendès-France, who has no serious party backing, remain what de Gaulle once called him, "a horse who cannot be harnessed?"

He has little respect for the leaders of the federation. He is not even on speaking terms with the Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, who has said that Mendès-France would always be "second best" because he refuses to be a party man. Mitterrand is jealous of his own position as leader of the federation, and has already complained to the editors of the left-wing weekly, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, that they gave Mendès-France more coverage than he received.

By joining the Mitterrand federation, says a well-informed Gaullist, "Mendès-France will have to accept voting discipline, which he has always refused, under leaders he despises who will treat him like a pariah and make him swallow continuous affronts."

But this is exactly what Mendès-France has had to do, "Loners" in the National Assembly have a five-minute speaking limit and cannot belong to parliamentary committees. Mendès-France's own tiny United Socialist party has only four seats, far short of the 30 needed to form a parliamentary group. Thus, in order to be heard, Mendès-France has had to accept affiliation with the Mitterrand federa-

tion. So far relations have been cordial and there is even talk that he will accept a portfolio in Mitterrand's shadow cabinet.

When Mendès-France is asked about his strained relations with the other leaders of the left, he stresses the urgent need to draft a common program, and here he faces his second dilemma. For he is unequivocally opposed to the Presidential system instituted by de Gaulle. The federation leaders are more realistic. They say that de Gaulle has abused the Fifth Republic Constitution but that it remains a functional document, perhaps requiring several amendments. They realize that there is no going back to a parliamentary form of government now that the French people have become accustomed to electing their President by universal suffrage.

But Mendès-France wants no part of the Presidential system. "The French aren't ready for it," he told me on the last day of his campaign. "They are not politically mature and too easily gulled. There isn't the sense of fair play you get in Protestant Anglo-Saxon countries. Here people say 'Look at de Gaulle; he has fooled and swindled everybody; isn't that marvelous?' They admire him for it! What would make a man dishonest in private life is praised in public life. I prefer a parliamentary system on the English or Scandinavian model, with a symbolic executive and a prime minister who has the power to dissolve the assembly and go to the people if his government is placed in the minority. There are 20 democratic governments which have arrived at this formula, whether they are monarchist or republican, whether they have two parties or six or eight, and in which the governments last roughly as long as the assemblies which have elected them."

Political Disease

Even if the issue did not exist, it is doubtful that Mendès-France would ever run for President (he refused repeatedly in 1965), for between two political choices he always picks the more difficult. Hardship is his natural environment. He would personally be more at ease within the Presidential system, but he opposes it on principle. This is only one symptom of several diseases, usually fatal to politicians, from which he suffers.

He tells the truth. He keeps promises. When he sees an open sore, he applies iodine, even if the patient screams. He also, as one of his former aides put it, "cultivates the art of displeasing." He is hard to get along with.

Mendès-France is the only French politician who has repeatedly defended politically unpopular positions simply because he thought they were right. In the town of La Tour du Pin on the last day of the Grenoble runoff, during lunch with local notables, the conversation turned to the digestive problems of French political campaigns. Recalling earlier electioneering in Normandy, Mendès-France said:

"There it was always *poulet à la crème* and five or six courses, and the inevitable *pousse-café*. I always said no to *pousse-café*, and do you know that it cost me an election?"

Mendès-France had lost his Normandy seat in the 1958 Gaullist tide and had run again and lost again in 1963. He had held to his views against drinking and illegal distilleries in a region where infants are still given bits of cloth soaked in applejack as pacifiers. To campaign against the liquor lobby in Normandy was like running for Mayor of Las Vegas on a down-with-gambling platform.

Such are the cases where his honesty is, very literally, painful. To make a moral rather than a politically convenient decision is an attitude which runs against the mainstream of French political life. Mendès-France's rigor, his refusal to compromise, his stubborn adherence to an absolutely consistent line of conduct, is at once one of the principal reasons he is so admired and a major obstacle to his return to power.

Need for Party Base

In 1955, after his Government fell, he recognized the need for a party base. His brain trust urged him to use his personal popularity and nucleus of militants as the basis for a new party. "I can't do that," he said. "I can't work outside the existing groups; it would be undemocratic." He thus tried to reform the old Radical party, the most compromising and compromised of all the French parties, the antithesis of all his beliefs. The results were disastrous: a three-way split of the Radical party and Mendès-France's resignation from it in 1957.

Much of Mendès-France's life has been voluntarily directed uphill. He comes from one of the oldest Jewish families in France, a family that left Portugal and settled in Bordeaux in the 17th century. He was the only son of a well-to-do ladies'-wear merchant. He studied law, became the youngest lawyer admitted to the Paris bar, the youngest deputy in France, and the youngest Cabinet Minister when Léon Blum made him an under secretary in his Popular Front Government of 1938.

France after 1940 did not live up to his high standards. Looking back on the war period, he remembers that at the very moment German Panzer divisions were moving westward, a group of philanthropic ladies in Paris had formed a committee to plant rosebushes on the Maginot Line to brighten the lives of the soldiers. Mendès-France reached London in 1942 and became a bomber navigator in the Free French Lorraine squadron. He volunteered for dangerous, low-ceiling, altitude missions over France because, "if we did not, others would aim with the same minus care."

General de Gaulle liked Mendès-France because he was one of the few politicians who had asked for neither a job nor a favor. De Gaulle summoned him to serve as Minister

of the Indochina lobby and succeeded in the war of the Vietnam. The war ended on the 21st and Vietnam was divided on the 17th parallel.

The Premier, who was his own Foreign Minister, next tackled decolonization in North Africa. He flew to Tunisia and promised immediate home rule and a treaty leading to independence. To implement this policy he had to stage a military coup against the French colonialists with the help of loyal officers. Returning to Paris, he raised the liquor tax, cracked down on moonshiners and tried in vain to make milk instead of wine the official French Army beverage. There could be no more effective way of alienating a large part of the electorate.

The United States had been trying since 1950 to rearm Germany, but French politicians, to delay this unpalatable move, had tied it to a supranational European Defense Community. The E.D.C. had been ratified by four countries when Mendès-France came to power, and France was being pressured to ratify, too.

Mendès-France decided to be a referee and not an advocate of the E.D.C. treaty. He presented it to the Assembly without staking his Government's survival on it, and it was voted down. Monday-morning quarterback to this day argues that he purposely killed the treaty by not endorsing it. In any case the death of the E.D.C. made another formula for German rearmament necessary, which the National Assembly did ratify in December after Mendès-France told his Council of Ministers that "this decision is the most crucial which has been imposed on Frenchmen since the war."

One of the least known but most important decisions of the Mendès-France Government was a secret decree which created a "Super-Commission for the Military Application of Atomic Energy." The same man who advocated the end of atomic testing and planned to make a speech about it before the United Nations General Assembly launched his own country's military atomic program. When asked to explain this contradictory behavior, Mendès-France says, "I approved only the first three years of research, which were non-military, and that he reserved the decision to pursue specifically military research 'for the proper time, depending on the international situation and strategic problems.'" But when the time came the decision was out of his hands.

The next political crisis was the one which precipitated the fall of his Government: the outbreak of the Algerian revolt in November with 30 acts of terrorism on the same day. Mendès-France gave Algeria both the carrot and the stick—he promised reforms and greater autonomy while cracking down on terrorists and increasing the number of French troops.

Victim of Smeared

Once again he was displaying a style of government to which the French had become accustomed—he made long-range decisions, acted upon them at once, and considered the interests of lobbies, pressure groups and allies as second to those of France. With every achievement, he made new enemies. He was the victim of a smear campaign unequalled in postwar France and orchestrated by what he refers to as "le gang"—an unscrupulous mixture of North African ultras, neo-Fascists, anti-Semites, liquor lobbyists and reactionary cells within the French police network.

Simon Nora, a brilliant economist who was a member of his brain trust, remembers seeing a copy of a secret report destined for C.I.A. agents of the United



ALLIANCE: Mendès-France and Bonn's Chancellor Adenauer at 1954 NATO conference which agreed on West German rearmament.



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France after 1940 did not live up to his high standards. Looking back on the war period, he remem- bers that at the very moment Ger- man Panzer divisions were mov- ing westward, a group of philan- thropic ladies in Paris had formed a committee to plant rosebushes on the Maginot Line to brighten the lives of the soldiers. Mendes-France reached London in 1942 and be- came a bomber navigator in the Free French Lorraine Squadron. He volunteered for dangerous, low- altitude missions over France be- cause, "if we did not, others would go instead and they might not al- im with the same minute care."

General de Gaulle liked Men- des-France because he was one of the rare politicians to rally to Free France who had asked for neither a job nor a favor. De Gaulle sum- moned him to serve as Minister

on the 20th. I believe he was capable of doing it," Mendes-France suc- ceeded in overcoming the French Indochina lobby and the reticence of the Vietnamese. The war ended on the 21st and Vietnam was divided on the 17th parallel.

The Premier, who was his own Foreign Minister, next tackled de- colonialization in North Africa. He flew to Tunisia and promised im- mediate home rule and a treaty leading to independence. To im- plement this policy he had to stage a military coup against the French colonialists with the help of loyal of- ficers. Returning to Paris, he raised the liquor tax, cracked down on moonshiners and tried in vain to make milk instead of wine the official French Army beverage. There could be no more effective way of alienating a large part of the electorate.

The United States had been try- ing since 1950 to rearm Germany, but French politicians, to delay this unpalatable move, had tied it to a supranational European De- fense Community. The E.D.C. had been ratified by four countries when Mendes-France came to power, and France was being pres- sured to ratify, too.

Mendes-France decided to be a referee and not an advocate of the E.D.C. treaty. He presented it to the Assembly without staking his Government's survival on it, and it was voted down. Monday-morning quarterbacking to this day argue that he purposely killed the treaty by not endorsing it. In any case, the death of the E.D.C. made an- other formula for German rearm- ment necessary, which the Na- tional Assembly did ratify in De- cember after Mendes-France had told his Council of Ministers that "this decision is the most cruel which has been imposed on French- men since the war."

One of the least known but most important decisions of the Men- des-France Government was a secret decree which created a "Superior Commission for the Military Ap- plication of Atomic Energy." The same man who advocated the end of atomic testing and planned to make a speech about it before the United Nations General Assembly launched his own country's mil- itary atomic program. When asked to explain this contradictory be- havior, Mendes-France says, he approved only the first three years of research, which were non-mil- itary, and that he reserved the de- cision to pursue specifically mil- itary research "for the proper time, depending on the interna- tional situation and strategic prob- lems." But when the time came, the decision was out of his hands.

The next political crisis was the one which precipitated the fall of his Government: the outbreak of the Algerian revolt in November, with 30 acts of terrorism on the same day. Mendes-France gave Al- geria both the carrot and the stick — he promised reforms and greater autonomy while cracking down on terrorists and increasing the num- ber of French troops.

Victim of Smears

Once again he was displaying a style of government to which the French had become accustomed — he made long-range decisions, ac- ted upon them at once, and consid- ered the interests of lobbies, pres- sure groups and allies as second to those of France. With every achievement, he made new enemies. He was the victim of a smear cam- paign inequaled in postwar France and orchestrated by what he re- fers to as "le gang"—an unscrup- ulous mixture of North African *ultras*, neo-Fascists, anti-Semites, liquor lobbyists and reactionary cells within the French police net- work.

Simon Nora, a brilliant econ- omist who was a member of his brain trust, remembers seeing a copy of a secret report destined for C.I.A. agents of the United

States which said: "One of the most shameful of the Fourth Republic. It was as though the Assembly could not forgive Mendes-France for having shown what purposeful leadership could accomplish. They had liquidated his Government and now they de- manded some ritual bloodletting. Mendes-France asked to make a final statement, and began:

"What has been done in these seven or eight months..."

From all sides, shouts of "No, no!" interrupted him.


"Men pass, but..."

"Go away, we have seen enough of you!"

"Essential problems remain..."

"Enough, enough!" And the tops of desks all over the chamber began slumping in unison so that he could not go on.

A few days later, while the for- mer Premier was cleaning out his desk, a sun-tanned colonel, fresh from a North African campaign, came to deliver a report. The colo- nel saluted, wheeled around to leave, hesitated, and then shouted, almost like an imprecation: "Mon- sieur le Président, I wanted to say thank you, because in the last



VOTER: Mendes-France casts his ballot in recent French election, which he called his hardest campaign since 1932.

seven months we have been proud of our country."

During his interval of power, Mendes-France had remained on cordial terms with the hermit of Colombey, Charles de Gaulle. The two men met at the Hotel La Pé- reuse shortly after the vote which killed the E.D.C., and de Gaulle said: "You'll see; they won't let you go all the way. The executive is not sufficiently detached from the legislative power. You person- ally escape in a certain measure from the regime of the Assembly. But men pass and institutions re- main." De Gaulle is his own prop- het, and in 1958 a military coup brought him to power and allowed him to end the tyranny of Parlia- ment. Mendes-France could not ac- cept what he considered the illegiti- mate birth of the Fifth Republic, and no one spoke out more force- fully against the general when he came to the Assembly seeking in- vestiture: "This Government is be- ing imposed on us by those very people who have sabotaged every attempt at a humane, reasonable

tears.

In France, Mendes-France con- tinued to be vilified by the ex- treme right and the extreme left, for antipodal reasons. The right held him responsible for the loss of France's empire. The Commu- nists could not forgive him for pushing through French ratifica- tion of German rearmament, re- pressing the revolution in Algeria, and prohibiting July 14 demon- strations, which tended in those days to degenerate into riots.

Sometimes, in fact, one gets the impression that Mendes-France has more sympathizers among liberal Gaullists than in the extreme left. As one of the leading young left- wing Gaullists, Michel Drrot, said: "We do not consider Men- des-France an adversary. We consider that he is the only man in the French left who would some day, be capable of rallying men who are today Gaullists. In 1972, the non- Communist left will have to re- group, and quite a few Gaullists feel friendship and attachment to Mendes-France, and are inter- estingly close to him. I won't hide the fact that if I had been in Grenoble, I would have voted for Mendes-France against the Gaul- list candidate."

Similarities With de Gaulle

Gaullists are fond of underlin- ing the similarities between the general and Mendes-France. One gave autonomy to Tunisia, the other to Algeria. One presided at the death of the E.D.C., the other would like to give the *comp de grace* to NATO. The great themes of the Fifth Republic—decoloniza- tion, France as an atomic power and nationalistic resistance to a United Europe—were hatched un- der the Mendes-France Govern- ment, which, logically, makes de Gaulle a *Mendesiste*.

"I can't understand what sepa- rates these two men," a leading Gaullist said recently. A first an- swer is that they are too simi- lar to get along. They are both stub- born and authoritarian. They both have a messianic faith in their own convictions. They both combine a lofty idea of France with thinly veiled derision for the vagaries of her citizenry. They were both com- pletely unadapted to the parlia- mentary anarchy of the Fourth Republic. But here they part ways. For Mendes-France's results were achieved within the parliamentary system, and although he was its principal victim, he never once con- sidered violating the established institutions. De Gaulle, too, was a victim of the Fourth Republic, so he destroyed it and installed its successor, with tailor - made institutions.

Mendes-France interprets blan- disments from Gaullists as an at- tempt to divide the left. He has never wavered in his opposition to the regime. He was long sustained by the conviction that Gaullism would meet a swift and terrible end. "There is no example in his- tory of a regime founded on a single man which did not end in disaster," he said. But thus far the curth has not split under de Gaulle's feet, and Gaullist Govern- ments have for nine years been re- turned to power by the electoral process.

In the new National Assembly, which held its opening session on April 3, the Gaullists have 245 out of 487 seats. One of the 242 non- Gaullist deputies is Pierre Men- des-France. He has great prestige. But he has one vote.

Will he be, as the Gaullist Min- ister Edgar Faure calls him, "a man isolated on the left," un- wanted or muzzled by a federation which was formed without him and a Communist party that fears his inflexible character? Or will he fulfill the hope of his many ad- mirers, who see him as the only untarnished man of the left, the only possible successor to de Gaulle?

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1
(813/2)

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I.31037

FROM.

DATED. 17TH MAY, 1967
0040 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D. 17TH MAY, 1967
2055 LT

1942. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1942
REPEATED WASHINGTON 56.
LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL) 564, ROME 16 (LONDON PSE PASS)
BONN 15, BRUSSELS 45, GENEVA 64, THE HAGUE 12

FROM WALKER.

BRITAIN AND E.E.C.

THE GENERAL TENOR OF DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
THIS AFTERNOON WAS STRONGLY UNFAVORABLE TO BRITISH PROSPECTS
OF ENTRY.

2. TREATING THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES "WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS", HE BEGAN BY WELCOMING THE SIGNS THAT
BRITAIN WAS NOW DISPOSED TO BIND HERSELF WITH EUROPE, AND BY
DENYING THAT THERE HAD EVER BEEN ANY QUESTION OF A VETO.


THE ESSENTIAL POINT, HE SAID, WAS WHETHER BRITAIN'S
INTENTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DESTROYING THE PRESENT
COMMON MARKET BUILT UP WITH SUCH EFFORT OVER TEN YEARS, OR
WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE BRITAIN'S OBJECTIVE
IN SOME OTHER FRAMEWORK.

HE WENT ON TO EXPOUND THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES
TO BRITISH MEMBERSHIP, STRESSING PARTICULARLY THE COMMON
AGRICULTURAL POLICY, FREEDOM OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, THE SITUATION
OF STERLING AND ITS ROLE AS A RESERVE CURRENCY, BRITAIN'S
SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH AND DEPENDENCE ON AMERICA, HER PREFERENTIAL
RELATIONS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE ANNOUNCED INTENTION OF
THE BRITISH TO SEEK CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE COMMON MARKET
ONCE THEY ARE ADMITTED.

(HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE ENVISAGED ANY SOLUTION OF
THESE DIFFICULTIES BEING REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.)

3. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF AND WHEN IT WAS AGREED TO
PROCEED TO CHANGE THE SITUATION OF BRITAIN IN RELATION
TO THE SIX, THIS COULD ENTAIL A CHOICE BETWEEN THREE POSSIBILITIES-

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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-2-

I.31037

(A) TO RECOGNIZE THAT BRITAIN'S ENTRY IN PRESENT CIRCUM-
STANCES WITH ALL THE ACCOMPANYING EXCEPTIONS AND WITH THE INEVITABLE
PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD REQUIRE CONSTRUCTING
AN ENTIRELY NEW EDIFICE.

ONE WOULD ARRIVE AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SORT OF FREE
TRADE AREA OF WESTERN EUROPE, FENDING THE ATLANTIC SONE WHICH
WOULD DEPRIVE OUR CONTINENT OF ALL REAL PERSONALITY.

(B) TO ESTABLISH A FORM OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE COMMON
MARKET ON ONE SIDE AND BRITAIN AND VARIOUS OTHER COUNTRIES ON
THE OTHER, WHICH COULD MULTIPLY AND FACILITATE THEIR ECONOMIC
RELATIONS.

(C) TO WAIT, BEFORE CHANGING WHAT ALREADY EXISTS, UNTIL
BRITAIN HAS POSSIBLY COMPLETED A PROFOUND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF WHICH SHE IS BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS, AND WHICH
FRANCE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME.

4. WE HOPE TO SEND TRANSLATION OF RELEVANT PARTS OF OFFICIAL
TEXT TOMORROW.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

18TH MAY, 1967

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) ER
AID FAS(4) EAMEC E C CR ICR PIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

PG.

I.31162.

FROM.

DATED. 17TH MAY, 1967.
1900 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D. 18TH MAY, 1967.
0530 LT

6132. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 6132 REPEATED PARIS 135 BURSSELS 31 . SAVING
ROME BONN THE HAGUE.

GENERAL DE GAULLES PRESS CONFERENCE.

FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIES OF DE GAULLES PRESS CONFERENCE
OF 16TH MAY AS REPORTED IN BRITISH NEWSPAPERS.

GENERAL DE GAULLE DEALT FIRST WITH THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC SITUATION WITHIN FRANCE BEFORE GETTING ON TO THE QUESTION
OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET.

GENERAL DE GAULLES FIRST SENTENCE ON BRITAIN AS REPORTED
IN THE TIMES WAS ' I AM NOT GOING TO PREJUDGE WHAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS IF THEY TAKE PLACE- I REPEAT IF THEY TAKE PLACE-
WOULD BE ABOUT'. HE WENT ON TO DENY THAT THERE WAS ANY
POSSIBILITY OF FRANCE APPLYING A VETO. 'NOR HAS THERE EVER
BEEN ANY QUESTION OF A VETO'. HE THEN HOWEVER PROCEEDED TO
STRESS THE VARIOUS OBSTACLES TO BRITISH ENTRY.

ACCORDING TO THE TIMES AND OTHER NEWSPAPERS.

(A) ON STERLING DE GAULLE DISMISSED AS PURELY
THEORETICAL WILSONS SUGGESTION THAT A DISTINCTION COULD BE MADE
BETWEEN THE ROLE OF STERLING AS A NATIONAL CURRENCY AND A
RESERVE CURRENCY. HE SAID THAT STERLING WILL NOT BE STRONG UNTIL
IT SHEDS IT ROLE AS A RESERVE CURRENCY.

(B) AGRICULTURE DE GAULLE POINTED OUT THAT ADOPTION
OF THE E.E.C.'S AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM WOULD PUT A GREAT STRAIN ON
THE U.K. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IT WOULD ALSO CAUSE COSTS WAGES ETC
IN BRITAIN TO RISE AND FORCE UP THE PRICE OF BRITISH EXPORTS.

(C) THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
WAS ALSO STRESSED. DE GAULLE CRITICISED BRITAIN'S SIDING WITH THE
UNITED STATES FIRSTLY ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
REFORM AND SECONDLY IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.31162.

(D) THE COMMONWEALTH DE GAULLE MENTIONED THE UNITED KINGDOMS TIES WITH THE COMMONWEALTH AND IN PARTICULAR ITS TRADITION OF BUYING CHEAP FOOD.

(E) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE FORCED TO ASK FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE ROME TREATYS PROVISIONS ON FREEDOM OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN ORDER TO PROTECT HER BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WHICH THOUGH SOMEWHAT IMPROVED OF LATE REMAINED 'THREATENING'.

(F) CHANGES IN THE COMMUNITYS NATURE ONE OF THE MAIN POINTS RUNNING THROUGH DE GAULLES SPEECH WAS THAT IT HAD TAKEN TEN YEARS HARD WORK TO BUILD THE E.E.C. **TO ITS PRESENT STAGE** AND ADMITTANCE OF A NON-CONTINENTAL AND POSSIBLY NON-CONFORMING POWER WITH POSSIBLY FOUR SMALLER POWERS IN TOW WOULD DISRUPT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY.

DE GAULLE (ACCORDING TO THE BRITISH PAPERS) THOUGHT BRITISH APPLICATION FACED THE E.E.C. WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES

1. TO ABOLISH THE EXISTING E.E.C. AND START WITH A CLEAN SHEET. THIS WOULD LEAD TO A WESTERN EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA AND EVENTUALLY TO AN ATLANTIC FREE TRADE AREA THAT WOULD 'SUCK AWAY OUR CONTINENTS' PERSONALITY
2. GRANT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EFTA ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP.
3. WAIT FOR BRITAIN TO ACCOMPLISH ON HER OWN THE 'PROFOUND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE HER TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'.

NEWSPAPER COMMENT.

MOST NEWSPAPERS COMMENTED ON THE SIMILARITY OF DE GAULLES PRESENT ATTITUDE TO HIS POSITION IN JANUARY 1963 WHICH HALTED THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THE SAME NEGATIVE POINTS WERE MADE. THE GENERAL EVIDENTLY DOES NOT CONSIDER BRITAINS SUITABILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP ANY GREATER THAN IT WAS IN 1963.

THE TIMES CONCLUDES THAT THE GENERAL SEEMS TO BE DETERMINED NOT TO LET BRITAIN INTO THE E.E.C. TO DISRUPT FRENCH LEADERSHIP OF THE SIX MEMBER CLUB. HIS LIST OF PROBLEMS IS MUCH THE SAME AS THE PROBLEMS RECOGNISED BY BRITISH MINISTERS ONLY HE SEES THEM AS BEING INSOLUBLE. THE TIMES CONTINUED THAT WILSON MUST NOW TRY TO PERSUADE THE GENERAL THAT BRITAIN IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE COMMON MARKET AS IT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE LAST TEN YEARS AND THAT BRITAINS MAIN OBJECT IN JOINING IS TO FURTHER THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNITY OF EUROPE.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.31162.

THE FINANCIAL TIMES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE GENERALS ATTITUDE HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE BRITAIN'S LAST ATTEMPT AND HE APPEARS TILL DETERMINED TO KEEP BRITAIN OUT HIS CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS MAY BE LESS THAN IT WAS. THE FINANCIAL TIMES OPINION IS THAT DE GAULLES ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES THE COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY ARE NOW WEARING THIN. THE IDEA OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE E.E.C. IS REJECTED STRONGLY. THE PAPER SEES THE ASSOCIATION GAMBIT AS A WAY OF DELAYING ANY BRITISH SAY IN THE AFFAIRS OF EUROPE UNTIL THE END OF THE GENERALS TERM OF OFFICE IN 1972.

THE GUARDIAN COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH DE GAULLE HAS MADE IT CLEAR HE DOES NOT WANT THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE E.E.C. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SUCCEED IN EXCLUDING THE UNITED KINGDOM BY A PROCESS OF DELAY. THE PROBLEM OF STERLING IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE GUARDIAN THE GENERAL DOUBTS BRITISH ABILITY TO ACCEPT THE RULES OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICULARLY THE C.A.P. THE PAPER CONTINUES THAT THE GENERAL MIGHT BE SURPRISED AT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE BRITISH NEGOTIATORS WILL SHOW THEMSELVES READY TO ACCEPT THE RULES SUBJECT ONLY TO TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE GUARDIAN INTERPRETS THE GENERALS DETAILED AND NEGATIVE SPEECH SO EARLY IN PROCEEDINGS AS POINTING TO LESS CONFIDENCE IN HIS POWER TO TORPEDO BRITAIN'S ATTEMPT.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH CONSIDERS THAT IN SPITE OF DE GAULLES RECAPITULATION OF OBSTACLES TO BRITISH ENTRY IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN PARIS THAT HE NOW REGARDS BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET AS INEVITABLE SOONER OR LATER (THOUGH PREFERABLY LATER) AND NOTHING THAT WAS SAID AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE CONTRADICTS THAT ASSUMPTION.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C.E.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

18TH MAY, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3)
ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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25/1/1

BKP

I.31178

FROM:

DATED: 17TH MAY, 1967.
2129LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 18TH MAY, 1967.
0727 LT

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1965, REPEATED BONN16, BRUSSELS 47, GENEVA 65,
LONDON 570, ROME 1, HAGUE,13, WASHINGTON 57, STOCKHOLM OP64,
VIENNA 9.

FROM WALKER.

MY 1942.

OVER HALF DE GAULLES PRESS CONFERENCE WAS DEVOTED TO UNREMARK-
ABLE STATEMENT ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND THE
REMAINDER TO THE FORTHCOMING COMMON MARKET SUMMIT MEETING IN
ROME AND TO BRITAIN AND THE E.E.C.

WE ARE CABLING SEPARATELY TRANSLATION OF SECTIONS ON ROME
MEETING AND BRITAIN AND E.E.C.

2. ON CONSIDERING TEXT OF DE GAULLE'S STATEMENTS, I THINK IT MUST
CLEARLY BE TAKEN AS CONFIRMING THAT FRANCE WILL OPPOSE BRITISH
APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP OF E.E.C. AT LEAST FOR SOME YEARS (UNTIL
BRITAIN "HAS ACHIEVED ... THE PROFOUND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION DESIRED SO THAT HER FUNCTION WITH THE SIX CONTINENTALS
MAY BE ACHIEVED.

MEANWHILE, THE MOST THAT FRANCE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT
WOULD APPARENTLY BE A FORM OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE SIX AND THE
SEVEN.

3. IN ESSENCE AND IN MOST OF THE DETAILS, DE GAULLE'S PRESENT
POSITION IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT STATED IN HIS JANUARY 1963
PRESS CONFERENCE (OUR TELEGRAM 70/63) WHICH PRECEDED THE FRENCH
REQUEST IN BRUSSELS THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE BROKEN OFF.

ON THE PRESENT OCCASION HOWEVER, DE GAULLE ADDED, AMONG THE
ECONOMIC OBSTACLES, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY ON BRITAIN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, HER INABILITY TO PERMIT
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, AND UNCERTAINTY OVER THE FUTURE STABILITY
OF STERLING, AUGMENTED BY ITS ROLE AS A RESERVE CURRENCY.

HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT TO ADMIT BRITAIN UNDER CONDITIONS ENTAIL-
-ING A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY WOULD
DEPRIVE FRANCE OF ONE OF HER MAIN REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE
COMMON MARKET.

4. DE GAULLE ALSO GAVE NEW EMPHASIS TO THE POLITICAL OBSTACLES,
ARGUING THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SIX IS TO FORM A WHOLE THAT WOULD
BE EUROPEAN IN ALL RESPECTS AND CAPABLE ONE DAY OF POLITICAL ACTION
"BY ITSELF AND FOR ITSELF" IN THE FACE OF ANYBODY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

BKP

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1.31178

GIVEN THE SPECIAL RELATIONS THAT TIE THE BRITISH TO THE AMERICANS GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND BRITISH PREFERENTIAL RELATIONS WITH IT, AND GIVEN BRITAIN'S SPECIAL COMMITMENTS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE WORLD, WHICH DISTINGUISH HER FROM THE CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES, HE SAYS, ONE CAN SEE HOW THEIR RESPECTIVE POLICIES COULD BE ASSOCIATED, BUT NOT HOW THEY COULD BE MERGED UNLESS EITHER THE BRITISH TAKE FULL CONTROL OF THEIR OWN DEFENCE, OR ALTERNATIVELY THE CONTINENTALS RENOUNCE EVER MAKING A EUROPEAN EUROPE.

5. HE INDIRECTLY REINFORCED THESE POLITICAL OBJECTIONS IN THE COURSE OF HIS REPLY TO A SEPARATE QUESTION ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT MEETING IN ROME, IN WHICH HE STRESSED THE GROWING FEELING OF SOLIDARITY AMONG THE SIX IN THE FACE OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND ATTRIBUTED IT PARTLY TO THE OPPOSITION OF BRITISH AS WELL AS AMERICAN INTERESTS.

I WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THESE REMARKS WHICH WERE OMITTED FROM THE LONDON TIMES REPORT.


A/MIN. & DEPT. T. & I.
MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT. N.D.
MIN. & DEPT. C. & E.
P.M.'S DEPT.
P.M.'S

18TH MAY, 1967.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(2) PACAM AMSP AID FAS(4) EAMEC E ER
WASHINGTON



Original by Commercial Airmail



Memo No.: 545
File No.: 211/1

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

27th April 1967


The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

25/1/1

General de Gaulle: Press Conference

I refer to our memorandum No. 499 of 13th April.
The Minister for Information announced after the regular
Wednesday Cabinet meeting on 26th April that General de Gaulle's
press conference would be held on 16th May.

G.B.F.
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor



e of Paper

Published at

File No.

Date

The Sword Arm Weakens

Can de Gaulle ever be the same,
far less look the same, again?

GENERAL DE GAULLE is no longer the d'Artagnan of the diplomatic stage. Since the results of the second ballot of the French elections started coming in on Sunday night, he has suddenly looked a much more lumbering figure. He may confound us all; that slashing, darting swordsman of diplomacy may yet reappear. But right now most people are going to assume that his foreign policy can never again be as nimble as it used to be. He has put on the weight of too much opposition.

The French government is busy pooh-poohing this idea. It points out, rightly, that the opposition parties won votes primarily on economic and social grievances. It adds, for good measure, that no burning foreign policy issues were at stake in the election. This too is true, if it means that most Frenchmen accept General de Gaulle's aim of "détente, entente and co-operation" with eastern Europe. But the general's claim to have led a reluctant western alliance towards a détente is a sham. President Kennedy launched the détente in 1963 and President Johnson, not President de Gaulle, is negotiating treaties on nuclear armaments in 1967. The fuss that followed the resumption of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Bucharest shows that west Germany's approaches to eastern Europe have more impact across the Elbe than French ones. And Germany, Britain and Italy are all ahead of France in trade with eastern Europe. The only distinctively gaullist contribution to the détente is the general's rejection of Nato, and this is not enough to give France a central importance.

Everyone knows that the real problem of gaullist foreign policy does not lie in the east, but in the organisation of western Europe itself. General de Gaulle's campaign against west European integration has hung fire for nearly eighteen months while he steered himself through the presidential election in 1965 and the parliamentary one this year. But he cannot afford to let this truce extend into a permanent peace. If he did, the Europe which takes shape after he has left the scene will be moulded more by the integrationists than by his own ideas. Given that his aim is to cut the European community down to size, the reverse he suffered on Sunday will tempt him to take some decisive action soon. The question is not his desire to do this; it is his ability to do it without endangering his claim to the leadership of Europe.

Already General de Gaulle faces a dilemma. He can keep "Anglo-Saxon" Britain out of the continental system for an ever lengthening waiting period; but this will make it hard to prevent the six-country European community gradually growing more integrated. Or he can hack away again at the European institutions in Brussels; but that makes it hard to keep Britain out, because his partners might start rooting for the British. He dislikes both integration and the idea of his British rival getting into Europe. It is easy to see how he can hinder one or the other; but not both.

Now the elections have added a new uncertainty in France itself. If M. Mitterrand can keep his left-wing Federation together and build on the alliance with the Communists, French politicians will be bound to base their calculations on the thought that General de Gaulle might be beaten in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1972. This makes it harder for him to remain the unquestioned way to 1972. It encourages the opposition to be more aggressive, and most members of the gaullist party look more of their own future than the general's. M. d'Estaing, the leader of the gaullists' conservative wing, has been careful to define his own distinctive (and, on a successful) electoral line since he left the government

last year. This makes it more important than ever for General de Gaulle to keep the support of French public opinion. He has always been supremely skilful and attentive in handling it; but if the elections mean anything, they mean that the majority of the voters are not ready to follow him blindly, and resent his bland assumption that they should.

This in itself makes strong-arm diplomatic methods risky; unless they are very convincingly justified, they tend to remind the voter of what he objects to at home. Even the Communist party, which has put its domestic French interests above its sympathy for General de Gaulle's foreign policy, now favours an opening of the European community both to Britain and to eastern Europe. So does M. Mitterrand's Federation of the Left. The key man on the right, M. Giscard d'Estaing, who has taken an increasingly "European" line since he left the government last year, is said to have his doubts about Britain. But if the general looked like being vulnerable, M. Giscard too might be tempted to cash in on the new situation. All these factors together do not necessarily prevent General de Gaulle from slapping another veto on a British application to join the common market. But they do make it possible that, if Mr Wilson plays his cards well, the British issue could become part of an intricate internal French political game in which the general would not have much room for manoeuvre.

THE French view of Britain has changed since 1963. Many Frenchmen who then believed that the general was right to say Britain was not a European power are ready to think again. Some fear that a six-country community is too small to make its weight felt, and that anyway west Germany outweighs France inside it; some think Britain is essential if there is to be effective economic planning within it; others simply note that the leader of the British party which thought the common market irrelevant in 1962 is now trying to lead Britain into it. As far as one can tell, many Frenchmen think that if Britain proves itself "European" it should not and cannot be left out of the community; and General de Gaulle himself has lowered the entrance fee for entry by temporarily at any rate squashing the federalists. If Mr Wilson has the nerve to risk the effects in Britain of a possible rebuff by General de Gaulle, an attempt to join the community this year could yet pay off. Mr Wilson should respond to the call on Friday by M. Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe for British membership of the community. Its impressive list of names significantly includes the German foreign minister, Herr Brandt, and the Italian socialist leader, Signor Nenni, whose party has newly joined the lobby.

All this assumes that Mr Wilson has the tactical savvy to identify himself with the European community mystique in the way France, even under General de Gaulle, has done. The latest signs are that he is doing exactly that. His reported remark in Luxembourg that Britain would not invoke the common market's mutual aid clause for a country in balance-of-payments trouble goes some way to puncturing the French argument about the difficulties sterling would cause to the common market. Mr Wilson's apparent readiness to see Britain pay all levies on food imports by Britain into the common market's farm funds after 1970 likewise disposes of the biggest single agricultural problem. Above all, he has seen the danger of handing General de Gaulle the axe to chop him down with. The recent visits of Lord Chalfont to Euratom in Brussels and of Sir Solly Zuckerman to Bonn show that Mr Wilson is trying to meet some of the European fears about the proposed non-proliferation treaty.

The key objection of the Germans, of the Italians and of

Allen Farnham

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper ECONOMIST.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

18-3-67

Euratom to the non-proliferation treaty concerns the proposed Article 3 which, it is feared, would subordinate Euratom's nuclear inspection system to that of the International Atomic Energy Agency and widen the gap between nuclear France and the non-nuclear Five. Hitherto the British had taken a very stiff line on this. But now Lord Chalfont and Sir Solly have indicated that Britain, as a "European" power, has a less definite view on Article 3 and would be ready to put workable European ideas to the two super-powers. This is the first sign that a British prime minister has accepted the view that British foreign policy as a whole must be affected by the bid to join the European community. That a Labour prime minister should do this on a nuclear question makes the shift doubly significant. This could be a turning point in Britain's bid to join the European community.

This is not to pretend that Mr Wilson has an easy hand play. He has not. If he applies to enter the community,

he risks another rebuff. If he fails to apply, he forfeits the advantage of proving that he really tried. It is an uncomfortable business. But if he has the nerve to face the risk of a rebuff, the increasingly visible fact is that General de Gaulle too has his weaknesses. His real position has always been a nationalist one, but by clothing it in European jargon he has managed to silence the opposition, not least in France. But since he attacked the European community in 1965 his European cloak has worn thin; and Sunday's election, coming on top of the presidential election in 1965, has shown that his domestic opposition is growing stronger. If Mr Wilson manages to assume the European mantle himself, these two things together could make it pretty hard for General de Gaulle to chance his arm with another veto. At the very least, people would suspect that this second veto would not stick permanently; and that would further weaken his diplomacy. That is the measure of the change since 1963.

UPIX-88

PARIS, APRIL 18 (UPI)--PREMIER GEORGES POMPIDOU SAID TODAY FRANCE CONDEMNS THE VIETNAMESE WAR AS AN UNJUST CONFLICT WHICH INFLECTS SUFFERINGS ON THE INDOCHINESE POPULATIONS AND THREATENS WORLD PEACE. 175

BUT, THE PREMIER TOLD THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FRANCE PLANS TO REMAIN AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES ALTHOUGH SHE DISAGREES WITH WASHINGTON'S VIETNAMESE POLICIES.

POMPIDOU ANNOUNCED THAT WHILE FRANCE WILL STAY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) AFTER ITS PULLOUT FROM THE NATO MILITARY ARM, IT WILL RELENTLESSLY PURSUE ITS ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC. Feb 11

HE SAID HE HAS ACCEPTED A SOVIET INVITATION TO GO TO MOSCOW IN JULY AND PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE WILL TOUR POLAND IN THE FIRST HALF OF JUNE.

POMPIDOU SPOKE IN THE LOWER HOUSE TO OUTLINE THE HOME AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE NEW CABINET FORMED APRIL 7 FOLLOWING THE MARCH ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS.

POMPIDOU DEVOTED A LARGE PART OF HIS 70-MINUTE STATEMENT TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. HE PLEDGED THE GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE SOCIAL WELFARE BUT CAUTIONED THAT FRANCE MUST NOT UNLEASH INFLATION AND JEOPARDIZE ITS ECONOMIC STABILITY AT A TIME WHEN IT IS ABOUT TO FACE NEW INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOLLOWING THE DISMANTLING OF REMAINING TARIFF BARRIERS IN 1968.

JV/358A/228W/

EUROPE
74

Name of Paper

Foreign Report

File No.

25/1/1

Published at

London

Date

2-3-67

Towards a French Commonwealth?

Those French-speaking African countries that are trying to promote a wider French community or commonwealth are under the impression that, when the French elections are over on March 12th, France may be readier to give them some positive support. Hitherto the French government has viewed the idea with great caution, although it has always been careful not to rebuff such a complimentary initiative. But two recent developments have raised African expectations. They are:

(i) President de Gaulle has shown some interest in the holding of a preparatory conference of French-speaking peoples in April. The idea was put to him by President Hamani Diori of Niger when he visited Paris five weeks ago. (Mr. Diori and President Senghor of Senegal are the two heads of state who were asked last June by the countries of Ocam—*l'Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache*—to canvass the commonwealth project abroad.) It presumably rests with the Africans to organise such a conference in one of their capitals, but France, it is thought, can be counted on to send a top-rank official to it.

(ii) Two days after President Diori had conferred with General de Gaulle, a new organisation, *L'Association de Solidarité Francophone*, was launched in Paris. The two French secretaries of state for foreign affairs, M. de Broglie and M. Charbonnel, are its patrons and its president is a former French ambassador to Belgium and Canada. At its opening ceremony M. de Broglie gave an encouraging address. Among the ambassadors present were those of both Canada and Algeria—the latter in spite of the fact that his country has consistently opposed any French-speaking system. This happy occasion was hailed by the normally well-informed French-language African weekly *Jeune Afrique* on February 3rd as a turning point: it declared that France had, at last, "said yes" to the francophones.

Jeune Afrique's reaction was possibly too euphoric, though it is natural to welcome a new francophone society in Paris enjoying such official favour. The society, all the same, is a private one which can become a driving force only if it attracts to its active membership really big personalities—political and professional—from all the French-speaking world. As for the Algerian attitude, it cannot be judged by the conduct of an Algerian ambassador doing his social duties and trying to find out what's brewing. It was better reflected last week when President Senghor visited Colonel Boumedienne in Algiers. When Mr. Senghor touched on their two countries' common French cultural heritage, the colonel coolly reminded him of the dangers of neo-colonialism—but made him a citizen of Algiers to show there was no ill-feeling. Algerians like to think that their special partnership with France is something unique and never to be confused with French post-colonial influence further south in the African continent.

The former French possessions in black Africa, still depending, as they do, not only on French material aid but on Frenchmen to run their affairs, are in a difficult position. They consider they would be less open to the charge of neo-colonialism if their Frenchness were incorporated in some wider global unit. Many are desperately poor and would like to have some claim for aid on all richer French-speaking people. (Some former French territories already get aid from Canada, in deference to Quebec's special interests—a departure from Canada's earlier policy of assisting British Commonwealth countries only.)

The French commonwealth idea has expanded a lot since it was first set out by President Bourguiba of Tunisia when visiting Mr. Senghor in Dakar in November 1965. At that time both presidents were thinking in terms of Africa. Mr. Bourguiba saw a continent where the forces making for disunity are so strong that any existing link between countries or races was worth cultivating—in the name of harmony and the continent's speedier development. But he and his fellow-crusaders rapidly developed their theme in full international terms. They would like to extend the French circle to all countries where French is widely spoken. Mr. Hamani Diori, surveying the globe from Laos and Cambodia through Europe and Africa to Canada and Haiti, has calculated that at least 200 million people would be concerned. This is the kind of big thinking that appeals to General de Gaulle and indeed to all Frenchmen who lament the present tendency to subordinate French to English as an international language.

But the French are extremely wary of exchanging the substance of President de Gaulle's real international influence for the shadow of some great French-speaking political design. Careful husbanding of cultural ties might make something of it for the future. As France consolidates its position in a more fully integrated Europe its pull on French speakers elsewhere may become something to conjure with. Meanwhile France is as touchy as Algeria about entering into anything that might

One of Paper *Foreign Report*
Published at *London*File No.
Date *2-3-67*

look like a neo-colonialist throwback. It is largely through its policies towards Algeria that France stands so well today with the third world. The French are also aware that not even all the Ocam countries are sold on the commonwealth idea. Most Frenchmen say that the Franco-African community already exists in these countries—in education, defence and economic planning. (The franc zone is as good a club as any; even Mali, after years of trying to go it alone, has just rejoined it.) Why burden this precious framework with new self-conscious political structures? France is equally chary of creating political friction in bilingual countries—Belgium, Canada, Switzerland—by premature francophone schemes.

The Tunisians, whose president started the commonwealth hare, have not, as have other Africans, seen much quickening of the pace in recent developments. They reckon they have done their bit and it is for France to act. At the launching of the new solidarity association in Paris, the Tunisian ambassador said: "We want to see the French government showing more than just sympathy and interest." To which M. de Broglie retorted: "We must not confuse empiricism with reserve . . ." And that is about where things stand: the French are playing it by ear. Yet the Africans may be right in believing that, after the French elections, France will give deeper thought to what can be done with what is becoming quite a big head of francophone steam. President de Gaulle has no objection in principle to cultural imperialism, so long as it is his own, and so long as it pays France.



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RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

30th March 1967

Memo No.: 403
File No.: 211/1



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

General de Gaulle's Visits Abroad in 1967

..... The newspapers have reported (see attachment) that General de Gaulle will make the following visits abroad this year:

- (a) Rome in April for the Common Market "summit"
- (b) Poland in late spring
- (c) Roumania in the autumn
- (d) Bonn at the end of June or beginning of July
in the framework of the Franco-German
co-operation treaty
- (e) Canada in July for the Montreal exhibition

2. The deputy chief of protocol in the Foreign Ministry advised us recently to treat these newspaper reports with caution: he said that no definite plans had yet been made for the General's visits abroad.

G.B. Feakes
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

withd
Mr Phillips
PLEASE DESTROY DUP (DATE COPY
AND DESTROY IF SO. REQUIRED)

RESTRICTED



De Gaulle ira cette année dans deux Républiques populaires : la Roumanie et la Pologne

La Roumanie est venue s'ajouter au programme déjà chargé des visites que le général de Gaulle compte faire, cette année.

Les dossiers de politique étrangère, fermés pendant la campagne électorale, seront rouverts dès que le remaniement ministériel sera terminé. Dans l'immédiat, il s'agit surtout de préciser des dates car, dans ses grandes lignes, la politique extérieure française ne sera pas modifiée.

Ceux qui s'attendent à un « assouplissement » se trompent : l'objectif est toujours d'organiser l'Europe indépendante par la coopération des « Six » du Marché commun et la détente avec l'Est.


● PREMIERE ETAPE : CONFERENCE AU SOMMET DU MARCHÉ COMMUN, A ROME EN AVRIL

On essaiera alors de renouer avec les rencontres des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement interrompues depuis six ans et qui doivent être, selon le général de Gaulle, le fondement de la coopération politique des « Six ». La conjoncture européenne est aujourd'hui plus favorable. Les Allemands sont

très désireux de renforcer la coopération avec la France et les Italiens souhaitent que la conférence de Rome soit un succès.

Cependant, les adversaires de la politique européenne du général de Gaulle estiment que, le gaullisme sortant affaibli des élections, ce n'est pas le moment de lui faire des concessions. Ils seront, d'autre part, tentés — c'est le cas des Hollandais — de poser comme condition à « l'Europe selon de Gaulle », l'admission de l'Angleterre dans le Marché commun. C'est déjà ce qui avait provoqué la rupture de 1961.

A ce propos, aucune éclaircie n'est en vue. Le gouvernement français est toujours très réticent et les Anglais, d'ailleurs, toujours hésitants. Le Premier ministre britannique, M. Wilson, viendra sans doute une seconde fois à Paris avant de décider de poser la candidature anglaise en bonne forme.



Voici les cinq voyages que fera de Gaulle en 1967.

● LA POLITIQUE DE DETENTE AVEC L'EST

Elle sera marquée par des visites du général de Gaulle en Pologne, au printemps (probablement en juin) et en Roumanie à l'automne. Le Premier ministre doit rendre en U.R.S.S. la visite que le chef du gouvernement soviétique, M. Kossyguine, a faite à Paris en décembre. Quant aux autres dirigeants soviétiques, MM. Brejnev et Podgorny, chefs du parti communiste et de l'Etat soviétique, il est possible que leur visite officielle en France n'ait lieu qu'à l'automne, tant le programme immédiat est déjà chargé.

La volonté du gouvernement français de développer la coopération avec l'U.R.S.S. n'est pas douteuse, mais la difficulté est toujours de mener de front ce rapprochement avec l'amélioration des relations franco-allemandes.

● VOYAGE A BONN

Bien entendu le général de Gaulle ira à Bonn fin juin ou début juillet, dans le cadre du traité de coopération franco-allemande.

● AU CANADA EN JUILLET

Enfin, le président de la République ira à Montréal (Canada) où il visitera la grande exposition universelle (Terre des Hommes) et sera reçu en visite officielle à Ottawa, capitale fédérale, et Québec, capitale de la province du même nom.

Une question n'est pas résolue : ce voyage transatlantique sera-t-il mis à profit pour organiser une rencontre De Gaulle-Johnson ?

Maurice DELARUE.

PARIS-PRESSE/
FRANCE-SOIR

16/3/67

INWARD CABLEGRAM

BKP

I.19706

FROM:

DATED. 1ST APRIL, 1967.
1515 LTAUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.REC'D: 2ND APRIL, 1967.
0122 LT1235. CONFIDENTIAL.ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1235
REPEATED LONDON 365, WASHINGTON 28, BANGKOK OP41

FROM WALKER.

SEATO

WHEN I SAW MANAC'H ON 31ST MARCH HE REFERRED TO FRANCE'S
DECISION NOT TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE COUNCIL MEETING, REHEARSING
THE REASONS ALREADY ADVANCED.

HE STRESSED THAT FRANCE REMAINS A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE
AND A CONTRIBUTOR TO THE BUDGET, AND, WITHIN HER MEANS,
TO SEATO AID.

WHILE DEPRECATING THE TREATMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS THOUGH
IT WERE A MEMBER, AND THE EFFORTS TO ASSOCIATE SEATO WITH
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, FRANCE SEES VALUE IN THE ORGANISATION
AND RECOGNIZES THAT IT COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES.


A/MIN.& DEPT. E.A.
MIN.& DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'S

29/1
2ND APRIL, 1967.

SEC FAS(1) SEA M&I M DL FAS(2) PACAM AMSP FAS(3)
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BANGKOK WASHINGTON

Confidential

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26th January, 1967

Dear Arthur,

Thank you for your letter of 26th January, enclosing telegram 57 of 9th January from the Canadian Embassy in Paris. I have found it very interesting.

Yours sincerely,


(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

His Excellency Mr A.R. Menzies,
High Commissioner for Canada,
CANBERRA.

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25/1/43
(O. on 18/5/1)

SECRETARIAL No 17

MR LANE 4/1/1

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OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA



HAUT COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA

Canberra, A. C. T.,

January 25, 1967

Dear Jim:

On January 9 I sent you a copy of Telegram DL-3111 of December 23 from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, to the Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris giving a general assessment of the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Paris in mid December. You were kind enough to comment that you had found it of interest.

I suppose one of the most important things that has happened to NATO over the last two years has been General De Gaulle's decision to disengage from the integrated military command structure of NATO and indeed to pull back a little from full support for the political activities of NATO. I thought it might be of supplementary interest, therefore, to you to read the attached copy of Telegram 57 of January 9 from the Canadian Embassy in Paris giving an account of a review of the NATO Ministerial Meeting made by a member of our Embassy with De La Grandville, the officer in the Quai d'Orsay responsible for NATO affairs.

Yours sincerely,


Arthur Mungas

Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.,
Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.

25/1/67
J.M.

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MINISTER FOR
DEFENCE
CANBERRA

1967 JAN 13 07:08



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TO EXTERNAL 87 PRIORITY
INFO NATOPARIS LBN WASHDC BRU HAGUE ROME BONN BISARNOBELNEVA
TT CANFORCEDHED DE OTT
BAG ATHENS ANKRA COPEN OSLO DE PARIS MOSCOW WSAW PRQUE BGRAD LISBON DE
LDN CNDR DE OTT BERLIN DE BONN
REF YOURTEL DL3111 DEC23/66
NATO MINISTERIAL MTG
WE CALLED ON DE LA GRANDVILLE JANS ON HIS RETURN FROM LEAVE TO
REVIEW RESULTS OF LAST MONTHS NATO MINISTERIAL MTG.
2. WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL OUTCOME OF MTG, QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE
FRENCH VIEW WAS THAT THE FOURTEEN WERE GOING TO A GREAT DEAL OF
TROUBLE TO PRODUCE A COHESIVE GROUPING BUT THAT ONLY TIME WOULD
TELL WHETHER THEY WOULD SUCCEED. HIS QUOTE PERSONAL UNQUOTE OPINION
NEVERTHELESS WAS THAT, WITH PROCEDURES ADOPTED BY DPC AND CREATION
OF MPC, THE FOURTEEN HAD IN FACT ALREADY SUCCEEDED IN SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER MEASURE THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED IN FRENCH GOVT CIRCLES A
FEW MONTHS BACK.
3. AS FOR FRENCH PERFORMANCE, AND RELATIONS WITH THE FOURTEEN, GRAND-
VILLE WAS PLEASED THAT IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID UNNECESSARY
FRICTION. THIS HE PUT DOWN TO FACT THAT FOURTEEN HAD EVIDENTLY NOT
WISHED TO QUARREL WITH FRENCH AND TO RELATIVELY RELAXED
ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY COUVE DE MURVILLE. LATTER WAS, HOWEVER, NOT
ENTIRELY COMPLIMENTARY TO NATO SINCE IT AROSE IN PART
FROM DELIBERATE DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM GOING TO BATTLE OVER

***2

PAGE TWO 57 CONF

DIFFERENCES WITH THE OTHERS, IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION THAT ORGANIZATION WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN FACT FRENCH GOVT CONSIDERED IT NOW WAS.

4. REGARDING GERMAN POSITION AND ROLE PLAYED BY BRANDT AT THE MTC, HE SAID THAT FRENCH REACTION HAD BEEN FAVOURABLE. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A SIGN OF BETTER THINGS TO COME WHICH THEY EXPECTED WOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER CONFIRMATION DURING CHANCELLOR WIESINGERS VISIT THIS WEEK. NEVERTHELESS CHANCES OF PROGRESS WERE LTD INsofar AS GERMANY WAS NO RPT NO LONGER AT CENTRE OF THE PRESIDENTS ATTN AS IT HAD BEEN IN 1963. THEN IT HAD BEEN DE GAULLES FIRST PREOCCUPATION, BUT NOW HIS INTEREST WAS TURNED MORE TOWARD DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE EAST, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN PARIS AND MOSCOW.

5. ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS GRANDVILLE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMUNIQUE WAS IN DIRECTION OF FRENCH THINKING. HE WENT ON TO SAY HOWEVER THAT THIS DID NOT RPT NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT FRENCH GOVT CONTINUED TO BELIEVE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH EAST WAS NOT RPT NOT REALLY CONCERN OF NATO.

6. SAME ATTITUDE WAS EVIDENT IN HIS COMMENTS ON BELGIAN INITIATIVE. THEY HAD ENDORSED BELGIAN INITIATIVE QUOTE BECAUSE IT CAME FROM A FRIEND NEMOYE AND BECAUSE AFTER ALL IT WAS IN ACCORD WITH FRENCH VIEWS INsofar AS PURPOSE WAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES IN INTERNATL SITUATION SINCE 1949. NEVERTHELESS NO RPT NO ONE SHOULD CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT FRENCH HAD CHANGED THEIR OPINION ABOUT ROLE OF NATO, WHICH WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (OURTEL 2625 DEC9/66 REFERS). SAME WAS THE


PAGE THREE BY COMFD

AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN SLANT OF BELGIAN PROPOSAL, AS DE GAULLES EYES WERE ON LARGER EUROPE INCLUDING THE EAST, NOT RPT NOT ON IMPROVING WESTERN EUROPE'S STANCE WITHIN NATO. 7. IN CONTEXT OF EXAM OF FUTURE OF ALLIANCE WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO RUSKS COMMENT ON EVENTUAL CHINESE THREAT TO QUOTE WESTERN FLANK UNQUOTE AND ASKED WHAT GRANDVILLE THOUGHT OF SULZBERGERS RECENT ARTICLES IN NY TIMES TAKING USA TO TASK FOR RAISING THIS MATTER WITH EUROPEANS. GRANDVILLE OBSERVED MILDLY THAT SULZBERGER WAS WELL KNOWN FOR SUPPORTING FRENCH POINT OF VIEW, ADDING THAT PRESENT ARTICLES WERE NO RPT NO EXCEPTION, AND THAT NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS NOT RPT NOT INTENDED TO COVER PACIFIC AREA. HE COULD UNDERSTAND HOWEVER THAT COMS, WHO ALSO HAD A WEST COAST TO WORRY ABOUT, MIGHT HAVE A RATHER DIFFERENT OPINION. WE CONCURRED.

8. IN SUM WE TAKE IT GRANDVILLE WOULD AGREE WITH COMMENT IN YOUR REFUEL THAT QUOTE TO A LARGE DEGREE NEW EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN FRANCE AND FOURTEEN HAS BEEN ACHIEVED UNQUOTE. THERE ARE DOUBTLESS MIS- GIVINGS AMONG AT LEAST SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS REACHED, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE EXPECT THAT THEY SHARE A FEELING OF RELIEF AT POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEWHAT CALMER PERIOD MAY BE IN PROSPECT. AS GRANDVILLE PUT IT HE SHOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO LOOK TO FUTURE QUOTE AVEC SERENITE DANS SES ILLUSIONS UNQUOTE.

Confidential

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


26th January, 1967

Dear Arthur,

Thank you for your letter of 25th January, enclosing telegram 57 of 9th January from the Canadian Embassy in Paris. I have found it very interesting.

Yours sincerely,


(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

His Excellency Mr A.R. Menzies,
High Commissioner for Canada,
CANBERRA.

26
29/1/67
(O. on 28/1/67)

SECRETARIAL No 17

MR LAWRENCE

Confidential

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA



HAUT COMMISSARIAT DU CANADA

Canberra, A. C. T.,

January 25, 1967

Dear Jim:

On January 9 I sent you a copy of Telegram DL-3111 of December 23 from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, to the Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris giving a general assessment of the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Paris in mid December. You were kind enough to comment that you had found it of interest.


I suppose one of the most important things that has happened to NATO over the last two years has been General De Gaulle's decision to disengage from the integrated military command structure of NATO and indeed to pull back a little from full support for the political activities of NATO. I thought it might be of supplementary interest, therefore, to you to read the attached copy of Telegram 57 of January 9 from the Canadian Embassy in Paris giving an account of a review of the NATO Ministerial Meeting made by a member of our Embassy with De La Grandville, the officer in the Quai d'Orsay responsible for NATO affairs.

Yours sincerely,


Arthur Meighen

Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.,
Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A. C. T.

25/1/67
M.H.



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NATO MINISTERIAL MTG
HE CALLED ON DE LA GRANDVILLE JANG ON HIS RETURN FROM LEAVE TO
REVIEW RESULTS OF LAST MONTHS NATO MINISTERIAL MTG.
2. WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL OUTCOME OF MTG, QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE
FRENCH VIEW WAS THAT THE FOURTEEN WERE GOING TO A GREAT DEAL OF
TROUBLE TO PRODUCE A COHESIVE GROUPING BUT THAT ONLY TIME WOULD
TELL WHETHER THEY WOULD SUCCEED. HIS QUOTE PERSONAL UNQUOTE OPINION
NEVERTHELESS WAS THAT, WITH PROCEDURES ADOPTED BY DPC AND CREATION
OF MPC, THE FOURTEEN HAD IN FACT ALREADY SUCCEEDED IN SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER MEASURE THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED IN FRENCH GOVT CIRCLES A
FEW MONTHS BACK.
3. AS FOR FRENCH PERFORMANCE, AND RELATIONS WITH THE FOURTEEN, GRAND-
VILLE WAS PLEASED THAT IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID UNNECESSARY
FRICTION. THIS HE PUT DOWN TO FACT THAT FOURTEEN HAD EVIDENTLY NOT
WISHED TO QUARREL WITH FRENCH AND TO RELATIVELY RELAXED
ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY COUVE DE MURVILLE. LATTER WAS, HOWEVER, NOT
ENTIRELY COMPLIMENTARY TO NATO SINCE IT AROSE IN PART
FROM DELIBERATE DECISION TO REFRAIN FROM GOING TO BATTLE OVER

PAGE TWO ST CONF

DIFFERENCES WITH THE OTHERS, IN ORDER TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION THAT ORGANIZATION WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN FACT FRENCH GOVT CONSIDERED IT NOW WAS.

4. REGARDING GERMAN POSITION AND ROLE PLAYED BY BRANDT AT THE ATG, HE SAID THAT FRENCH REACTION HAD BEEN FAVOURABLE. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A SIGN OF BETTER THINGS TO COME WHICH THEY EXPECTED WOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER CONFIRMATION DURING CHANCELLOR KIESINGERS VISIT THIS WEEK. NEVERTHELESS CHANCES OF PROGRESS WERE LTD INsofar AS GERMANY WAS NO RPT NO LONGER AT CENTRE OF THE PRESIDENTS ATTN AS IT HAD BEEN IN 1963. THEN IT HAD BEEN DE GAULLES FIRST PREOCCUPATION, BUT NOW HIS INTEREST WAS TURNED MORE TOWARD DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH THE EAST, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN PARIS AND MOSCOW.

5. ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS GRAINEVILLE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMUNIQUE WAS IN DIRECTION OF FRENCH THINKING. HE WENT ON TO SAY HOWEVER THAT THIS DID NOT RPT NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT FRENCH GOVT CONTINUED TO BELIEVE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH EAST WAS NOT RPT NOT REALLY CONCERN OF NATO.

6. SAME ATTITUDE WAS EVIDENT IN HIS COMMENTS ON BELGIAN INITIATIVE. THEY HAD ENDORSED BELGIAN INITIATIVE QUOTE BECAUSE IT CAME FROM A FRIEND UNQUOTE AND BECAUSE AFTER ALL IT WAS IN ACCORD WITH FRENCH VIEWS INsofar AS PURPOSE WAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES IN INTERNATL SITUATION SINCE 1949. NEVERTHELESS NO RPT NO ONE SHOULD CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT FRENCH HAD CHANGED THEIR OPINION ABOUT ROLE OF NATO, WHICH WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS IT HAD BEEN BEFORE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (OURTEL 2685 DEC9/66 REFERS). SAME WAS TRUE

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PAGE THREE 57 CONTD

AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN SLANT OF BELGIAN PROPOSAL, AS DE GAULLES EYES WERE ON LARGER EUROPE INCLUDING THE EAST, NOT RPT NOT ON IMPROVING WESTERN EUROPE'S STANCE WITHIN NATO.

7. IN CONTEXT OF EXAM OF FUTURE OF ALLIANCE WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO BUSIS COMMENT ON EVENTUAL CHINESE THREAT TO QUOTE WESTERN FLANK: UNQUOTE AND ASKED WHAT GRANDVILLE THOUGHT OF SULZBERGERS RECENT ARTICLES IN NY TIMES TAKING USA TO TASK FOR RAISING THIS MATTER WITH EUROPEANS. GRANDVILLE OBSERVED MILDLY THAT SULZBERGER WAS WELL KNOWN FOR SUPPORTING FRENCH POINT OF VIEW, ADDING THAT PRESENT ARTICLES WERE NO RPT NO EXCEPTION, AND THAT NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS NOT RPT NOT INTENDED TO COVER PACIFIC AREA. HE COULD UNDERSTAND HOWEVER THAT COMS, WHO ALSO HAD A WEST COAST TO WORRY ABOUT, MIGHT HAVE A RATHER DIFFERENT OPINION. WE CONCURRED.

8. IN SUM WE TAKE IT GRANDVILLE WOULD AGREE WITH COMMENT IN YOUR REPT THAT QUOTE TO A LARGE DEGREE NEW EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN FRANCE AND FOURTEEN HAS BEEN ACHIEVED UNQUOTE. THERE ARE DOUBTLESS MISGIVINGS AMONG AT LEAST SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS REACHED, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE EXPECT THAT THEY SHARE A FEELING OF RELIEF AT POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEWHAT CALMER PERIOD MAY BE IN PROSPECT. AS GRANDVILLE PUT IT WE SHOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO LOOK TO FUTURE QUOTE AVEC SERENITE MAIS SANS ILLUSIONS UNQUOTE.



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No. 67
File No. 211/1

25/1/1
18 JAN 1967
Indexed by

12th January, 1967

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

French Colonial Policy

.... Attached for your information is a copy of the record of debates in the French National Assembly in November on the budget provisions covering credits for the French overseas territories. In the course of these debates General Billotte, the Minister of State responsible for the administration of overseas territories and departments, set out some comments on French colonial policy. The Government's policy in New Caledonia was in turn sharply criticised by an Opposition member, M. Roch Fidolet, who spoke at some length on the deleterious effect of the monopoly of nickel production by the French Société Le Nickel in New Caledonia. It is of some interest also to see the strength of opposition on the Government benches to opening the field to the Canadian/U.S. company International Nickel.

2. The Government's subsequent agreement, in principle to allow a second company to operate in Noumea with foreign participation (which must remain in a minority position) was announced in Noumea on 9th December and reported by our Consulate at the time. The announcement provoked little comment in Paris, although you may like to have the brief note on the event which appeared in Le Monde (attached).

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3. There is also little current interest in France in developments in French Polynesia, although John Teariki has again written to Le Monde (copy attached) registering his disapproval of the Formulas to be submitted to the voters in Somalia regarding their future status, and seeking a "new contract" between Polynesia and France.

4. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to our Consulate in Noumea.

J. Piper
(J. Piper)
First Secretary

ENCLOSURE 12-14-65
CHECKED

PLEASE DESTROY DUPLICATE COPY
AND ATTACHMENT IF NOT REQUIRED

*me
ANSP 24/1
Dept. of External Affairs
ER - in Paris
Kiss Fanning*

ÉTAT C

Répartition des autorisations de programme et des crédits de paiement applicables aux dépenses en capital des services civils (mesures nouvelles).

TITRE VI. — SUBVENTIONS D'INVESTISSEMENT ACCORDÉES PAR L'ÉTAT

« Autorisation de programme, 65.200.000 francs ;

« Crédit de paiement, 41 millions de francs. »

Voici les temps de parole encore disponibles dans ce débat :

Gouvernement, 50 minutes ;

Commissions, 15 minutes ;

Groupe de l'U.N.R.U.D.T., 40 minutes ;

Groupe socialiste, 20 minutes ;

Groupe du centre démocratique, 20 minutes ;

Groupe communiste, 15 minutes ;

Groupe du rassemblement démocratique, 15 minutes ;

Groupe des républicains indépendants, 10 minutes ;

Isolés, 10 minutes.

Hier soir, l'Assemblée a commencé d'entendre les rapporteurs. La parole est à M. Feuillard, rapporteur pour avis de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la République. (Applaudissements.)

M. Gaston Feuillard, rapporteur pour avis. Monsieur le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer, mes chers collègues, dans l'avis qu'elle donne sur les crédits relatifs aux territoires d'outre-mer, votre commission des lois croit devoir surseoir à l'examen des problèmes particuliers qui se posent en Côte française des Somalis et en Nouvelle-Calédonie.

Toutes les questions concernant le premier de ces territoires feront l'objet d'un large débat lors de la discussion du projet de loi n° 2118 organisant une consultation de la population de la Côte française des Somalis. Pour donner à ce débat toute l'importance qu'il mérite, il nous a paru préférable de ne pas mêler ce problème à ceux que soulève l'examen des crédits budgétaires.

Pour la Nouvelle-Calédonie, vos commissaires ont estimé que le rapport d'information qui sera très prochainement déposé par la mission de la commission des lois qui s'est rendue cette année dans ce territoire, fournira à l'Assemblée nationale tous les éléments de jugement sur les problèmes propres à ce territoire, éléments devant être considérés comme le complément nécessaire au rapport écrit donnant l'avis de votre commission sur le budget des territoires d'outre-mer. Du reste, vous entendrez l'exposé que fera au cours de la discussion M. de Grailly, qui a présidé cette mission, et l'Assemblée nationale sera ainsi mise au courant de la nature de ces problèmes.

Ces deux territoires n'ont pas été pour autant placés hors des préoccupations de votre commission des lois. Votre rapporteur a soumis en effet à la commission l'étude générale qu'il a faite du budget des territoires d'outre-mer, étude qui comprend tous les territoires dont la Nouvelle-Calédonie et la Côte française des Somalis.

Quelles sont les caractéristiques de ce budget ? C'est à cette question que j'ai répondu dans le rapport écrit. A cette tribune, je vais reprendre brièvement l'essentiel de cette réponse.

Par rapport à 1966, le projet de budget de 1967 se présente en augmentation de 25 p. 100, affectée principalement aux crédits du titre IV : « Interventions publiques ». Celles-ci se manifestent au niveau des budgets locaux. Les subventions d'équilibre sont en effet augmentées de plus de onze millions de francs.

Au stade des mesures de caractère administratif, nous devons en retenir deux séries : l'une générale, pour l'ensemble des territoires ou pour plusieurs territoires, l'autre spéciale, au profit de la Polynésie française.

Parmi les décisions de caractère général, soulignons celles relatives au personnel. Elles se présentent sous les aspects suivants : l'amélioration des traitements ; les emplois nouveaux ayant des indices supérieurs aux indices anciens ; la prise en charge par l'Etat de certaines catégories de fonctionnaires ; le transfert des charges.

Ces deux derniers points seront d'abord examinés parce qu'ils caractérisent le mieux l'action gouvernementale. Il s'agit en premier lieu de la prise en charge par l'Etat des personnels des cadres métropolitains en service dans les administrations locales.

En exécution d'un décret en Conseil d'Etat, du 29 avril 1964, cette prise en charge est couverte financièrement par le paiement de l'indemnité différentielle versée aux territoires antérieurement à cette mesure ; par la dotation spécifique ouverte chaque année au chapitre 41-01 : « Subventions aux budgets locaux des territoires d'outre-mer » ; par les subventions d'équilibre versées aux territoires à titre d'appoint.

En second lieu, il a été décidé, dans un but de simplification, de transférer au ministère de l'équipement les emplois et les crédits affectés au fonctionnement des services de l'aéronautique civile et de la sécurité maritime.

L'amélioration des rémunérations de fonctionnaires en service dans les territoires d'outre-mer apparaît de la façon suivante : mesures acquises se traduisant par une revalorisation des rémunérations publiques ; mesures nouvelles par l'application d'un nouveau système de rémunérations et par une nouvelle répartition par territoire des emplois de personnel d'autorité.

Les développements concernant ces deux questions figurent au rapport écrit. Il en est de même, d'une part, des mesures de suppression d'emplois, d'autre part, de celles portant création d'emplois.

Elles sont liées à des améliorations de traitements.

Spécialement pour la Polynésie française, il convient d'examiner séparément les mesures tendant à la création d'emplois, car si elles sont liées budgétairement aux suppressions d'emplois d'administrateur et de haut-commissaire, elles doivent être replacées dans le cadre des mesures d'ensemble prises en faveur de ce territoire en ce qui concerne la fonction publique.

En effet, l'essor remarquable de la Polynésie, du en partie à l'installation du centre d'essais du Pacifique, retient nécessairement sur les besoins administratifs de l'archipel.

Deux créations d'emploi sont prévues, destinées à pourvoir un poste de directeur du service du tourisme et un poste au bureau des collectivités. La création de ce dernier poste est, en effet, devenue indispensable.

Le rapport écrit indique le montant des subventions d'équilibre allouées aux territoires où cette aide supplémentaire est nécessaire.

En terminant, je dois rappeler qu'au cours de la dernière session parlementaire, un problème de première importance pour la Polynésie française a été réglé.

Sur le rapport de M. Krieg, le projet de loi relatif à la création de corps de fonctionnaires de l'Etat pour l'administration de ce territoire a, en effet, été adopté. Ce texte, qui est devenu la loi n° 66-496 du 11 juillet 1966, prévoit dans son article 3 que les « conditions de prise en charge par le budget de l'Etat des rémunérations des fonctionnaires des corps visés à l'article 1^{er} et de la participation des territoires de la Polynésie française au coût de ces rémunérations sont fixées chaque année par la loi de finances. »

Un crédit de 4.500.000 francs a donc été inscrit pour la première fois au présent budget en application de cette disposition. Il s'agit d'une première inscription budgétaire puisque la prise en charge de la rémunération des fonctionnaires des cadres territoriaux doit s'effectuer par étapes et sur la demande des intéressés.

Au cours de la discussion en commission, des observations ont été formulées par MM. Chandernagor, Coste-Floret et Roch Pélit sur les problèmes politiques et sur le statut des territoires d'outre-mer.

Sous le bénéfice des observations que je viens de formuler, la commission a émis un avis favorable à l'adoption du budget des territoires d'outre-mer. (Applaudissements.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U.N.R.U.D.T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. Pierre Billotte, ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Monsieur le président, mesdames, messieurs, je tiens d'abord à rendre hommage au travail accompli par les commissions qui avaient à connaître du projet de budget des territoires d'outre-mer.

J'ai écouté avec la plus grande attention les rapports de MM. Pierre Bas, Renouard et Feuillard. Je les remercie des appréciations bienveillantes qu'ils ont portées sur les efforts fournis par l'administration de mon département.

Soucieux de ménager le temps de l'Assemblée, je ne reviendrai pas en détail sur des problèmes dont vous avez maintenant une conscience exacte, grâce en particulier au rapport très complet de M. le rapporteur spécial de la commission des finances. Je me réserve cependant de reprendre certains points lors des réponses que je serai amené à faire aux questions qui me seront posées dans le débat.

Avant d'examiner les grandes lignes du projet de budget qui vous est présenté — ce qui me conduira à étudier la situation des divers territoires d'outre-mer — je vous exposerai quelle est à leur égard, et pris dans leur ensemble, la politique du Gouvernement.

Les territoires d'outre-mer offrent la particularité d'avoir, en choisissant leur statut, opté pour l'appartenance à la République française dont ils constituent des collectivités territoriales ; si bien qu'à la signification administrative que revêt formellement leur choix de 1958, se superpose une signification plus haute, d'ordre moral, celle qu'il comporte la confirmation

d'une fidélité à un drapeau, donc à une patrie, la plus libre et la plus indépendante : la France ! (Applaudissements.)

Aussi est-il remarquable que ce soient des liens déjà anciens qui aient été consolidés en 1958 par le vote des territoires d'outre-mer, moins anciens certes que ceux noués entre la France et les départements d'outre-mer, mais antérieurs à la grande période d'expansion de la fin du siècle dernier et du début de notre siècle.

Mais il n'y a pas de prescription en histoire. En tout cas, il n'est pas dans l'idée de la France se fait d'elle-même de prescrire contre la liberté. Pour anciens que soient les liens entre la France et les territoires d'outre-mer, leur nature, leur existence même résultent de la volonté des peuples au nom de qui ils ont été formés jadis et à qui il appartient de les maintenir ou de les transformer.

L'histoire des territoires d'outre-mer, qui ont choisi en 1958 de le demeurer, ne s'est pas arrêtée avec cette option. A partir de situations différentes, il y a eu évolution, c'est-à-dire adaptation aux circonstances et aux besoins. Cette nécessité continuera d'inspirer la politique du Gouvernement.

J'ai parlé des circonstances. S'adapter aux circonstances, cela signifie écouter et accepter d'entendre. Certes, l'histoire s'est écoulée plus lentement qu'ailleurs dans les îles des mers du Sud ou sur les rives de l'océan Indien. Certains ont pu croire que ces îles de l'espace demeureraient aussi comme des îles dans le temps. Mais, c'était compter sans l'effet naturel de la présence française. Pour partiels qu'aient été longtemps nos efforts dans l'ordre de l'esprit, il était impossible qu'il n'en résultât point un ensevelissement. Les récoltes ont levé, ici plus tôt, là plus tard, par endroits timidement, ailleurs avec plus d'assurance. C'est à tout ce mouvement qu'il faut être attentif et, d'assurance, c'est à la rencontre du génie même de la France avec les peuples confiés à elle, l'attention à lui apporter doit être faite de sympathie, de compréhension et de respect.

J'ai parlé des circonstances. J'ai parlé aussi des besoins.

Si le choix effectué par les territoires d'outre-mer en 1958 se justifiait par les liens anciens d'une affection mutuelle génératrice de confiance, c'est cette affection qui a justifié les efforts accomplis par la France pour assurer leur développement et améliorer les conditions d'existence de ceux qui les habitent. Efforts considérables, compte tenu du fait que la plupart des territoires d'outre-mer présentent, dans des conditions et à des degrés divers, les caractéristiques des pays qu'il faut bien dire en voie de développement.

L'instrument essentiel de l'effort de la métropole dans les territoires d'outre-mer est le Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social — le F.I.D.E.S. — dont l'action a pris, ces dernières années, des proportions plus vastes. Au 1^{er} janvier 1966 a débuté un nouveau plan quinquennal d'équipement rattaché au plan métropolitain. L'inclusion dans le plan national des objectifs et des prévisions concernant les territoires d'outre-mer répond — vous le savez — à la volonté du Gouvernement d'accélérer le rythme de leur développement ; elle répond aussi à la préoccupation — dont M. Pierre Bas s'est fait l'interprète — de l'introduction toujours plus grande de ces territoires dans la vie métropolitaine.

La prise en charge par les ministères métropolitains d'une part grandissante des besoins locaux résulte de cette politique.

Je rappellerai ici que les ministères techniques en 1965 ont dépensé outre-mer une somme globale de quelque 42 millions. Le total de ces mêmes dépenses, dont le calcul ne peut être encore qu'approximatif, s'élèvera, en 1967, au moins à 52 millions, et c'est une estimation prudente. Voilà ce que je voulais dire à M. le rapporteur spécial qui a — je ne l'ignore pas — éprouvé quelque difficulté à se procurer les informations qui lui étaient nécessaires à ce sujet.

L'évolution, ai-je dit, est adaptée aux circonstances et aux besoins. Mais la France, je vous le demande, l'a-t-elle jamais oubliée ? Elle sait qu'au-delà de la satisfaction des besoins élémentaires, la recherche d'un certain bien-être se confond en fait avec la conquête de la dignité, et des exigences de cette dernière, elle n'ignore rien, elle qui a proclamé les droits de l'homme.

C'est pourquoi, refusant dans son principe même l'idée d'une différenciation fondée sur l'appartenance à une ethnie, elle a construit des écoles, ouvert ses facultés, favorisé la formation d'élites à l'occidentale et, ce faisant, elle mesure avec exactitude l'ampleur de son engagement. Parce qu'il lui apparaissait qu'il n'était pas de condition plus digne et plus libre que celle de citoyen français, pour s'acquitter de cet engagement elle ouvrait, sans restriction d'aucune sorte, aux habitants des territoires les portes de la cité française.

Telles sont, mesdames, messieurs, quelques-unes des considérations auxquelles je voulais vous rendre attentifs avant de vous présenter les chapitres du projet de loi de finances pour 1967 intéressant les territoires d'outre-mer.

Le budget que j'ai l'honneur de vous présenter rapidement, puisqu'il est si bien décrit par les rapports, s'élève à 201.250.323 francs, en augmentation de 25 p. 100 sur celui de 1966.

Mais il y a lieu de souligner que le pourcentage d'augmentation atteint 53,40 p. 100 pour les dépenses en capital, les crédits de paiement croissant de 49 millions de francs à 76.700.000 francs et les autorisations de programme de 46 millions de francs à 63.200.000 francs.

C'est dire combien l'effort budgétaire a été centré sur l'équipement.

Les dépenses ordinaires passent à 124.360.000 francs, en augmentation par conséquent de 12.427.000 francs. Cette augmentation résulte pour un peu plus de 1.845.000 francs de l'application de textes visant à améliorer les rémunérations de la fonction publique, pour un peu plus de 10.582.000 francs de mesures nouvelles. Celles-ci concernent l'administration centrale, le personnel d'autorité, les services de l'Etat dans les territoires, les subventions aux budgets locaux.

Une mesure générale, à laquelle j'attache beaucoup d'importance et à laquelle M. Feuillard a fait allusion, intéresse l'ensemble des personnels métropolitains en service outre-mer. Il s'agit de la refonte et de l'amélioration du régime de soldes des fonctionnaires en service dans les territoires. Ainsi sera satisfait un vœu du Parlement tendant à mettre à la disposition des territoires les fonctionnaires métropolitains nécessaires à la bonne marche de leurs services publics, ce que compromettrait la continue dépréciation de la situation des fonctionnaires servant outre-mer.

Je m'arrêterai plus longuement sur les aides aux budgets locaux des territoires, en accroissement de 19 p. 100 par rapport aux crédits votés l'an dernier.

Dans un total de 10.500.000 francs, les subventions proprement dites entrent pour 2.800.000 francs, la prise en charge par l'Etat des personnels métropolitains affectés dans les cadres territoriaux pour 1.100.000 francs, l'étatisation de la fonction publique polynésienne pour 4.500.000 francs, la recherche scientifique dans les Terres australes et antarctiques, pour 1.500.000 francs, l'opéra au début de l'année prochaine, pour 100.000 francs pour Wallis et Futuna, 500.000 francs pour les Nouvelles-Hébrides, 1.200.000 francs pour les Comores, 1.000.000 de francs pour les Terres australes et antarctiques.

La loi du 11 juillet 1966 vient d'autoriser la création de corps de fonctionnaires de l'Etat en Polynésie qui pourront être intégrés progressivement dans les nouveaux corps de l'Etat. La loi de finances arrêtera chaque année les conditions de leur prise en charge par le budget de l'Etat et la participation du territoire au coût de leurs rémunérations.

L'évaluation globale de l'opération s'élève à 22 millions de francs, la prise en charge se faisant par étapes. Elle est cette année d'environ 20 p. 100.

Je ne saurais terminer l'examen des dépenses ordinaires et des interventions publiques sans rappeler l'article 62 du projet de loi de finances qui a trait à la prise en charge par l'Etat de l'enseignement du premier degré à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

Je souhaite aussi que dans le projet de loi rectificatif pour 1966 puisse figurer la prise en charge par le ministère des affaires sociales de certains services territoriaux chargés de la lutte contre les grandes endémies et de la protection de la santé publique. Dans d'autres territoires, la prise en charge n'aurait à couvrir que les dépenses des services de nutrition et de lutte contre les endémies : tuberculose, filariose, typhé.

J'ajoute que la prise en charge par l'Etat des services de la pêche maritime fait l'objet d'une étude menée avec le secrétariat d'Etat aux transports duquel ces services techniques doivent relever à l'avenir.

Ayant terminé l'examen des dépenses ordinaires, j'en viens maintenant aux dépenses d'investissement.

L'année 1967 sera la deuxième année du plan quinquennal dont le F.I.D.E.S. est l'un des instruments essentiels de financement. Le projet de budget prévoit des crédits supérieurs à ceux de 1966 : 54.500.000 francs en autorisations de programme et 50.800.000 francs en crédits de paiement. En 1966 ces chiffres s'élevaient respectivement à 43.300.000 francs et 44.600.000 francs.

Si en 1966, le démarrage du plan a été assez long, la prévision pour 1967 marque une progression très nette par rapport à 1965. Le F.I.D.E.S. se trouve augmenté de 35 p. 100. Ainsi est mise en évidence la volonté du Gouvernement de respecter les objectifs quinquennaux établis en accord avec les instances locales.

Le programme d'emploi de ces crédits ne peut être aujourd'hui exposé en détail, puisqu'il appartiendra au comité directeur du F.I.D.E.S. et aux assemblées locales d'en délibérer prochainement. Les orientations de base correspondent aux objectifs fixés par le Plan. Les crédits qui vous sont proposés au titre de la section générale du F.I.D.E.S. passent de

12.500.000 francs à 15.200.000 francs pour les autorisations de programme. Un effort identique se traduit dans les chiffres concernant les sections locales des territoires, les autorisations de programme passant de 30.100.000 francs à 39 millions.

Mais j'insiste à nouveau, après M. le rapporteur spécial, sur le fait qu'à ces efforts s'ajoutent les opérations menées, soit par le ministère d'Etat au titre de l'équipement administratif, soit par les ministères techniques. A ces investissements directs de l'Etat s'ajoutent encore les prêts et avances des organismes de crédit d'une part, les subventions et prêts du Fonds européen de développement de la Banque européenne d'autre part. C'est l'addition de tous ces moyens qui donnera la mesure et le caractère propre des actions poursuivies ou entreprises dans chacun des territoires en 1967.

Je vais m'efforcer de vous en donner la physionomie générale au cours de l'examen des problèmes propres à chaque territoire.

Je commencerai, si vous le voulez bien, par le territoire de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon à qui sa situation dans l'Atlantique nord, au bord du continent américain, son peuplement métropolitain et ses ressources à peu près exclusivement fondées sur la pêche, contribuent à donner une physionomie tout à fait particulière.

Avec la création en 1952 de la société de pêche et de congélation, dotée d'une flottille de chalutiers, la pêche industrielle s'est implantée à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. L'exploitation a connu des difficultés diverses, en partie imputables à des causes accidentelles.

C'est un fait que la pêche connaît des variations cycliques, que les poissons passent plus ou moins près de Saint-Pierre, que la pêche est plus ou moins abondante et la société de pêche plus ou moins rentable. Ce sont donc les déficiences de l'approvisionnement qui sont essentiellement en cause.

Mais il est apparu que l'utilisation des avantages que présente la position de l'archipel exige un autre effort qui tienne compte de tous les atouts dont dispose cet archipel : proximité des centres de production — les bancs de Terre-Neuve — et de consommation — les régions peuplées et riches de la côte nord-est de l'Amérique ; situation sur la route maritime reliant l'Europe occidentale aux grands lacs par le Saint-Laurent ; valeur du port de Saint-Pierre, excellent abri naturel toujours libre de glaces.

On a dit — et j'ai fait mienne ces formules — que Saint-Pierre et Miquelon devait assumer le double rôle d'une « station-service » maritime et d'un « bateau-usine » en service permanent. L'achèvement cette année même des travaux d'expansion du port de Saint-Pierre doit le mettre à même de jouer ce double rôle, répondant ainsi à sa vocation naturelle. Ainsi s'orientera-t-on vers la solution des problèmes économiques et sociaux de l'archipel.

La construction d'un second frigorifique s'avère également nécessaire. Le Gouvernement fait poursuivre l'étude des problèmes que pose sa réalisation et je veille, pour ma part, à ce que la solution adoptée soit de nature à recueillir l'approbation de tous ceux que concerne cette entreprise d'intérêt public, c'est-à-dire tous les habitants de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Compte tenu du fait qu'il n'existe pas de problème d'emploi majeur ni de concurrence au point de vue des débouchés, le Gouvernement désire que le territoire augmente sa production et qu'il la diversifie en s'orientant éventuellement vers des produits plus élaborés.

Je poursuivrai mon tour du monde des territoires par l'Ouest. La Polynésie française vient de réserver au chef de l'Etat un accueil qui témoigne des sentiments qu'elle porte à la mère patrie. Il avait été mené grand bruit sur les dangers que les expériences fâcheuses de Mururoa et de Fangataufa ne manqueraient pas de faire courir à l'archipel polynésien. Ces expériences ont eu lieu comme il était prévu, conformément aux calculs de nos savants, et se sont révélées sans danger. En revanche, on se demandera avec raison si l'installation du centre d'expérimentation du Pacifique n'a pas développé dans le territoire une tendance inflationniste.

Il est exact que l'injection massive de revenus a entraîné une telle conséquence. Mais il faut ajouter que cette conséquence de l'implantation du centre d'expérimentation du Pacifique en Polynésie a été compensée par un grand nombre d'avantages.

D'abord, les investissements n'ont pas concerné seulement les installations militaires. Ensuite, les revenus provenant de ces investissements ont contribué à animer l'ensemble des secteurs économiques, si bien que, fort justement, c'est maintenant l'achèvement des grands travaux du centre d'expérimentation qui inquiète un peu l'opinion polynésienne. Quant à la lutte contre l'inflation, elle est entreprise et sera menée avec toute l'énergie nécessaire. Je vous en donne l'assurance.

Bien que la lutte anti-inflationniste ne soit pas sans provoquer des réactions diverses, nous travaillons dans l'intérêt du plus

grand nombre, qui ne se confond pas avec celui des bénéficiaires de l'enrichissement. C'est ce dont doivent se souvenir ceux qui critiquent les mesures déjà prises ou à prendre.

La Polynésie est ainsi passée très rapidement d'une situation économique stable, mais médiocre et précaire, à une économie de consommation et de grands besoins. Les Polynésiens, notamment les jeunes, admettent ce bouleversement et sont prêts à s'y adapter.

Les dotations du F. I. D. E. S. ont été presque doublées. Les actions menées grâce à elles seront très diversifiées, les grands secteurs étant évidemment l'agriculture, l'encadrement de la production, le tourisme — auquel j'attache une importance toute particulière — les transmissions, les équipements sociaux. D'autre part, il y a lieu de souligner la part véritablement spectaculaire que vont prendre les ministères métropolitains dans l'équipement du territoire.

C'est ainsi que le ministère de l'éducation nationale va lancer, l'an prochain, la première tranche de la cité scolaire de Pirae et consacrer d'importants crédits à l'amélioration du lycée Gauguin, du lycée d'Uturoa et des collèges d'enseignement général répartis dans les îles.

Le ministère d'Etat chargé des affaires culturelles et le ministère de la jeunesse et des sports entreprendront également un vaste programme d'équipement culturel et sportif. Le ministère de l'équipement poursuivra l'amélioration des aéro-dromes, de la signalisation et du balisage maritimes.

Le ministère des postes et télécommunications prendra une part plus grande au fonctionnement de l'office d'Etat des postes et télécommunications. L'O. R. T. F. réalisera le nouveau centre émetteur de Mahaeva. Le ministère des affaires sociales doit prendre en charge le service de lutte contre les grandes endémies. C'est avec le concours de la Caisse centrale de coopération économique que l'investissement privé entreprendra, en 1967, la construction de deux grands hôtels de classe internationale. Dans le même temps, l'Etat réalisera les équipements d'accompagnement. En outre, la route transverse attendue avec tant d'impatience par les Polynésiens depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans est maintenant à l'étude.

L'année 1967 sera sans doute pour les Polynésiens une année charnière. Les propositions qui vous sont présentées et les dispositions prises par le Gouvernement doivent permettre au territoire de trouver un nouvel équilibre fondé sur ses ressources traditionnelles, mais aussi sur son développement social et sur l'essor du tourisme.

Le territoire des îles Wallis et Futuna est — vous ne l'ignorez pas — la dernière née de nos collectivités territoriales d'outre-mer. C'est dire que l'infrastructure administrative, économique et sociale exige encore d'être complétée.

C'est ainsi que l'aérodrome de Hihifo sera bientôt adapté à une meilleure régularité du trafic. Dans le domaine social, il n'est rien de plus important que de lutter contre la tuberculose.

Il importe d'accroître les ressources naturelles et d'en susciter de nouvelles. Un certain nombre d'études et d'essais seront nécessaires, car bien des données de base nous manquent encore. Quant aux émigrants, ils ne doivent pas être abandonnés à eux-mêmes. Nous nous attacherons à élever le niveau technique des jeunes gens qui voudront s'expatrier.

Du reste, un effort particulier est prévu pour l'amélioration de l'ensemble des équipements scolaires, lesquels relèvent en grande partie de la mission catholique.

Ainsi que vous l'a indiqué M. le rapporteur spécial, la situation matérielle de la Nouvelle-Calédonie ne soulève pas d'inquiétude. Grâce à ses industries extractives très florissantes, le territoire ne connaît pas de difficulté majeure sur ce plan.

C'est en effet de la prospérité de ces industries qu'est tributaire l'équilibre du budget local.

Actuellement deuxième producteur du monde occidental après le Canada, l'île exporte du minerai brut — un million de tonnes environ — principalement vers le Japon. En ce qui concerne la métallurgie, la production de la société Le Nickel, est passée, comme l'a dit M. Renouard, de 10.000 tonnes en 1955 à 35.000 tonnes actuellement et ses prévisions sont encore beaucoup plus larges.

La prédominance de cette industrie soulève de très nombreux problèmes. La crainte du monopole, toujours latente, domine la vie politique locale. Elle a été amplifiée par diverses propositions de développement émanant de plusieurs sociétés. Devant la complexité du problème posé par le développement de la production, développement souhaité, tant par les habitants de l'île que par les consommateurs, et en raison de l'intérêt national qu'il présente, le Gouvernement a jugé nécessaire d'être très exactement informé des données générales et techniques extrajuridiquement complexes conditionnant une nouvelle exploitation qui devrait, de toute façon, rester à majorité française. Un haut fonctionnaire du ministère de l'Industrie, faisant partie d'un groupe de travail interministériel qui fut installé dès le prin-

temps dernier et qui poursuit ses travaux depuis cette date, a été récemment chargé d'une mission. Après trois semaines passées en Nouvelle-Calédonie, où il a pris contact avec toutes les instances locales, il vient de remettre son premier rapport au Gouvernement. Il a multiplié les contacts avec les personnalités locales, il a été entendu par l'assemblée territoriale, il a examiné comment pouvait être modernisée l'activité des mineurs indépendants et il s'est renseigné sur la situation du domaine minier.

Vous conviendrez que la synthèse de tous les éléments qu'il a recueillis demande beaucoup d'attention et que je ne puisse encore actuellement vous donner d'information sur cette mission dont le Gouvernement doit d'abord tirer les enseignements.

On ne peut négliger enfin que les populations mélanésiennes, par ailleurs avides de justice sociale et de promotion sociale, attendent avant tout des ressources du sol l'amélioration de leurs conditions propres, et j'insiste sur le fait que le problème demeure de trouver les voies d'évolution les plus propres à leur développement. Comme il est naturel, les investissements publics ont été conçus en vue d'atténuer les distorsions trop considérables dans la répartition des différents secteurs de l'économie et dans la distribution des profits tirés de cette croissance. Cette distribution n'est pas encore très exactement celle que nous souhaiterions.

Il y a lieu d'insister sur les crédits importants dont vont bénéficier, en 1967, les voies de communication, l'aérodrome de Tontouta, le port de Nouméa qui sera doté d'un poste d'accostage en eau profonde. Cette opération permettra notamment l'accueil des paquebots de croisière et contribuera à l'essor touristique que ne manquera pas de susciter, dès cette année, le déroulement à Nouméa des deuxième jeux du Pacifique-Sud pour les quels ont été réalisées de remarquables installations avec une aide importante du ministère de la jeunesse et des sports.

Je ne dirai qu'un mot des Nouvelles-Hébrides qui ne constituent pas un territoire d'outre-mer de la République, mais un condominium franco-britannique. A Port-Vila, le général de Gaulle a pu se féliciter de la fructueuse coopération franco-britannique dans cette partie du monde. Dans un message récent, à la suite d'une négociation que j'avais menée à Londres au mois de juillet, la reine Elisabeth avait rassuré les trois communautés néo-hébridienne, britannique et française sur la volonté de la Grande-Bretagne, jusque-là hésitante, de continuer à mener avec la France l'œuvre de progrès entreprise en 1906.

Du Pacifique passons à l'océan Indien.

L'archipel des Comores est le plus peuplé des territoires d'outre-mer. Le développement de la production agricole s'inscrit donc au nombre des grandes orientations du Plan, les dotations du F.I.D.E.S. et du Fonds européen de développement pour 1967 étant consacrées à l'encadrement des agriculteurs, à l'accroissement de leur productivité, à la formation professionnelle agricole, à la sauvegarde de la cocoteraie, à l'équipement rural, aux recherches d'eau.

Pour divers produits d'exportation — vanille, huiles essentielles, épices — les Comores ont acquis une importance sur les marchés internationaux. Il s'agit de produits riches mais à marché spéculatif, dont les agriculteurs ne peuvent envisager d'affronter seuls les aléas.

Le traitement sur place des plantes à parfum, le travail du sisal, l'industrie du bois, l'artisanat traditionnel d'influence arabo-persane, la pêche représentent les grandes ressources auxiliaires susceptibles d'un inégal développement. Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner que l'émigration apparaisse comme une ressource complémentaire de l'archipel, répondant à la vocation commerciale et maritime d'une partie des Comoriens. Mais elle doit apparaître comme un choix et non comme une fuite devant la misère. C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles un si grand effort est accompli dans le domaine social, qu'il s'agisse de la santé ou de la scolarisation encore très insuffisante, ou dans celui des infrastructures de base.

Je ne m'étendrai pas aujourd'hui sur la situation du territoire de la Côte française des Somalis, puisque, comme l'a dit M. Feuilleard, un large débat s'ouvrira dans quelques jours à l'occasion de l'examen, par votre Assemblée, du projet de loi sur la consultation des populations. Aussi bien le magistrat expose que vient d'en faire le chef de l'Etat dans sa dernière conférence de presse est-il assurément dans vos mémoires.

Il n'est point dans l'intention de la France d'imposer sa présence en Côte française des Somalis, si bénéfique soit-elle pour le territoire. Ce n'est point dans son intention parce que ce n'est pas conforme à son génie. Si la réponse à la question posée lors de la consultation était négative, il resterait à ceux qui prônent l'indépendance à en assumer le risque. Si cette réponse était positive, les liens qui unissent la France aux peuples d'Afrique et d'Asie se trouveraient renforcés, comme ils l'ont été en 1958 à une très grande majorité, il lui resterait à poursuivre l'œuvre qui les a dotés de moyens d'existence et de développement.

Assurément, ce ne serait pas dans un cadre institutionnel qui ne correspond plus, du fait des progrès réalisés grâce à la présence française, aux exigences de notre temps. Le nouveau statut comportera une très large participation des élus locaux à l'administration et au gouvernement des affaires territoriales, à concilier bien entendu avec la responsabilité, assumée par la France, de l'évolution du territoire, bref, un partage libéral des compétences. Je crois répondre ainsi à la préoccupation manifestée par MM. les rapporteurs et notamment par M. Renouard à la fin de son rapport.

Il va de soi que la réalisation des objectifs du Plan reste fonction de l'option politique de la population. Je tiens cependant à souligner que les dotations du F.I.D.E.S. permettent de poursuivre les actions désormais traditionnelles de recherche d'eaux souterraines, d'hydraulique rurale, de formation technique, d'équipement social et d'urbanisme. Il y serait aidé par le Fonds européen, tandis que le ministère des affaires sociales prendrait en charge la lutte contre les grandes endémies, notamment la tuberculose. Un programme substantiel d'amélioration de l'infrastructure aérienne est établi, tandis qu'un équipement sportif et culturel correspondant aux besoins de Djibouti serait réalisé grâce aux subventions du ministère de la jeunesse et des sports.

J'ajoute que d'importants crédits ont été prévus pour la réalisation d'un nouveau môle et de postes d'accostage au port de Djibouti.

Tout est donc prévu pour que la présence française continue à produire ses effets bienfaisants, si tel est le vœu de la population.

Telles sont, mesdames, messieurs, les grandes lignes du budget que je propose à votre approbation. Budget strict et stable en ce qui concerne l'administration centrale et le personnel d'autorité, comportant, par contre, un certain renforcement des services d'Etat et des subventions aux budgets des territoires; enfin, augmentation très importante des dépenses en capital.

Vous l'avez constaté, notre préoccupation, toujours la même, c'est l'élevation du niveau de vie par l'augmentation de la production et la promotion humaine. Si elle se diversifie compte tenu de la spécificité des territoires, j'insiste sur le fait que, partout où ces questions se posent, les disciplines de la démographie, la surveillance de l'émigration, la formation technique, la création de ressources nouvelles, celles en particulier que peut procurer le tourisme, retiennent l'attention des pouvoirs publics et suscitent leurs initiatives.

Ainsi ce projet de budget témoigne-t-il de la volonté du Gouvernement de faire en sorte que la condition de territoires d'outre-mer de la République ne cesse d'apparaître aux peuples qui l'ont choisie comme la garantie de leur progrès et le gage de leur espérance. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R., U. D. T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Le Besnerais, premier orateur inscrit.

M. Henry Le Besnerais. Monsieur le président, monsieur le ministre, mes chers collègues, l'année dernière à la même époque, du haut de cette tribune, Albert Briand, mon prédécesseur parmi vous, lançait un nouveau cri d'alarme pour attirer l'attention sur la situation de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon.

Ce cri d'alarme était plus que largement justifié par la très grave crise que traversait le territoire, crise aux aspects et aux causes multiples, parfois lointaines, qu'aucune mesure prise jusqu'alors n'avait réussi à enrayer. Il n'est pas resté sans effet, puisque certains des problèmes qui se posaient à cette époque ont trouvé aujourd'hui des solutions qui améliorent la situation présente; mais l'avenir n'en est pas pour autant assuré de manière définitive et demeure très préoccupant. Vous avez d'ailleurs eu personnellement l'occasion de le constater, monsieur le ministre, lors du voyage que vous venez d'effectuer à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon.

En outre, M. Pierre Bas, rapporteur spécial de la commission des finances, dans son rapport, et M. Renouard hier soir à la tribune, ont bien voulu également évoquer la situation de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Je les en remercie.

Les problèmes qui ont été résolus par l'action déterminante du ministère d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer relèvent de plusieurs domaines. Ce sont, par exemple, les rapports entre les élus locaux et l'administration qui ont retrouvé leur sérénité par la remise en vigueur de textes plus ou moins tombés en désuétude, lesquels assurent maintenant au conseil général le plein exercice des pouvoirs et les garantit compte tenu des prises en charge par l'Etat, comme vous l'avez d'ailleurs, monsieur le ministre, récemment confirmé par écrit; c'est aussi grâce aux travaux en cours ou à intervenir l'année prochaine et financés par fonds publics, un niveau élevé de l'emploi qui, au moyen de quelques mesures appropriées, ne devrait pas fléchir au cours de l'hiver à venir.

Les travaux actuels sont ceux qui concernent l'achèvement de l'infrastructure du nouveau port et des bâtiments qui abriteront le Trésor et l'O. R. T. F., pour la partie télévision. Ceux qui sont appelés à les relayer, parfois dès cette année, sont la continuation de la route du littoral, la construction du laboratoire fixe de l'institut scientifique des pêches maritimes, la construction des deux bâtiments de la météorologie et celle d'une salle de gymnastique, l'allongement de l'apontement de Miquelon et le bituminage des rues de Saint-Pierre, pour ne citer que les principaux.

Ils doivent, sous réserve de l'inscription définitive aux budgets des ministères intéressés qui, je veux le souhaiter, ne rencontrera pas d'obstacle, être suivis par les travaux complémentaires du nouveau port, la construction du centre gymnique et culturel et celle de l'école primaire, par des travaux d'adduction d'eau à Saint-Pierre, mais au titre du fonds européen de développement, et enfin par la construction des bâtiments destinés à abriter une nouvelle unité frigorifique de stockage et de production, dont l'équipement serait financé par des fonds privés. L'ensemble des équipements nouveaux qui en résulteront, et auxquels il faut ajouter pour être exact le nouveau bateau postal en cours d'aménagement et le nouvel aéroport pratiquement achevé, va certes progressivement rénover tout l'archipel et lui donner les moyens en particulier d'atténuer l'isolement tant géographique que moral dont souffrent ses habitants.

Mais ce ne sont pas là, le port excepté, des équipements directement productifs et générateurs d'emplois futurs. On peut facilement en déduire que si le niveau actuel de l'emploi pourra être maintenu au cours de l'année à venir, on ne voit pas comment il pourrait l'être, une fois ces travaux achevés. Car en dehors du tourisme estival, du médiocre trafic actuel du port et de la production d'ailleurs insuffisante de la société de pêche et de congélation, il n'existe aucune autre activité productive capable, dans un an, de prendre le relais des travaux d'équipement. Et d'après l'énumération que je viens de faire des travaux nécessaires pour maintenir le niveau de l'emploi, on peut aisément se rendre compte de l'ampleur des relais à mettre en place.

La vocation essentielle du territoire est celle des activités portuaires, de la pêche et de l'industrie du poisson. Vous l'avez rappelé, il y a quelques instants, monsieur le ministre. C'est pour répondre à cette vocation qu'en 1952 fut créée la société de pêche et de congélation, belle réalisation d'économie mixte certes, mais qui ne fonctionne qu'à 60 p. 100 de sa capacité. La société pourrait d'ailleurs aisément porter cette capacité à 100 p. 100 — ce qui lui permettrait d'augmenter son personnel — si étaient prises diverses mesures d'organisation, de formation, de modernisation et d'accroissement de sa flotte de pêche. Car il serait inconcevable que l'on facilite l'installation de nouvelles unités de production en négligeant parallèlement celles qui existent.

En tout état de cause, le fonctionnement de la société de pêche et de congélation à pleine capacité n'absorbera qu'une faible proportion de la main-d'œuvre libérée par l'achèvement des chantiers et de celle qui, à partir de l'année prochaine, se pressera de plus en plus nombreuse sur le marché du travail.

C'est aussi pour répondre à cette vocation de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon que la Communauté économique européenne a financé les travaux de construction de l'infrastructure du nouveau port et d'un môle destiné à recevoir une unité frigorifique de stockage et de production de poisson. Or, sous ce double angle du port et de l'unité frigorifique nouvelle, les perspectives d'avenir sont, hélas ! des plus sombres.

Le port, compte tenu à la fois de son exigüité qui lui interdit les plus gros chalutiers, de son éloignement des meilleurs lieux de pêche, du retard mis à son achèvement, et de la concurrence qui a pu consécutivement se développer chez nos voisins, comme à Saint-Jean de Terre-Neuve, n'aura pas une clientèle spontanée importante. On ne voit, en effet, se dessiner à l'horizon outre celle des navires qui y sont ou y seront basés, que celle des quelques chalutiers étrangers qui actuellement le fréquentent, des chalutiers qui fréquenteront le laboratoire de l'institut des pêches, et de ceux qui utiliseraient les possibilités offertes par l'unité frigorifique de stockage dont la création est envisagée, clientèle qui ne sera pas suffisante pour assurer une utilisation optimale des installations.

Dans l'éventail réduit qui subsiste, il va falloir prospecter les armateurs et tenter de les attirer à l'aide de divers avantages et services. C'est là une affaire qui demande du temps et il apparaît nécessaire de s'y consacrer dès maintenant si l'on ne veut pas être pris de court.

Les perspectives de développement de l'industrie frigorifique du poisson par l'installation, sur le môle construit à cet effet dans le nouveau port, d'une entreprise de stockage et d'une entreprise de production, cette seconde entreprise

employant seule un personnel nombreux, sont encore plus alarmantes, car si le port a, lui, au moins le mérite d'exister, là, il n'y a pour le moment absolument rien.

La convention passée à Bruxelles faisait obligation de rechercher les capitaux privés nécessaires à cette opération en priorité chez les Européens de la Communauté économique européenne, dont les milieux intéressés ont été depuis deux ans et à plusieurs reprises sollicités.

Aussi surprenant que cela puisse paraître — et je ne suis pas en mesure d'en analyser les raisons — aucune proposition sérieuse n'a jamais émané de leur part, à l'exception de celle d'un groupe français de frigoristes intéressé par l'unité de stockage dont les perspectives de réalisation semblent maintenant moins éloignées. L'intérêt manifesté par un armateur français, et qui concernait la société de pêche et de congélation, ne pouvant être cité que pour mémoire vu son importance restreinte.

Mais, entre-temps, des propositions extérieures à l'Europe des Six se manifestaient de façon soutenue. Celle qui retient actuellement particulièrement notre attention porte sur des sommes dépassant 1.200 millions d'anciens francs et a pour objectif la création d'une unité intégrée comprenant des chalutiers. Elle est destinée à produire des plats cuisinés surgelés, projet qui ne viendrait pas en concurrence avec la production de la société de pêche et de congélation.

Les investissements étrangers dans nos territoires d'outre-mer peuvent poser des problèmes d'intérêt national tout à fait légitimes auxquels ont fait allusion M. Bas et M. Renouard. Je ne pense pas qu'ils puissent se poser en des termes identiques pour Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, à condition, bien entendu, qu'en contrepartie de l'octroi d'avantages fiscaux ou autres, soit obtenue la garantie que les objectifs de l'entreprise répondent aux intérêts économiques et sociaux du territoire et de la nation.

Mais, de plus, nous avons déjà la preuve qu'aucune autre solution que cette proposition étrangère n'est possible tout au moins dans un avenir proche, la place ne manquant pas pour bien accueillir ultérieurement toute autre proposition. En outre la situation a atteint un point tel que nous n'avons plus maintenant le loisir d'attendre, sinon en courant le risque d'une grave crise économique et sociale qui créerait un malaise durable dont on ne peut prévoir les conséquences.

Je connais votre sentiment sur le sujet, monsieur le ministre. Je vous demande donc d'user de toute votre autorité pour faire aboutir ce projet et, si des impératifs qui m'échappent s'y opposaient, d'user alors de cette autorité pour trouver une solution de valeur et d'intérêt comparable sachant que, jusqu'à présent, celle-ci n'a jamais été offerte par les milieux intéressés de la France ou de la Communauté européenne.

C'est de la solution de cet angoissant problème et des autres que j'ai évoqués que dépend, vous le savez mieux que quiconque, l'avenir du territoire, un avenir encore bien incertain pour des Français dont l'attachement à la patrie, vous l'avez encore tout récemment rappelé, ne peut être mis en doute. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Pidjot.

M. Roch Pidjot. Monsieur le président, monsieur le ministre, mes chers collègues, je voudrais tout d'abord faire part à l'Assemblée des excuses de mon collègue, M. Teariki, député de la Polynésie française qui, retenu dans sa circonscription, ne peut être aujourd'hui parmi nous.

Le 7 juillet 1966, l'Assemblée territoriale de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, consciente à la fois des possibilités minières du territoire et des problèmes graves qui commencent à se poser dans l'île et qui, restant sans solution concevable, allaient s'aggravant, votait à l'unanimité un mémorandum très explicite qui a eu un retentissement certain auprès des pouvoirs publics.

Dans ce mémorandum, l'Assemblée territoriale faisait connaître que l'équilibre budgétaire du territoire et les prochaines dépenses d'équipement nécessitées par la pression démographique étaient commandés par les recettes à prévoir, constatant que l'effort fiscal des années d'œuvre de ressources minières et, en particulier, des projets d'installation d'usines de traitement que se proposaient de réaliser d'importantes sociétés françaises et étrangères.

L'Assemblée territoriale faisait connaître également que la population tout entière était opposée au maintien du monopole minier de la société Le Nickel. Cette situation de monopole, malgré une expansion de la société qui a quintuplé sa production en dix ans, ne permet plus au territoire de trouver, dans ses ressources actuelles les moyens financiers indispensables pour faire face à ses besoins.

L'Assemblée territoriale exposait aussi que personne, dans le pays, ne pouvait admettre que la Nouvelle-Calédonie ne bénéficie pas de toutes les chances de développement économique se présentant à elle sous prétexte qu'elle est vulnérable aux influences étrangères.

Le général de Gaulle devait, lors de son passage à Nouméa, le 4 septembre dernier, à la fois reconnaître le caractère particulier du territoire et affirmer que le pays devait, à condition que ce fût dans un cadre français, développer ses grandes possibilités minières.

Au début d'octobre, l'administration du territoire a déposé devant l'Assemblée territoriale un projet de budget pour 1967 qui est en réduction de 300 millions sur le budget précédent, lequel se trouve ramené de 2.500 millions à 2.200 millions. Mais les rentrées réelles, ainsi que les conséquences de la grève des ouvriers de la société Le Nickel conduisent à estimer que les recettes à prévoir en 1967 seront inférieures aux prévisions administratives.

Ainsi, la haute administration du pays, qui assure en même temps son gouvernement depuis la suppression des dispositions essentielles de la loi-cadre, a été amenée, en quelques mois, à confirmer par les chiffres la dégradation croissante de l'économie locale, que dénonçait trois mois plus tôt le mémorandum de l'Assemblée territoriale, lancé comme un cri d'alarme et un avertissement.

Cette situation financière est d'autant plus contradictoire que l'on peut estimer que la société Le Nickel a augmenté son chiffre d'affaires au cours du premier trimestre 1966 par rapport au premier trimestre de 1965.

Dans le courant de septembre, un conflit a éclaté dans le centre minier de Thio entre les ouvriers de la société Le Nickel et la direction. Le chef du centre, un homme certainement très compétent et un comportement inadmissible à l'égard des ouvriers. La tension augmentant à chaque nouvelle erreur psychologique, les ouvriers mineurs se mirent finalement en grève, non pas pour revendiquer une amélioration de salaire mais pour protester contre les atteintes à leur dignité d'homme et de Calédonien et exigèrent le départ du chef de centre incriminé.

Par solidarité, les organisations syndicales ont soutenu les ouvriers de Thio. La grève avait atteint l'ensemble des exploitations minières, menaçant l'usine de fusion de Nouméa d'un arrêt total par épuisement des stocks.

La population de Thio a soutenu entièrement les ouvriers et les syndicats se sont trouvés dépassés par cette prise de position. La société Le Nickel s'étant refusée à rappeler le chef de centre, cause de cette grave agitation sociale, a durci ses positions en rejetant les conclusions de l'arbitrage rendu par l'administration et que les syndicats avaient acceptées.

La société avait envisagé des centaines de licenciements et aurait été menacée d'une grève totale de tout son personnel si elle avait exécuté ce projet.

L'opinion publique calédonienne soutenait entièrement les ouvriers, comme l'ont prouvé les collectes de soutien aux grévistes auxquelles ont soutenu non seulement des ouvriers, des employés de commerce et des fonctionnaires, mais aussi des élus territoriaux, des collectivités autochtones et même des industriels locaux.

L'Assemblée territoriale a réagi en blâmant le comportement de la société Le Nickel et en décidant d'apporter une aide aux familles éprouvées par la grève.

Le mouvement de solidarité s'est amplifié à tel point que, s'il s'était traduit par une grève générale, celle-ci aurait touché l'ensemble du secteur privé et du secteur public.

Devant l'ampleur prise par ce mouvement de protestation et l'obstruction de la société Le Nickel, qui était en train de perdre d'importantes ressources, on ne pouvait imaginer que c'était pour la défense d'un ingénieur, futur chef de centre minier, que la société affrontait la Nouvelle-Calédonie tout entière et, dans le territoire, on se perdait en conjectures sur les raisons qui la poussaient à agir ainsi.

Etait-ce pour effrayer les capitaux étrangers concurrents, désireux de s'investir, et pour leur faire croire que la Nouvelle-Calédonie est en proie aux conflits sociaux et que les investissements y courent les plus grands risques ?

Etait-ce pour acculer les pouvoirs territoriaux et les autorités nationales à consentir une aide plus forte que celle dont la société bénéficie ?

Etait-ce pour permettre aux partisans d'une politique dure à l'égard des populations calédoniennes de prendre des mesures de tutelle renforcée favorisant la départementalisation déguisée et l'intégration administrative et fiscale que le pays refuse unanimement ?

Nous ne pouvons pas le savoir encore.

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Vous auriez dû m'écouter.

M. Roch Pidjot. Une chose est certaine, c'est que le malaise n'a fait que s'aggraver.

Même si le but recherché était de provoquer une mise au pas de la population calédonienne, on ne pouvait pas changer l'état d'esprit de ce territoire.

Lors du voyage du chef de l'Etat dans les territoires d'outre-mer, l'accueil du Président de la République à Nouméa a prouvé l'attachement du pays à la France et le souvenir vivace que gardent ses habitants de l'épopée de la France libre et de leur ralliement à son chef. Ces souvenirs historiques, chaque fois qu'ils sont remués, touchent le cœur des Calédoniens. Mais il semble que le dialogue, confiant et indispensable, entre le chef de l'Etat et les représentants de la population du territoire n'ait pas été assez approfondi pour permettre une solution immédiate et réaliste des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociaux actuels.

Après le passage du chef de l'Etat, les événements, un instant suspendus, ont repris leur cours et la Nouvelle-Calédonie s'est retrouvée avec son malaise et ses problèmes.

A qui peut profiter l'aggravation de la situation ?

Le pays tout entier se pose la question.

La grève dans l'industrie du nickel, industrie qui représente 95 p. 100 des exportations du territoire et 45 p. 100 de ses ressources fiscales, la réduction critique de son budget, les difficultés économiques qui se font jour ne sont pas, hélas ! les seuls problèmes graves qui se posent au territoire.

La Nouvelle-Calédonie a, dans la ville de Nouméa, une capitale en plein développement qui a absorbé près d'un tiers de la population totale du pays. Avec ses nouvelles constructions, ses rues goudronnées, son stade, ses quartiers qui s'étendent, ses magasins, où se trouvent tous les articles d'une grande ville de France, Nouméa présente un niveau de vie confortable, dont une population à très forte prédominance européenne bénéficie avec satisfaction.

Mais le revers de la médaille est un arrière pays et des îles sous-développées. La population rurale autochtone et quelques petits colons accrochés à leur terre vivent sans aucune perspective prochaine d'amélioration de leur sort. Exclues par une politique d'importations à outrance, les agricultures calédoniennes sont gênées dans leur production. Les exportations agricoles ne représentent guère plus de 2 p. 100 des exportations totales. L'élevage arrive, pour le moment, à peine à satisfaire les besoins locaux. Le pouvoir d'achat des ruraux est très faible et le contraste entre la prospérité relative de la région urbaine de Nouméa et le reste du pays qui est en retard et va s'appauvrissant constitue une menace permanente pour l'équilibre du territoire et la bonne harmonie de ses composants.

Les autochtones qui n'ont pour patrimoine que leurs réserves ont vu celles-ci mises en cause par la haute administration. L'émul provoqué a obligé cette dernière à renoncer à ses projets mais, à l'intérieur du pays et dans les îles abandonnées à elles-mêmes on ne vit que des allocations familiales versées à ceux qui travaillent à Nouméa, et ces régions se vident peu à peu au profit de la grande ville.

Quant à la jeunesse, dans tout le pays elle se demande, si on ne crée pas d'emplois nouveaux, de quoi demain sera fait.

Or, en face d'une telle situation — une population urbaine à majorité européenne qui bénéficie de la plus grande partie des équipements et qui s'oppose à une population rurale à majorité autochtone et défavorisée — que nous proposons, ou plutôt, que nous impose-t-on ? La loi n° 66-794 du 27 octobre 1966 qui aggrave encore le déséquilibre économique et social puisqu'elle fait passer de dix à seize le nombre des sièges réservés à Nouméa et à sa région et laisse aux îles Loyauté leurs cinq sièges actuels alors que le nombre des électeurs loyaltiens est sensiblement égal au nombre des électeurs de Nouméa.

Ainsi est renforcée la position de Nouméa en tant que principale partie prenante au budget et ce au détriment des populations autochtones de l'intérieur et des îles.

Il semble que cette loi ait des motifs purement politiques, ce qui est inadmissible en la matière.

Il n'est pas admissible, si les Calédoniens doivent tous être considérés comme des Français ayant des chances égales, de faire qu'en 1966 des lois électorales faussent ces chances et augmentent les avantages dont jouissent des privilégiés. En Nouvelle-Calédonie, les habitants ne peuvent pas se permettre de dire : « Après nous, le déluge » et il n'est pas de leur intérêt, comme cela risque de se produire, d'accroître les contradictions internes du pays.

Au cours des discussions budgétaires des années précédentes devant l'Assemblée nationale, lors de l'examen ou de la dotation du F.I.D.E.S. ou des crédits inscrits au budget des territoires d'outre-mer, le député de la Nouvelle-Calédonie a toujours protesté, je le rappelle, contre l'insuffisance des crédits d'équipement et de développement économique affectés au territoire. On lui a toujours laissé entendre qu'aucun problème de fonds ne se pose pour la Nouvelle-Calédonie en raison de ses ressources minières dont dispose le territoire. Et l'expérience nous a appris qu'il n'a pas servi à grand-chose de dénoncer les erreurs et d'exprimer des doléances.

C'est par devoir civique de Français et comme député du territoire que je me permets d'exprimer à cette tribune le

sentiment profond de la population que je représente. Cette population a pris conscience de son mal et l'expérience lui a révélé la cause de ses problèmes. A l'approche de difficultés qui s'annoncent plus graves encore, car les remèdes ne sont prévus qu'à une échéance plus ou moins longue; l'assemblée territoriale a réussi à rassembler ses forces dans l'unanimité de ses délibérations.

Nous avons appris le déblocage, envisagé par le Fonds européen de développement, des crédits nécessaires au remplacement des cinq principaux bacs qui desservent la côte est par cinq ponts dont la mise en service améliorera nettement les conditions de vie des populations de cette partie du territoire. Ce financement revêt donc à la fois un intérêt social, un intérêt économique et un intérêt touristique.

Au cours de ces dix dernières années, un effort financier positif a été consenti par le territoire en faveur de l'enseignement. Le résultat est visible puisque le taux de scolarisation actuel est de 89 p. 100. Nous sommes persuadés que l'effort du territoire en ce sens se poursuivra et que la prise en charge par l'Etat de l'enseignement secondaire et technique se concrétisera par des résultats probants.

C'est à ces observations de caractère très général, quoique d'actualité, que je bornerai mes remarques sur les crédits du budget de la France d'outre-mer concernant mon territoire. En effet, si ces considérations présentent un grand intérêt, il en est d'autres qui ont une bien plus grande importance.

Monsieur le ministre d'Etat, je connais suffisamment votre perspicacité et votre sens politique pour être persuadé que vous avez compris les problèmes essentiels et vitaux qui se posent à ces territoires. Il s'agit maintenant de les résoudre. Je ne doute pas que vous m'en donniez l'assurance, mais ces problèmes sont trop graves et trop urgents, ils attendent depuis bien trop longtemps pour que nous vous jugions sur des discours. Nous vous jugerons à vos actes. (Applaudissements sur les bancs du centre démocratique et du rassemblement démocratique.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. de Grailly.

M. Michel de Grailly. Mesdames, messieurs, ainsi que l'a rappelé M. Feuillard, une délégation de la commission des lois s'est rendue en mars dernier en Nouvelle-Calédonie avec mission d'examiner les problèmes administratifs du territoire, et notamment les conditions d'application de la loi du 21 décembre 1963, portant réorganisation du conseil de Gouvernement.

La délégation a effectué cette mission dans le cadre des attributions constitutionnelles de la commission des lois, à savoir le contrôle de l'administration générale de la République.

Cette mission — je crois pouvoir le dire — a été à bien des égards fructueuse. Un rapport d'information est en cours d'impression. Il sera présenté, conformément au règlement de notre Assemblée, à la commission et ne saurait donner lieu à un débat particulier; mais il est utile et opportun, à l'occasion de la discussion budgétaire sur les territoires d'outre-mer, de formuler un certain nombre d'observations et de profiter, monsieur le ministre, de votre présence au banc du Gouvernement pour vous poser certaines questions.

Ces observations et ces questions seront de trois ordres. Elles porteront sur les problèmes administratifs du territoire, sur les problèmes législatifs et sur le problème particulier du nickel.

Après trois ans d'application, on peut apprécier les effets de la loi du 21 décembre 1963, dont je rappellerai la portée limitée.

Le décret-loi de 1957, pris en application de la loi-cadre de 1956, confiait aux conseillers de gouvernement élus parmi les membres de l'assemblée territoriale, non seulement des fonctions collégiales auprès du gouverneur chef du territoire, mais des fonctions dites ministérielles qui les plaçaient à la tête de certains services publics.

L'exposé des motifs de la loi du 21 décembre 1963 a fait apparaître les inconvénients de ce système pour un territoire comme la Nouvelle-Calédonie, où chaque ministre se trouvait pratiquement à la tête d'un service unique. De cette situation résultait une confusion de pouvoirs et d'attributions entre le conseiller de gouvernement exerçant des fonctions ministérielles et le fonctionnaire chargé de la bonne marche du service.

Des conflits avaient même résulté, en certains cas, au détriment du service, de cette confusion dans les attributions et quelques exemples en avaient été cités à cette tribune, monsieur le ministre, par votre prédécesseur M. Jacquinet.

Je ne reviendrai pas sur cette discussion et je m'en tiendrai à certaines constatations.

Les inconvénients signalés ont paru à MM. Feuillard, Coste-Floret, Boulay, Baudouin et moi-même, lorsque nous sommes allés en Nouvelle-Calédonie, particulièrement sensibles en matière de santé publique et de travaux publics.

En matière de santé publique notamment, l'absence de définition précise des pouvoirs du médecin-général chef du service, la restriction extrême apportée à l'exercice des pouvoirs de ce haut fonctionnaire par cette dualité que je viens d'évoquer

ont pu conduire parfois ses subordonnés à contester jusqu'à son autorité.

C'est ainsi qu'aux termes d'une décision du 1^{er} avril 1963 — car il fallait bien délimiter d'une façon ou d'une autre les compétences du ministre et du chef de service — celui-ci avait été chargé de l'expédition des affaires courantes et urgentes, mais toute initiative concernant la gestion et l'organisation intérieure du service lui avait été en fait retirée.

Les travaux publics constituent un exemple encore plus significatif. A cette tribune, M. Jacquinet avait critiqué, en des termes jugés parfois trop sévères, l'état d'anarchie de ce service et l'inefficacité totale de son action qui en résultait. Il avait relevé notamment l'absence de bureaux d'études dignes de ce nom, l'inexistence de plans concernant les grands travaux, les dépenses pléthoriques affectées à des personnels trop nombreux, inutilisés et manquant souvent des qualifications administratives et techniques nécessaires; enfin, comme pour la santé publique, la confusion de toutes les fonctions de responsabilité entre les mains du seul conseiller ministre.

Nous avons nous-mêmes constaté tout cela. Mais nous avons apprécié combien la situation s'était améliorée depuis l'application de la réforme. Et cela était bien plus utile que de revenir sur le passé.

Nous avons eu des contacts avec l'ingénieur en chef des ponts et chaussées chargé de la responsabilité du service. Ce fonctionnaire a mis en place un bureau d'études comprenant trois ingénieurs, grâce à qui a été effectuée, pour la première fois, l'inventaire des matériels et des besoins en vue de l'établissement d'un plan de travaux concernant notamment le réseau routier.

Une remarque intéressante s'impose à ce sujet. Sur 1.092 kilomètres de routes, la Nouvelle-Calédonie n'en comptait en 1964 que 42 qui fussent dignes de ce nom. En 1965, ce kilométrage de routes, disons carrossables, a été doublé et un plan a été établi, qui permet de prévoir l'aménagement de la totalité du réseau routier dans un délai de quinze ans.

Quant au personnel la situation a été assainie; c'est maintenant selon les seuls critères de la capacité technique qu'il est recruté.

En 1965, si 45 millions de francs avaient été affectés aux dépenses de matériel et six millions à l'achat de matériaux routiers, 145 millions avaient été nécessaires pour les dépenses en personnel. Cette disproportion des crédits de matériel et de personnel créait une situation anormale. Il y a été remédié et la réforme réalisée permet d'envisager avec confiance l'avenir de ce service public territorial.

Ces deux exemples, mesdames, messieurs, montrent que la réforme de 1963 était opportune et nécessaire. Est-ce à dire qu'elle est appliquée dans les meilleures conditions et qu'elle est suffisante? Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse répondre par l'affirmative.

La réforme n'est pas appliquée dans les meilleures conditions parce qu'on se heurte à certaines réticences de la part de ceux sur qui repose précisément cette partie du jeu des institutions, à savoir les conseillers de gouvernement eux-mêmes.

Certains d'entre eux ont ressenti comme une sorte d'offense personnelle ou comme une marque de défiance la suppression de leurs attributions ministérielles. J'estime qu'en cela ils ont tort, mais c'est un fait que ce sentiment existe.

Or la collaboration de ces hommes est nécessaire à la réussite de la réforme et à l'application du nouveau statut relatif au fonctionnement du conseil de gouvernement.

N'oublions pas que si le territoire est relativement peu peuplé, l'administration est cependant souvent éloignée des administrés. Aussi les hommes politiques du territoire que sont les conseillers de gouvernement ont-ils raison de dire qu'ils ont un rôle important à jouer. Selon l'expression de l'un d'eux, il est bon qu'ils puissent insuffler par leur action un « sang neuf » à l'administration, grâce à leurs contacts personnels avec les populations qu'ils représentent.

Je dis que tout cela est nécessaire, mais qu'il ne tient qu'à eux, dans une large mesure, de collaborer plus étroitement qu'ils ne le font avec le gouverneur chef du territoire, dans le cadre de leurs fonctions collégiales.

Toutefois, monsieur le ministre, il faudrait également faire un effort pour les associer davantage à l'application du nouveau statut. Les textes le permettent. Je pense à l'article 20 de la loi du 21 décembre 1963, aux termes duquel les conseillers du gouvernement présentent au conseil des rapports sur les affaires inscrites à son ordre du jour; ils peuvent faire au gouverneur chef du territoire toutes propositions sur les matières relevant de la compétence du conseil de gouvernement; mais aussi ils peuvent être chargés par le gouverneur chef du territoire, en conseil de gouvernement, de missions de contrôle ou d'études.

Monsieur le ministre, on ne saurait trop appliquer cette disposition. Il conviendrait de multiplier, dans toute la mesure

du possible, ces missions de contrôle ou d'études, qui permettront d'associer davantage les conseillers de gouvernement à l'administration du territoire.

Mesdames, messieurs, si la réforme de décembre 1963 s'est révélée opportune et nécessaire, elle ne suffit pas, je l'ai dit, à assurer dans les meilleures conditions l'administration du territoire. De nombreuses améliorations pourraient encore être apportées si l'on voulait revoir sur certains points la répartition des compétences entre l'Etat et le territoire.

A cet égard, monsieur le ministre, vous avez répondu par avance à mes observations — et d'une façon entièrement satisfaisante — quant à la prise en charge par l'Etat d'un certain nombre de services qui relèvent actuellement des compétences territoriales, en Nouvelle-Calédonie comme ailleurs.

Nous devons nous réjouir de ce qui a déjà été fait en matière d'enseignement, à savoir le rattachement aux compétences de l'Etat, et la prise en charge par le budget de l'Etat, des enseignements secondaire et technique. Et le député du territoire vient de déclarer — je ne puis que faire écho à ses paroles — qu'on devait légitimement attendre les meilleurs résultats, notamment sur le plan de l'enseignement secondaire, d'une scolarisation accrue des populations autochtones.

Mais on pourrait agir de la même manière en matière de travaux publics et de santé publique.

S'agissant des travaux publics, le programme que j'ai énoncé pourrait être considérablement accéléré si l'on pouvait opérer un classement des voies du territoire et en inclure certaines dans la voirie nationale, avec pour conséquence la prise en charge par le budget de l'Etat de leur réfection, de leur aménagement et de leur entretien.

En ce qui concerne la santé publique, vous avez de même devancé mes souhaits en déclarant que vous envisagiez, pour certains territoires, de rattacher la lutte contre les grandes maladies aux compétences de l'Etat. C'est précisément ce que je voulais vous demander pour la Nouvelle-Calédonie.

Mais, là encore, ces mesures seront insuffisantes si on ne veut — j'aborde ce sujet avec la plus grande modération et la plus grande objectivité — reconsidérer aussi les modalités d'exercice de ses pouvoirs par l'Assemblée territoriale.

Je pense plus précisément aux problèmes de la santé publique.

J'ai montré que la réforme de 1963 avait été particulièrement efficace en matière de travaux publics. Mais, pour la santé publique, elle est bien insuffisante du fait qu'en Nouvelle-Calédonie on manque de critères convenables concernant les frais et les tarifs d'hospitalisation.

Un projet de délibération a été préparé par la direction du service de santé en vue d'introduire plus de rigueur dans cette définition des critères d'hospitalisation et de soins ainsi que dans la prise en charge par la collectivité publique d'une fraction des dépenses considérées. Mais cette délibération n'est pas adoptée encore par l'Assemblée territoriale et je ne suis pas sûr qu'elle le sera rapidement.

D'autres exemples pourraient être cités.

On peut dire, en résumé, que les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée territoriale et les modalités de leur exercice s'apparentent bien plus à ceux de l'Assemblée nationale sous la IV^e République, qu'à ceux du Parlement de la V^e République. Il y a là une anomalie qui n'est pas sans porter préjudice au bon fonctionnement des services du territoire.

Une réforme pourrait être apportée — avec l'accord de l'Assemblée territoriale, monsieur Rock Pidjot, je m'empresse de le dire! — qui consisterait à appliquer la règle de l'article 40 de la Constitution aux délibérations de l'Assemblée territoriale.

J'ajoute que cette apparente restriction — car il s'agirait en fait d'obtenir un meilleur rendement du travail de cette assemblée — pourrait être nantie de contreparties. On pourrait, par exemple, envisager de faire bénéficier les membres de l'Assemblée territoriale de l'immunité parlementaire pendant les sessions ordinaires; on pourrait également leur permettre de poser des questions écrites et les encourager à le faire, afin qu'ils puissent exercer un contrôle efficace sur l'action du chef de territoire, et du conseil de gouvernement.

J'en ai terminé, mesdames, messieurs, avec les problèmes administratifs. J'en arrive au problème de la législation applicable dans les territoires d'outre-mer et mes observations débordent le cadre de la Nouvelle-Calédonie.

Le principe actuellement en vigueur est celui de la spécialité législative. Il peut s'énoncer ainsi: aucune loi n'est applicable dans les territoires d'outre-mer si le législateur ne l'a pas prévu expressément.

Il en allait différemment, autrefois, sous le régime du décret colonial: les textes votés en métropole pouvaient être déclarés applicables par décret. Ce système a été écarté implicitement — c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire — par la Constitution de 1958, dont le silence permet d'avancer que les textes législatifs ne sont pas applicables de plein droit aux territoires d'outre-mer. C'est bien d'ailleurs ce principe qui a été appliqué puisque,

à plusieurs reprises, certains textes législatifs ont été expressément déclarés applicables à ces territoires.

Mais ce n'est pas le cas pour tous les textes. Il y a donc une lacune regrettable en matière de droit civil, de droit commercial, de droit pénal et spécialement de procédure pénale.

J'appelle votre attention, monsieur le ministre, sur l'urgence qu'il y aurait en particulier à prévoir l'extension du code de procédure pénale aux territoires d'outre-mer. La réforme de la procédure pénale, la transformation de l'ancien code d'instruction criminelle en code de procédure pénale s'imposait aussi bien pour les territoires d'outre-mer que pour la métropole. Car il s'agit en définitive de défendre, d'une manière plus complète que ne le faisait le code d'instruction criminelle, les droits de l'homme, qu'il importe de respecter autant dans les territoires d'outre-mer que dans la métropole.

Il est de nombreux exemples que je ne puis développer, faute de temps. M'en tenant à une conclusion générale, je dirai qu'une solution est possible du point de vue constitutionnel puisque l'article 34 de la Constitution prévoit que ses dispositions pourront être précisées et complétées par une loi organique.

Ne pourrait-on, monsieur le ministre, envisager une loi organique — évidemment ce ne pourrait être que l'œuvre de la prochaine législature — aux termes de laquelle la législation serait applicable de plein droit aux territoires d'outre-mer, sauf dispositions contraires, c'est-à-dire l'inverse du principe actuellement appliqué? Cela serait valable pour la législation à intervenir.

Il conviendrait également d'envisager un inventaire de la législation selon qu'elle est actuellement applicable dans les territoires d'outre-mer ou non. Sans doute, le travail à accomplir serait-il considérable; mais une commission interministérielle composée de représentants du ministère de la justice et de vos services, monsieur le ministre d'Etat, pourrait en venir à bout.

Je ne parlerai pas des complications inhérentes au statut territorial et dues à la compétence de l'Assemblée — il n'est d'ailleurs pas question d'y porter atteinte — en matière de réglementation. Songez, par exemple, que l'Assemblée territoriale a compétence pour statuer en matière de procédure civile, mais non point en matière d'organisation judiciaire! On perçoit combien l'application d'une telle disposition peut être source de complications, d'erreurs et de lacunes.

Dernier point, que j'aborderai d'ailleurs très brièvement puisqu'il a été évoqué par M. Bas et par M. Renouard, et pour lequel ce que vous en avez déclaré vous-même, monsieur le ministre, il y a un instant, me donne entièrement satisfaction: le problème du nickel. C'est un problème capital pour la Nouvelle-Calédonie, puisque toute la prospérité, certaine, de ce territoire repose sur l'exploitation et le traitement de ce minéral.

J'ai écouté avec intérêt les observations de M. Pidjot, qui avait dans une grande mesure raison. Seulement il ne faudrait pas être injuste et oublier que la société Le Nickel, qui emploie 3.500 salariés, distribue une masse salariale qui profite à 14.000 personnes et que la prospérité dans laquelle vit cette population est due à cette situation.

Les perspectives de développement des activités de cette société sont considérables: 25.000 tonnes de nickel ont été commercialisées en 1963, plus de 31.000 tonnes en 1964, plus de 33.300 tonnes en 1965; l'objectif est d'atteindre en 1969 une production double de celle de 1963, soit 50.000 tonnes.

Cela dit, j'admets parfaitement que cette situation de monopole de fait ne soit pas satisfaisante. A cet égard, j'ai été très intéressé par ce que vous nous avez déclaré il y a un instant, monsieur le ministre, et si vous pouvez tout à l'heure nous préciser votre pensée sur ce point, j'en serai heureux.

En tout cas, l'unanimité des membres de la délégation de la commission des lois a tenu à manifester son hostilité totale à une éventuelle entreprise de l'International Nickel dans le territoire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. J'ai l'impression que, dans une grande mesure, les dirigeants de l'International Nickel ont voulu leurrer les populations sur leurs possibilités d'action. Cela nous donne à penser que cette entreprise n'était pas dépourvue d'arrière-pensées politiques. Nous devons donc être extrêmement vigilants et le Gouvernement commettrait une faute grave — mais il ne la commettra certainement pas — en autorisant cette société à donner suite à ses projets.

Il n'en reste pas moins que toutes dispositions qui pourraient être prises par le Gouvernement tendant à la diversification de l'exploitation minière et industrielle du nickel sur le territoire seraient approuvées, tant par les pouvoirs du territoire que par l'Assemblée nationale.

J'en ai terminé. Je prie l'Assemblée de bien vouloir m'excuser d'avoir peut-être un peu dépassé mon temps de parole. L'ensemble des observations que j'ai été amené à formuler et les quelques suggestions que j'ai pu présenter procèdent d'une préoccupation

qui, j'en suis convaincu, est celle de tous les membres de cette Assemblée, de tous ceux en tout cas qui assistent à ce débat. Elles étaient inspirées à la fois du souci de renforcer les liens entre la Nouvelle-Calédonie et la mère patrie, comme il convient de les renforcer avec tous nos territoires d'outre-mer, mais aussi de défendre les intérêts des populations autochtones dont le développement sur le plan humain doit être l'impératif majeur de notre action. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Odru. (Applaudissements sur les bancs du groupe communiste.)

M. Louis Odru. Votre projet de budget, monsieur le ministre, est sans doute en augmentation par rapport à celui de 1966, mais il en a gardé les caractéristiques essentielles, comme le prouve notamment la croissance des dépenses affectées à l'appareil administratif et policier.

Cependant, ce qui, cette année, lui confère son originalité politique, c'est que sa discussion se situe au lendemain des événements sanglants de Djibouti et au moment du dépôt d'un projet de loi tendant à l'organisation en 1967 d'un référendum dans le territoire qu'officiellement l'on désigne sous le vocable de Côte française des Somalis.

Je n'aurai pas la cruauté de rappeler vos fières et définitives déclarations précédant de quelques jours seulement le passage à Djibouti du Président de la République, passage au cours duquel la vérité éclata dans les conditions que vous savez.

La « décolonisation », dont le pouvoir aime à se présenter comme le champion, n'avait pas atteint Djibouti pas plus que les Comores, la Polynésie, la Nouvelle-Calédonie, Wallis et Futuna, les Nouvelles-Hébrides...

M. Pierre Bas, rapporteur spécial de la commission des finances, de l'économie générale et du Plan. Et la Sibérie !

M. Louis Odru. ... pas plus d'ailleurs que les départements d'outre-mer : la Réunion, la Martinique, la Guadeloupe et la Guyane.

Quelle était donc la situation en Côte française des Somalis à la veille du voyage présidentiel ? Voici ce qu'en disait le bulletin du parti du mouvement populaire dont le président est M. Ahmed-Idriss Moussa qui, je le rappelle pour ceux qui l'ignoraient, siège dans notre Assemblée comme apparenté au groupe de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T. :

« Il y a bien longtemps que la Côte française des Somalis a vu la justice disparaître de l'horizon. L'unique sort réservé à l'autochtone est d'être un jour ou l'autre victime de l'injustice. L'autorité locale pratique le gangstérisme, la contrainte, le truquage de la liste électorale, la candidature officielle. Nous soutenons que l'avenir du territoire doit être envisagé dans une ambiance de compréhension. Nous demandons donc, comme par le passé, notre indépendance. »

C'est parce que le colonialisme a continué de sévir en Côte française des Somalis et qu'ils voulaient en finir avec lui que les habitants de Djibouti, par leurs manifestations, ont attiré l'attention du monde entier sur le sort misérable qui leur était réservé.

« Ce n'est pas avec des pancartes qu'on décide du destin d'un pays », a affirmé le Président de la République dans son discours du 26 août à Djibouti. A quoi nous pouvons rétorquer : « Encore moins par les manœuvres colonialistes, la répression brutale et la force des armes. »

Nous voulons exprimer publiquement nos craintes devant les mesures prises par le pouvoir pour préparer le référendum de 1967. Nous protestons contre l'arrestation récente de douze personnalités politiques parmi lesquelles se trouvent M. Mohamed Ahmed Issa, président du comité de coordination des partis d'opposition, ainsi qu'un conseiller territorial.

Nous protestons contre vos propres déclarations, monsieur le ministre, vous qui tentez de faire pression sur l'électeur somalien, comme le prouvent vos affirmations au micro d'Europe n° 1 où vous pratiquiez, permettez-moi l'expression, le chantage à la sécession, à la rupture de toutes relations entre Paris et Djibouti, et où vous menaciez les Somaliens d'une « indépendance à la guinéenne ». C'est peut-être là une politique gaulliste, ce ne peut être la politique de la France.

Nous demandons la libération de toutes les personnalités récemment arrêtées et le respect strict de la liberté de parole et d'opinion, condition élémentaire d'un déroulement normal de la future campagne référendaire.

Nous désirons savoir comment le Gouvernement envisage le déroulement de cette campagne électorale, notamment quelles consignes il a données ou va donner à son représentant à Djibouti pour que la consultation se déroule de la manière la plus démocratique, pour que l'administration locale, la police et les troupes n'interviennent en rien pour fausser la décision de la population. Pendant longtemps encore les autorités de police du territoire vont-elles continuer à procéder à des expulsions

d'habitants indiscutablement originaires de la Côte française des Somalis ?

Allez-vous enfin, comme cela nous paraît logique, engager des négociations avec les véritables représentants de la population de la Côte des Somalis et tenir compte des aspirations de cette population à gérer librement ses propres affaires, de ses aspirations à l'indépendance ? Allez-vous discuter avec eux des problèmes politiques et pratiques posés par l'organisation de votre référendum ? Comme c'est le cas pour les autres peuples ex-colonisés d'Afrique, la population de la Côte des Somalis doit pouvoir disposer librement de son sort. Nous souhaitons, monsieur le ministre, qu'elle soit maîtresse de son avenir et que la France pratique à son égard une politique de coopération loyale et sans arrière-pensée.

Après Djibouti, Tahiti pose aussi d'importants problèmes politiques. Quelques jours après le passage du Président de la République, les élections municipales de Papeete en ont été, pour ceux qui l'ignoraient, comme une sorte de révélateur.

Les Tahitiens n'apprécient guère, et on le comprend, les explosions atomiques. La création et le développement du centre d'expériences nucléaires ont provoqué sur le plan de la vie quotidienne des perturbations lourdes de conséquences. Si quelques affairistes ont su réaliser de colossales fortunes, la hausse du coût de la vie a accru la misère des Tahitiens et le tourisme, officiellement présenté comme le remède de l'avenir, a reçu un net coup d'arrêt car la civilisation des loisirs s'accommodait mal des champignons atomiques et des poussières radioactives.

L'installation du centre nucléaire a des conséquences désastreuses pour l'économie de l'île et pour sa population, tant au point de vue matériel que moral, et ce n'est pas en refusant au vieux leader tahitien Pouvanaa le droit de revenir dans son pays natal que vous empêcherez la protestation des Tahitiens de se faire entendre et que vous pourrez leur interdire longtemps encore le droit de gérer leurs affaires comme ils l'entendent.

La Nouvelle-Calédonie enfin, sur laquelle règne la toute puissante société Le Nickel, veut également entrer librement dans ce xx^e siècle. De tous les territoires d'outre-mer, elle est cependant celui qui a la structure administrative la plus typiquement colonialiste puisqu'une loi antidémocratique de 1963 l'a ramenée aux pratiques d'avant la loi-cadre de 1956. Et cela au moment même où la population de l'île réclame l'octroi d'une large autonomie au territoire.

Aussi ne faudra-t-il pas vous étonner, monsieur le ministre, si un jour, à cause de votre recolonisation en Nouvelle-Calédonie, le vent de l'histoire se met à souffler sur Nouméa comme à Djibouti.

Le groupe communiste votera contre votre projet de budget concernant les territoires d'outre-mer. (Applaudissements sur les bancs du groupe communiste.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Feuillard.

M. Gaston Feuillard. Mesdames, messieurs, mon excellent ami M. Loste, retenu dans son territoire par une session de l'assemblée territoriale, m'a demandé de vous parler des principaux problèmes de Wallis et Futuna ; j'ai acquiescé à sa demande.

Ces deux îles lointaines sont, comme vous le savez, devenues territoires d'outre-mer français depuis 1961 et, de ce fait, ne bénéficient que depuis peu d'années des investissements consentis par la métropole dans les autres territoires. Leurs ressources sont encore presque inexistantes : exportation de 500 à 800 tonnes de coprah, quelques revenus du service des postes, subsides envoyés par les habitants qui sont obligés de se rendre en Nouvelle-Calédonie pour trouver du travail.

Dans ces conditions, on comprend que le budget local, dont les ressources sont très faibles, soit couvert à 87 p. 100 par une subvention de la métropole. Malgré cette générosité, l'état de sous-équipement de ces îles reste un mal profond qui pose des problèmes techniques et humains angoissants.

Le plus important à résoudre dans l'immédiat est celui des liaisons. En effet, toute possibilité de développement du territoire est annihilée par suite de l'absence d'une ligne maritime régulière et stable. Cette situation, qui ne peut plus durer, monsieur le ministre d'Etat, a aussi pour conséquence un coût élevé de transport, ce qui grève anormalement le prix des marchandises et entrave de surcroît toute tentative de production de matières exportables.

Le navire de commandement affecté au territoire fin 1965 et qui reliait Futuna à Wallis a été supprimé. Son remplacement est donc indispensable dans les délais les plus brefs, d'autant plus que Futuna ne possède pas d'aérodrome et se trouve pratiquement isolée.

A cet égard, un crédit de paiement de 300.000 francs est ouvert dans le cadre d'une autorisation de programme qui s'élève au double. A première vue, il semble que cette somme soit insuffisante pour couvrir l'achat, même d'occasion, d'un

bateau de cent tonnes. En tout cas, la question reste posée de savoir s'il n'y aurait pas intérêt à consentir un effort supplémentaire pour acquérir un navire plus important permettant de suppléer à la carence des liaisons avec la Nouvelle-Calédonie. En même temps, le taux du fret pourrait être ramené à un montant plus raisonnable.

M. Loste a déjà attiré l'attention sur l'état de l'aérodrome de Wallis, menacé de fermeture si des travaux de réfection ne sont pas immédiatement effectués. Monsieur le ministre, nous aimerions que vous nous confirmiez que des mesures ont été prises pour que les liaisons aériennes déjà aléatoires et insuffisantes ne risquent pas d'être interrompues totalement.

Dépourvue d'aérodromes et de liaisons maritimes régulières, l'île de Futuna est, comme nous l'avons dit, presque totalement isolée. Une possibilité de créer, à peu de frais, une piste de 1.100 mètres ayant été reconnue, la solution la plus humaine, la plus raisonnable ne serait-elle pas de réaliser cet équipement et de baser dans le territoire un avion léger de 8 à 12 places reliant Wallis à Futuna et à Fidji qui est desservi par une ligne intercontinentale française, via Nouméa, une fois par semaine. Nous aimerions, monsieur le ministre d'Etat, connaître l'avis du Gouvernement sur ce point.

Si le problème de l'eau a été virtuellement réglé à Wallis, par le percement de puits dans les villages, il faut penser maintenant à la situation de Futuna dont les rivières doivent être aménagées pour permettre aux populations des différents centres de se ravitailler en eau potable tout en assurant les conditions d'hygiène indispensables.

Un important réseau routier créé par les Américains pendant la guerre existe à Wallis et a pu être conservé avec des moyens réduits. Le nombre de véhicules importés dans l'île a sensiblement augmenté depuis et il est indispensable maintenant de doter le service des travaux publics, du personnel et surtout du matériel permettant de conserver ce qui existe. Les prévisions de dépenses complémentaires nécessaires à ce service ont été évaluées à 435.000 francs.

En ce qui concerne Futuna, nous ne pouvons qu'espérer que le dossier qui doit être présenté prochainement au fonds européen de développement pour la création de la route sera définitivement établi et que cet organisme donnera rapidement une suite favorable pour le financement de cette réalisation indispensable à l'avenir économique et touristique de l'île.

Le service de santé couvre les besoins courants, mais l'effectif actuel ne peut pas s'attaquer aux deux endémies extrêmement graves, évoquées d'ailleurs par M. le ministre et dont est atteint un pourcentage considérable de la population : la tuberculose et la filariose.

Les deux seuls médecins résident actuellement dans chacune des îles et ne peuvent s'entraider en raison des difficultés de liaison. Il est indispensable d'affecter au territoire un troisième praticien et de doter ce service des moyens matériels nécessaires, l'ensemble exigeant une intervention supplémentaire du budget de l'Etat chiffrée à 95.000 francs.

Le service d'agriculture a besoin, lui aussi, d'être étoffé non seulement pour l'amélioration de l'agriculture traditionnelle, mais encore pour la création de cultures d'exportation, la vulgarisation de l'élevage et la reforestation. La dépense prévisible à inscrire au budget de l'Etat peut être chiffrée à 110.000 francs.

Il serait par ailleurs souhaitable que l'on s'attache, comme on l'a fait avec succès aux Tuamotou, à examiner les possibilités de la culture perlière. Cette industrie pourrait être une source de revenus intéressants pour le territoire tout en créant des emplois nouveaux dont il a grand besoin.

La chefferie traditionnelle, maintenant intégrée dans l'administration générale, devrait être prise en charge par le budget de l'Etat. Elle joue un rôle social qu'il convient de rémunérer convenablement. Actuellement, un chef ne touche guère que 35 francs français par mois, ce qui est pour le moins insuffisant. Vous conviendrez qu'il faudrait au minimum tripler cette allocation pour rémunérer les chefs d'importance. Cette mesure représenterait une dépense de 125.000 francs à inscrire au budget de l'Etat.

Venons-en à un chapitre des plus importants, celui de l'enseignement.

2.600 enfants, soit la totalité de la jeunesse wallisienne et futunienne, sont actuellement scolarisés. En 1966, le service de l'enseignement a reçu une dotation de 300.000 francs versée par le budget de l'Etat, à laquelle il faut ajouter une subvention complémentaire de 90.000 francs accordée par le ministre d'Etat. L'ensemble représente 150 francs par élève, alors que la Nouvelle-Calédonie percevait 467 francs et la Polynésie française 341 francs par élève.

La dotation de 150.000 francs prévue pour 1967 reste bien en dessous des besoins minimum de fonctionnement même compte tenu de la reconduction — que nous espérons — de la subvention complémentaire de 90.000 francs du ministère d'Etat.

Une commission locale de l'enseignement avait évalué en 1965 le minimum des besoins à 687.500 francs pour couvrir les frais de personnel, de fournitures scolaires et d'aménagement des locaux, soit environ 265 francs par élève. Mes chers collègues, ne croyez-vous pas que ce minimum est aujourd'hui dépassé ?

De plus, la création d'un centre technique se révèle des plus urgentes. En effet, la main-d'œuvre présente une qualification très faible à laquelle il faut remédier tant en considération des besoins du territoire que dans l'intérêt des ouvriers qui, pour nourrir leur famille, doivent aller s'employer en Nouvelle-Calédonie.

Cet exposé ne constitue qu'un bref résumé des principaux besoins de ce territoire qui ne pouvaient être passés sous silence.

La subvention d'équilibre accordée au budget local, qui était de 1.203.094 francs en 1965, passera à 1.304.064 francs en 1967. Monsieur le ministre d'Etat, je vous en remercie au nom de M. Loste.

Toutefois, cette légère augmentation est loin d'être à la mesure des besoins à satisfaire.

Mon temps de parole étant très limité, je me suis borné à exposer les principaux problèmes dont la solution conditionne le développement du plus jeune — vous l'avez vous-même souligné — des territoires de la République. Le désir des habitants de Wallis et de Futuna bat à l'unisson de celui de tous les Français. Vous ne l'ignorez pas, monsieur le ministre d'Etat.

Puisse cette certitude nous donner à penser que, votre attention étant déjà retenue par les problèmes qui se posent à Wallis et Futuna, vous transmettez prochainement à mon ami M. Loste les réponses satisfaisantes qu'il attend en faveur d'un territoire qu'il représente dans notre Assemblée avec compétence, dignité et dévouement. (Applaudissements sur les bancs du groupe des républicains indépendants et de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Mohamed. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. Ahmed Mohamed. Monsieur le ministre d'Etat, j'ai écouté avec grand intérêt vos déclarations.

C'est avec plaisir que j'ai enregistré le pourcentage d'augmentation des crédits de votre département, qui est certainement l'un des plus forts que connaît le budget de 1967. Je remarque cependant que les crédits affectés au territoire des Comores n'ont pas suivi cette progression et je le déplore.

A plusieurs reprises, mon prédécesseur, le prince Saïd Ibrahim et moi-même avons appelé votre attention sur la situation de l'archipel des Comores qui, pour des raisons que nous avons longuement exposées, se trouve, sur le plan du développement économique et social, dans une situation inférieure à celle des autres territoires d'outre-mer français.

M. Pierre Bas, rapporteur spécial du budget des territoires d'outre-mer, ne cesse également de souligner cette situation dans ses rapports et de demander une augmentation des crédits destinés à notre territoire. Je lui rends hommage pour l'objectivité de ses rapports.

Je dois reconnaître qu'un effort a été fait par le Gouvernement, mais il reste insuffisant pour rattraper le retard que plusieurs décennies de rattachement à Madagascar nous ont légué.

Il est d'autant plus urgent de faire un effort encore accru en faveur des Comores qu'une progression démographique trop forte nous alarme.

Une ébauche de plan quinquennal a été faite. A mon avis, ce plan est insuffisant ; en outre il n'est pas très bien conçu pour assurer le développement rapide de l'archipel. En tout cas, la modicité des crédits prévus pour son expansion est certaine. D'ailleurs, pour les années 1966 et 1967, le montant des sommes attribuées aux Comores au titre du F.I.D.E.S. est même inférieur aux prévisions de ce plan.

Monsieur le ministre, vous avez effectué un bref séjour aux Comores au mois de juin dernier. Vous avez eu un aperçu rapide du pays. J'aurais souhaité que vous restiez plus longtemps afin de pouvoir faire des tournées dans les villages les plus déshérités de l'archipel. Malheureusement, votre emploi du temps ne vous l'a pas permis. Je suis cependant persuadé que vous avez eu une vue d'ensemble des problèmes comoriens et que vous ferez tout ce qui est possible pour améliorer le niveau de vie des populations locales.

Dans votre exposé, vous avez énuméré les différents projets que vous proposez de réaliser au cours de l'année prochaine pour les territoires d'outre-mer dans le domaine de l'équipement et de l'infrastructure. J'aurais aimé apprendre ce que vous envisagez de faire pour améliorer les liaisons aériennes de l'archipel des Comores, où il n'existe aucun terrain susceptible d'être utilisé par les avions à réaction, ce qui rend le territoire

tributaire de Madagascar pour ses transports aériens vers l'extérieur.

Les inconvénients de cette situation, vous les connaissez. J'espère que le Gouvernement se penchera sérieusement sur ce problème et lui trouvera une solution dans un avenir rapproché. J'aurais également aimé savoir ce que le Gouvernement se propose de faire pour les liaisons téléphoniques entre l'archipel et la France, ainsi que pour l'accroissement de la puissance du poste émetteur de la radiodiffusion et la modernisation des installations de ce dernier service.

M. Louis Briot. Très bien !

M. Ahmed Mohamed. M. Peyrefitte, alors ministre de l'information, venu aux Comores il y a deux ans, avait fait à ce sujet des promesses qui n'ont pas été réalisées. J'espère, monsieur le ministre d'Etat, que vous voudrez bien leur donner suite.

Pour terminer, j'appelle votre attention sur un sujet qui me semble être mal traité. Il s'agit de la prise en charge par le budget métropolitain des traitements des fonctionnaires et agents de la métropole en service aux Comores.

Une somme déterminée est prévue pour le paiement des soldes et frais divers concernant ces personnels. Elle constitue une aide appréciable pour le territoire, mais qui risque de diminuer dans les prochaines années lorsque les jeunes Comoriens actuellement en France retourneront, leurs études terminées, travailler dans leur pays.

En effet, j'ai constaté que le remplacement d'un fonctionnaire non originaire des Comores par un natif du pays constitue une charge supplémentaire pour le budget du territoire, car les émoluments de ce dernier ne sont plus à la charge du budget qui payait son prédécesseur.

Or cette relève est fort utile. Il est indispensable que les jeunes Comoriens retournent dans leur pays pour y travailler. La relève qu'ils assurent alors permet, par ailleurs, au personnel enseignant ou médical employé aux Comores d'être utilisé dans d'autres territoires qui en ont un pressant besoin.

Il y a là un problème qui mérite d'être étudié et de recevoir une solution satisfaisante. Pour ma part, je souhaite que l'aide financière apportée au titre de l'assistance technique à l'archipel des Comores soit évaluée globalement et mise à la disposition des autorités locales qui l'utiliseraient suivant les nécessités du pays.

J'espère, monsieur le ministre d'Etat, que vous voudrez bien examiner les quelques questions que j'ai ainsi posées et que vous leur donnerez une suite satisfaisante. D'avance, je vous en remercie. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R. U. D. T. et du groupe des républicains indépendants.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer.

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Messieurs, j'ai écouté avec attention les interventions que vous avez bien voulu faire. Si je ne réponds pas à toutes les questions que vous m'avez posées — ce qui exigerait un très long temps de parole dont je ne dispose pas — je peux vous assurer que j'ai noté vos observations et que je m'efforcerai d'y donner suite.

M. Le Besnerais a fait un exposé qui est, je dois le dire, extrêmement exact, de la situation à Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Je voudrais seulement le rassurer sur l'avenir de ce territoire.

Nous sommes parfaitement au courant, comme il a bien voulu le reconnaître, de sa situation économique au voisinage d'un grand Etat de l'Amérique du Nord en pleine expansion économique et dont le niveau de vie monte tous les jours. Nous savons aussi que l'économie de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon repose essentiellement sur la pêche, que le goût des consommateurs a beaucoup évolué dans les dernières années, qu'on exige maintenant du poisson surgelé, du poisson frais ou des plats cuisinés.

Enfin, nous n'ignorons pas que la pêche au doris est surclassée par la pêche avec les chalutiers modernes de fort tonnage.

Par conséquent, il est extrêmement difficile, dans cet environnement très riche, d'être concurrentiel. Aussi partageons-nous pleinement votre avis sur les nécessités de perfectionnement de l'appareil économique de Saint-Pierre et Miquelon.

Après l'installation moderne du port, après la décision prise et bientôt appliquée de constituer un frigorifique de stockage, il est bien évident que nous sentons la nécessité d'un autre frigorifique de production. Le Gouvernement est très attentif à cette question. Les études se poursuivent et je pense que nous pourrions bientôt trouver le moyen pratique de créer un véritable complexe à Saint-Pierre, et même, grâce probablement aux apports que vous savez d'une société américaine, d'améliorer la pêche en haute mer.

De toute façon, je veux que vous sachiez que la France ne laissera jamais ses enfants charentais, basques, bretons et normands, dont les aïeux virent là-bas il y a 300 ans, dans une

situation indigne de celle qui devrait être la leur, celle de Français à part entière dans le continent américain où ils nous représentent et où ils doivent nous représenter toujours plus dignement.

Monsieur Rock Pidjot, je ne crois pas que vous ayez écouté avec grande attention le discours que j'ai prononcé peu de temps avant votre exposé. Si vous l'aviez fait, sans doute votre intervention aurait-elle été plus nuancée.

Vous nous avez parlé, bien entendu, du nickel et ce, sous le jour le plus sombre. Vous nous avez également parlé de la situation très difficile qui est faite, à tous égards, à la population.

Ce tableau que vous avez brossé est excessivement sombre et ne correspond pas très exactement à la réalité. Bien sûr, il y a un malaise et nous le savons. Bien sûr, il faut prendre des mesures et nous les prendrons.

M. de Grailly, en revanche, a exposé avec une grande modération et une grande objectivité, et aussi avec une connaissance des problèmes, les questions qu'il a pu étudier à la tête de la délégation de la commission des lois qui s'est rendue dans ce territoire il y a quelques mois. Cette délégation qui comprenait des personnalités comme M. Feuillard et plusieurs autres, a laissé là-bas la meilleure impression en raison de la très grande objectivité de ses remarques et du sérieux de ses études.

Les différentes observations que m'a présentées M. de Grailly, au nom de cette délégation, ont retenu toute mon attention et donneront suite, sans aucun doute, à des études précises.

Vous nous avez parlé en particulier, monsieur de Grailly, de la loi de 1963 et de son application. Je reconnais avec vous que cette application est loin d'être parfaite et que des adaptations doivent être apportées. Le territoire évolue à tous égards, c'est un fait. Nous devons en tenir compte. Je serai au début du mois de décembre dans ce territoire pour inaugurer les jeux du Pacifique, certes, mais aussi, et surtout, pour y étudier, avec l'administration et les élus locaux, différents problèmes parmi lesquels celui du nickel.

A cet égard, j'indique à M. Rock Pidjot que le Gouvernement n'a pas attendu le premier cri d'alarme poussé par l'assemblée territoriale à la fin du mois d'août ni le deuxième, poussé un peu plus récemment d'une façon d'ailleurs beaucoup plus mesurée. C'est au printemps, peu de temps après mon premier voyage là-bas, qu'un groupe de travail interministériel, comprenant des représentants hautement qualifiés du ministère de l'économie et des finances, du ministère de l'industrie et de mon département, a étudié les conditions générales du marché mondial du nickel et l'inclusion des ressources neo-calédoniennes dans ce marché.

M. Rock Pidjot a dit qu'il existe un monopole du nickel en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Je lui rappelle qu'il existe surtout un monopole de fait dans le monde, détenu par une puissante société canado-américaine, l'I. N. Co, dont on a parlé à plusieurs reprises au cours de ce débat. Cette société vient de décider unilatéralement l'augmentation du prix de son nickel de 10 p. 100, pensant s'attaquer ainsi plus commodément à l'exploitation du minerai à basse teneur ; mais elle l'a fait unilatéralement comme un véritable monopole. Je voudrais mettre M. Rock Pidjot à l'abri de quelques illusions qu'il pourrait avoir, ainsi que certains de ses compatriotes de Nouvelle-Calédonie, sur les possibilités de lutter à armes égales, de manière concurrentielle, sans avoir derrière soi des moyens financiers considérables.

Ce groupe de travail a désigné le 10 août très exactement, donc avant les cris d'alarme, un fonctionnaire de grande qualité qui est allé en Nouvelle-Calédonie et qui nous a remis son premier rapport. Ce fonctionnaire, hautement qualifié en matière minière et en matière de métallurgie, consulte, à l'heure actuelle, tous les futurs partenaires des Neo-Calédoniens. Vers la fin du mois, je l'espère, un deuxième rapport sera soumis au Gouvernement et je pourrai, à mon tour, avec ce haut fonctionnaire, venir en Nouvelle-Calédonie étudier de très près les conditions d'installation d'autres entreprises qui comprendront, bien entendu, les Neo-Calédoniens, des entreprises de la métropole, avec peut-être l'apport de capitaux étrangers ; mais la France devra rester majoritaire, car il s'agit d'une matière d'importance stratégique et d'intérêt national. Il ne peut pas être question, M. de Grailly l'a fort bien dit, de livrer l'économie des territoires de la République à un puissant trust étranger. La collaboration avec l'étranger, nous l'acceptons, bien sûr, mais sans aucun doute le dernier mot doit rester, dans cette affaire, à la France.

M. Michel de Grailly. Très bien !

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Les intérêts des mineurs calédoniens et de la population seront préservés également et je ne doute pas que nous arrivions à trouver des solutions favorables.

M. Roch Pidjot a fait allusion, et je l'avais fait avant lui, au désir de promotion sociale et de justice sociale. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec lui, mais il est bien évident que pour mieux répartir le revenu du territoire, ce qui est essentiel, nous nous devons d'abord d'assurer la formation professionnelle, de nous y acharner. J'ai donné des instructions très précises au gouverneur pour que soient admis dans les lycées et collèges techniques un plus grand nombre d'élèves autochtones. C'est une œuvre que nous poursuivrons ; il nous faudra de la patience, mais nous y arriverons.

M. de Grailly a fait allusion au rôle des conseillers de gouvernement. Lorsque le chef de l'Etat s'est rendu dans le Pacifique, il s'est entretenu avec ceux-ci du rôle plus précis, plus important, qui devrait être le leur. Le gouverneur m'a déjà fait des propositions, et lors de mon prochain voyage je mettrai définitivement cette question au point.

En ce qui concerne l'harmonisation de la législation, des personnes, dont a parlé M. de Grailly, je signale que des travaux très précis sont en cours entre le haut commissaire, le garde des sceaux et moi-même, et j'ai bon espoir qu'une solution sera prochainement trouvée. Je ne sais pas si elle sera celle que vous souhaitiez et qui consiste à ajuster les coutumes sur les nôtres, mais nous devons aboutir à une uniformisation comme l'article 34 de la Constitution nous l'impose.

M. Odru a bien voulu ne pas avoir trop de cruauté à mon égard et je l'en remercie. A mon tour, je ne serai pas cruel avec lui.

Vous avez consacré 15 secondes à l'examen du budget et 14 minutes 45 secondes aux questions politiques, ce qui démontre votre objectivité, monsieur Odru !

Vous avez parlé de Djibouti. Je ne vous répondrai pas longuement aujourd'hui parce que, ainsi que vous devez le savoir, un grand débat s'instaurera à ce sujet dans une dizaine de jours.

En ce qui concerne les personnes qui ont été arrêtées, je ne puis être d'accord avec vous. Au cours de mon séjour précédent, lorsque j'accompagnais le chef de l'Etat, j'ai assisté à diverses manifestations sur la voie publique. Par mesure d'apaisement, les arrestations qui ont suivi ces manifestations n'ont pas été maintenues. Mais il était bien entendu — et je l'avais fait savoir à ceux qui avaient été libérés — que je souhaitais de leur part, surtout lorsqu'ils étaient chefs de parti ou membres d'états-majors de parti, qu'ils se comportent dorénavant de manière plus démocratique. Il n'est pas indispensable d'utiliser des banderoles, et encore moins des bâtons, pour se faire entendre, d'autant que nous avions immédiatement promis aux intéressés qu'ils pourraient s'exprimer par les voies les plus démocratiques. Malgré ces déclarations, malgré un appel solennel au calme lancé par le nouveau chef du territoire, M. Saget, dès son arrivée à Djibouti le 11 septembre, des scènes de violence, de désordre, de pillage se sont à nouveau déroulées dans la ville de Djibouti les 13 et 14 septembre. Les infractions commises au cours de ces journées ont donné lieu à l'ouverture d'informations par les autorités judiciaires compétentes et le déroulement normal de cette procédure a conduit le magistrat instructeur à procéder à l'inculpation et à la mise sous mandat de dépôt de certaines personnes. Il appartient dorénavant à la justice souveraine de se prononcer en toute sérénité sur les infractions commises.

Aucun Etat ne saurait tolérer que sur son territoire des éléments étrangers, de leur propre mouvement ou obéissant à des consignes venues de l'extérieur, puissent exercer la moindre contrainte sur toute fraction, ou qu'elle réside, de la nation.

Aucun citoyen français n'a été expulsé. Quelques-uns sont partis de leur propre gré. Sans doute se sentaient-ils coupables. Mais aucun citoyen français, je le répète, n'a été expulsé. En revanche, il est exact que 2.481 étrangers ont été reconduits à la frontière de leur pays d'origine.

Vous avez prétendu, monsieur Odru, qu'à Tahiti la population était extrêmement opposée aux activités du centre d'expérimentation du Pacifique. Plusieurs séjours là-bas ne m'ont pas donné cette impression. Je suis au regret de ne pas être d'accord avec vous.

M. Louis Odru. M. Teariki, député du territoire, affirme le contraire !

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Je ne doute pas qu'il soit de votre avis, mais, sur ce point particulier, il ne représente là-bas qu'une minorité.

M. Louis Odru. Mais il a été élu député. Et les élections de Papeete en sont la démonstration !

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Ces élections ont été organisées sur des objectifs purement locaux. Je crois connaître mieux que vous l'affaire, car c'est mon métier. Les questions d'intérêt national ont été absolument absentes des préoccupations des candidats. Il s'est agi d'une affaire locale entre le sénateur Poroi et son rival.

M. Michel de Grailly. Exactement !

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Monsieur Mohamed, vous avez exposé avec beaucoup

de précision et beaucoup de modération le point de vue des Comores. J'entretiens, vous le savez, avec le président Saïd Mohamed Cheik des rapports constants et très amicaux. Il est certain que les relations entre le conseil de gouvernement des Comores, les membres de la chambre des députés et le Gouvernement français sont exactement ce qu'elles doivent être : amicales et confiantes.

Vous savez fort bien que nous allons avoir de nouvelles conversations très sérieuses avec le président Saïd Mohamed Cheik à partir du 12 janvier et que d'ici là ces entretiens seront préparés. De nombreux points seront examinés pour adapter toujours davantage à l'évolution générale l'appareil politique, financier, administratif et économique du territoire des Comores.

Vous avez regretté, comme moi, que les crédits accordés aux Comores ne suivent pas exactement le même taux d'augmentation que ceux qui ont été attribués à d'autres territoires. Cela tient surtout malheureusement au fait que votre appareil administratif et économique ne permet pas d'absorber des crédits beaucoup plus vastes. C'est ce qui nous gêne. Nous allons nous efforcer de vous doter d'un meilleur appareil économique et administratif, d'une meilleure infrastructure, d'un meilleur équipement. Nous allons étudier tout cela.

Je tiens tout de même à vous rappeler que les efforts de la France en matière de crédits d'investissements — puisque c'est de cela qu'il s'agit avant tout — ont été en constante augmentation. Sur le premier Plan, vous avez reçu 18.925.000 francs métropolitains, sur le deuxième Plan, 24 millions, sur le troisième Plan, 37 millions. Sur les treize années des deux premiers plans, les Comores ont reçu une moyenne de 3.300.000 francs métropolitains par an, sur les cinq années du troisième Plan, 7 millions 500.000 francs. Il n'est guère possible de citer en détail tout ce qui a été fait avec ces crédits. Je rappelle tout de même que de 1961 à 1966, plus de quatre millions de francs ont été consacrés à l'amélioration des routes secondaires et que le fonds européen a subventionné la construction de routes bitumées. Je rappelle qu'un effort important a été fait dans le domaine social : la construction de citernes, l'adduction d'eau dans les villages, le creusement de puits, les recherches d'eaux souterraines ont absorbé, depuis 1961, près de quatre millions de francs. Dans le domaine sanitaire cinq millions environ ont été consacrés à la construction de pavillons dans les hôpitaux et de neuf dispensaires. Enfin, en matière d'enseignement, on a réalisé le collège de Moroni, devenu lycée dépendant du ministère de l'éducation nationale, cinquante classes primaires et cinquante logements d'instituteurs.

Certes, le taux de scolarisation est encore bas, mais il a progressé depuis cinq ans et, à cet égard, je demande le concours du conseil de gouvernement et de la chambre des députés des Comores pour nous aider à inciter les familles à doter leurs enfants d'une instruction toujours meilleure.

Aux concours du F.I.D.E.S. et du Fonds européen il y a lieu d'ajouter ceux de l'Etat : 6 millions de francs métropolitains pour le transfert des bâtiments administratifs et des logements depuis Dzaoudzi jusqu'à Moroni.

Vous m'avez demandé si nous allons bientôt améliorer l'aéroport de Moroni ? Je le souhaiterais d'autant plus que je me rappelle fort bien les conditions assez étonnantes de mon atterrissage de nuit à Moroni, lorsque je suis venu vous visiter. Malheureusement, c'est une affaire qui ne dépend pas que de moi et, à l'heure actuelle il serait malhonnête de vous dire que des crédits sont affectés au V^e Plan pour l'installation à Moroni d'un nouveau terrain d'aviation ouvert aux avions à réaction. En effet, la piste actuelle qui longe la mer ne peut pas être prolongée et il faudra en construire une autre. Je suis d'ailleurs allé, avec le président Saïd Mohamed Cheik, reconnaître l'emplacement de ce futur terrain. Toutefois, j'espère obtenir à temps des crédits d'études afin de pouvoir agir immédiatement dès l'ouverture du prochain Plan.

Quant aux liaisons téléphoniques, j'indique qu'elles seront réalisées beaucoup plus rapidement. Elles transiteront vraisemblablement par le relais de la Réunion, mais elles seront excellentes.

M. Louis Briot. Et la radio ?

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Puisque vous êtes allé aux Comores, monsieur Briot, vous savez que la radio pose aussi un problème que nous nous efforçons de résoudre au mieux.

M. Louis Briot. Les Comoriens n'écoutent que la radio allemande.

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Parce que la radio française ne porte pas jusque là. Je sais fort bien qu'aux Comores, pour obtenir des nouvelles de France, on est obligé d'écouter les radios des nouvelles de France, ce qui n'est pas admissible ; mais je peux vous rassurer à cet égard. Grâce à l'augmentation récente du montant de la taxe en métropole, l'O.R.T.F. sera dotée des moyens d'améliorer rapidement l'écoute de la radio aux

Comores. Cette amélioration devrait maintenant intervenir au cours des prochains mois.

En ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires, monsieur Mohamed, vous avez effectivement posé le problème, que nous étudierons, du maintien de la prise en charge de fonctionnaires comoriens remplaçant des fonctionnaires métropolitains. Il n'est pas simple à résoudre, mais c'est un objectif que l'on peut atteindre.

En résumé, mesdames, messieurs, je vous remercie des observations que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser. Elles nous seront utiles, au cours de l'année 1967, pour la préparation du prochain budget, mais je ne doute pas que nous aurons l'occasion de reprendre et d'étudier certaines questions qui nous ont été posées, la plupart, je le reconnais très volontiers, avec une grande objectivité. (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U. N. R. - U. D. T.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Feuillard.

M. Gaston Feuillard. J'aimerais que M. le ministre réponde rapidement, ainsi qu'il me l'avait promis, aux questions que j'avais posées au sujet du plus jeune territoire de la République française.

M. le président. La parole est à M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer.

M. le ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer. Monsieur Feuillard, vous m'avez posé neuf questions, pas une de moins, auxquelles il me sera facile de répondre.

Vous avez parlé de la Reine-Amélie. Ce bateau, qui assurait la liaison maritime entre Wallis et la Nouvelle-Calédonie, est malheureusement hors d'état de fonctionner; il reste à quai à Nouméa en attendant un acheteur que nous n'avons pas encore trouvé. Un crédit prévisionnel de 600.000 francs figure au budget de 1967 pour l'achat d'un petit bâtiment permettant le transport de voyageurs et de marchandises; la prospection est en cours tant dans le Pacifique qu'en métropole pour trouver un bateau de ce type.

Les liaisons aériennes avec Wallis? Des études pour l'utilisation des matériaux locaux dans la construction de la piste sont en cours à Uhiho. Si elles se révèlent concluantes, les travaux pourraient commencer dès 1967.

A l'union, la réalisation de la piste est liée à la construction de la route de ceinture qui est prioritaire parce qu'indispensable.

La subvention à l'enseignement, qui était de 300.000 francs en 1966, passe à 450.000 francs au budget de 1967. Mais l'effet de ce supplément de 150.000 francs sera psychologiquement atténué car l'attribution exceptionnelle de 40.000 francs sur le reliquat des crédits d'aide sociale du budget des territoires d'outre-mer, dont les écoles catholiques avaient bénéficié en 1966, ne sera peut-être pas renouvelée en 1967.

Du point de vue du personnel, j'ai fait affecter des séminaristes aux écoles privées, au titre de l'aide technique, et l'évêque a manifesté sa satisfaction. Il n'en demande pas plus pour le moment.

Le contrat à passer avec le ministère de l'éducation nationale fait l'objet d'études très sérieuses dans les services. Au fur et à mesure que les années passent l'école publique doit prendre une place de plus en plus importante. On ne peut pas le faire d'un seul coup, car on se heurte à des habitudes. Le ministère de l'éducation nationale doit jouer un rôle prépondérant non seulement dans le contrôle des études, des maîtres, des professeurs, mais aussi dans la mise en place et l'extension de l'enseignement secondaire. Il s'y emploie.

Nous allons faire de notre mieux pour revaloriser les traitements et donner ainsi satisfaction aux chefs de droit coutumier qui ont incontestablement un rôle important à jouer.

La création de deux postes d'instituteurs, prévue au budget de 1966, a été maintenue au budget de 1967. Ils devaient être pourvus par deux instituteurs faisant fonction de conseillers pédagogiques et au besoin d'inspecteurs des écoles primaires de garçons et de filles. Cette mesure confirme les propos que je viens de tenir au sujet du rôle du ministère de l'éducation nationale.

Les règlements phytosanitaires applicables en Nouvelle-Calédonie relèvent exclusivement de la compétence du conseil de gouvernement et de l'assemblée locale. Mais il n'est pas douteux que, sans l'aide de la métropole, les autorités locales n'arriveraient à rien. Un médecin, particulièrement affecté à la lutte contre la tuberculose, va être prochainement envoyé à Wallis.

Le plan quinquennal 1966-1970 a été élaboré localement en liaison avec les services du département et approuvé par une délibération de l'assemblée territoriale. Il est important. Ainsi, par exemple, les opérations à mener en 1967 grâce à la section locale du F. I. D. E. S. sont très nombreuses; elles comprendront: des études sur la conservation des sols, l'implantation de cultures nouvelles, des campagnes de vulgarisation, l'amélioration

de l'élevage; des études sur l'organisation d'une coopérative de pêche, sur l'exploitation forestière et la campagne de reboisement, sur la culture perlière. Profitant des enseignements tirés en Polynésie, ce seront des Polynésiens qui serviront de moniteurs.

On s'efforcera également de remettre en état une partie du réseau routier, d'améliorer l'électrification, d'installer le téléphone et d'entreprendre des travaux d'urbanisation à Mata-Utu, Aiaia et Havalu.

Bien que les crédits ne soient pas aussi importants qu'on le désirerait, toute une série d'opérations vont donc être menées à Wallis, qui devraient pouvoir donner satisfaction à M. Loste. Je vous prie de lui transmettre mon message.

M. Gaston Feuillard. Je ne manquerai pas de le faire.

M. le président. Nous arrivons au vote des crédits.

Personne ne demande la parole?...

Je mets aux voix la réduction de crédit proposée pour le titre III de l'état B concernant le ministère des territoires d'outre-mer, au chiffre de 108.713 francs.

M. René Lamps. Le groupe communiste vote contre.

(La réduction de crédit, mise aux voix, est adoptée.)

M. le président. La parole est à M. Darchicourt, sur le titre IV.

M. Fernand Darchicourt. Monsieur le ministre, je dois d'abord vous expliquer pourquoi notre collègue François Millerrand n'est pas intervenu dans la discussion, bien que son nom figurât parmi les orateurs inscrits.

En effet, après avoir assisté à la séance qui s'est terminée très tard cette nuit, il a dû se rendre ce matin à Londres avec M. Guy Mollet, à l'invitation du Labour Party.

Et, puisqu'un débat aura lieu lors de l'examen par l'Assemblée du projet de loi sur le référendum qui décidera du statut de la Côte française des Somalis, il se réserve de prendre la parole à ce moment-là.

Quant aux propositions budgétaires qui nous sont soumises et qui reflètent une politique dont nous avons constaté les fâcheux résultats à Djibouti, comme en Nouvelle-Calédonie et à Tahiti, les députés de la fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste se refusent à les voter.

La politique pratiquée par le Gouvernement outre-mer est marquée par les événements sanglants de Djibouti. Cela suffit à notre jugement et à la condamnation que nous portons en votant contre cette partie du budget. (Applaudissements sur les bancs des groupes socialiste et communiste.)

M. le président. Personne ne demande plus la parole?...

Je mets aux voix le titre IV de l'état B concernant le ministère des territoires d'outre-mer, au chiffre de 10.691.200 francs.

(Ce titre, mis aux voix, est adopté.)

M. le président. Je mets aux voix, pour le titre VI de l'état C concernant le ministère des territoires d'outre-mer, l'autorisation de programme au chiffre de 65.200.000 francs.

M. René Lamps. Le groupe communiste vote contre.

(L'autorisation de programme, mise aux voix, est adoptée.)

M. le président. Je mets aux voix, pour le titre VI de l'état C concernant le ministère des territoires d'outre-mer, le crédit de paiement au chiffre de 41 millions de francs.

M. René Lamps. Le groupe communiste vote contre.

(Le crédit de paiement, mis aux voix, est adopté.)

M. le président. Nous avons terminé l'examen des crédits du ministère des territoires d'outre-mer.

La suite de la discussion budgétaire est renvoyée à la prochaine séance.

— 2 —

ORDRE DU JOUR

M. le président. Aujourd'hui, à quinze heures, deuxième séance publique :

Suite de la discussion de la deuxième partie du projet de loi de finances pour 1967 (n° 2044) ; (Rapport n° 3050 de M. Louis Vallon, rapporteur général, au nom de la commission des finances, de l'économie générale et du Plan).

Articles non rattachés (articles 22 à 29, 39 à 41, 45, 46, 51 à 53) et articles réservés.

Eventuellement, seconde délibération :

Explications de vote et vote sur l'ensemble.

La séance est levée.

(La séance est levée à douze heures vingt minutes.)

Le Chef du service de la sténographie de l'Assemblée nationale,
René Masson.

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A Nouméa *Le Monde*
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**UNE DEUXIÈME SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE
POURRAIT EXPLOITER
LE NICKEL CALÉDONNIEN**

Nouméa, 9 décembre (A.F.P.). — Avant de quitter vendredi Nouméa pour Papeete, M. Pierre Billotte, ministre d'Etat chargé des départements et territoires d'outre-mer, a déclaré notamment :

« Le gouvernement a retiré un certain nombre d'informations valables des délibérations de votre assemblée territoriale, en particulier sur l'intérêt social du développement économique de la partie nord du territoire. Il s'est déclaré favorable au principe d'une deuxième société, distincte de la société Le Nickel. Cette société comprendra, à côté des intérêts métropolitains et calédonniens, des intérêts étrangers qui devront, bien entendu, demeurer minoritaires. Les premiers six mois de l'année 1967 verront la mise en place des mécanismes juridiques et financiers nécessaires à la mise en valeur des richesses minières autres que celles détenues par la société Le Nickel. Cette affaire aura un tour un volume de l'ordre de 10 milliards de francs C.F.P., soit 500 millions de francs français, c'est-à-dire cinq fois la totalité du budget du territoire. »

[La majorité des responsables politiques calédonniens s'est déclarée favorable depuis plusieurs mois à l'installation d'une deuxième société minière en Nouvelle-Calédonie. C'est ainsi que la firme International Nickel (Inco) a été pressentie, ce qui à la fois inquiète la société Le Nickel, déjà installée dans l'île, et certains milieux politiques français. Ces derniers redoutaient en effet que les Calédonniens ne mettent à profit l'installation d'une firme américaine dans leur territoire pour acquérir une autonomie plus étendue.]

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M. John Teariki nous écrit tout d'abord :

« Je veux, dans tous les domaines, prouver la bonne foi, la bonne volonté, en un mot la bonne conscience des Polynésiens dans leurs rapports avec la France, espérant qu'un jour viendra où un gouvernement français vraiment démocratique et humain posera, avec nous, les bases d'une libre et fraternelle union entre la France et la Polynésie française. »

« La première condition en serait le renoncement aux essais d'armes nucléaires et thermonucléaires dans nos îles. J'ai dit ailleurs — et souvent — l'angoisse que m'inspirent ces expériences pour l'avenir physique de nos populations et les effets désastreux, pour notre économie et notre vie sociale, de l'invasion militaire massive que nous subissons. »

« La seconde condition serait la libération définitive et la réhabilitation de notre ancien député Pouvana O'opa, condamné, en fait, pour des raisons politiques après être tombé dans un piège tendu par des agents provocateurs. Cette erreur judiciaire — et politique — doit être réparée. »

« Une réforme des institutions locales, dans un sens plus démocratique que le statut néo-colonialiste qui nous fut octroyé en 1958, constituerait la troisième condition d'un nouveau contrat franco-polynésien. Cette réforme devrait nous permettre de gérer nous-mêmes nos propres affaires intérieures, dans toute la mesure où nous serions capables de le faire et de nous opposer efficacement le cas échéant, à certaines décisions gouvernementales que nous jugerions dommageables à nos intérêts fondamentaux. »

« A cet égard, le statut — unique en son genre — dont jouissent les îles Comores (1) nous inspire fortement, mais celui qui sera, en définitive, proposé au choix de la Côte française des Somalis nous semble devoir retenir notre attention car il n'est pas exclu que, par certains côtés, il ne soit valable pour nous. De toute façon, il nous permettra de juger de la sincérité de l'anti-colonialisme du général de Gaulle. »

Puis, évoquant le cas de la Côte française des Somalis et le prochain référendum, dont l'organisation est prévue dans ce territoire avant le 1^{er} juillet, le député de la Polynésie note :

« Si le gouvernement français voulait vraiment offrir toutes ses chances à la Côte française des Somalis, il devrait lui donner le choix librement entre toutes les formes possibles d'indépendance ou d'association, sans la menacer de lui retirer unilatéralement son appui. »

« En bref, la France devrait dire aux Somalis : « Je suis prête à partir, complètement et définitivement, si vous le désirez. » Mais je suis également prête à demeurer votre associée, dans la mesure où vous le désirez. » De toute façon, je suis et je reste votre amie. »

Et de poursuivre, à ce propos : « Malheureusement, nous n'en sommes pas là et nous avons tout lieu de craindre que le référendum de Djibouti soit aussi

malhonnêtement orienté que ceux qui l'ont précédé. Le viol de la volonté populaire est devenu un acte constitutionnel normal. » Commentant ensuite les élections municipales qui viennent de se dérouler à Papeete, M. Teariki affirme :

« (...) Sous toutes les Républiques, la rue Oudinet commet les mêmes erreurs. Les récentes élections municipales de Papeete le prouvent. La municipalité sortante, présidée par le sénateur, maire, Alfred Poroi, se représentait, soutenue par l'U.N.R. locale et la haute administration, après avoir eu sa réélection de l'année dernière annulée par le Conseil d'Etat pour « manœuvres de nature à fausser les résultats » des élections. La coalition des honnêtes gens a mis fin à ce scandale. Les résultats des deux tours de scrutin ont fait ressortir, d'abord, une montée spectaculaire de mon parti, le Pupu Here A'ia, par rapport aux élections de l'année dernière (gain de plus de 50 % en voix) ; ensuite, une chute très nette de l'U.N.R. locale, et une profonde volonté populaire de renouveau et d'épuration du climat politique. »

Puis le leader autonomiste conclut :

« Le recul du gaullisme en Polynésie française et la montée de l'opposition locale ne signifient pas que les Polynésiens soient devenus hostiles à la présence française, mais bien plutôt qu'ils ne veulent pas que cette présence se manifeste au détriment de leurs véritables et essentiels intérêts. »

(1) N.D.L.R. — Depuis la loi du 22 décembre 1961, l'archipel des Comores, territoire d'outre-mer, jouit d'un statut d'autonomie interne. Un haut commissaire représente la République dans l'archipel, qui a été doté d'une Chambre des députés et d'un gouvernement.

« Des perspectives sont ouvertes qui pourraient conduire à une solution des problèmes européens »

déclare M. Couve de Murville

Devant le micro d'« Inter-Opinions », M. Couve de Murville a répondu samedi à des questions qui lui étaient posées tant par Mme Jacqueline Baudrier, qui dirigeait le débat, que par M. Maurice Delarue, chef du service de politique étrangère de « France-Soir », et André Fontaine. Voici les passages les plus intéressants des déclarations du ministre des affaires étrangères :

« Pourquoi la France n'essaie-t-elle pas d'intervenir en faveur de la paix au Vietnam ? »

— Tout le monde est d'accord aujourd'hui pour dire qu'il ne peut pas y avoir de solution militaire, que la solution ne peut être qu'une solution politique, c'est-à-dire obtenue par la voie de la négociation, parce que ni l'un ni l'autre des adversaires en présence, si différents que soient ces adversaires à tous égards, ne peut espérer remporter la victoire. S'il en est ainsi, une négociation n'est possible que le jour où les deux adversaires [...] seront d'accord, non pas sur le traité à conclure, mais sur les objectifs à atteindre et sur les grandes lignes de la solution. A l'heure actuelle, ce qui rend la négociation impossible et ce qui fait que toute médiation, au sens technique du mot, est vouée à l'échec, c'est que cet accord sur l'objectif et sur les grandes lignes de l'accord à intervenir n'est en aucune façon réalisé [...]

« Le jour où tout le monde sera d'accord pour cesser les interventions et pour laisser les Vietnamiens du Sud régler entre eux leurs affaires intérieures, c'est-à-dire en particulier faire leur gouvernement — et les Vietnamiens du Sud, cela veut dire à la fois le gouvernement de Saïgon, les autorités de Saïgon et ceux qui se battent contre lui, c'est-à-dire le Front national de libération — le jour où tout le monde sera d'accord pour cesser les interventions extérieures et y renoncer et pour laisser les Vietnamiens régler leurs affaires, eh bien, la négociation sera possible. Ce qui fait qu'elle n'est pas possible c'est que l'on part, à l'heure actuelle, de cette idée simpliste que la guerre vient d'une attaque du Vietnam du Nord contre le Vietnam du Sud. Or ce n'est pas cela la situation : l'origine de la guerre, c'est une révolte de la population du Vietnam du Sud contre son gouvernement, son gouvernement qui, depuis 1954 et les accords de Genève, est indépendant, ou doit être indépendant, et qui est, en fait, soutenu par une puissance extérieure. C'est ça le fond des choses. Et c'est le jour où cela sera reconnu et où, encore une fois, les interventions extérieures seront condamnées que la négociation deviendra possible et que les bons offices de toutes sortes — et nous avons toujours dit qu'à ce moment-là nos bons offices ne feraient pas défaut s'ils apparaissaient nécessaires aux puissances intéressées — c'est à ce moment-là que les négociations et les bons offices deviendront possibles [...]

« Vous ne pouvez pas imaginer qu'il y ait une négociation qui s'ouvre entre les États-Unis, qui ont une énorme armée régulière aux ordres du gouvernement, et les Vietnamiens qui mènent un type de guerre qu'on appelle la guerre de subversion, ou la guérilla, qui est tout à fait différente, vous ne pouvez pas imaginer qu'une négociation s'engage sans qu'il y ait accord préalable sur les grandes lignes ou sur

les objectifs que j'ai dits. Jamais vous n'obtiendrez que du côté des Vietnamiens on puisse arrêter les opérations, dans les conditions où elles sont menées, sans qu'il y ait quelques perspectives sur l'issue de la négociation.

— La France donne-t-elle, la priorité à l'amélioration de ses rapports avec l'U.R.S.S., comme en 1946, ou avec l'Allemagne, comme en 1963 ?

— La politique extérieure n'est pas une affaire de technique ou de tactique de couloir. La politique extérieure est fondée sur les intérêts et les idéaux du pays dont il s'agit, et elle doit tenir compte essentiellement des circonstances, c'est-à-dire d'abord des circonstances extérieures. [...] Sa politique (de la France en Europe), c'est d'arriver un jour à un règlement pacifique européen qui assure la stabilité et qui empêche le renouvellement de la guerre. Pour cela il nous paraît — et il nous paraissait en 1963 tout autant qu'il nous paraît en 1967 — qu'il est nécessaire, pour la France, après s'être réconciliée avec l'Allemagne, d'entretenir avec ce pays de bonnes relations, et dans toute la mesure du possible une politique de coopération. Il nous paraît tout aussi nécessaire d'avoir de bons rapports avec l'Union soviétique de sorte que les relations entre les pays de l'Europe occidentale, dont nous sommes, et les pays de l'Europe orientale soient aussi normales, et par conséquent aussi développées et aussi pacifiques que possible. En 1963 nous avons, dans cet esprit, signé avec le gouvernement de la République fédérale d'Allemagne un traité de coopération. Si ce traité de coopération, entre 1963 et 1967, n'a pas fonctionné de la manière que nous espérons, ce n'est pas de la faute du gouvernement français. [...]

En 1963, nous avons fait un accord avec l'Allemagne [...], parce que la situation et l'attitude de l'Union soviétique étaient différentes : c'était au lendemain des grandes crises de Berlin et de Cuba et le rapprochement, la détente, la fin de la guerre froide n'apparaissaient pas encore possibles. Les choses ont évolué depuis. Les choses ont évolué dans le sens favorable, c'est-à-dire dans le sens de la détente ; nous en avons profité, nous avons essayé même de l'exploiter, c'est-à-dire de développer autant que possible la détente. [...]

« Si maintenant, en 1967, nos rapports avec l'Europe de l'Est étant ce qu'ils sont, nous pouvons, parallèlement, redonner de la vie au traité de coopération franco-allemand et essayer de développer cette coopération dans le sens que nous avions voulu en 1963, nous en serions très heureux et nous souhaitons très vivement que le nouveau gouvernement qui vient d'arriver à Bonn partage nos vues et nos convictions et se prête avec nous à cette sorte de revivification de la coopération franco-allemande.

« Il est évident que depuis quelques années les relations entre la République fédérale et la Russie soviétique se sont détériorées profondément ; nous n'en avons pas la responsabilité, mais nous ne considérons pas que ce soit désirable ni que ce soit satisfaisant, et si ces relations peuvent s'améliorer, grâce à la détente à laquelle tout le monde participerait du côté russe et du côté allemand, nous ne voyons pas pourquoi on n'essayerait pas de la faciliter.

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— Y a-t-il des conditions politiques à l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans le Marché commun ?

— Quand les choses sont importantes elles sont toujours politiques, même quand elles sont économiques. Il est évident que le problème des relations de la Grande-Bretagne avec la Communauté économique européenne, et a fortiori le problème de l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans cette Communauté, est un vaste problème politique qui soulève toute la question de ce que peut être, dans le domaine politique, l'orientation d'une Europe dont on recherche l'unité ; c'est ça, en réalité, la question qui est posée par l'éventuelle candidature de la Grande-Bretagne au Marché commun.

— Quel est le sens du prochain « sommet » des Six à Rome ?

— Il y a maintenant longtemps, c'était le cas en 1962, nous n'avons pas pu nous mettre d'accord entre les Six sur un développement des consultations politiques. Elles ont commencé dans le cadre de l'établissement d'une politique extérieure com-

mune. Et nous avons toujours, pour ce qui nous concerne, à Paris, dit que nous ne ferions jamais d'objection à reprendre ces consultations et à essayer de discuter ensemble des problèmes internationaux qui nous sont communs pour essayer de dégager des orientations ou des lignes d'action commune. C'est la raison pour laquelle, lorsque le gouvernement italien, par la bouche de M. Fanfani, a fait cette proposition de réunion à Rome (...), nous y avons très volontiers donné tout de suite un accord de principe.

» Ce faisant, naturellement, nous avons dans l'esprit que (...) ce qui est important, dans de telles réunions, c'est d'essayer, grâce à la discussion en commun, d'arriver à définir des orientations qui soient également communes (...). Par exemple, déterminer si les six pays que nous sommes ont des conceptions semblables en ce qui concerne la détente, la fin de la guerre froide, les relations avec l'Est et, finalement, l'orientation possible dans l'avenir d'une discussion et d'un règlement des grands problèmes européens, en commençant par le problème allemand.

La non-prolifération des armes nucléaires

— Pourquoi la France se tient-elle à l'écart des négociations sur un traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires ?

— Dans les discussions qui sont en cours maintenant depuis des années et qui ont été marquées, en 1963 je crois, par l'accord des Six sur les explosions atomiques, ce dont il s'agit malheureusement, c'est, non pas de désarmement, mais de ce qui sont armes

mais d'empêcher de s'armer ceux qui ne sont pas armés et c'est cela que nous, pour ce qui nous concerne, nous n'arrivons pas à trouver satisfaisant.

» Nous pensons que le désarmement est un coup sûr, et voilà bien longtemps qu'on en parle, une des nécessités du monde actuel et l'on veut empêcher les maux extrêmes, et cela signifie, naturellement, le désarmement.

» Ce qui est dit certains en France dans les polémiques politiques, je ne veux pas arriver à penser qu'il soit moins dangereux qu'une grande puissance comme les Etats-Unis, la Russie soviétique, plus tard la Chine, ait les moyens de détruire le monde que de voir des petits pays posséder des armements nucléaires qui ne seraient capables que d'atteindre leurs voisins immédiats.

» Certes, l'équilibre nucléaire et le sentiment que la paix est fonction de cet équilibre nucléaire sont une réalité, dans une large mesure, une réalité du monde présent. Je ne puis pas penser qu'il soit désirable que cela représente l'avenir de l'humanité. Je crois que s'en remettre indéfiniment à la sagesse des hommes serait une grande aventure.

» La disparité des armes nucléaires rendrait peut-être sa chance à la guerre classique, mais l'aimerais mieux donner sa chance à la guerre classique que de laisser sa chance à la guerre nucléaire.

— Etes-vous optimiste ou pessimiste pour 1967 ?

— Si l'on pense à la guerre du Vietnam, on n'est pas optimiste, on est même pessimiste car on ne peut pas penser qu'une issue soit prochaine et on peut même craindre que cette guerre, en se prolongeant ne se développe suivant le processus que l'on appelle aujourd'hui l'escalade. D'autre part, et pensant plus particulièrement à ce qui concerne de façon directe notre pays, je serais plutôt enclin à l'optimisme. Pour ce qui concerne la France elle-même et sa position dans le monde, il me semble qu'elle a retrouvé une audience qu'elle n'avait pas eue depuis longtemps, qu'elle est écoutée par tous, qu'elle luit en particulier, dans ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le « tiers monde », d'un prestige qui est la conséquence d'un effort de décolonisation bien accompli et d'une politique raisonnable qui l'a suivi. Peut-être y a-t-il aussi un autre sujet qui ouvre des perspectives et c'est l'évolution présente en Europe. (...) Je crois qu'il y a des perspectives, des perspectives qui sont ouvertes et qui peuvent nous faire penser que, non seulement, la guerre froide pourrait se terminer, mais même que les problèmes européens pourraient encore une fois trouver leur solution.

ment atomique, puisque, à l'heure actuelle, il n'y a d'armement véritablement terrifiant que l'armement atomique. Par conséquent le monde ne sera tranquille que le jour où tout le monde aura renoncé aux armements atomiques et où l'on aura commencé, et où l'on aura commencé de détruire tout ce qui existe en matière d'armes nucléaires. C'est cela qui nous paraît être le devoir essentiel de l'humanité. Et tout ce qui tend à empêcher ce devoir essentiel nous paraît mauvais. (...) » L'accord de Moscou sur les armements nucléaires n'a en rien contribué au désarmement de quiconque. Les puissances nucléaires ont continué à faire leurs expériences, à commencer par les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique ; ils n'ont plus fait que des expériences souterraines, mais c'est parce qu'il n'avaient pas, depuis le moment où ils ont conclu cet accord, eu le besoin de faire des expériences en plein air. La Chine et la France ont continué, de leur part, à faire leurs expériences et nul ne s'en étonne.


» Alors, il y a la non-dissémination. La non-dissémination est, assurément, un problème. Il n'y a pas d'intérêt, il y aurait même un très grand danger à ce que de plus en plus de pays fabriquent des armes nucléaires. Mais il y a une chose qui est beaucoup plus importante, c'est que ceux qui possèdent des armes nucléaires n'en fabriquent plus et détruisent celles qu'ils ont. Or ce qui est en préparation nous paraît aboutir au résultat inverse, c'est-à-dire, bien sûr, à empêcher ceux qui n'ont pas et qui, en réalité, pour la plupart, ne peuvent pas avoir d'armes nucléaires, d'en fabriquer ; mais cela n'empêche en rien ceux qui les ont de continuer à en fabriquer et de garder tous les stocks. Par conséquent c'est... je ne veux pas dire que c'est un faux semblant, parce que ce serait décevant, mais ce n'est pas du désarmement et nous croyons qu'il ne faut pas, en s'orientant dans des voies de ce genre, conduire le monde dans des équivoques, c'est-à-dire lui faire croire qu'il y a désarmement là où il n'y a, en fait, que la consolidation des monopoles des grandes puissances, et je ne peux pas, pour ma part, arriver à penser,



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9th January 1967

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Prince Sihanouk's Visit to France

As you will no doubt have heard from Phnom Penh, Prince Sihanouk is in the course of a visit here. He arrived in Nice on 7th January and is to take a cure near Grasse in the Alpes-Maritimes for a month. It is expected that he will be received by General de Gaulle in the second half of February.

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Phnom Penh.

G.B. Feakes
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor

Mr Woodberry
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AND ATTACHMENT IF NOT REQUIRED



CONFIDENTIAL 140


OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON. W.C.2.

In reply quote No. 3/12/26

Memo. No. 2/



6th January, 1967.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.PRESIDENT DE GAULLE - FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS

The British Embassy in Paris has sent the following reports to the Foreign Office on 2nd January concerning General de Gaulle's New Year statements -

"The following is the extract on foreign policy from General de Gaulle's New Year message to the French people broadcast on the evening of 31 December:-

Copy to *diffused*

'As for the world in which we live - everyone sees how profoundly and how swiftly international relations are being transformed and what an influence (useful to all) French action now exercises. In Europe the Cold War which has lasted 20 years is in process of disappearing because in the East as in the West the sterile nature of this permanent and dangerous state of tension has been recognised. On the other hand it is also acknowledged that detente followed by entente and finally by co-operation between all the peoples of our old continent would bring possibilities of solving her own problems, notably that of Germany, of re-establishing a vital and pacific equilibrium in the world and of placing Europe once more at the forefront of human progress.

x!

France, which has regained her independence, and which has provided herself with the means to this end, will continue to work for a reconciliation of the European continent. She will do this by practising friendly and fruitful relations with Soviet Russia. She will do it by renewing her former close ties with Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania. She will do it by cultivating her contacts with each of her neighbours in a friendly manner and by working to construct an economic, and perhaps one day, a political grouping of the six Western powers. All that will be carried out in order to help our continent to gather together all her nations from one end to the other to form a European Europe.

But while Europe is following the path of peace, war is rife in South East Asia. It is an unjust war because it springs from the armed intervention of the United States on the soil of Vietnam. It is a detestable war since it is leading a great nation to lay waste a small one. In the name of common sense, of the affection which we retain for Indo-China and of the two hundred year old friendship which we bear

M. MacKenna

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CONFIDENTIAL

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for America we consider it vital that the United States puts an end to the conflict by withdrawing her forces to her own soil. On the day - however distant it may be - when she should decide to do this, France would (and with what enthusiasm) do everything to unlock the great doors through which world peace may be ushered in - to help backward peoples and to further human brotherhood of which, our nation, following her vocation, is today the champion.'

In his speech at the evening reception on 1 January for the Diplomatic Corps General de Gaulle made the following further references to the Vietnam war after praising the Pope's efforts to promote world peace:-

'There are at present many indications that, after the devastation of two world wars and their aftermath, the world is about to enjoy an age of peace, marked by detente and international co-operation as a result of the general progress ordained by the modern epoch, if only this victory of wisdom was not, alas, prevented by the conflict which has been unleashed and which is being cruelly prolonged on Vietnamese territory. Among the wishes which all nations should have in common, there is doubtless none which takes precedence over the desire to see the swiftest possible end to this wretched conflict. France, which is for her part dedicated to the task of ending the Cold War which divides Europe, would not hesitate to contribute to the healing of the conflict in South East Asia as soon as the well known conditions which would make such a solution possible are fulfilled. She has no doubt that when that time comes, she would be encouraged by the support of your Governments.' "

2. The Embassy commented that the New Year message was -

"... by universal consent, an opening shot in the campaign for the legislative elections. Most commentators interpret these two speeches, in the words of the New York Times correspondent as 'A deliberate decision to use the poor state of American-French relations and the new-found friendship between Paris and the Soviet Union as a central issue in that campaign'.

On Vietnam the General's condemnation of American responsibility for the continuation of the war was harsher even than his Phnom Penh speech. As the press and other observers have noted, he is now calling simply for the withdrawal of American forces, and has made no reference to his earlier suggestion that an agreed time-table for such a withdrawal should be drawn up and that this would be sufficient for the process of negotiations to start. He has again declared that when the moment is ripe France will be ready to contribute to a solution; and he went a little further than before in saying that when the time comes France would look to the support and encouragement of all governments.

As regards the passage on Europe in the speech of 31 December, commentators have been struck by the contrast between the careful enumeration of the European Communist countries (including even Albania) with which France intends to co-operate 'in the direction of the reconciliation of the continent' and the absence of any mention of Britain's future relationship with Europe. The Foreign Editor of Figaro sums up the general press reaction by pointing out that 'Britain seems to be deliberately excluded from the 'continental' construction of General de Gaulle's dreams.' "

CONFIDENTIAL 138

3. During the President's New Year reception on 1st January, the British Ambassador had a short conversation with him. The President said that he was looking forward to the visit of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, which would certainly be important.

"He then referred to the Federal Chancellor's visit to Paris, which would precede your own saying that the French of course knew Herr Kiesinger well. He added in a rather odd confidential way that the Germans must be modest and must not ask too much. I presume that he meant in terms of progress towards reunification.

Before I could pursue this subject, however, he turned abruptly to the Vietnam war and said that it was a stupidity, it was spoiling everything. It was essential to stop it. Picking up the reference in the speech he had just made to support from other governments for any French action that might be possible, I said that he would of course have seen that Her Majesty's Government were again trying hard to bring the participants to a conference. He showed however no interest in your initiative and would only say that H.M.G. had not said the one essential thing, which was that the Americans should leave Vietnam."

F. W. S. Milne

(F. W. S. Milne)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

DF

I.64576

FROM:

DATED: 13TH DECEMBER, 1966
1740 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
ROME.

REC'D: 13TH DECEMBER, 1966
0257 LT

1719. CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1719
REPEATED WASHINGTON 18 (CBA PLS PASS)
PARIS 45 BONN 13 (LDN PLS PASS)

FANFANI'S VISIT TO PARIS

FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE IN PARIS THIS WEEK HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY THE PRESS AS CONCERNED WITH SOUNDING OUT IDEAS FOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION.

THIS SOUNDS THIN, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS.

THE INVITATION TO FANFANI ORIGINATED WITH DE GAULLE.

2. A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE NATO BUREAU OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPECULATED TO U S EMBASSY THAT DE GAULLE HAS SOUGHT TO BALANCE KOSYGIN VISIT WITH RUSK AND BRANDT VISIT WITH FANFANI

FOR BRIEFING FANFANI ASKED FOR 1) KOSYGIN VISIT 2) NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT 3) TECHNOLOGICAL GAP PROPOSALS.

STIRLING

MIN.& DEPT E.A.
MIN.& DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

14TH DECEMBER, 1966

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M DL SA FAS(2) UN PACAM
AMSP FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO E@ SAS(MS)

WASHINGTON




136

RESTRICTEDAUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No.: 46

10th January 1967

File No.: 211/1

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.Foreign Minister's Radio Interview

.... M. Couve de Murville gave a radio interview on 7th January to M. André Fontaine and M. Maurice Delarue, foreign editors respectively of le Monde and France-Soir. A copy is attached of le Monde's account of the interview. The main subjects covered by the Foreign Minister were Viet Nam, relations with the Soviet Union and Germany, Britain and the Common Market, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Viet Nam

2. On Viet Nam, M. Couve de Murville repeated the French view that at the present time negotiations for a solution were out of the question and that any mediation was bound to fail, because of the absence of any agreement on the objectives of negotiation and on the broad outline of a solution. It is of interest that the Foreign Minister should reiterate the French view on these points so promptly after the short burst of public speculation about prospects for negotiations on Viet Nam which followed Pham Van Dong's interview with Mr. Harrison E. Salisbury and the remarks of the North Vietnamese delegate here, Mr. Mai Van Bo, on 5th January (our telegram No. 45). In a separate part of the interview, M. Couve de Murville said, on prospects for 1967, that "if one thinks of the Viet Nam war one is not optimistic, one is even pessimistic for one cannot think that a conclusion is near and one may even fear that this war as it is prolonged may develop according to the process that these days is called escalation". It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Foreign Minister does not regard the North Vietnamese representative's remarks as indicating a change in the North Vietnamese position.

3. In the rest of his remarks on Viet Nam, after referring in familiar terms to agreement on an end to outside intervention in Viet Nam as the path to negotiation, the Foreign Minister criticized as an over-simplification the idea that the origin of the war in Viet Nam lay in an attack by North Viet Nam on the South and went on to allege that the origin of the war was a revolt by the population of South Viet Nam against its Government, which Government was supported by an outside power. The Foreign Minister repeated the offer of French good offices

Continued/.....

Mr Wood/Kerry

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Page 2.

in negotiation if those good offices seemed necessary to the interested powers. Although the Foreign Minister's remarks on the origin of the Viet Nam war fit in completely with the well-known French view of the war as primarily a civil war, and with French belittling of opposition to the Northern regime in the South and hence of support for the Ky Government, this is the first occasion, so far as we know, on which a French representative has publicly described the origins of the war in the blunt terms M. Couve de Murville used. As to the Foreign Minister's references to French good offices in negotiations for a solution in Viet Nam, it is worth remarking that it now seems that two conditions would have to be fulfilled before the French would be prepared to use their good offices: first, there would have to be agreement among the parties that outside intervention in Viet Nam should end; and second, those good offices would have to appear necessary to (presumably all) the interested powers.

Britain and the E.E.C.

4. In reply to the question whether there were political conditions to British entry into the E.E.C., the Foreign Minister refused to be drawn: what he said in effect was that all important matters, even economic ones, were political and that the question of British entry was a major political question.

5. It was announced last week that General de Gaulle was ready to go to Rome in the Spring for the meeting of Heads of State to mark the tenth anniversary of the E.E.C. which the Italians have proposed. In reply to a question about the significance of this meeting, M. Couve de Murville placed it in the context of the attempts that had previously been made among the Six to organize consultations with a view to drawing up a common foreign policy. Such meetings as the forthcoming one in Rome should be used to establish whether the E.E.C. members had similar ideas about relaxation of tension, the end of the Cold War, relations with Eastern Europe and "the possible trend in the future of a discussion and of a settlement of the great European problems, beginning with the German problem".

Non-Proliferation

6. In reply to a question why France stood aside from negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, M. Couve de Murville gave as the reason, ~~rather~~, that, although non-dissemination was certainly a problem, it was more important that those who already possessed nuclear weapons should stop making them and should destroy their stocks. Disarmament meant ~~about~~ all nuclear disarmament. Discussions on disarmament over recent years had not been concerned with disarming those who were armed but with preventing those who were unarmed from arming themselves. M. Couve de Murville could not succeed in thinking that it was less dangerous for a great power like the

Continued/.....

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Page 3.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

United States, Russia, and later on China, to have the power to destroy the world than it was for small countries to possess nuclear weapons which were not capable of reaching their immediate neighbours.

Relations with Eastern Europe and with Germany

7. The Foreign Minister was asked whether France gave priority to improving its relations with the Soviet Union, as in 1966, or with Germany, as in 1963. In reply he said that French policy in Europe was to attain a peaceful European settlement ensuring stability and preventing the recurrence of war. To this end it was necessary both that France, having been reconciled with Germany, should maintain co-operative relations with her and that relations between Eastern and Western European countries should be developed and as peaceful as possible. The Minister attributed the 1963 co-operation agreement with Germany at least in part to the fact that at that moment, with the Berlin and Cuban crises, the relaxation of tension and the end of the Cold War no longer seemed possible. M. Couve de Murville also forecast French help towards improving German relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

8. We have sent copies of this memorandum to Bonn, Brussels, London, Rome and Washington.

G.B. Feakes
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor

RESTRICTED



In reply quote No.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Memo No. 1719/66

22nd November, 1966



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

DE GAULLE'S EUROPEAN STRATEGY

..... Attached for your information is a copy of an article entitled "De Gaulle's European Strategy" which appeared in "East Europe", a monthly review of East European affairs published in New York. This article is from the November issue.

2. A copy of this memorandum and attachment is being sent to Paris for information.

R
(D.P. RITCHIE)
Second Secretary

Mr. Woodberry
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SW.

I. 55606

FROM:

DATED: 29TH OCTOBER, 1966.
1241 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 29TH OCTOBER, 1966.
2230 LT

3365

RESTRICTED.

F25/1/1

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE

MAIN INTERNATIONAL TOPICS DEALT WITH WERE VIETNAM, NATO,
EUROPE (COMMON MARKET, GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE), FRENCH
SOMALILAND

PRESIDENT ALSO DEALT AT LENGTH WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS
2. OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS TRANSLATION OF
SECTION ON VIETNAM (WHICH FOLLOWS LINE OF DE GAULLES SPEECH IN
PHNOM PENH)

IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT PRESIDENT CHOSE NOT TO RESPOND
UNEQUIVOCALLY TO QUESTION ABOUT TRUTH OF REPORTS THAT FRENCH WOULD
LEAVE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN NEAR FUTURE

PRESS HAS ALSO COMMENTED ON HIS STATEMENT THAT ALLIED FLIGHTS
ACROSS FRANCE WILL HAVE TO BE AUTHORIZED CASE BY CASE

PRESIDENT ALSO FAILED TO TAKE OPPORTUNITY WHICH QUESTIONS
OFFERED HIM OF COMMENTING DIRECTLY ON PROSPECTS FOR BRITISH ENTRY
INTO EEC IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES


(SECOND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT'S
REFERENCE TO BRITAIN AND EEC)

SHARPNESS OF PRESIDENT'S REFERENCES TO GERMANY'S FAILURE
TO TAKE UP OPPORTUNITIES FRANCE OFFERED FOR A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND TO GERMANY'S TIES WITH UNITED STATES IS
ALSO NOTEWORTHY

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT. T. & I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'S DEPT.
P.M.'S

30TH OCTOBER, 1966.

A/SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M DL SA FAS(2) UN PACAM
PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT C&P ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E@
AFME ER SAS(MS)



RESTRICTED

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SW:

1.55629

FROM

DATED: 29TH OCTOBER, 1966
1800 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 30TH OCTOBER, 1966.
0323 LT

3366

UNCLASSIFIED.

25/11

OUR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

I WOULD SAY TO YOU, FIRST, THAT WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY VICTORY WHICH COULD ALLOW THE AMERICANS TO OVERCOME THE VIETNAMESE

AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE, FURTHER, THAT THE LATTER COULD POSSIBLE DESTROY THE UNITED STATES FORCES

NEXT, WE ARE NOT PROPOSING ANY SORT OF MEDIATION, WHICH NO ONE WOULD WELCOME AND WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING

THIS DOES NOT PREVENT OUR FINDING DETESTABLE THE FACT THAT A SMALL NATION SHOULD BE BOMBED BY A VERY GREAT ONE: AND WE FIND NO LESS DETESTABLE THE LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE SOLDIERS OF BOTH SIDES, BUT STILL WE ARE FORMULATING NO PLAN FOR PEACE, FOR THE GOOD REASON THAT, AT PRESENT, PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE

THIS DOES NOT PREVENT OUR POINTING OUT, AS PLAINLY AS WE CAN, WHAT WE THINK ARE THE CONDITIONS WHICH COULD ONE DAY ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR

THESE CONDITIONS, WHICH WE PUT FORWARD AT PHNOM PENH AND THEN LATER AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK, ARE DEPENDENT, TO TELL THE TRUTH, ON THE DECISION OF THE AMERICANS

IT WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE THAT EACH NATION, WHATEVER IT BE, SHOULD SETTLE ITS PROBLEMS ITSELF IN ITS OWN WAY AND BY ITS OWN MEANS

IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO APPLY THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

IT WOULD MEAN, IN CONSEQUENCE, THAT THEY WITHDRAW TO AMERICA THE FORCES WHICH, LITTLE BY LITTLE, THEY HAVE BROUGHT TO VIETNAM SINCE OURS LEFT

THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE TO ADOPT, AS THE BASIS OF A FUTURE SETTLEMENT, A REAL NEUTRALIZATION, REALLY CONTROLLED, IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND ASSISTANCE ON THEIR PART SO THAT THE AREA COULD REPAIR THE RUINS AND RESUME DEVELOPMENT

FINALLY, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN ASIA NO AGREEMENT, NO IMPORTANT TREATY IS OF VALUE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF CHINA: AND THEY SHOULD DRAW FROM THIS THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO THE RELATIONS THEY SHOULD ESTABLISH WITH THIS GREAT STATE AND IN REGARD TO THE PLACE BELONGING TO IT AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

.....2/

Bo

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SW:

-2-

1.55629

^{FRU}
IT IS TIME THAT AMERICAN POLICY AND OPINION ARE NOT AT THE MOMENT, TO SAY THE LEAST, ORIENTATED IN THIS DIRECTION AND THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS, THE POSITION TAKEN BY FRANCE ON THE SUBJECT CAUSES A LOT OF ILL-FEELING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. NEVERTHELESS WE MAINTAIN IT BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO OTHER SOLUTION CONCEIVABLE FOR THIS CONFLICT IF IT IS TO REMAIN LOCAL, AND ALSO BECAUSE THE AMERICANS, PRESTIGIOUS, POWERFUL AND PROSPEROUS AS THEY ARE, WOULD, WE BELIEVE, HAVE EVERY ADVANTAGE TO GAIN, MORALLY AND MATERIALLY, BY ENSURING THAT PEACE WAS POSSIBLE THANKS TO THEMSELVES AND IN THIS WAY, EVEN IF IN GIVING IT UP, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE SPOT WERE NOT TO BE WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE WISHED. BESIDES, WHAT WOULD THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR BRING THEM EXCEPT BURDENS AND INCREASING INCONVENIENCES, WITHOUT ANY IDEOLOGICAL COMPENSATION?

THAT IS OUR THOUGHT ON THE SUBJECT.
IF WE SPEAK SO PLAINLY, IT IS BECAUSE WE ARE A PEOPLE WHO HAVE SET AN EXAMPLE NOT LONG AGO IN ALGERIA, BY TAKING IT UPON OURSELVES - AND BELIEVE ME IT WAS COMMENDABLE - TO GIVE WAY THERE TO PEACE.
WE DO IT ALSO BECAUSE, AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE WEST, WE ARE THE ONE WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY HAS THE GREATEST ATTACHMENT FOR THE PEOPLES OF INDOCHINA: AND FINALLY WE DO IT BECAUSE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICA WHICH HAS, FROM THE BEGINNING, LET US TO TRY UNCEASINGLY TO TURN HER AWAY FROM THIS ILL-FATED UNDERTAKING.

MIN. AND DEPT E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

30TH OCTOBER, 1966.

A/ SEC FAS(1) S AND SEA M AND I M(ACTION) DL SA
FAS(2) UN PACA' AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO
FAS(4) EAMEC E SAS(MS)

for Huelst 129
Belmonte
18/11/66

CONFERENCE DE PRESSE
DU GENERAL DE GAULLE, PRESIDENT DE LA
REPUBLIQUE, LE 28 OCTOBRE 1966,
AU PALAIS DE L'ELYSEE

F 257/11

Mesdames, Messieurs, je suis heureux de vous voir.

Pour ce qui concerne la France, je crois que ce que nous aurons à dire aujourd'hui n'est pas dramatique parce que par contraste avec ce qui est arrivé souvent et avec ce qui se passe dans beaucoup d'autres pays, la France actuellement ne vit pas de drame. Alors, c'est en toute sérénité que nous parlerons, si vous le voulez bien, de la politique étrangère de la France, de son action au dehors. Puis nous parlerons de Djibouti, nous parlerons de l'affaire sociale et nous parlerons des élections. J'espère que ce programme vous agréera.

Nous allons aborder la question de notre politique étrangère et comme d'habitude je vais d'abord demander aux uns et aux autres s'ils désirent me poser des questions, et quelles questions ils désirent me poser sur ce vaste sujet. Après quoi, si vous voulez bien, nous les classerons de manière à répondre, partie par partie, à ce qui me sera demandé. Je vous écoute.

.....

.....

.....

Eh bien alors, il s'agit du Vietnam. Il s'agit de l'Europe. Il s'agit de l'Alliance atlantique. Je ne me trompe pas, c'est bien ce qui nous occupe ? Alors sur ces différents sujets, je vais vous répondre. Et d'abord, je vais parler, si vous le voulez bien, de ce qu'est la politique française en général.

.../...

└ Dans le monde tel qu'il est, on affecte parfois de s'étonner des soi-disants changements et détours de l'action de la France au-dehors, et même il y en a qui ont parlé de contradictions ou de machiavélisme. Eh bien ! Je crois que si les circonstances changent autour de nous, en vérité, il n'y a rien de plus constant que la politique de la France. Cette politique, en effet, à travers les vicissitudes très diverses que nous présentent notre temps et notre univers, cette politique tend essentiellement à ce que la France soit et demeure une nation indépendante. Pourquoi ? Pour qu'elle joue son rôle à elle dans le monde. En vue de quoi ? En vue de l'équilibre, du progrès et de la paix. Cela ne veut pas dire, bien entendu, contrairement à ce que certains affirment, que nous voulions rester isolés et que jamais nous ne devions, nous ne voulions, lier notre action à celle des autres. Bien au contraire, nous n'avons pas vécu aussi longtemps et aussi durement comme peuple au milieu des peuples, sans avoir appris que nos moyens ont leurs limites, que notre géographie nous expose à de grands périls, que notre économie exige des échanges, que notre progrès est conjugué avec celui de l'humanité, que par conséquent, il nous faut nécessairement coopérer avec des partenaires. Mais l'indépendance signifie que nous décidions nous-mêmes de ce que nous avons à faire et avec qui, sans que cela nous soit imposé par aucun autre Etat et par aucune collectivité.

Il est vrai que parmi nos contemporains, il y a beaucoup d'esprits, et souvent non des moindres, qui ont envisagé que notre pays renoncât à son indépendance sous le couvert de tel ou tel ensemble international. Ayant ainsi remis à des organismes étrangers la responsabilité de notre destin, nos gouvernants n'auraient plus, suivant l'expression consacrée par cette école de pensée, qu'à "y plaider le dossier de la France". Il faut dire que l'affaiblissement relatif que nous avons subi, - que nous avons subi -, à la suite des deux guerres, avait l'air de donner un argument à ces champions de notre effacement. Sans doute aussi des idéologues enrobaient-ils l'abandon dans des théories plus ou moins séduisantes. Ainsi, certains, s'exaltant au rêve de l'Internationale, voulaient-ils placer notre pays, comme eux-mêmes se plaçaient, sous l'obédience de Moscou. Ainsi, d'autres, invoquant, ou bien le mythe supranational, ou bien le péril de l'Est, ou bien l'intérêt que pourrait trouver l'Occident atlantique à unifier son économie, ou bien encore l'utilité grandiose d'un arbitrage universel, prétendaient-ils que la France laissât sa politique se fondre dans une Europe fabriquée tout exprès, sa défense dans l'O. T. A. N., sa conception monétaire dans le Fonds de Washington, sa personnalité dans les Nations Unies, etc. Certes, il est bon que de telles institutions existent et nous pouvons avoir quelquel'intérêt à en faire partie, mais si nous avons écouté leurs apôtres excessifs, ces organismes où prédominent, - tout le monde le sait -, la protection politique, la force militaire, la puissance économique, l'aide multiforme des Etats-Unis, ces organismes n'auraient été pour nous qu'une couverture pour notre soumission à l'hégémonie américaine. Ainsi la France disparaîtrait, emportée par les chimères.

Au contraire, pour ma part, qui ne le sait, je n'ai jamais cessé d'inciter notre pays à assumer son indépendance et c'est cela qui fait depuis l'origine l'unité d'une politique, qui est devenue, par la volonté du peuple, celle de la République. On ne voit pas d'ailleurs que la France et le monde s'en trouvent mal, et même il semble que les positions que nous prenons et les actions que nous entreprenons sont, en définitive, utiles à tous et notamment, à nos amis américains. Par exemple, ce que nous disons, faisons

.../...

pour le Vietnam ou pour l'Europe, ou pour l'O.T.A.N., ou pour la Monnaie, je pense très sincèrement qu'ils auraient avantage à le vouloir et à le faire eux-mêmes.

Questions - Mon Général, après les récentes déclarations du Président Johnson, comment voyez-vous le sort du Vietnam et quel rôle peut y jouer la France ?

- Mon Général, les rapports franco-chinois peuvent-ils contribuer au règlement pacifique de la guerre du Vietnam ?

Réponse - Je vous dirai d'abord que nous sommes certains qu'il n'y a pas de victoire militaire qui puisse permettre aux Américains de soumettre les Vietnamiens et que nous ne croyons pas davantage à la possibilité, pour ceux-ci, de détruire les forces des Etats-Unis. Bien que le bombardement d'un petit peuple par un très grand et les pertes subies par les soldats des deux côtés nous paraissent absurdes et détestables, nous n'avons à proposer aucune médiation dont personne ne voudrait et qui n'aboutirait à rien. Nous ne formulons pas de plan de paix, pour cette bonne raison qu'actuellement la paix est impossible. Mais tout en constatant que la guerre a toutes chances de se poursuivre en Asie, ce que la réunion de Manille, vient de montrer, sans aucun doute possible, nous n'en indiquons pas moins clairement quelles sont à notre avis les conditions qui pourraient permettre, un jour, de négocier, pour la faire cesser.

Ces conditions que nous avons formulées à Phnom-Penh, puis à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à New-York, dépendent en vérité de la décision des Américains. Il s'agirait pour eux d'observer le principe suivant lequel chaque peuple, quel qu'il soit, doit régler lui-même ses affaires à sa façon et par ses propres moyens. Il s'agirait que les Américains appliquent ce principe au peuple vietnamien. Il s'agirait par conséquent qu'ils ramènent délibérément en Amérique les forces que, peu à peu, ils ont amenées au Vietnam, après le départ des nôtres. Il faudrait aussi qu'ils adoptent comme bases d'un futur règlement, la neutralité réelle et réellement contrôlée du Sud-Est asiatique et l'aide à lui apporter pour qu'il puisse réparer ses ruines et reprendre son développement. Enfin, il faudrait que les Américains reconnaissent qu'en Asie, aucun accord, aucun traité important n'est valable, sans la participation de la Chine et qu'ils en tirent les conclusions quant aux relations à établir avec ce grand Etat et quant à la place qui lui revient aux Nations Unies.

Il est vrai que la politique et l'opinion américaines ne sont pas en ce moment, - c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire -, orientées dans ce sens et que, du coup, la position prise par la France à ce sujet heurte nombre d'esprits sur l'autre rive de l'Atlantique. Mais nous nous y tenons, pourtant, parce que nous sommes convaincus qu'il n'y a pas d'autre solution concevable pour ce conflit s'il doit rester local, et aussi parce que les Etats-Unis prestigieux, puissants, et prospères comme ils le sont, tireraient moralement et matériellement beaucoup d'avantages de la paix si elle était rendue possible grâce à eux et de cette manière, même au cas où, sur place, la suite politique ne serait pas celle qu'ils auraient souhaitée. Au contraire,

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Cette guerre, en se prolongeant, ne fera que leur apporter des charges et des inconvénients croissants sans aucune compensation, fût-elle d'ordre idéologique.

Si nous proclamons, ce qui nous paraît le plus utile et le meilleur pour tous, y compris les Etats-Unis, et qui, peut-être, se fera quelque jour, nous le faisons comme des gens qui ont donné l'exemple naguère, en Algérie, en prenant sur eux - et croyez-moi, c'était méritoire - d'y laisser la place à la paix. Nous le faisons aussi, parce qu'en Occident aucun peuple ne porte plus d'attachement que le nôtre aux peuples d'Indochine et, enfin, nous le faisons à cause de notre amitié pour l'Amérique, amitié, qui depuis le début, nous a amenés sans cesse, en toute connaissance de cause, à tâcher de la détourner de cette funeste entreprise.

Questions - Mon Général, au moment où l'intérêt grandit en Angleterre pour le problème du Marché Commun, quelles sont, selon vous, vues de Paris, les perspectives de la construction européenne ?

- Mon Général, que pensez-vous du ralentissement de la marche vers une large union européenne et notamment de la fusion des institutions ?

- Monsieur le Président, pensez-vous qu'il y ait des empêchements économiques, tels que les liens étroits entre la livre et le dollar, qui soient capables de retarder l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne au sein de la Communauté Européenne ?

Réponse - La conception que nous avons de l'Europe et l'action que nous y menons sont naturellement les nôtres, mais elles ne sont dirigées contre personne et même nous pensons qu'elles sont utiles à tout le monde.

Il est vrai qu'elles ont pour fondement l'Europe telle qu'elle est, et non pas telle qu'on a pu se figurer qu'elle était, et qu'elle n'est pas. Il est vrai que ce que nous tâchons d'y faire vise à servir ses intérêts à elle et non pas des intérêts qui lui soient extérieurs. Il est vrai que nous croyons bon que notre continent organise lui-même, d'un bout à l'autre de son territoire, la détente, l'entente et la coopération. Mais nous pensons qu'il n'y a rien là qui doive, en définitive, contrarier l'intérêt de personne, et telle est l'inspiration de notre politique européenne, qu'il s'agisse de nos rapports avec l'Allemagne, notre ennemie d'hier, ou de nos efforts pour que se réalise un groupement économique et si possible politique de l'Europe occidentale, ou enfin, de ce que nous faisons pour nous accorder et nous associer avec les pays de l'Est.

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Pour ce qui est de l'Allemagne, malgré toutes les pertes que nous ont fait subir les guerres déclenchées par le premier Reich et par le troisième Reich, nous lui avons offert une franche réconciliation. J'ai moi-même parcouru ses villes, ses usines, ses campagnes pour le crier à son peuple, au nom de la France de toujours. Nous avons même été, il y aura bientôt quatre ans, jusqu'à conclure avec la République Fédérale, et à sa demande, un traité qui aurait pu servir de base à une coopération particulière des deux pays dans les domaines de la politique, de l'économie, de l'agriculture et de la défense. Ce n'est pas notre fait si les liens préférentiels, contractés en dehors de nous et sans cesse resserrés par Bonn avec Washington, ont privé d'inspiration et de substance cet accord franco-allemand. Il est bien possible que de ce fait, nos voisins d'outre-Rhin aient perdu quelques occasions quant à ce qui aurait pu être l'action commune des deux nations, parce que, pendant qu'ils appliquaient, non pas notre traité bilatéral mais le préambule unilatéral qui en changeait tout le sens et qu'eux-mêmes y avaient ajouté, les événements marchaient ailleurs et notamment à l'Est et même peut-être à Washington, brouillant les données de l'affaire telles qu'elles étaient au départ.

Pourtant, nous ne sommes revenus, ni sur l'oubli de nos griefs, ni sur la pratique de rapports cordiaux avec l'Allemagne Fédérale. Et même, tout en conservant, là comme ailleurs, l'entière disposition de nos troupes, nous consentons à maintenir pour le moment, sur son territoire, une force militaire importante qui, bien évidemment, concourt à sa sécurité, que nous retirerions dès qu'elle viendrait à nous le demander, et pour l'entretien de laquelle, par opposition avec ses autres alliés, nous ne lui demandons aucune compensation financière. En somme, à l'égard de l'Allemagne, qu'aurions-nous pu raisonnablement faire de plus méritoire et de plus accommodant ?

D'autre part, si le Marché Commun européen est maintenant organisé, pour combien aura compté dans cette réussite la participation de la France ! Je ne parle pas seulement de l'inlassable contribution apportée à la construction de l'édifice par nos ministres et par nos experts. Je veux aussi souligner qu'à maintes reprises c'est grâce à la netteté et à la fermeté de l'action de nos pouvoirs publics que l'entreprise ne s'est pas égarée dans des voies qui n'avaient pas d'issue. C'est ainsi qu'en 1963, nous avons été amené à mettre un terme aux négociations engagées à Bruxelles par l'Angleterre en vue d'entrer dans l'organisation, non point certes, que nous désespérions de voir jamais ce grand peuple insulaire unir vraiment son destin à celui du continent, mais le fait est qu'il n'était pas alors en mesure d'appliquer les règles communes et qu'il venait, à Nassau, d'attester une allégeance extérieure à une Europe qui en serait une. Or, en se prolongeant vainement ces négociations empêchaient bel et bien les Six de bâtir leur Communauté.

Ce fut le cas, de nouveau, en 1965, lorsque nous dûmes interrompre à Bruxelles des entretiens qui paraissaient être sur le point d'aboutir mais qui n'aboutissaient pas parce qu'au moment décisif on

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remettait en cause l'achèvement du Marché Commun agricole, lequel nous était nécessaire, et qu'on réclamait de nous un grave abandon de souveraineté. Or, après certains remous, notre attitude s'est révélée éminemment salubre puisqu'elle a fortement contribué à la décision prise par les Six d'adopter cette année tous les règlements essentiels concernant l'agriculture et restés jusqu'alors en suspens, et de prendre acte du fait que désormais pour revenir sur ce qui avait été décidé il faudrait l'unanimité des membres, autrement dit l'aval de la France. On le voit, en soutenant de cette manière ses propres intérêts, la France a servi ceux de la Communauté, ne fut-ce qu'en la sauvegardant quand elle risquait d'échouer.

Au surplus, pour que la Communauté économique des Six soit durable et pour qu'elle puisse aller en se développant, la coopération politique des Etats qui en sont membres est à coup sûr indispensable. Or, nous n'avons cessé de proposer qu'une telle coopération s'organise progressivement à la seule condition qu'elle vise à définir et à suivre une politique qui soit européenne, et non point à se conformer par principe et nécessairement à une politique qui ne l'est pas. C'est cette condition qui a empêché jusqu'à présent le plan français d'être adopté bien qu'aucun autre n'ait été formulé. Mais du moment qu'on parlait d'Europe, comment méconnaître que la France a tout fait pour qu'elle naisse et se réalise à partir de l'Occident autrement qu'en vains discours? Du reste, même si un jour le groupement économique des Six est complété par leur concert politique, rien encore ne sera fait de valable ni de solide, pour ce qui est de l'Europe, tant que ses peuples de l'Ouest et ses peuples de l'Est ne se seront pas accordés. En particulier, la solution d'un problème aussi grave que celui du destin de l'Allemagne n'est pas concevable autrement. Quant au développement et au rayonnement de notre Continent, actuellement contrariés par sa division, quel essor prendraient-ils dans l'union? On sait quelle initiative la France a prise pour se rapprocher de l'Union Soviétique dans tous les domaines et qu'a illustrée le voyage que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire en Russie l'été dernier, voyage auquel vont fort heureusement répondre les visites de ses dirigeants. On sait aussi quelle rapidité et quelle étendue marquent les progrès accomplis, on sait quelles perspectives vraiment amples et vraiment fécondes ouvrent les accords économiques, culturels, scientifiques et techniques qu'ont conclus les deux pays. Nul n'ignore d'autre part que nous sommes en train de renouveler profondément et positivement nos rapports avec la Pologne, la Roumanie, la Yougoslavie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Bulgarie, la Hongrie. Entre tous ces peuples et le nôtre, aujourd'hui, la guerre froide apparaît comme dérisoire tandis que s'organise une grandissante et amicale coopération.

Telle est l'action européenne de la France. Si, comme nous le croyons, l'intérêt de tous, y compris celui de l'Amérique, est dans l'équilibre, le progrès et la paix de l'univers, comment pourrait-on nier qu'en nous efforçant de les établir en Europe, nous travaillons pour tout le monde?

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Question : Mon Général, on dit parfois que la France aurait l'intention de quitter l'Alliance Atlantique. Qu'en est-il en vérité ?

Réponse : Beaucoup croyaient impossible, - il y en a même qui disaient ridicule - ou bien dangereux pour notre sécurité, ou bien de nature à compromettre notre situation internationale de fait que la France recouvre son indépendance en matière de défense. Elle le fait pourtant bel et bien et on ne voit pas jusqu'à présent quel drame cela a pu entraîner. Dès à présent si l'Alliance Atlantique demeure telle que nous l'avons conclue en 1949, il ne subsiste pour nous aucune subordination ni actuelle ni éventuelle de nos forces à une autorité étrangère. Dans cinq mois aucun Etat-Major, aucune unité, aucune base d'aucune armée alliée ne resteront sur notre territoire; les militaires, les matériels, les navires, les avions qui souhaiteront passer par chez nous le feront en vertu d'une autorisation que nous leur donnerons cas par cas et, pour le temps limité où ils seront en France ou dans notre ciel, déféreront aux ordres du commandement français.

D'autre part, nous faisons notre force atomique dont la capacité, dès l'année prochaine, dépassera plusieurs milliers de kilo-tonnes pour dépasser les cent mille, dès lors que dans les quatre ans elle sera devenue thermonucléaire. En même temps nous rendons leur caractère pleinement national à nos armées de terre, de mer, de l'air, en fait de commandement, d'opérations, de formation, tout en les modernisant à tous égards et en les dotant de matériels fabriqués chez nous ou, pour certains, avec la seule participation d'un autre pays d'Europe. Or on ne voit pas que la France en soit ruinée puisque, par rapport à son budget total, elle ne dépense pas plus pour sa défense qu'elle ne dépensait avant; on ne voit pas non plus qu'elle soit plus menacée, car personne ne croit que le danger d'invasion grandisse; on ne voit pas enfin qu'elle soit déconsidérée, car bien au contraire, tous les jours et partout, tous les signes montrent quelle salutaire impression produit la réapparition de notre pays au rang des grandes puissances.

Tel est, d'ailleurs, le fond des choses. La situation mondiale dans laquelle deux super-Etats auraient seuls les armes susceptibles d'anéantir tout autre pays, posséderaient seuls, par la dissuasion, le moyen d'assurer leur propre sécurité, tiendraient seuls sous leur obédience chacun son camp de peuples engagés, ne saurait à la longue que paralyser et stériliser le reste de l'univers en le plaçant tantôt sous le coup d'une écrasante concurrence, tantôt /sous le joug

d'une double hégémonie convenue entre les deux rivaux. Dans de telles conditions, comment l'Europe pourrait-elle s'unir, l'Amérique Latine se révéler, l'Afrique suivre sa propre route, la Chine trouver sa place, les Nations Unies devenir une efficace réalité ? Faute que l'Amérique et l'Union Soviétique aient détruit leurs armes absolues, il fallait rompre le charme. Nous le faisons, pour ce qui nous concerne, et par nos seuls moyens.

Certes, l'accession de la France à la puissance nucléaire en même temps qu'à l'indépendance en matière de défense nationale ^{est} pour elle, désormais une garantie essentielle sans précédent de sa sécurité propre. Mais aussi, comme nous n'avons, nous, aucune ambition de nous étendre au-delà du territoire où nous sommes souverains, comme nos frontières actuelles nous suffisent telles qu'elles sont, comme nous ne prétendons ni convertir, ni dominer, idéologiquement ou politiquement, ou économiquement, personne, comme nous ne serions entraînés dans aucun conflit que nous n'aurions pas voulu, il n'est pas un pays au monde qui puisse se sentir menacé, par le fait que nos mains sont libres, tandis que notre force acquiert les suprêmes moyens. Bien mieux ! Il y a là, pour l'univers, un élément nouveau et libérateur de nature à réduire la tension que provoque l'opposition des deux camps formés autour des deux colosses. En effet, dès lors que la France rompt cette étouffante rigidité, on va voir, on voit déjà s'estomper le jeu constamment et gravement dangereux qu'on appelait la guerre froide. Cui donc pourrait le regretter ?

QUESTION Vous avez dit, au cours de votre passage en Côte Française des Somalis : " Tout peut s'imaginer ". Quelles pourraient être les grandes lignes du statut renouvelé qui va être proposé par référendum aux populations du territoire ? Pourrait-il, le cas échéant, être envisagé pour d'autres territoires français d'outre-mer ? Dans le cas d'une acceptation de ce statut, par la population de la Côte Française des Somalis, pensez-vous que des garanties pour son respect pourraient être données par la République voisine de Somalie ou l'Empereur d'Ethiopie avec lequel vous venez d'avoir récemment des conversations ?

REPONSE Je vais vous répondre sur Djibouti, je ne vous parlerai pas spécifiquement du statut pour une raison que vous comprendrez très bien. C'est que jusqu'à présent, notre Gouvernement n'a pas encore décidé de la formulation du décret dans lequel ce statut sera indiqué. C'est pourquoi, je n'en parlerai pas explicitement. Mais je vais vous en dire assez pour que vous compreniez quelle est la politique de la France au sujet de son territoire d'outre-mer qui est la Côte Française des Somalis.

Qu'est-ce que la Côte Française des Somalis ? C'est une contrée de 23 000 Km² avec environ 80 000 habitants, qui est à la corne de l'Afrique Orientale, là où se joignent la Mer Rouge et l'Océan Indien. C'est un pays au climat torride, presque sans eau, qui n'a comme ressources naturelles que la maigre végétation dont peuvent subsister les Nomades, ou bien la pêche et la navigation qui font vivre quelques vaillants.

Au surplus, la population est divisée en deux communautés très différentes et très souvent opposées, les Afars et les Issas - ceux-ci, les Issas, d'origine somalie - sans compter nombre d'Arabes. L'Ethiopie et la Somalie enveloppent complètement ce territoire, le considèrent chacune de son côté comme implanté dans ce qui devrait être son propre domaine et l'épient au long d'une frontière qui a 530 Km et qui n'est qu'une ligne sur le sable. Dans cette terre vraiment dépourvue et vraiment menacée, qu'a fait la France ? Eh bien ! D'abord, elle a donné à ses habitants un moyen d'existence collectif en créant de toutes pièces le port moderne de Djibouti. Ayant à partir de là, construit une extraordinaire voie ferrée qui va jusqu'à Addis-Abeba elle a fait du port le débouché principal de l'Ethiopie. Comme, en outre, un nombre croissant de navires de tous pays qui parcourent la Mer Rouge, font escale à Djibouti, il se produit une activité commerciale importante qui profite au budget local et qui profite aux habitants. Le trafic du port ne cesse de se développer puisqu'en 1935 il aura été d'environ 16 millions de tonnes et qu'on comptait qu'en 1967, s'il n'y avait pas eu les incidents qui ont eu lieu récemment, et qui hypothèquent plus ou moins l'avenir, ce trafic aurait monté à 18 millions de tonnes et il aurait grandi encore plus par la suite étant donné l'incertitude où se trouve Aden de l'autre côté de la Mer Rouge.

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Le port de Djibouti assure au territoire le plus clair de ses ressources propres. Car c'est au territoire que la France l'a remis tout en continuant de l'entretenir et de l'étendre, et comme en outre elle s'abstient d'y prélever elle-même aucun impôt, et comme enfin le port est franc, vous voyez qu'il y a quelques moyens d'exister dans cette terre si dépourvue. Mais ce n'est pas là le seul concours que la France apporte à la vie et au progrès des populations : par la voie des subventions budgétaires, par celle du Fonds de développement économique et social, par la présence d'ingénieurs, de médecins, de professeurs, de techniciens, elle fait accéder à la civilisation moderne des hommes qui sans cela végéteraient dans de bien difficiles conditions. C'est ainsi, - tout en sachant qu'il y a encore des progrès à faire à cet égard - que les écoles primaires, publiques et privées, accueillent, cette année, 5 000 élèves ; que le lycée, le collège technique, le collège secondaire privé, en reçoivent un millier ; que la radio fonctionne, que des hôpitaux modernes traitent en moyenne 12 000 malades par an, qu'une prophylaxie méthodique a réduit de 4/5 les maladies endémiques qui ravagent la population et que, dans le bled désolé, des forages de points d'eau continuent à grands frais mais avec des résultats appréciables. En outre, l'armée française détache à Djibouti les forces voulues pour assurer la sécurité d'un territoire très exposé dans une région du monde très instable et très agitée. Bref, en 1955, c'est 120 millions de francs nouveaux que la France aura consacrés à la Côte des Somalis et elle se disposait à en consacrer 150 millions l'année prochaine. Vraiment, je ne crois pas que nulle part l'aide économique et sociale, c'est-à-dire l'œuvre humaine de la France, ait été plus désintéressée. Elle l'a fait jusqu'à présent de grand cœur en raison de l'affection et de l'estime qu'elle porte à une population très méritante et qui lui a donné, depuis longtemps, tant de preuves de son attachement. Et moi, je ne peux pas oublier, en particulier, le vaillant bataillon Somali que la France Libre avait recruté et qui s'est illustré lors de la libération de la France, notamment à la prise de Tayan.

Et cependant, lorsque les 25 et 26 Août derniers, le Président de la République est venu rendre visite, au nom de la France, à la ville de Djibouti, il a été accueilli tout au long de son parcours par beaucoup d'inscriptions et de cris " Indépendance ! ". Ce jour-là et les jours suivants, sur le même thème, se sont produits dans la plupart des quartiers des échauffourées violentes. Cependant, on sait qu'après l'adoption de la Constitution de 1958, votée par la Côte Française des Somalis à une énorme majorité, le territoire avait eu la possibilité de décider de son destin. Or, son Assemblée élue avait, à l'unanimité, choisi le statut de territoire de la République française, moyennant l'assurance donnée par le Gouvernement que les modalités pourraient en être modifiées le cas échéant, ce que d'ailleurs la Constitution prévoit d'une manière explicite.

Et cependant, je le répète, lors de mon passage, la question a été posée d'une manière qu'on peut qualifier de pressante et de bruyante. Eh bien, soit ! Mais alors

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Il faut savoir à quoi s'en tenir. La France, étant donné les charges qu'elle porte, entend savoir si la population de la Côte des Somalis veut rester avec elle ou non. Elle va donc le lui demander et dans un délai suffisant pour que les citoyens consultés par référendum aient le temps de se décider en toute connaissance de cause. Si la réponse était négative, évidemment, la France retirerait du territoire ses représentants, son aide et ses forces et elle laisserait ceux qui invitent la population à réclamer l'indépendance en assumer les responsabilités.

Il est vrai que certains d'entre-eux, semble-t-il, imaginent que, la séparation étant choisie et le territoire devenant théoriquement un Etat souverain, la France, qui n'aurait plus à s'en mêler, continuerait cependant de pourvoir aux dépenses et aux besoins, ferait combattre ses troupes pour empêcher les voisins d'entrer. Il convient de dissiper cette dérisoire illusion. Car la France n'engagerait certainement pas ses moyens et ses soldats pour soutenir inutilement une apparence d'Etat que, le faible nombre et la division de sa population, la médiocrité de ses ressources, l'infirmité de ses frontières, les visées de ses voisins, l'Ethiopie et la Somalie, qui, par rapport à ce futur Etat sont des colosses et aussi étant donné tous les appels qui de l'intérieur seraient adressés continuellement à l'un ou à l'autre, étant donné enfin la situation de la région de monde où le territoire se trouve, qui est très agitée, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, rendraient pratiquement inviable.

Si, au contraire, la réponse est positive, alors la France continuera de tenir la Côte des Somalis comme étant liée à son propre destin. Elle continuera de lui fournir l'aide et la protection qu'elle doit à ceux qui font partie d'elle-même. Elle continuera d'y ménager peu à peu une formation humaine, une ascension économique, une promotion sociale, un rayonnement extérieur qui sont possibles avec son concours ; étant entendu, comme elle l'a plusieurs fois affirmé et comme vous l'avez rappelé tout à l'heure, je l'ai déclaré moi-même le 28 Août dernier à Djibouti à l'Assemblée territoriale, étant entendu, comme cela sera précisé en interrogeant tous et toutes, que le gouvernement et l'administration internes devront évoluer, compte tenu du développement.

Nous allons aborder l'affaire sociale.

Questions :

- M. le Président votre gouvernement a dû devoir refuser à la direction de la RATP les moyens qui lui auraient permis de répondre aux demandes du personnel unanimement rassemblé dans la grève que nous subissons aujourd'hui. Pour sa part, M. le Premier Ministre a laissé entendre que les tarifs seraient augmentés après les élections. Pensez-vous que votre gouvernement fasse une politique qui permette au progrès social de se développer en respectant la justice et plus particulièrement les plus défavorisés dans un cadre harmonieux ?

- Mon Général, on a beaucoup parlé ces temps derniers de l'amendement Vallon et en particulier, d'une manière plus générale, de l'intéressement des travailleurs aux profits des entreprises. Quel est votre point de vue à ce sujet ?

- M. le Président, à quoi attribuez-vous la baisse de la Bourse, alors qu'on dit que l'économie va bien ?

Le Général :

Je dirai un mot de la Bourse puisque vous m'en parlez.

En 1962, elle était exagérément bonne, en 1966, elle est exagérément mauvaise. Mais vous savez, la politique de la France ne se fait pas à la corbeille.

Question : Mon Général, êtes-vous favorable ou non au Plan Loichot ?

Le Général : C'est à peu près la même question que m'a posée votre collègue et je vais répondre sur cette grave affaire.

Depuis l'avènement de la civilisation industrielle moderne, la vie de la France et notamment l'épreuve des deux guerres avaient mis en lumière les causes qui entravaient l'essor de notre pays et l'affaiblissaient par rapport à d'autres et qui répandaient parmi les Français le sentiment d'un déclin national. C'étaient ce que les politiques, les théoriciens, la presse, appelaient "les grands problèmes", dont on discutait indéfiniment, sans toutefois jamais les résoudre. Or, voici qu'ayant tranché presque tous ces noeuds gordiens, l'avenir nous est ouvert.

C'est ainsi qu'après une période de confusion qui a duré plusieurs générations, nous avons doté notre pays d'institutions qui font de lui maintenant un modèle de stabilité et d'efficacité, quant à son système politique.

.../...

C'est ainsi que la natalité, qui depuis le Second Empire n'avait pas cessé de se réduire au point qu'elle était dépassée par la mortalité, s'est relevée d'une manière durable et notable, notamment à cause des mesures prises dans ce but lors de la Libération.

C'est ainsi qu'ayant pendant plus d'un demi-siècle tenu notre industrie derrière un mur néo-protectionniste nous avons maintenant, par le Plan, l'emploi du crédit, le marché commun, etc... etc... dirigé notre industrie vers la productivité, la recherche, la concentration, pour qu'elle devienne compétitive. En même temps nous avons assuré le destin de notre agriculture compte tenu de l'immense mutation qui a porté la masse paysanne à quitter les champs pour chercher des usines.

C'est ainsi qu'après des décades d'inflation et de crises monétaires, nous avons fait du franc français une des monnaies les plus solides du monde.

C'est ainsi que pour donner ses chances à notre jeunesse et élargir à ses dimensions nos ressources en valeurs humaines, nous avons donné à l'éducation nationale l'extension, l'organisation, les moyens proportionnés à cette tâche capitale alors qu'elle risquait d'étouffer à force de tergiversations, d'insuffisances et de retards accumulés depuis des lustres.

C'est ainsi que pour en finir avec de stériles et coûteuses expéditions, nous avons décolonisé délibérément des peuples qui voulaient être affranchis et remplacé à leur égard notre administration directe par une amicale et féconde coopération.

C'est ainsi que nous arrachant aux mythes du renoncement qui mettaient notre pays en état de subordination, nous avons rétabli l'indépendance nationale dans le domaine politique et dans celui de la défense que nous dotons des moyens voulus pour dissuader l'agression de quelque puissance que ce soit.

Certes, pour mener à bien chaque partie de cette rénovation, dont dépend notre destin, il nous a fallu le temps d'en faire mûrir les éléments psychologiques et matériels; les réalisations n'ont pas eu lieu du jour au lendemain, mais nous y avons abouti.

Eh bien ! il reste devant nous une question essentielle au premier chef. Comme elle est profondément humaine, économique et nationale, celle-là aussi commande notre avenir.

Il s'agit de la condition des travailleurs au sein de l'activité économique dont ils font partie, que ce soit au niveau des industries ou au niveau de la nation. J'en parle sans me lancer ni dans les considérations idéologiques ou doctrinales, ni dans les déclarations émouvantes et grandiloquentes que comporte nécessairement le sujet. C'est, posément et en me plaçant sur le seul terrain de l'intérêt général, que je l'évoquerai aujourd'hui.

A vrai dire, on ne peut pas méconnaître, en ce qui concerne le niveau de vie et la sécurité des travailleurs, que des choses importantes ont déjà été faites. La rémunération moyenne de chaque catégorie sociale s'élève à mesure de notre industrialisation, la sécurité sociale et les allocations familiales, qui ont été créées par le gouvernement de la Libération, ont fortement atténué les angoisses que la misère, la vieillesse, la maladie, l'infirmité, le chômage, ou bien la naissance des enfants et les soucis immédiats des parents à leur sujet, suscitaient naguère parmi tant et tant de gens. Du coup, la dignité de chacun et de chacune y a certainement trouvé son compte.

D'autre part, bien qu'il y ait encore et qu'il y aura toujours beaucoup à faire pour le logement, l'aménagement des villes, des villages, des habitations, les hôpitaux, les maisons de retraite, ^{quelque} l'organisation des loisirs, etc... il est clair que tout le monde maintenant tire avantage de l'équipement social que nous développons d'un bout à l'autre du territoire.

Mais il n'y a là, pour un grand nombre, qu'une participation passive à nos progrès collectifs. Le changement qu'il faut apporter à la condition ouvrière, c'est l'association active du travail à l'oeuvre économique qu'il contribue à accomplir.

Je sais bien que, dans cette voie là aussi, quelques pas ont déjà été franchis, au point que si la transformation n'est en fait qu'à ses débuts, on peut dire que le cap des principes est maintenant dépassé. C'est quelque chose, en effet, que d'avoir, en 1945, institué les comités d'entreprise; c'est quelque chose, que d'avoir, par une loi de 1966, étendu leurs attributions; c'est quelque chose, que d'avoir, par une ordonnance de 1959, incité matériellement les entreprises à pratiquer l'intéressement du personnel aux bénéfices, au capital et à la productivité; c'est quelque chose, que d'avoir prévu dans la loi tout récemment, que les salariés, dans certains cas, auront droit à une part capitalisée des plus values en capital.

Mais à l'échelon de la nation aussi, c'est quelque chose que d'avoir inauguré, avec le Vème Plan, une politique des revenus, politique par laquelle les salaires s'élèvent en même temps que le produit économique global. Je ne dis pas au même niveau, ni à la même vitesse. Je dis "en même temps", vous savez ce que je veux dire. Car il y a tous les prélèvements à faire subir qui font que leurs taux d'augmentation respectifs ne peuvent pas être rigoureusement égaux. C'est quelque chose aussi, à l'échelon de la nation, que d'avoir introduit les syndicats dans les instances où s'élaborent les données économiques et sociales de la politique de l'Etat. C'est quelque chose, que d'avoir organisé l'éducation nationale de telle sorte que désormais tous les enfants de France aient leur chance complète dans les études, depuis le début

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jusqu'à la fin. Mais il reste à fixer les voies et les moyens par lesquels les travailleurs auront légalement leur part et du même coup leurs responsabilités dans les progrès des entreprises, étant donné qu'ils y participent directement par leur effort et leur capacité.

Il va de soi qu'une réforme pareille qui consiste à bâtir, ou plus exactement à achever, un support nouveau de notre édifice économique et social, cette réforme doit s'accomplir sans ébranler les autres piliers, qui sont d'une part l'investissement des capitaux pour l'équipement des entreprises et d'autre part l'initiative et l'autorité de ceux qui ont à les diriger. Il va de soi que cette réforme exige à son tour, des études, des choix et des délais. Mais d'abord il faut la vouloir, la décider et la déclencher. Voilà pourquoi j'ai dit aujourd'hui à ce sujet ce que j'avais à en dire. Voilà ce qui sera, au cours de la prochaine législature, entrepris par le Président, le Gouvernement et le Parlement de la République.

Il faut dire quelque chose des élections, je pense. Cela vous préoccupe quelque peu.

Questions : - Mon Général, on a dit souvent que les prochaines élections législatives seraient une sorte de troisième tour de l'élection présidentielle qui pourraient même, le cas échéant, remettre en question les résultats du mois de décembre dernier. Qu'en pensez-vous ?

- M. le Président, avec plusieurs de mes confrères j'ai assisté aux travaux de la convention de la gauche gaulliste. Nous avons entendu un orateur jeune et plein de talent lancer une affirmation qui causa quelque mouvement puis finalement des applaudissements. Cet orateur déclara : aujourd'hui en France le régime est plus populaire que son Chef. Qu'en pensez-vous ?

- M. le Président, je voudrais vous poser une question au sujet de la loi électorale. En 1958, le principal parti de l'opposition, le parti communiste, a obtenu 3.900.000 voix et dix députés. Le parti gouvernemental, parti qui se réclame de vous, a obtenu 188 députés avec 3.000.000 voix de moins. Je voudrais savoir si vous n'estimeriez pas juste de revenir à la loi proportionnelle qui accordait à chaque formation le nombre de députés correspondant aux voix qu'elle a obtenu dans le pays.

Le Général : et qui empêcherait, comme naguère, d'avoir aucune espèce de Gouvernement...

Question : - Mon Général, lors d'un débat récent à la télévision, M. le Premier Ministre a émis l'hypothèse que la majorité actuelle serait quelque peu diminuée lors des prochaines élections législatives. Si tel était le verdict du peuple souverain, aussi souverain en cette matière que pour un référendum ou que pour l'élection présidentielle, quel serait votre point de vue ?

Je vais parler des élections législatives si vous le voulez bien. J'en parlerai quant à la portée qu'elles peuvent avoir sur un des domaines que la Constitution attribue au Chef de l'Etat : la permanence des institutions et le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics.

Je fais observer que c'est la troisième fois, qui ne le sait, que depuis la fondation de la République nouvelle on va procéder à des élections générales. Compte tenu des quatre référendums et de l'élection présidentielle au suffrage universel, jamais les Français n'ont eu, aussi souvent, aussi directement, aussi complètement, à décider de l'ensemble de leurs affaires. Autrement dit, aucun régime, à beaucoup près, n'a été aussi démocratique que celui qui fut fondé en 1958.

Cependant, les élections législatives prochaines auront pour notre pays une importance considérable parce qu'il s'agit de savoir si la France va poursuivre normalement sa marche en avant ou bien risquer de retomber dans le marasme d'antan. C'est là en réalité l'enjeu des élections prochaines.

Je dis que la question se pose parce que s'il s'est trouvé que depuis l'adoption de la Constitution par le peuple, - vote qui, à cet égard, exprimait massivement la volonté collective de la Nation - les élections de 1958 avaient marqué que ce grand courant national commençait à surmonter toutes les barrières que, localement, les habitudes, les partis, les journaux, opposaient à la rénovation. Si, en 1962, les élections avaient fortement accentué cette transformation il n'est pas sûr que les leçons en aient été tirées de manière complète par l'ensemble des citoyens. Les choses ne vont pas toujours très vite dans cette matière. En tout cas, le fait est qu'après les élections de 1958 et surtout celles de 1962, il existait à l'Assemblée Nationale une majorité constante et positive. C'était un événement essentiel et qui ne s'était encore jamais produit. Et delà alors devenait possible une collaboration cordiale, confiante, féconde, entre le Parlement et le Gouvernement, qui aidait puissamment la République à vouloir et à agir avec une continuité, une efficacité en tous domaines que, de mémoire d'homme, notre pays n'avait jamais connues. D'autre part il faut reconnaître que depuis huit ans la valeur, l'étendue, la cohérence de l'oeuvre législative qui a été accomplie, sont saisissantes et tout à fait conformes aux conditions d'une époque qui exige la rénovation mais qui exclut la confusion.

On peut espérer, qu'à la longue, ces évidences seront reconnues plus largement encore qu'elles ne le sont et en particulier, dans beaucoup de vos colonies et que l'on verra se rallier à la Vème République certains de ceux qui, jusqu'à présent, s'en tiennent encore éloignés.

Mais si, en dépit de tout, les prochaines élections législatives devaient, numériquement parlant, mettre les partis en mesure de tenter de reprendre au Parlement les jeux stériles qui sont inéluctablement les leurs, de plonger de nouveau les pouvoirs publics en état de crise chronique, et de rejeter la France dans l'impuissance où, naguère, ils l'avaient enfouie, il

...

On n'est que trop aisé de prévoir à quels risques serait une fois de plus exposée la Nation.

En effet, dans la perspective électorale prochaine, si l'on voit que les quatre ou cinq fractions qui sont à la fois opposées à notre régime et opposées les unes aux autres, ont la possibilité théorique de faire entrer à l'Assemblée Nationale une majorité de députés hostiles à la Vème République, si l'on voit que cette majorité négative serait en mesure de censurer successivement tous les Ministères et d'entraver ainsi le fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics, on ne voit pas du tout comment on pourrait y trouver la base et le soutien positifs d'un gouvernement qui en soit un. Cela est vrai, d'abord, séparément de chacune de ces quatre ou cinq fractions dont j'ai parlé, car aucune d'entre elles n'a aucune espèce de chance d'enlever, par elle-même, un nombre assez grand de sièges, d'obtenir de ses membres, et même de ses chefs, une discipline assez solide, de disposer dans le pays d'une confiance assez large, pour assumer valablement la politique de l'Etat. Cela est vrai, à plus forte raison, de la coalition de ces éléments profondément divers, même si, pour le temps de la campagne électorale, ils parvenaient à dissimuler leurs contradictions assez pour se répartir la majorité des voix.

Au contraire, si les Français maintenaient et renforçaient à l'Assemblée Nationale une majorité qui fasse corps avec la Vème République, - et, que, tout naturellement, le Premier Ministre s'emploie à préciser en vue des élections - cette majorité positive continuerait avec une vigueur redoublée son œuvre de progrès, d'indépendance et de paix, étant bien entendu que, pour elle, la cohésion est une obligation.

Il est vrai que naguère il y avait des tacticiens qui s'efforçaient d'aménager les choses devant le peuple, puis au sein du Parlement, de telle sorte que cela aboutissait à un fractionnement propice aux combinaisons. C'était là, en rendant précaire toute majorité, paralyser les pouvoirs publics alors que le pays a, évidemment, un intérêt vital à ce que son gouvernement puisse vouloir agir et durer.

De telles pratiques doivent avoir fait leur temps. Il est bien entendu que pour confronter les idées, pour élaborer les doctrines, pour mettre au point les projets, des débats sont nécessaires.

Mais dès lors que la position de la majorité est prise à la lumière des données ainsi délibérées, que la position de la majorité est prise en accord avec les autres instances responsables de l'Etat, toute division suscitée à l'intérieur d'elle-même, toute divergence serait néfaste et condamnable car la cohésion est la condition de la stabilité et de l'efficacité, raisons d'être de notre régime; et que le pays a voulu aux lieux et places de l'inconsistance et de l'impuissance d'autrefois.

.../...

En somme, dans toutes les circonscriptions, je crois que les Français se trouveront, quand ils seront appelés à voter, devant un choix aussi simple et clair que possible : ou bien investir les candidats qui se seront franchement unis et s'engageront à le rester pour servir ensemble la Vème République, ou bien donner la préférence à d'autres mais, dans ce cas, risquer de plonger de nouveau la France, et cette fois dans des conditions plus graves que jamais, dans les mêmes bouleversements inhérents à l'ancien régime des partis. Encore une fois, j'en parle du point de vue du Chef de l'Etat, compte tenu de ses attributions constitutionnelles, et j'ajoute que pour ma part, je ne doute pas de l'issue.

Mesdames et Messieurs, je vous remercie.



*M. Woodberry - for up. (11)
files.*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No.

27th September, 1966.


The Co-ordinator,
J.I.S.,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

France - Policies and Interests East of Suez

Attached in response to your request, is
an External Affairs paper on this subject.

M.J.C.

(M. J. Cook)
Intelligence Co-ordination Branch.



France - Policies and Interests East of Suez

Prospects The area under consideration is South Asia, South East Asia including the Philippines, New Caledonia and New Hebrides, Papua-New Guinea, Australia and Solomon Islands. ~~Gauche able to mediate successfully~~

In the VI There is no discernible pattern (except perhaps a vague paternalism towards French actual and former possessions) in present French attitudes and policies towards countries in the area. There is no significant French military presence nor are there large economic interests there and, except the French Pacific territories, French influence now derives largely from a cultural presence. France thus no longer has vital interests in Asia, other than to the extent that political developments there may affect the world balance of power.

By and large recent French political activity in Asia can be attributed to a desire to gain credit for France, which is in line with de Gaulle's efforts to fashion for France a third-force position between the United States and the U.S.S.R. There has been a perceptible swing politically towards the cultivation of those countries in the area tending towards a non-aligned role in international affairs, notably India and Cambodia, and to a lesser extent Pakistan. France has also drawn away from or been forced to modify its policies in South Vietnam and Laos as these countries have moved towards closer co-operation with the United States in Indochina.

French aid to the area is not extensive, although considerable bilateral aid is given for education and other cultural activities, especially in Indo China (including Laos and South Vietnam) and for selected international economic projects, e.g., Mekong Development Scheme and IBRD consortia for India and Pakistan (but not for the Asian Development Bank). Some detailed notes are attached.

Conclusion. Opportunism is likely to remain the chief motivating factor in French policy in the area during the tenure of General de Gaulle and probably for some considerable time after he ceases to be President of France. This may well cover the next ten years.

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Prospects for a more active French role in the area appear to be mainly in the economic and cultural aid fields. France could attain more political influence were General de Gaulle able to mediate successfully in the Vietnamese conflict.

South Asian area. There is a cultural link with Afghanistan where the ruling group has traditionally been French-educated, but in the other South Asian countries - Burma, Ceylon and Nepal - French involvement has remained small.

(a) India. France has traditionally had a strong cultural and economic interest in India. French activity has been more active since 1962 when France became an official member of the Aid-India Consortium. In 1965, 1966 and 1967 French annual contributions (which have varied) have been between \$29 and \$40 million. This is not a very large contribution, particularly relative, although it has been supplemented by scholarships and staff secondments and by training programmes. France has also supplied some military equipment. Recently political relations have become closer with India in the last two years as a result of high level exchange visits between French and Indian leaders. It is understood that the French regard these expanded contacts as part of a French effort to strengthen their influence in Asia, and it would seem that French policies are being presented to India and Pakistan and perhaps also to other countries in the area as a possible viable alternative to the policies of the United States and its supporters. However, French influence in India is not likely to become dominant, as long as the value of its aid and the scope of its economic relations remain well below those of other major powers.

(b) Pakistan. French interests in Pakistan have developed along lines somewhat similar to those in India, although clearly the French do not regard Pakistan as having the same importance.

ANNEXURESouth East Asia

South Asia In South East Asia France has close relations only with Cambodia. Relations with Thailand are cool and those with Laos and Vietnam are friendly. Apart from India and Pakistan, France has minor interests only in the South Asian area. There is a cultural link with Afghanistan where the ruling group has traditionally been French-educated, but in the other South Asian countries - Burma, Ceylon and Nepal - French involvement has remained small.

(a) India. France has traditionally had a declining interest in India. It has few cultural and economic interests in India and its policy has been more to develop India. French activity has been more active since 1962 when France became a member of the Aid-India consortium. Since 1962 French annual contributions have been between \$20 and \$40 million. These contributions have been broken up into grants, loans and technical assistance. This is not a very large contribution, particularly in view of the fact that it has been supplemented by scholarships and French teachers and 45 training programmes. France has also supplied some military equipment. In the last two years as a result of Indo China relations have become closer and exchange visits between French and Indian leaders. It is understood that the French regard these expanded contacts as part of a French effort to reassert this influence in Asia, and it would seem that French policies are being presented to India and Pakistan and perhaps also to other countries in the area as a possible viable alternative to the policies of the United States and its supporters. However, French influence in India is not likely to become dominant, as long as the value of its aid and the scope of its economic relations remain well below those of other major powers.

(b) Pakistan. French interests in Pakistan have developed along lines somewhat similar to those in India, although clearly the French do not regard Pakistan as having the same importance.

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South East Asia

In South East Asia France has close relations only with Cambodia. Relations with Thailand are cool and those with the Philippines are merely correct. This situation arises in part from French policies in South East Asia generally, including French attitudes to SEATO and to the American presence in the area. France has some commercial interests in Malaysia (e.g. rubber) in which it has shown increasing interest as its similar interests in South Vietnam have declined. It has now, however, so far shown any particular interest in developing relations with Singapore since the latter became independent. Relations with Indonesia are mainly commercial and at the moment Indonesia owes France 112.5 million dollars. There are no significant political contacts. Political relations with South Vietnam were broken off eventually in 1965 after a protracted period of crises. The French retain a strong influence through cultural relations - there are about 350 French teachers and 45 University professors and lecturers in South Vietnam - but French economic interests have declined greatly in the last two or three years. Relations with Laos have also cooled as French policy towards Indo China has developed and hardened and as Laos has moved towards closer support for the United States on Vietnam. The French nevertheless give considerable cultural aid to Laos where they exercise a great influence over the educational system.

Cambodia. France's close and friendly relations with Cambodia reflect an historically relatively harmonious colonial association and in recent years a broad measure of agreement on major international issues especially those concerning Indo China. France has consistently supported Cambodia's efforts to obtain guarantees of its neutrality and territorial integrity. France has also given Cambodia substantial civil and military aid and has important but not vital commercial interests there. France also provides substantial cultural aid to Cambodia.

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New Caledonia and New Hebrides

The basic situation in these territories is unlikely to alter substantially within the period under review although the integration of New Caledonia into metropolitan France will probably be completed about 1970. Limited political evolution in the New Hebrides is possible, particularly should the British withdraw from the condominium in favour of France. It should be noted that the French Pacific territories are a liability to France, which extended to them aid to the value of \$9.3.27 million in 1965.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
27th September, 1966.

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LHM-075
 LHM-TTT
 BY JOSEPH V. GRIGG
 PARIS, SEPT 14 (UPI)-- FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE IS
 LIKELY TO BE AN EVEN MORE +DIFFICULT+ ALLY FROM NOW ON.
 THAT, IN THE BELIEF OF MANY SEASONED DIPLOMATS HERE, WILL
 BE ONE OF THE FIRST NOTICEABLE RESULTS OF THE TWO MARATHON
 FOREIGN TOURS HE HAS CARRIED OUT THIS YEAR -- ONE OF NEARLY
 10,000 MILES IN JUNE AND JULY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
 27,000-MILES GLOBE-SPANNING TRIP HE HAS JUST COMPLETED.
 DE GAULLE MADE CLEAR ON THESE TWO TOURS THAT AS HE NEARS
 THE AGE OF 76 --HE WILL BE 76 ON NOV. 22-- HE IS AN OLD MAN IN
 MORE AND MORE OF A HURRY. THAT IS, HE IS IN A HURRY TO SET
 FRANCE'S POLICIES IN A MOLD FROM WHICH THEY COULD NOT EASILY
 BE RELEASED IF HE DISAPPEARED TOMORROW AS WELL AS TO REBUILD
 THE WORLD ALONG HIS OWN GAULLIST LINES.
 DE GAULLE ALSO HAS HIS EYE ON SOMETHING
 A LOT NEARER IN THE FUTURE -- NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
 NEXT MARCH OR APRIL. THE RULING GAULLIST UNION FOR THE NEW
 REPUBLIC (UNR) WILL BE FIGHTING THEN TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE
 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. DE GAULLE UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS TO PILE
 UP SUFFICIENT ADDITIONAL PRESTIGE TO OFFER THE UNR GOOD HOPE
 OF WINNING AGAIN.

(MORE)

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.Memo No. 1052
File No. 222/12/2

26th August, 1966

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.International Monetary System - French Views

The public release yesterday of the report by deputies to Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten, on possible improvements in the international monetary system, prompted a forthright statement by the Ministry of Economics and Finance of France's position, and in particular of the reasons why France does not share the assessment of other members of the Group of Ten on the establishment of a contingency plan. The statement amplifies the points made by the Minister of Finance and Economics, M. Debré, following the Group of Ten meeting in The Hague on 25th and 26th July, 1966. It is also of interest to note the statement on the same subject by the former Finance Minister, M. Giscard d'Estaing, on 22nd August, 1966.

2. The main points in the Ministry's communiqué are:-

- (a) For many months France has emphasized the drawbacks and even the dangers of the present monetary system, based on the joint use as reserves of gold and certain national currencies. France is especially interested in that section of the report dealing with the reform of the present system, and in particular the improvement of the mechanisms for adjusting balances of payments and also the strengthening of multilateral surveillance. Deputies have rightly kept clear of suggestions, and particularly that of the harmonisation of policies concerning the composition of reserves, which would not eliminate the real causes of instability but only offer a temporary palliative for some of the consequences of the present system.
- (b) In respect of the creation of additional reserves, France is fully convinced of the correctness of the unanimous view of the Ten that there is at present no general shortage of world monetary reserves. It can even seriously be questioned whether the creation of reserves has not rather been excessive during recent years. It is of course not unreasonable to accept, as a hypothesis, the idea that a need for additional reserves may become apparent in the future.
- (c) But France does not accept the conclusion that it is necessary to prepare now a contingency plan which will permit the creation of additional reserves when the need becomes obvious. Such a procedure appears dangerous. The introduction of a plan for reserves creation raises fears that it will create an irresistible temptation to make it work prematurely, which would jeopardize the monetary and economic equilibrium of the

*Ex. 1052**(Reg. 222/12/2)*
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world. This risk appears greater insofar as the likelihood of a return to equilibrium in the balance of payments of the reserve currencies remains uncertain.

- (d) While the deputies of the Group of Ten have accepted in principle the idea of preparing now a contingency plan for the deliberate creation of reserves, agreement has not been reached as to the practical application of such a plan. A procedure to follow the preparation of the plan has been suggested. France disagrees with the procedure envisaged.
- (e) The French Government has indicated on several occasions that it favours the exchange of views among all interested countries on the reform of the international monetary system. But it can only acknowledge with much reticence a procedure which leaves the greatest ambiguity on the future work, on the way in which the eventual contingency plan will be chosen and as to how the moment for its activation will be decided. France fears that such a procedure will give rise to regrettable confusion between measures capable of bringing real solutions to developing countries and short-lived palliatives which will bring illusions of monetary creation.
- (f) France wishes to continue to make a positive contribution to the necessary reform of the international monetary system. But concrete results will be attained only under certain well-known conditions, notably a more satisfactory equilibrium in international payments, a sincere agreement between the main industrialized countries on the objectives and conditions of the necessary reform, and finally the will to pursue simultaneously negotiations on the stabilisation of prices for raw materials.

3. In a television interview on 22nd August, 1966
M. Giscard d'Estaing commented:-

"When an international monetary conference is held the United States think of the dollar, the British of the pound, and Europeans of gold. Why do Europeans think of gold?... Because there is no currency corresponding to the renaissance of their economies. They have sound national currencies: the mark is sound, the franc is sound. These are not world currencies. Europe has become once more an economic power but she has no currency which expresses her part in the economic realities of the world today. The truth is that probably much less would be said of gold if there was a European currency equivalent to the major world currencies. The management, control, the credits and policy of such a currency would contribute much to resolve the problems which today appear to be insoluble. It is abundantly clear that the world is not drawing the consequences of the changed economic and political reality which followed the Second World War. The economic renaissance of Europe implies a European

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monetary presence."

4. It is assumed that you have received sufficient copies of the Report of Deputies. Copies of the related O.E.C.D. report on "The Balance of Payments Adjustment Process" were forwarded with our memorandum No.1044/66.

5. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to London (Mr. Lloyd), E.E.C. posts and Washington.

P.J. FLOOD

(P. J. Flood)
First Secretary

RESTRICTED

→ 25/1/1

101

Mr Weddell

F

While I understand
the problem, you will see
from a note I have sent the
Minister that the overriding
consideration is to talk to
the French and keep ordering
etc.

I understand that he now
intends to talk to Cerise in Paris with
Pl. de la part telling him what we
know of the French case of the, i.e., of
Somalia, New Caledonia, Réunion, Hong Kong
etc. What Maleny (Israel) raised with
Dennis and myself last week is another
topic

Mr 27/2

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SECRET

100

FILE No. 25/1

DATE 29 AUG 1966

SUBJECT

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH
ISRAEL AND MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE

FOR THE MINISTER

(Copy For The
Secretary)

You have raised in your minute upon the attached submission the desirability of engaging the French from time to time in discussion of matters other than those upon which we would be bound to be critical of French policy. You have suggested as a starting point the French future east of Suez.

2. We agree entirely with your idea of such discussions with the French. When I myself served in Paris, I was struck with the eagerness of the French to talk with us -- they like us to talk to them because to their mind this shows that we do not regard London and Washington as the source of all wisdom. Moreover, when I last talked to Gillet, who was at the time M. Couve de Murville's Chef du Cabinet, and to Man'ach (at the SEATO Council in Manila in 1964), they complained of lack of Franco-Australian dialogue and said that no matter how much we disagreed with French policies, we must never, "like the Americans", stop talking to the French for to do so would be regarded as a slight.

3. We also like your proposed starting subject and are working on a paper which we hope to have with you before you leave for London. In this connection, the attached record of conversation [redacted] reveals one broad subject which might be discussed (you will have heard that General de Gaulle's visit to Djibouti led to riots there).

4. As to the venue of the discussions, we suggest that you yourself should take the initiative in talks with M. Couve de Murville during your approaching overseas visit, either in Paris or in New York (M. Couve de Murville intends to attend the opening days of the General Assembly, we have been told).

5. Departmentally, we are not attracted to helping to promote contacts between Israel and Malaysia and Singapore because:-

- (a) As Mr Teshler himself revealed, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore each have their own reasons for being rather cool towards Israel. Unless therefore we ourselves stand to gain something by intervening and the advantage of such a course is difficult to perceive, we are reluctant to recommend action by our representatives in Malaysia and Singapore.

SECRET

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SECRET

-2-

- (b) The Israelis are very competent diplomatic operators and if they have been unable to make headway in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, it is to be doubted that our intervention would help.

6. Accordingly, on this question I recommend that we should not take any action and if Mr Teshar follows up his approach, we should politely point out that, while sympathetic, we cannot see our way clear to intervene and also doubt that our intervention would help.

Approved.

SH

31/8/66

W

Alan Renouf
(A.P. Renouf)
First Assistant Secretary
Division IV

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL 98

FILE No. _____

DATE 26th August, 1966

SUBJECT

FRANCE : EAST OF SUEZ

FOR MR RENOUF

Following consultation with relevant sections I have come to the conclusion that there is at present no pattern of French behaviour "East of Suez" - interpreted generously to mean from Madagascar to the Pacific Islands - which might be described as a French policy applicable to the area as a whole. Nor does it seem that such a policy is likely to emerge. For example :-

- (a) The French retain political and cultural interests in Cambodia and Laos. But these are not vital. But at the same time they are undermining the F.E.O.F. arrangements in Laos.
- (b) Their present and future interests in Malaysia and Indonesia are likely to be strictly commercial.
- (c) They have some political and cultural interests in India and Pakistan. But there is no sign of any French intention to get involved deeply with the sub-continent or its neighbours.
- (d) The French have shown interest in selected multilateral projects in the area. They are not participating in the Asian Development Bank and their interest in the South Pacific Commission is restricted. But they are quite active in ECAFE - perhaps because of its connection with Indo-China.

2. I doubt that the above indicates sufficient foundation for the Minister to approach M Couve de Murville with a view to discussing a French "policy" "East of Suez". We may need to set our sights lower and on more specific targets which might be developed as areas of potential common interest. For example :-

- (a) we might ask Defence to prepare a paper on French defence interests and actual military presence in the area, e.g. Malagasy, Djibouti, Reunion, Kerguelen and the Pacific. (But this would probably take a long time since no study is at present available. I am not, in any case, sure that it would be useful for our present purpose);


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2.

- (b) we might develop a study of the potential for Australian-French co-operation in the Pacific. We know that the French do not intend to develop their colonies in the Pacific into independent units and we accept this. But the French are not easy partners in the Pacific. They are suspicious of the other metropolitan powers. New Zealand is unsympathetic to their policies, as is the United Kingdom. The deterioration of Anglo-French and American-French relations in world issues seems likely to spill over into the Pacific and affect relations in the South Pacific Commission. It is possible that Australia may be able to do something in this area to reduce the frictions between France and her partners;
- (c) there is perhaps room for a limited dialogue on the future of China in Asia but as I understand it the Quai d'Orsay is already being co-operative in letting us have information and French views on what is happening in China. We cannot expect much more from them on this;
- (d) future co-operation in the Antarctic is also a field which could be worked up but co-operation here is already reasonably close. The subject does not seem to be suitable for protracted exchanges at the Ministerial level;
- (e) future aid to Indo-China for economic and social development after the restoration of peace in the area.

3. I am bound to conclude from the above that none of these topics is susceptible of development by the Minister with M Couve de Murville. Do you have any more positive ideas? The South Pacific position, which I thought might be developed, has been vetoed by Pac.Am. as being inconsistent with the facts of life, ~~as they are.~~


(B.W. Woodberry)

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96
SECRET

(697/8)

22nd August 1966

A.E. The Arab. Ambassador

Australian Embassy,
TEL AVIV.

25/1/1

ISRAELI VIEWS ON WESTERN PRESENCE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

Thank you for your memorandum of 14th July 1966. You will have seen the Secretary's record of his conversation with the Israeli Ambassador on 13th August. The matters raised are being further considered within the Department. The Minister has, for example, directed that the question of the future French role East of Suez should be reviewed as a basis for discussions with the French on the problems of the area.

- ... 2. In the meantime you may like to read on a see-and-return basis the attached copy of the latest review of Australia's Defence interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean. (D.C. 35/65 Copy No. 35).

*Mr. [unclear]
Mr. Woodbury [unclear]*

EAME

It is assumed you will have coverage of this from here. We cd. ask Defence to look at the French role East of Suez and I feel this operation would be of considerable interest.

Alpin [unclear]

AM
(A.M. Morris)
Assistant Secretary

*R/S
26/9/66*

SECRET

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MR PIPER
MR CURTIS
MR ASHWIN
MR FLANAGAN
MR JAMES
MR FORSYTH
MR LAVETT
MR PHILLIPS
MR HARDING
MR DAN
MR DALRYMPLE
MR EVANS
MISS KING

17th August, 1966

F251/3

FRENCH ROLE EAST OF SUEZ

Notwithstanding that the number of international political matters which may usefully be discussed with the French is shrinking, the Minister is anxious to maintain as far as possible a dialogue with the French on international affairs. He has suggested that one topic which might be taken up with the French in an effort to stimulate further exchanges is the future French role East of Suez.

2. I should appreciate having, at your earliest convenience, your written comments on this proposal, to the extent that it is relevant to your Section, with a view to holding shortly an intra-departmental meeting to decide whether the topic is one which might be taken up with the French, probably by the Minister with M. Couve de Murville at the forthcoming meeting of U.N.G.A.

(B.W. Woodberry)
Europe Section

F
Aus Relations with France.

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^{for}
Mr Woodluney

I am very partial to the Minister's view as expressed in the attached. The subject of Francis' intentions east of here is, in my opinion, an admirable subject on which to engage the French - and they have countries like us to show an interest in their policies. Please put the Minister's idea to study (with other branches concerned) ^{Venue of} discussion is a problem. Hasluck - Curre in N.Y. during U.N.G.A. seems best (I have sent telegram asking if Curre will be at U.N.G.A.).

M 17
P

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682/22/1/1
File No. 175/11/51

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

16 AUG 1966

Conversation with H.E. the Israeli Ambassador (Mr David S. Tesher)
on 13th August, 1966

Officers Present: The Secretary

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

ISRAEL'S VIEWS ON EAST OF SUEZ POLICY

1. The Ambassador of Israel (Mr Tesher) called on me this morning at his request and spoke to me at length about the Middle East and about future British policy there. A lot of what he said is covered in Mr Landale's Memorandum No.298 of 14th July from the Australian Embassy in Tel Aviv, reporting a talk with Mr Gazit, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel.

2. Mr Tesher seemed to have two principal points to get across :

(a) The withdrawal of the British from Aden would probably result in a further expansion of Nasser's influence, and he would indirectly take over the territory being vacated by the British. A further disturbing development was the refusal of the West to give arms assistance requested by Iran. Mr Tesher spoke of the dangers of the Red Sea being closed to Israel shipping when Aden ceased to be British and if the French ever left Djibouti. Mr Tesher said that the French were not showing any signs of leaving Djibouti, but it was realistic to assume that they would not remain there for ever.

(b) Australia, which was naturally concerned to keep the British east of Suez, should not think only of the Singapore end and the Indian Ocean but should also be concerned about what was happening at the other end.

3. The only thing that Mr Tesher asked for specifically was that we might take some opportunity to indicate to the French that we would be happy to see them remaining in Djibouti. He also expressed a desire to have a continual exchange of views on what was happening in the Middle East, and said he would appreciate knowing of any attitude we were taking with other governments. I made sympathetic noises in response, but did not promise anything.

4. I assured Mr Tesher that the Australian Government was very conscious of the importance of developments in the Middle East. We had shown that by contributing forces to the region in two world wars, by maintaining part of our air force in Malta in the early '50s, and by the attitude

/as the...

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FOLLOWING POSIS: Tel Aviv; Cairo; Singapore;
Kuala Lumpur

ACTION: MR RENOUF: For study and action

2981/61.

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• • • • •

DAR-ES-SALAAM

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Glad of brief cabled information
regarding status and extent of French military
presence and interests in Malagasy Republic.

*Related to East?
Suez exercise -
JLW.*

24.8.66

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682/22/1/1
File No. 175/11/51

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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(b) Australia, which was naturally concerned to keep the British east of Suez, should not think only of the Singapore end and the Indian Ocean but should also be concerned about what was happening at the other end.

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FOLLOWING POSTS:

Tel Aviv; Cairo; Singapore;
Kuala Lumpur

Report prepared by

(J. Plimsoll)

ACTION: MR RENOUF: For study and action

2981/61.

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2.

the Australian Government had taken in 1956 during the Suez crisis. We were also conscious of the importance for Singapore and other positions in the Far East of the maintenance of secure communications through the Middle East, even though the British would have alternative communications across North America. Mr Tesher stressed the extent to which we drew on the Middle East for our oil supplies, and I said that we were already well aware of that.

5. Turning to another subject, Mr Tesher said that Australia might be helpful to Israel on two points, namely, Israel's contacts with Singapore and Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew had not responded to any suggestions to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and had not been prepared to support Israel's presence at an Asian socialist conference. In the case of Malaysia, the two Governments recognized one another though there had been no exchange of diplomatic representatives. But there had been signs that Malaysia was growing colder towards Israel, presumably in the hope of helping its position with other Islamic states. The two preceding Malaysian High Commissioners in Canberra had exchanged calls with the Israel Ambassador, but the new High Commissioner had not sent to the Israel Ambassador the letter normally sent to other heads of mission informing them that he had presented his credentials. Mr Tesher wondered whether there was anything that Australia could say to Malaysia and Singapore.

.....

- To Secretary,
1. I should like you to give some thought to the question whether we should seek to have some discussions with the French about subjects in international affairs in which we can talk to the French seen to be shrinking. We could either talk about their nuclear testing or about their attitude to Nato and in both cases there would little exchange of views or either case we need something in which we can engage their interest without appearing to be critical of their actions. Their own future part of Suez might promote a starting point for a broadening discussion. If you see any merit in this you might discuss with me the question of where, when and how we get alongside them.
 2. I would be inclined to be helpful to Mal over Malaysia and Singapore if we could be.

LH
16/8/66

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682/22/1/188
File No. 175/11/57

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with H.E. the Israeli Ambassador (Mr David S. Teshor)
on 13th August, 1966

Officers Present The Secretary

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FOLLOWING POSTS:

Tel Aviv; Cairo; Singapore;
Kuala Lumpur

ACTION: MR RENOUF: For study and action

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2.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.

In reply quote No. 230/13/2.
Memorandum No. 298.

14th July, 1966.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

EAST OF SUEZ POLICY: ISRAELI VIEWS.

I refer to our telegram 113 of 14th July. Recently, Mr. M. Gazit, who is the Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of Middle East Affairs, expressed a wish to give me the Ministry's views on the East of Suez policy and its application to Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf Area and I, therefore, arranged to call on him on 12th July, 1966.

2. Gazit's main theme was that the British/American East of Suez policy was based on two 'pivots', South East Asia in the east and Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf area in the west, and that the 'western pivot' was receiving too little attention. He knew that the British intended to build up their base in Bahrain following their withdrawal from Aden in 1968 but wondered whether they would be able to fulfil their obligations in the Persian Gulf and to protect Western oil interests from there; in any event he thought England's position in Bahrain was tenuous and might become untenable. He then spoke very briefly on possible bases in East Africa and a vacuum in the Indian Ocean but did not amplify his remarks.

3. Mr. Gazit said that Israel and other countries, including Iran, were concerned over the trend of events. He visualized that if nothing were done, President Nasser would use the Yemen as a springboard to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf area. At this point he handed me a cutting from an Iranian paper to prove his point that the Shah of Persia was also alarmed (cutting attached). He mentioned that representatives of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were meeting in Copenhagen to negotiate an agreement over oil rights on the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf. The rulers of these countries no doubt felt that they should settle such matters while they had the time. Gazit suggested - as a personal view - that Iran regarded the general area of Muscat and Oman as a 'pistol pointed at its heart' and he speculated that the Shah might at a later stage feel compelled to take some preventive action to ensure that it did not fall into 'hostile' hands.

4. Gazit said that Russian aims in the area were an 'enigma'. He did not know, for instance, whether or not they were encouraging President Nasser to keep his troops in the Yemen. They (i.e. the Russians) had fifteen hundred experts in Somalia and they were, therefore, in a position to support President Nasser's ambitions in Southern Arabia if they so desired; however, the Russian presence in Somalia was to some extent neutralized by a strong American presence in Ethiopia.

5. Gazit said that the Ministry derived comfort from the fact that the French still held Djibouti and that there was no evidence suggesting that they were planning to evacuate this territory. Gazit expressed the hope that you would consider finding an opportunity of indicating to the French that you would be happy if they remained there. I said that I would pass this on to you but that I did not know what your attitude would be. (Gazit had seen a report that President de Gaulle planned to visit Djibouti at the end of August this year).

6. Gazit drew my attention to two newspaper articles; one of these "Wilson East of Suez" appeared in the London Economist of 18th June and the other one - by Hansen Baldwin - in the New York Times of 8th July 1966 (copies attached). He made no reference to an article "The Shadow of Nasser looms over Ethiopia" which appeared in the London Times of 8th July. Gazit then told me that the Ministry would ask Teshar to explain these views to you.

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7. As I interpret Gazit's remarks, his 'message' to Australia is that the Ministry believes that the defence and control of the whole area from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to South East Asia should be regarded as indivisible and that the West is paying too little attention to the 'western pivot'. If they do not maintain an effective presence there and lose control, they will find it difficult to implement their policy of containing Communist China in the eastern sector. It will, therefore, pay Australia to watch developments in the Red Sea/Persian Gulf areas.

8. I should appreciate your comments on Gazit's remarks.

William G. Landale
(W.G.A. Landale)
Ambassador.

CONFIDENTIAL

East of Suez: A Problem of 'Presence' NYT July 8 1966

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

NEW YORK—How to maintain a military "presence" east of Suez is a strategic problem that will increasingly preoccupy security planners in London, Washington, Canberra and elsewhere in the next decade.

The British withdrawal from Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea in 1968 will leave the vast area of the Indian Ocean, once dominated by the Royal Navy, a virtual military vacuum.

London has attempted to give a tentative answer to the looming problem. But it so far poses more questions than it answers; it is clearly tailored to reduced British power and is fashioned more by the Treasury than by the Ministry of Defense.

The answer is based upon the substitution of land-based planes for aircraft carriers, the development of new island bases with United States help, and, above all, upon dependence on United States power in the area.

No New Carrier

This year's defense white paper ruled out the construction of a new aircraft carrier but opted instead for the purchase of 50 General Dynamics F-111 swept-wing "strike" aircraft from the United States. These planes, supplemented by some McDonnell F-4's and Lockheed C-130 transports for air supply, and by new British aircraft, will—the Defense Ministry hopes—be capable of providing the principal British power punch east of Suez.

The Australians have also contracted for 24 of the F-111A aircraft. London contemplates retaining most of its 50 aircraft in Britain. The

basic concept of defense of the Indian Ocean area is that the F-111's and other aircraft would be able to fly to the vicinity of crisis quickly from home or other bases. To do this, transit or staging and operating bases must be available despite the long range of the F-111.

But the bases, actual or potential, available to British, Australian and presumably American aircraft in the Indian Ocean area are few.

Available Bases

On the western flank of the Indian Ocean area, well-developed bases on Cyprus are still available. Bahrain, on the Persian Gulf, is a tenuous foothold, usable until and unless political difficulties force the British out. There are at least four bases in east Africa, including Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which provide satisfactory military facilities but in an uncertain political environment.

In the great ocean area between Africa and Australia, there are only two small staging and transit strips today, Gan in the Maldiv group southwest of Ceylon and the Cocos Islands 800 miles from Singapore, with modest refueling facilities. Both are inhabited.

In an effort to fill in some of the vacuum in the Indian Ocean, the British Government last year established a new colony—the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony includes the tiny, low-lying coral atolls of Farquhar, Aldabra and Des Roches north of Madagascar and the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia near the center of the Indian Ocean, 1,200 miles northeast of Mauritius.

Construction of bases at such sites would be very expensive. So much so that Britain has already said it expects the United States to share expenses, as well as responsibilities, in the area. None of the islands offers the prospect of adequate naval ports. Yet it is quite clear that control of the vast area east of Suez cannot be maintained by a handful of land-based aircraft, but must be maintained primarily by ships, including aircraft carriers.

Yet the British white paper makes it clear that Britain will no longer attempt to maintain her ancient naval power and that she will depend, to a great degree upon American power.

Moreover, if naval vessels are to operate permanently in the Indian Ocean area, the South African naval base at Simonstown will have renewed importance, since maritime communications around the Cape of Good Hope would become a primary route—replacing Suez, which would be threatened or closed in war.

Filling the Vacuum

Filling the vacuum of power in the Indian Ocean, it is quite clear, must be a multinational effort, involving not only Britain and the United States, but also and most importantly Australia and South Africa, and hopefully, in time, India and Pakistan.

Thus the new British strategic concept for the area east of Suez appears to be today, as *The Times* of London defense correspondent puts it, a "patchwork of inconsistencies... little more than a series of hunches by the Government which defy analysis."

KAYHAN, 29.6.66

'Iran must brace for U.K. pullout of Persian Gulf'

by BIZHAN IRANDOUST

HIS Imperial Majesty said yesterday he would welcome the rise of other political parties in Iran, unmotivated by personal gains. He felt that political institutions were already emerging in this country at the grass-roots level.

The Shahanshah said Egypt's Nasser was planning to use Yemen as a spring-board against the Persian Gulf, waiting for Britain to pull out of Aden before doing so. He said Iran must prepare herself for that day.

The Iranian Monarch spoke in an interview with Washington Post Associate Editor Alfred Friendly during an audience yesterday. Kayhan Newspapers President Montazeri and Bahzadeh was also present. Friendly, who leaves this morning, has been here for 10 days with his wife and daughter as guest of Kayhan Newspapers. While here, he delivered several lectures to the Kayhan Institute of Journalism.

Touching on a wide range of subjects, the Shahanshah expressed unhappiness about American foreign policy, explaining that it had forced Pakistan to turn to Communist China for arms.

U.S. foreign policy had also taught Iran to rely upon itself. The Shahanshah was believed referring to the non-involvement of America and Britain, CENTO partners in the Indo-Pakistani hostilities.

He said America should not be surprised to see Iran shopping elsewhere for her armament requirements. The United States was no longer giving away arms, but selling them, thus forcing Iran to look for the cheapest price at which it could buy. America should

The Iranian Parliament has already approved two separate sums of \$200 million during the past two years to build up the Iranian Armed Forces, including a strong navy in the Persian Gulf, at which it

His Imperial Majesty said Nasser was remaining in Yemen to have a position on the Arab Peninsula when Britain leaves Aden. This would, it was understood, allow Nasser to move unhindered toward the Gulf.

Britain is now the protecting power on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, controlling the foreign policy and defense affairs of Qatar and the Trucial States.

The Trucial states are Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al Quwain, Ajman and Fujairah.

The Shahanshah denounced those countries who call themselves as progressive. Their

day. Kayhan Newspapers President Moustafa Mous-
bahzadeh was also present.
Friendly, who leaves this
morning, has been here for
10 days with his wife and
daughter as guest of Kay-
han Newspapers. While
here, he delivered several
lectures to the Kayhan In-
stitute of Journalism.

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The Shahanshah de-
nounced those countries
which had labelled them-
selves as progressive. Their
progress, he said, was in
setting up concentration
camps and denying liberty
to the masses.

These countries, His Im-
perial Majesty said, pro-
posed something, but as
soon as they saw Iran do-
ing it, they would denounce
the country as a lackey
of imperialism.

This was believed to be
a reference to the so-called
"revolutionary Arab states,"
including Egypt, Syria and
Algeria.

On internal affairs, the
Shahanshah said political
institutions were already
emerging in Iran at the
village level through village
councils, rural co-opera-
tives and political groups.

Earlier, Friendly had ex-
pressed opinion that a real
problem that Iran would be
facing in the future would
be setting up rural and
urban political institutions
to undertake decision-mak-
ing responsibilities.

The expanding educated
urban population, stream-
ing in from the villages,
was not going to allow it-
self to be denied an active
part in the Government,
Friendly had said.

The Shahanshah, though
expressing satisfaction
with the two ruling Iran-
Novin and minority Mar-
dom parties, said he would
welcome the formation of
other political parties as
long as they were not set
up to fulfil personal ambi-
tions.

Wilson East of Suez

The Prime Minister has overcome his rebels, but he still has an argument to win—which is well within his power

HAROLD WILSON, by a knock-out. There is no arguing with the figures: the rebel motion before the private members of the Parliamentary Labour Party on Wednesday was thrown out by 225 votes to 54. For a motion supposedly backed not just by the left, but by important elements of the centre and right, that 54 was almost derisory. The left by itself on a purely left-wing issue could have polled more. Messrs Mayhew, Wyatt and Allaun, the leaders of the rebellious cabal, cannot even blame the unusually heavy muster of ministers and peers rallying behind the Prime Minister: on this showing, they would have been beaten comfortably even in a vote confined to backbenchers.

But it is important to recognise just what Wednesday's vote was all about. On paper, Labour MPs were discussing a motion calling for decisive cuts in defence spending east of Suez by 1969-70, and Mr Wilson dealt pretty faithfully with this particular issue. He claimed that cuts would come as the Government swapped big bases for smaller staging posts, but he argued that if Britain were to help in the peace-keeping role of the UN, then this country had either to be on the spot, or at least able to get there. He insisted that Britain had a duty to assert some influence in Asia and Africa, and he made effective play with all the bases and staging posts needed to back up the oil blockade of Beira and Mr Ian Smith.

All this made sufficient sense to shift some of the would-be rebels at least into abstaining: the invocation of the UN is always a winner with the Labour party. But Mr Wilson made sure that this was a vote as much about party loyalty as about the details of defence: "The Government must govern, and there must be no substitute for it." The Labour party has not heard such blunt words from its leader since 1961. Mr Hugh Todd Naylor Wilson will be the first to appreciate that.

The rebels were in fact beaten before they started on Wednesday. Had they been able to force a vote three weeks ago they might well have got very close: certainly they would have got closer. But Mr Shinwell, as chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, ruled then that they had not given sufficient notice of their motion, and the intervening time was put to effective use by the Government whips. It was possible to forecast a Government win a week ago. (It is also possible to forecast that sooner or later the backbenchers are going to get fed up with Mr Shinwell's interpretation of his job.)

But Mr Wilson made sure that his victory was overwhelming. A rebel needs to get up very early in the morning to catch him on the hop. But on Tuesday, at question time, the Prime Minister had been far from convincing. More than once he referred obliquely to Wednesday's meeting, revealing how preoccupied he was by it. He was embarrassingly concerned to cut Mr Mayhew down. But by most accounts his speech on Wednesday was a *tour de force*. Even reading the transcript (which the party obligingly let him publish) it is clear that he pulled out almost every stop in his considerable political armoury. A prime minister can always cow his critics (though future prime ministers, and even Mr Wilson himself, may regret the very fact that a policy issue was thus put to a direct vote inside the parliamentary party). So Mr Wilson won re-asserting his personal authority inside his party. No doubt

this will be reflected in other aspects of his premiership. The degree to which his position was threatened had been greatly exaggerated, but now, after taking things too easily since the election, he has got his second wind.

Even so Mr Wilson will be the last person to draw too wide conclusions from his success. A backbench revolt, particularly one so genteelly led, tested him at his strongest point. He knows, even better than Mr Harold Macmillan, who is his model, how to handle a party. This week he has proved it again—it remains to be seen how he capitalises on his victory.

FOR the outcome of the squabble is not really a satisfactory one. There is still an argument to be won outside the Labour party as well as in it. If the Powellite Tories and the Liberals had trooped along to the meeting too their voices would have been raised even more resolutely against Britain remaining east of Suez. This is the second most serious issue in this country today. The financial argument is one matter. It has been *The Economist's* contention that if Britain cannot afford the defence bill east of Suez, without Aden and without the confrontation in Malaysia, then there is something more seriously wrong with the British economy than the present measures to put that economy right would suggest. But finance is not, and should not be, the be-all and the end-all. Both Labour and Tory governments have for the past four years been content to justify a positive British policy east of Suez by talking about the defence of Malaysia. Now that Malaysia has been successfully defended, what remains of the British commitment has seemed too negative, politically and psychologically, too much the familiar process of the inevitable ultimate withdrawal of an increasingly ineffectual power, to have much point. What needs to be spelled out even more than Mr Wilson did in his speech is just how practicable a continuing British commitment east of Suez really is.

Strategically Britain can do precious little east of Suez by itself. It is not the Labour party or the Conservative party that can decide, in the last resort, whether there is a useful job for Britain to do in the Indian Ocean; that depends now on the United States. American policy towards the containment of China, and Vietnam in particular, is not going to be decided by what Britain will or will not do in the Indian Ocean. But British policy in the Indian Ocean, and a lot of other places too, stands or falls by what the United States in the end decides to do on the periphery of China: if the Americans decide that south-east Asia is unsavable, and that India must take its luck, then Britain has no conceivable function in the area.

But Britain's east-of-Suez policy depends, and will depend increasingly, on the Asians too. By some time in the medium future—say 1980—the Asian balance of power will have to be held primarily by some combination of Japan, India and Indonesia (700 million people) against China (ditto). Japan already has the industrial capacity but not yet the political inclination to do this—though there are signs that this is beginning to change now. India has the political inclination

rebels, but is well

premiership. The had been greatly o easily since the

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will depend the medium will have to n, India and itto). Japan : political in- this is begin- l inclination

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but not the economic capacity. Indonesia at the moment has neither. But in the end the three probably will make a workable counter-balance; at which time it will be nonsense for Britain to remain, and Britain's provisional job will be over. Then, and only then, Mr Enoch Powell will be right.

Some Powellites and Mayhewites may be persuaded to accept this. They have just been too quick. Among them are the Europe-firsters, who have jumped from an entirely correct desire to get into Europe to the false conclusion that this is inseparable with a military policy outside Europe. It is incompatible. Going into Europe requires a number of economic and political changes; it does not require a British military redeployment into Europe. The correct military policy for Britain, in or out of Europe, is to have troops where there is a job for British troops to do. Europe does not need redeployment, and will not unless Russian policy changes. It is the other Europeans who will soon be looking silly (or isolationist) because their troops are drawn up with their backs to the sound of the guns. Other rebels that can be persuaded, and seem to have been persuaded by Mr Wilson, are the Labour party's solid, not very imaginative but at bottom highly responsible middle-of-the-roaders. They are men who call themselves liberals. The test of a liberal in international affairs is that he feels a sense of responsibility for what happens to people even if they happen to be a long way away from Britain. He does not want to see Malaysians pushed about by a man like Mr Sukarno, or east Africans terrorised by drunken mutineers, or a Mr Ian Smith left unchallenged. All three of these things have had to be coped with in the past three years. Why on earth should anyone who has not been indoctrinated to think otherwise believe that the next 15 years will not produce several equally deserving cases?

It must be emphasised that the military dispositions that Mr Wilson and Mr Healey want to make east of Suez do not involve large numbers of men—certainly not the 81,000 now there. They involve probably four or five battalions with air cover and logistic support and the transport to reinforce them from Britain if necessary. They do not require large bases in the middle of a potentially hostile population—except for Singapore where Britain stays only as long as the Singaporeans' interest in revenue outweighs their nationalism. The east-of-

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 18, 1966

Suez deployment is ultimately based on the idea of securing positions in Australia, which wants British forces, and islands where virtually nobody lives anyway. Above all it needs to be emphasised that the troops east of Suez are not meant to fight the Chinese army. They are for counter-insurgency operations, preferably at the bud-nipping stage, which Britain happens to be pretty good at.

These are arguments based on the reality of military power. Other arguments are put forward (by Mr Wilson himself) which say that Britain should carry on until the peace-keeping role east of Suez is taken over by an organisation like the United Nations. It is high time everyone realised the fallacy in this. The simple fact is that the British military presence east of Suez that is being discussed is of a nature and scale quite unrelated to the only kind of peace-keeping operations that the UN will be used for in the early future. The UN may well get involved, somewhere in the Indian Ocean area, in an operation roughly like those that it is running now: in Cyprus and on the Israel-Egypt border, forces of between 4,000 and 7,000 men each; in India-Pakistan, observer groups of a strength that might be anything from 50 to a few hundred.

Normally, UN forces have to be carefully mixed-manned by those smaller states that are eligible in a given situation. The British participation in Cyprus was an exception, for special reasons, to the general rule that excludes troops of the "big five" powers. Even if a similar exception occurs again, it means only one battalion from Britain in a mixed force. As in Cyprus, so in the east British supply dumps, communications and other support might well fit in with a UN mixed-manned operation. But this is very different from the concept of large-scale British combat forces being used either by the UN, or as an interim substitute for UN action. Introducing "UN peace-keeping" into the argument merely creates confusion—deliberately or not. But another kind of "peace-keeping" action, the kind involved in the British response early in 1964 to the east African governments' appeals for help, is relevant. That was not UN, or UN-type, action. But it was precisely the kind of action that Britain may one day be called on to do again—and which is within British capabilities of doing. No one else can do it as well. No one else is likely to do it as well. It is no shame to a British government to say this aloud.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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DL
~~SECRET~~ BRANCH
.....

At the Secretary's direction,
I have this morning sent off to
Cairo a copy of the attached record of
conversation - but without a copy of
the memo. from Tel Aviv (which is
referred to in the record). The
Secretary wishes you to decide whether
a copy should follow to Cairo- and also
whether a copy should be attached to all
or some of the other copies of the
record. *(See paper attached)*

Would you mind seeing to this
please?

SB Brown
16/8

DRAFT ONLY

SECRET

Australian Embassy
TEL AVIV

Not used
P.

EAST OF SUEZ POLICY : ISRAELI VIEWS

Thank you for your memorandum no. 298 of 14th July 1966 setting out Israeli views on Western presence east of Suez, in particular in the Middle East.

2. You could tell Mr. Gazit when you next have discussions with him that Australian planners fully recognize the need for ^{peace and} stability and ~~peace~~ in the Persian Gulf in order to assure oil supplies to the rest of the world, and to leave open ~~general~~ ^{the} lines of communications across the Indian Ocean. The extent to which this objective is secured by continuing Western military presence in the area is a matter largely for the judgment of the countries involved. It seems to us that ~~it~~ ^{the} would depend to a significant extent on local conditions and the ^{addition} of the local people. It ~~does~~ ^{also} seem to us unrealistic to expect Western presence to be permanent although the countries in the area such as Iran and Israel would no doubt be able to argue effectively and with greater knowledge than we have about the consequence of Western withdrawal. It is noted that Gazit said that Russian ^{aims} ~~views~~ are an "enigma". Although the Russians can be expected to fish in any troubled waters do the Israelis see any signs of new Russian pressures in the Middle East, comparable, for example, to the kind that the Chinese are exerting in South East Asia? Are the Israelis convinced that the political instability in the Middle East/African area will be reduced rather than accentuated by increased Western military presence there? ^{any considerations relating to} (aside from ~~the~~ British concern about the "over-stretch" of their resources). Does such a presence accelerate or retard the emergence of more forward-looking Arab political entities?

It would be useful to convey to the Israelis that we are interested in their views on these and other problems of the area. We would not, however, want you to give the Israelis the impression that ~~we are~~ ^{ask or willing to exert} ~~our~~ leverage on the British or French to persuade them to remain in greater force in the Middle East.

We are attaching for your own information on a see-and-return basis a recent Defence ^{Committee} ~~External Affairs~~ paper on the Indian Ocean which will give you an outline of ^{our thinking} ~~thinking~~ on the area as a whole. There is clearly a need to watch and take into account developments in the Middle East but at this stage they do not appear to us to warrant as great a concern, or

require as high a priority of effort as do ^{developments} ~~developments~~ in South East Asia.

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THE MINISTER
RENOUF

A group of background papers for your talks with the French are being sent to you by bag by Booker (on the Pacific) and myself today. You will no doubt select from these any specific subjects you want to raise.

2. As will be apparent to you, what the background papers lack is a central theme. This theme should, I suggest, be to let the French know that we value their presence East of Suez as a stabilizing and "civilizing" element and want it to continue. You might even work in a little flattery, if the opportunity arises, by saying that we regret that other Western European countries do not take the same interest east of Suez as the French do. For these reasons, we are interested in periodically exchanging knowledge and views about situations and problems which do not receive much public attention and upon which our respective positions are not so well known to each other.

3. I also suggest that one of your objectives in this round with the French should be to encourage them to reveal to

Div. IV

1.9.66

→ *Mr. Woodberry* *for*

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you what is their long-range thinking about the future of their possessions East of Suez (for example French Somaliland and New Caledonia). As far as I am aware, we know nothing of this thinking.

4. To make an obvious point, I recommend you should establish a good atmosphere for the discussions by offering the French at the outset a fairly frank account of what went on at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. They would appreciate such a gesture.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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FILE No. 25/1/1

DATE 1 SEP 1966

SUBJECT

FRENCH INTERESTS EAST OF SUEZ

FOR THE MINISTER

....

Attached are notes which may be useful to you when you see M. Couve de Murville. For convenience the region in this case has been defined to include French Somaliland, the Malagasy Republic and the Comoro Archipelago, the Indian Ocean and the states on its northern littoral, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Indochina and the French Pacific territories.

2. Australia's main strategic interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean stem from:-

1. Military sea and air communications and major trade routes, together with facilities required to support these.
2. Access to strategic materials, particularly oil.
3. The maintenance of the political climate to enable the continuance and development of allied military facilities.
4. The denial of military facilities and reinforcement routes to potential enemies.
5. Preserving and developing United States and United Kingdom interests.

3. There is no discernible pattern (except perhaps a vague paternalism towards the French possessions) in present French attitudes and policies towards countries in the region. For example, unlike Britain, the French have neither a significant military presence nor large economic interests there. All French territories are constitutionally linked with metropolitan France.

4. Despite the enormous expanse of the Indian Ocean area, there are relatively few places within it which have the potential for development of port facilities or air fields and considerable advantage accrues merely from access rights to existing ports and harbours. Given the considerable strategic significance of the area for Australia, it is important that such facilities as are in French hands should so remain. Furthermore, in the case of the French territories, there may be more security of tenure in the long term than elsewhere (compare Réunion with Mauritius, for example). The denial factor of the continued French presence is thus significant.

MR. WOODBERRY

Return to Hest.
326.

29/9/66.

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FRANCE/MALAGASY

Although -2- the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connections with France which retains dominant influence there. These connections relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable.

5. Similar considerations apply, in varying degrees, to Australian strategic interests in the Pacific Ocean area.

all secondary schools and university teachers are French.

6. A significantly increased direct French contribution to defence of the region appears to be excluded, on political grounds, in the immediately foreseeable future. But French cooperation could be useful in influencing the francophone African states, particularly Malagasy, in support of any Anglo-American establishment which may be set up in the Indian Ocean.

7. Prospects for a more active French role in the region appear to lie rather in the economic and cultural aid fields than in defence. (The French have generally shown more interest in bilateral than in multilateral aid projects.)

usually frequent visits by other units of the French fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a gravel dock.

3. The Malagasy army (A.P. Renouf) up to 4000 men, including infantry, First Assistant Secretary and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Defence Zone No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French Europe Section both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

4. Malagasy has a small air force of six transport aircraft and one helicopter. Elements of the French Air Force are also based there.

COMORO ARCHIPELAGO

5. The Comoro Archipelago, which lies about 200 miles west of the northern tip of Malagasy, commands the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel (between Malagasy and the mainland). The French have been established there since 1943, and since 1961 the islands have formed an Overseas Territory of the French Republic.

6. The territory is governed under a French High Commissioner by a Council of Ministers responsible to a

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FRANCE/MALAGASY

Although the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connexions with France which retains dominant influence there. These connexions relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable. A considerable number of senior government officials, senior officers in the army, gendarmerie and police, and virtually all secondary school and university teachers are French. Nearly 70% of the country's trade is with the franc zone. The population of 5.6 million includes 50,000 French citizens.

2. The small Malagasy navy comprises a coastal minesweeper, a small patrol vessel, and five coastguard patrol craft. It works in close co-operation with the French navy, which has its Indian Ocean headquarters at Diego Suarez. A French frigate and a surveying ship are usually stationed there. There are frequent visits by other units of the French fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a graving dock.

3. The Malagasy army is being built up to 4000 men, including infantry, artillery, armour, engineers and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Defence Zone No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

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local Chamber of Deputies. It is represented in the National Assembly by 2 deputies and in the Senate by 1 senator. An Arab minority forms an aristocracy which provides most of the administrators and political leaders.

7. The economy of the Comoro Islands is mainly agricultural, producing rice, manioc and bananas for domestic consumption and vanilla, essences and perfumes, copra and sisal for export. The only industries are preparation of sisal for export and distillation of essences.

8. There are no ports of any significance, though small lighters and launches can use various landing places.

9. Responsibility for defence rests with France, but we have no information about defence installations, if any.

REUNION

10. Reunion, an island 420 miles east of Malagasy and some 180 miles south-west of Mauritius, is an Overseas Department of the French Republic. It has belonged to France since 1642. It is administered by a Prefect, and an elected general council of 36 members. It has three representatives in the French National Assembly^{and} (one of whom is M. Michel Debré, the French Minister for Economy and Finance).

two Senators

11. The chief products are sugar, rum, manioc, vanilla, essences.

12. We have no information about any defence facilities there, but port facilities are available.

FRENCH SOMALILAND

13. French Somaliland is an Overseas Territory within the French Republic. The French control foreign exchange relations and defence, but otherwise the country is largely self-governing. The French claim that the majority of inhabitants are satisfied with their present status - there does not appear to be any immediate threat to French rule, in spite of the recent disturbances during President de Gaulle's visit, but his reported statement that the status of the territory could change only in democratic conditions suggests that he would not be opposed to a change in status if the majority of the population expressed a

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desire for it in a democratic consultation.

14. French Somaliland has very little industry and no mineral deposits. There are no viable exports and the economy of the country rests on its transit trade with Ethiopia and the expenditure of the French armed forces.

15. The French Navy maintains a small establishment at Djibouti. The shore base, 80 strong, has a wireless telegraphy station and provides limited repair facilities. Two patrol craft and some small landing craft are permanently stationed at Djibouti, which is also used as a refuelling port by larger naval units on passage to the Indian Ocean.

16. The French military forces stationed in French Somaliland number approximately 3000 and consist of a semi-motorized battalion group of colonial troops, a Foreign Legion infantry unit and a base battalion. The battalion group includes an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron with armoured cars and light tanks, an artillery battery and supporting services. French officers, NCOs and technicians command and serve with these units.

17. There is no air force. There is, however, a small French Air Force detachment of some 350 men with transport and ground-attack aircraft.

18. The impending departure of the British from Aden has spurred the French to speed up certain developments in French Somaliland. The port facilities in Djibouti are being enlarged; roads, schools and hospitals are being built in the interior; Djibouti is experiencing a boom in trade and investment. There is every indication that the French are determined to stay on in spite of a growing liberation movement, and that they will seek to prevent intervention by the United Nations by emphasizing the legal position that French Somaliland is a part of the French Republic. In this they are likely to continue to find a silent partner but a sure ally in Ethiopia (which fears that, in the event of the French departing, the country would be taken over by Somalia and Ethiopia's main access to the sea would be cut off.)

FRANCE/SOUTH ASIA

19. France has had a limited interest in the South Asian area as a whole. Over the last few years, however, it has developed an increasing interest in India,

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and to a lesser extent Pakistan. This has been accentuated by the Gaullist drive to extend French international influence. There is also a cultural link with Afghanistan, where the ruling group has traditionally been French-educated, but in the other South Asian countries - Burma, Ceylon and Nepal - French involvement has remained small.

20. (a) INDIA

There has always been a high degree of interest in India and its problems. In the first instance this was mainly cultural and economic, while France also generally approved of India's policy of non-alignment, in spite of French membership of SEATO. The question of the French establishments in India (Pondicherry etc.) was settled amicably in 1956, and a further agreement in 1963 regulated their transitional status, including the question of the retention of the French language.

From about 1962, France began to take a more active interest in India. In 1962 France became a member of the Aid India Consortium and her annual contributions have since been between \$20-\$40 million. This is not a very large contribution relatively (it is about the same as Canada's), but it has been supplemented by scholarship and training programmes. France has also given some emergency food aid to India over the last two years (although not as much as Australia). There has also been an active and increasing programme of cultural exchanges, and a cultural agreement is at present under consideration. There have been negotiations regarding possible French co-operation in India's nuclear programme; France has the advantage of not being inhibited by the issue of safeguards.

Following the Chinese attack against India in 1962, France showed sympathy with the Indian position and made available a token quantity of military aid. France has since sold military equipment, including helicopters, to India. Machinery has also been established for consultations on trade and economic matters.

In the last two years the process of developing relations has been stepped up through exchanges of visits between French and Indian leaders. In February, 1965, a French Prime Minister (Pompidou) visited India

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(and Pakistan) for the first time, providing the occasion for a declaration of the two countries' mutual regard and their concern for international security, including the desirability of the political solution in Indo-China. France's intention to continue an increased air aid to India was also stated. In March, 1966 Mrs. Gandhi visited France, and again the identity of interests of the two countries, including their attachment to democratic ideals, was stressed. President de Gaulle referred to India as "one of the essential elements of the modern world" while Mrs. Gandhi praised French foreign policy. There have also been a number of other visits by Indian Ministers to France, including particularly the Finance Minister in connection with India's external aid requirements, and arrangements have been made for periodic consultations between officials on matters of mutual interest.

According to French officials, these expanded contacts are part of a French effort to reassert its influence in Asia and to promote a better understanding of French international policies. It would seem that these policies are being presented to India and other countries as a viable alternative to the policies of the United States and its supporters, which in the French view are promoting a dangerously rigid division of the world into two rival blocs. The French probably believe, with some justification, that their policies receive a high degree of approval in India. French influence, however, is not likely to become a dominant factor as long as the value of its aid and the scope of its economic relations remain well below those of other major powers.

21. (b) PAKISTAN

French influence in Pakistan has developed along somewhat similar lines, although it is apparent that the French do not regard Pakistan as having the same importance as India. France is also a member of the Aid Pakistan Consortium, and has given training and developed cultural relations as with India. It has recently agreed to supply Pakistan with up to three submarines.

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France would presumably approve recent trends in Pakistan's foreign policy, e.g. in respect of SEATO and Vietnam. It would also not regard Pakistan relations with Communist China as inimical to Western interests. The French are impressed by President Ayub (who has sometimes been described as the "Asian de Gaulle"), and Ayub is also impressed by the strong leadership of the present French Government. Pakistan appears to have followed the French lead in regard to its association with SEATO, and would probably also like to adopt a similar general international stance, but is inhibited by its dependence on American aid.

22. KASHMIR *French interest in Thailand.*

France has had little difficulty in its Indian and Pakistani contacts in side-stepping the issue of Kashmir, but has, if anything, leaned slightly towards the Pakistan point of view. It has not made any major move to help resolve India/Pakistan problems.

23. (c) CEYLON *discussions and subsequent visit of the*

French interest in Ceylon is not significant. However, France has given some economic aid and is taking a minor role in the current Ceylon Rescue Operation. Mr. Senanayake visited France early this year (the first visit of a Ceylon Prime Minister), but the visit did not receive much attention and his attempts to secure additional French aid were apparently not successful.

24. (d) BURMA *in Malaysia by those two countries. France's*

French interest in Burma is largely commercial. It seems likely that France would generally approve the policies of the Ne Win Government and particularly its efforts to preserve Burma's independence and neutrality. Burma has been considering the purchase of French jet fighters but it is not certain whether this will proceed.

FRANCE/THAILAND

25. France's relations with Thailand are cool and the Thais regard with distrust French aims and policies. This is partly for historical reasons, since from the mid-nineteenth century France resisted Thailand's eastward expansion into what are now the western provinces of Cambodia^{and} was instrumental in defining Cambodia's frontiers to the detriment of Thai claims.

26. Joint membership of SEATO tended to bring Thailand and France a little closer for a short period after 1959, but subsequently it has been in their attitudes to SEATO that their

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diverging approaches to South-East Asian issues have found particular expression. France's recognition of communist China and advocacy of a neutralist solution to the political problems of Indo-China also run contrary to Thai policy, based as it is on containment and isolation of China and a wish to have an anti-communist zone of buffer states on Thai frontiers. Thailand also suspects France's special position in Cambodia. France on the other hand is critical of a continuing United States military presence in South-East Asia which Thailand supports. France has minor commercial interests in Thailand.

FRANCE/MALAYSIA AND FRANCE-SINGAPORE

27. France took a co-operative attitude at the London discussions of the Consultative Group on Aid to Malaysia in May of this year (an attitude which the Malaysians contrasted with that of Britain) and in those discussions and a subsequent visit of the Malaysian Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, to Paris, agreement was reached on a French credit to Malaysia of \$M.100 million. This is likely to be used principally for the purchase of French goods. France and Malaysia are also at present negotiating a technical and cultural co-operation agreement.

28. The French have gained a good deal of goodwill in Malaysia by these two gestures. France's principal interest in Malaysia is commercial.

29. France has shown no particular interest in developing relations with the Singapore Government since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

FRENCH/INDONESIA

30. French/Indonesian relations are mainly commercial. There are no significant political contacts.

31. France has extended no direct aid to Indonesia but the French Government has guaranteed export credits to private French firms. At the moment Indonesia owes France \$112.5 million.

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32. France stopped selling arms to Indonesia after confrontation began. We do not know whether controls are still maintained.

33. There is a very small amount of trade.

34. FRANCE/SOUTH VIETNAM

Diplomatic relations between France and South Vietnam were broken on the initiative of the South Vietnamese on 23rd June, 1965. This development arose mainly from Vietnamese reactions to publicly expressed French attitudes on the Vietnam conflict, exacerbated by the legacy of bitterness towards France among South Vietnamese following the Indo-China experience.

35. While the severance of diplomatic relations inhibits the current development of official relationships between the two countries, a strong undercurrent of sympathy towards French culture and thinking still exists in South Vietnam. French influence in the Vietnamese educational system remains strong, and there are about 350 French teachers and 45 university professors and lecturers in South Vietnam.

36. French economic interests in South Vietnam, e.g. in rubber plantations, have declined greatly in the last 2-3 years.

37. The reluctance of the Vietnamese, despite the diplomatic break, to sever all ties with France, was best exemplified by the official Vietnamese announcement at the time of the break that France's economic and cultural interests would not be affected.

FRANCE/LAOS

38. Relations between France and Laos have cooled in recent years as French policy towards Indo-China has developed and hardened, and as Souvanna has moved towards closer sympathy and support for U.S. aims in South Vietnam. Over this period the influence of the United States in Laos, particularly through their massive civil aid and assistance with regard to North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao activities, has grown. The French have endeavoured overtly and covertly to counteract this influence, through, for example, a continuing also made available large loans and credit guarantees for major development projects including the rail link between

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Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, the Prek Thnot Dam attempt to dominate the Laotian information media and occasional overtures to Kong Le, and their own civil aid effort and development of education.

39. Culturally, France and Laos remain very close. The French have great influence over the Laotian educational system, and in 1965 alone sent 250 teachers to Laos, mainly for secondary schools. The curricula of Laotian secondary schools accords completely with the French system, and the cultural agreement between the two countries stipulates that all secondary instruction must be primarily in French.

40. There are 150 French service personnel in Laos in the French Military mission. However, the Laotian Government has rejected French offers of military training.

FRANCE/CAMBODIA

41. France's relations with Cambodia are close and friendly, reflecting a relatively harmonious colonial association, and in recent years a broad measure of agreement on major international issues, especially those concerning Indo China.

42. In particular, France has consistently supported Cambodian efforts to obtain guarantees of its neutrality and territorial integrity and has a similar attitude to the South Vietnam conflict. The current visit of de Gaulle to Cambodia is a symbol of the close relationship between the two countries.

43. France has given Cambodia substantial civil and military aid and has important commercial interests there. Closely following the repudiation of U.S. aid, the Messmer Mission to Phnom Penh in January, 1964 marked a sharp increase in French aid, reported to be a trebling of the former level which ran at about \$US.6 million per annum. A squadron of tanks, 100 trucks, training and reconnaissance aircraft and training facilities, both military and civil, were important items offered by the French.

44. In February, 1966 a further aid agreement covering 50 jeeps and 50 trucks was signed. France has also made available large loans and credit guarantees for major development projects including the rail link between

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Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, the Prek Thnot Dam and the Port of Sihanoukville. It has also made a valuable contribution to the establishment of colleges and the broad development of education.

FRENCH TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC

45. Separate papers have been prepared for you on matters relating to the Pacific territories should you wish to discuss this with M. Couve de Murville.

FRANCE/SEATO

46. France's role in SEATO activities has always been a minor one. They have taken part in most activities but without being at all active. With the increasing involvement of Treaty signatories in Vietnam France has avoided participation in SEATO's political activities.

47. At the Ninth Meeting, at Manila, in April, 1964, the French Delegation was unable to associate itself with the Communique because of political differences. On 2nd April, 1965, one month before the Tenth Council Meeting, M. Couve de Murville told our Ambassador that he would probably not be attending himself "our differences are so great and feelings of antagonism so high that it would be better not to envenom the situation further". On April 16, the French Ambassador in Bangkok informed the Secretary-General that France would not send a delegation to the London meeting and would be represented only by an observer. This practice was followed at the Eleventh Meeting, held in Canberra 27-29 June, 1966.

48. The French have continued to attend the weekly Permanent Working Group and monthly Council Representatives meetings in Bangkok and to participate in most expert study groups and seminars. (Members do not attend these meetings on any regular basis). In regard to the Intelligence Assessment Committee, France participated up to and including the Fourth Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting (February 17-19, 1965) but not in the Fifth Meeting (18-20 August, 1965) or the Sixth and Seventh Meetings.

49. French participation in the Secretariat has continued at the same level.

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50. There are three Frenchmen on the Secretariat (Australia has four) and France contributes on a regular basis to the budget.

51. France no longer participates fully in SEATO military exercises, although they send military observers to some of these.

52. (Thailand, supported to some extent by the Philippines, has suggested the exclusion of France and Pakistan from the Organization. Thailand would prefer SEATO to become a closer group concentrating on Thailand's problems and Indo-China).

FRENCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ASIA

53. France's trade with the region is small in relation to France's total trade - exports to non-Communist Asia (including Australia and New Zealand but excluding other Oceania) amounted to about US.\$300 million in 1965 (about 3 per cent of total exports) while imports from the region totalled about \$453 million (approximately 4.5 per cent of total imports). Moreover, trade with the area has failed to keep pace with the overall growth in French trade in recent years - in particular, French imports from the Asian region as a whole have shown virtually no increase over the last six years.

54. France's main export markets in the region are India, Japan and Australia; the main suppliers are Australia (by far the most important), Japan, Malaysia and India. South Vietnam was formerly one of France's more important trading partners in the area but the total value of trade has fallen sharply over the last six years to less than half its previous level.

55. France has a favourable balance of trade with French Oceania but exports to their territories account for less than 1 per cent of total exports.

56. French aid is largely concentrated in the franc area - principally in Africa. The only countries in the Asian region which receive aid in the form of grants or official long term loans are Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. Total disbursements to these countries amounted to U.S.\$9.2 million in 1963, \$16.8 million in 1964 and \$16.0 million in 1965. Over half of this aid

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is for technical assistance.

57. Assistance to other countries is in the form of government guarantees for private export credits - the main beneficiaries being India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Korea. France is a member of the I.B.R.D. Consortia for India and Pakistan. (Credits to India and Pakistan consist mainly of guaranteed extended medium term credits with subsidised interest financed by the budget).

58. Aid to French Oceania amounted to U.S.\$27.0 million (disbursements) in 1965. Of this \$18.2 million was in the form of grants and \$8.8 million in official loans.

FRANCE/ECAFE

59. France is a foundation member of ECAFE and one of the five members "from outside the region". Although its role has not been as significant as that of the U.S.A. or Britain, France has participated actively in ECAFE in the sense that she has consistently sent representatives to a wide range of ECAFE meetings. France, to some extent, has used ECAFE to fashion a new relationship with the region, including a commercial stake, following the loss of her Asian colonies. In this connection the interest of France in the Mekong project should be noted. France has contributed some \$2.8 million to the Mekong Development Scheme and associated projects. However, France has not pledged any financial contribution to the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning (the only two non-regional members participating are the Netherlands and U.S.A.). However, France made available an expert (on national accounting) for the Institute's training programme in 1964/65 and has agreed to provide another expert for the programme. So far as ECAFE is concerned, we might express our pleasure that France is continuing to play an active part in the work of the organization. France is a country with the type of background of knowledge and expertise that could be very useful to the region.

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FRANCE/ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

60. France has not so far indicated any interest in becoming a party to the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank. (The Bank's articles provide for membership by non-regional countries and the following have pledged subscriptions to the Bank: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal German Republic, Finland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Britain and the United States.) Switzerland has offered to subscribe \$US.5 million to the Bank but as it did so after the deadline dates for signature on 31st January, 1966 it cannot become a member until after the Bank comes into existence in October, 1966.

61. The Australian Government has made representations about Bank membership to the French on two occasions but without success. The French who have not become parties to the African or Latin American Development Banks have indicated that they do not at this stage intend to participate in the Asian Development Bank.

62. A final decision will not be taken however until after the Bank has been definitely established.

63. Membership of the Asian Development Bank would involve France in regional economic and financial matters, and would help to stimulate and keep alive France's interest and presence in the region.

64. We might usefully continue to express to France our hope that she will become a member. In making such representations we could emphasise :-

- (i) the Asian character of the Bank;
- (ii) the need for funds outside the region to be attracted to the region and the fact that other European countries have joined; and
- (iii) the important contribution which France could make to the Bank in the context of France's financial and economic experience, and her historical association

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with the region.

65. French membership of the Bank in the foreseeable future is however unlikely, especially in view of her belief that the Bank is an American creation.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN F.E.O.F. (LAOS)

66. French participation in F.E.O.F. has been of very little value in the long-term to the Laotian economy. This is because the French have been using the local currency generated by their contribution to F.E.O.F. to pay much of the cost of the French presence in Laos. In effect they have been profiting from their membership of the Fund in that this enables them to obtain kip at half the normal price. The benefits of French participation are two-fold:

- (i) the funds generated by the French contribution are not used immediately and thus there is some time lag in the subsequent generation of financial pressure; and
- (ii) the Americans agreed to match the contributions of other donors, including the French.

67. France has so far contributed \$1.3 million (U.S.) to the Fund this year. It seems likely that the French contribution for the whole year will rise to about \$1.7 million - equalling their withdrawal use of Laotian currency.

68. Sisouk has asked the French to contribute an additional \$1 million this year (thus bringing their total 1966 contribution up to approximately \$2.7 million). There is less optimism now, than there was a week ago, on this score.

FRANCE AND THE ANTARCTIC

69. Australia has an important link with France through the fact that both have claims to Antarctic territory and each has recognized the claims of the other. (Only Britain, New Zealand and Norway certainly recognize these claims.) Our approach on a number of significant issues affecting Antarctica should therefore broadly be similar and our mutual interests will no doubt best be

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served by working closely together on such issues. Co-operation with France may be of particular importance now that Britain has decided that the concept of territorial claims in the Antarctic ought to be abandoned. Moreover, Norway, also a claimant, has suspended all its Antarctic activities.

70. The main French Antarctic base is at Kerguelen Island, in the Southern Indian Ocean. It is not excluded that Kerguelen may in the future attain some strategic importance.

71. Australia is also, as matters stand at present, dependent for a large extent for carrying out its Antarctic programme upon French goodwill and co-operation, in that we sub-charter from the French expedition our second ship, the "Thala Dan". If this ship were not available to us, we should be unable to carry out important elements of our programme. The possibility of future co-operation with France at the expedition level also exists in connection with the use of the newly developed Breguet S.T.O.L. aircraft to and from the French station at Dumont d'Urville. If French use of the Breguet in the Antarctic is successful, it might well be that Australia will wish to use similar aircraft for its Antarctic expedition and that through both using the same type of aircraft opportunities for mutual co-operation might well increase. Already the French have made some very tentative and so far undefined suggestions that we may be able to work together on air operations.

72. We have in mind the possibility of conducting some informal discussions with the French later this year to ascertain their views on current developments on Antarctica and to sound them out on the claims issue with a view to confirming our assumption that, if the Antarctic Treaty were to break down, the French would not wish to give up their claim.

73. You may wish to mention to M. Couve de Murville, should the opportunity occur, our mutual interest in Antarctica and express the hope that we might maintain and develop further our contacts on Antarctic matters.

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FRENCH INTERESTS EAST OF SUEZ

THE MINISTER

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3. Similar considerations apply, in varying degrees, to Australian strategic interests in the Pacific Ocean area.

Attached are notes which may be useful to you when you see M. Couve de Murville. For convenience the region in this case has been defined to include French Somaliland, the Malagasy Republic and the Comoro Archipelago, the Indian Ocean and the states on its northern littoral, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Indochina and the French Pacific territories.

American establishment which may be set up in the Indian Ocean. Australia's main strategic interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean stem from:-

1. Prospects for a more active French role in the region. 1. Military sea and air communications, cultural aid and major trade routes, together with facilities required to support these. in multilateral aid projects.)

2. Access to strategic materials, particularly oil.

3. The maintenance of the political climate to enable the continuance and development of allied military facilities. Assistant Secretary

4. The denial of military facilities and reinforcement routes to potential enemies. Division IV

Europe Sec 5. Preserving and developing United States and United Kingdom interests. B.W.Woodberry

3. There is no discernible pattern (except perhaps a vague paternalism towards the French possessions) in present French attitudes and policies towards countries in the region. For example, unlike Britain, the French have neither a significant military presence nor large economic interests there. All French territories are constitutionally linked with metropolitan France.

4. Despite the enormous expanse of the Indian Ocean area, there are relatively few places within it which have the potential for development of port facilities or air fields and considerable advantage accrues merely from access rights to existing ports and harbours. Given the considerable strategic significance of the area for Australia, it is important that such facilities as are in French hands should so remain. Furthermore, in the case of the French territories, there may be more security of tenure in the long term than elsewhere (compare Réunion with Mauritius, for example). The denial factor of the continued French presence is thus significant.

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Since the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connections with France which retains dominant influence there. These connections relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable.

5. Similar considerations apply, in varying degrees, to Australian strategic interests in the Pacific Ocean area.

6. A significantly increased direct French contribution to defence of the region appears to be excluded, on political grounds, in the immediately foreseeable future. But French cooperation could be useful in influencing the francophone African states, particularly Malagasy, in support of any Anglo-American establishment which may be set up in the Indian Ocean.

7. Prospects for a more active French role in the region appear to lie rather in the economic and cultural aid fields than in defence. (The French have generally shown more interest in bilateral than in multilateral aid projects.)

usually stationed there. There are frequent visits by other units of the French Fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a graving dock.

3. The Malagasy army (A.P. Renouf) consists of 4000 men, including infantry, artillery, engineers and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Defence Zone No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French B.W. Woodberry/wad both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

4. Malagasy has a small air force of six transport aircraft and one helicopter. Elements of the French Air Force are also based there.

COMORE ARCHIPELAGO

5. The Comore Archipelago, which lies about 200 miles west of the northern tip of Malagasy, occupies the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel (between Malagasy and the mainland). The French have been established there since 1943, and since 1962 the islands have formed an Overseas Territory of the French Republic.

6. The territory is governed under a French Commissioner by a Council of Ministers responsible to a

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FRANCE/MALAGASY

Although the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connexions with France which retains dominant influence there. These connexions relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable. A considerable number of senior government officials, senior officers in the army, gendarmerie and police, and virtually all secondary school and university teachers are French. Nearly 70% of the country's trade is with the franc zone. The population of 5.6 million includes 50,000 French citizens.

2. The small Malagasy navy comprises a coastal minesweeper, a small patrol vessel, and five coastguard patrol craft. It works in close co-operation with the French navy, which has its Indian Ocean headquarters at Diego Suarez. A French frigate and a surveying ship are usually stationed there. There are frequent visits by other units of the French fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a graving dock.

3. The Malagasy army is being built up to 4000 men, including infantry, artillery, armour, engineers and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Defence Zone No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

4. Malagasy has a small air force of six transport aircraft and one helicopter. Elements of the French Air Force are also based there.

COMORO ARCHIPELAGO

5. The Comoro Archipelago, which lies about 200 miles west of the northern tip of Malagasy, commands the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel (between Malagasy and the mainland). The French have been established there since 1943, and since 1961 the islands have formed an Overseas Territory of the French Republic.

6. The territory is governed under a French High Commissioner by a Council of Ministers responsible to a

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local Chamber of Deputies. It is represented in the National Assembly by 2 deputies and in the Senate by 1 senator. An Arab minority forms an aristocracy which provides most of the administrators and political leaders.

7. The economy of the Comoro Islands is mainly agricultural, producing rice, manioc and bananas for domestic consumption and vanilla, essences and perfumes, copra and sisal for export. The only industries are preparation of sisal for export and distillation of essences.

8. There are no ports of any significance, though small lighters and launches can use various landing places.

9. Responsibility for defence rests with France, but we have no information about defence installations, if any.

REUNION

10. Réunion, an island 420 miles east of Malagasy and some 180 miles south-west of Mauritius, is an Overseas Department of the French Republic. It has belonged to France since 1642. It is administered by a Prefect, and an elected general council of 36 members. It has three representatives in the French National Assembly ^{and} (one of whom is M. Michel Debré, the French Minister for Economy and Finance).

two Senators

11. The chief products are sugar, rum, manioc, vanilla, essences.

12. We have no information about any defence facilities there, but port facilities are available.

FRENCH SOMALILAND

13. French Somaliland is an Overseas Territory within the French Republic. The French control foreign exchange relations and defence, but otherwise the country is largely self-governing. The French claim that the majority of inhabitants are satisfied with their present status - there does not appear to be any immediate threat to French rule, in spite of the recent disturbances during President de Gaulle's visit, but his reported statement that the status of the territory could change only in democratic conditions suggests that he would not be opposed to a change in status if the majority of the population expressed a

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desire for it in a democratic consultation.

14. French Somaliland has very little industry and no mineral deposits. There are no viable exports and the economy of the country rests on its transit trade with Ethiopia and the expenditure of the French armed forces.

15. The French Navy maintains a small establishment at Djibouti. The shore base, 80 strong, has a wireless telegraphy station and provides limited repair facilities. Two patrol craft and some small landing craft are permanently stationed at Djibouti, which is also used as a refuelling port by larger naval units on passage to the Indian Ocean.

16. The French military forces stationed in French Somaliland number approximately 3000 and consist of a semi-motorized battalion group of colonial troops, a Foreign Legion infantry unit and a base battalion. The battalion group includes an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron with armoured cars and light tanks, an artillery battery and supporting services. French officers, NCOs and technicians command and serve with these units.

17. There is no air force. There is, however, a small French Air Force detachment of some 350 men with transport and ground-attack aircraft.

18. The impending departure of the British from Aden has spurred the French to speed up certain developments in French Somaliland. The port facilities in Djibouti are being enlarged; roads, schools and hospitals are being built in the interior; Djibouti is experiencing a boom in trade and investment. There is every indication that the French are determined to stay on in spite of a growing liberation movement, and that they will seek to prevent intervention by the United Nations by emphasizing the legal position that French Somaliland is a part of the French Republic. In this they are likely to continue to find a silent partner but a sure ally in Ethiopia (which fears that, in the event of the French departing, the country would be taken over by Somalia and Ethiopia's main access to the sea would be cut off.)

FRANCE/SOUTH ASIA

19. France has had a limited interest in the South Asian area as a whole. Over the last few years, however, it has developed an increasing interest in India,

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and to a lesser extent Pakistan. This has been accentuated by the Gaullist drive to extend French international influence. There is also a cultural link with Afghanistan, where the ruling group has traditionally been French-educated, but in the other South Asian countries - Burma, Ceylon and Nepal - French involvement has remained small.

20. (a) INDIA

There has always been a high degree of interest in India and its problems. In the first instance this was mainly cultural and economic, while France also generally approved of India's policy of non-alignment, (in spite of French membership of SEATO). The question of the French establishments in India (Pondicherry etc.) was settled amicably in 1956, and a further agreement in 1963 regulated their transitional status, including the question of the retention of the French language.

From about 1962, France began to take a more active interest in India. In 1962 France became a member of the Aid India Consortium and her annual contributions have since been between \$20-\$40 million. This is not a very large contribution relatively (it is about the same as Canada's), but it has been supplemented by scholarship and training programmes. France has also given some emergency food aid to India over the last two years (although not as much as Australia). There has also been an active and increasing programme of cultural exchanges, and a cultural agreement is at present under consideration. There have been negotiations regarding possible French co-operation in India's nuclear programme; France has the advantage of not being inhibited by the issue of safeguards.

Following the Chinese attack against India in 1962 France showed sympathy with the Indian position and made available a token quantity of military aid. France has since sold military equipment, including helicopters, to India. Machinery has also been established for consultations on trade and economic matters.

In the last two years the process of developing relations has been stepped up through exchanges of visits between French and Indian leaders. In February, 1965, a French Prime Minister (Pompidou) visited India

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(and Pakistan) for the first time, providing the occasion for a declaration of the two countries' mutual regard and their concern for international security, including the desirability of the political solution in Indo-China. France's intention to continue an increased air aid to India was also stated. In March, 1966 Mrs. Gandhi visited France, and again the identity of interests of the two countries, including their attachment to democratic ideals, was stressed. President de Gaulle referred to India as "one of the essential elements of the modern world" while Mrs. Gandhi praised French foreign policy. There have also been a number of other visits by Indian Ministers to France, including particularly the Finance Minister in connection with India's external aid requirements, and arrangements have been made for periodic consultations between officials on matters of mutual interest.

According to French officials these expanded contacts are part of a French effort to reassert its influence in Asia and to promote a better understanding of French international policies. It would seem that these policies are being presented to India and other countries as a viable alternative to the policies of the United States and its supporters, which in the French view are promoting a dangerously rigid division of the world into two rival blocs. The French probably believe, with some justification, that their policies receive a high degree of approval in India. French influence, however, is not likely to become a dominant factor as long as the value of its aid and the scope of its economic relations remain well below those of other major powers.

21. (b) PAKISTAN

French influence in Pakistan has developed along somewhat similar lines, although it is apparent that the French do not regard Pakistan as having the same importance as India. France is also a member of the Aid Pakistan Consortium, and has given training and developed cultural relations as with India. It has recently agreed to supply Pakistan with up to three submarines.

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France would presumably approve recent trends in Pakistan's foreign policy, e.g. in respect of SEATO and Vietnam. It would also not regard Pakistan relations with Communist China as inimical to Western interests. The French are impressed by President Ayub (who has sometimes been described as the "Asian de Gaulle"), and Ayub is also impressed by the strong leadership of the present French Government. Pakistan appears to have followed the French lead in regard to its association with SEATO, and would probably also like to adopt a similar general international stance, but is inhibited by its dependence on American aid.

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French interest in Ceylon is not significant. However, France has given some economic aid and is taking a minor role in the current Ceylon Rescue Operation. Mr. Senanayake visited France early this year (the first visit of a Ceylon Prime Minister), but the visit did not receive much attention and his attempts to secure additional French aid were apparently not successful.

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FRANCE/THAILAND

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diverging approaches to South-East Asian issues have found particular expression. France's recognition of communist China and advocacy of a neutralist solution to the political problems of Indo-China also run contrary to Thai policy, based as it is on containment and isolation of China and a wish to have an anti-communist zone of buffer states on Thai frontiers. Thailand also suspects France's special position in Cambodia. France on the other hand is critical of a continuing United States military presence in South-East Asia which Thailand supports. France has minor commercial interests in Thailand.

FRANCE/MALAYSIA AND FRANCE-SINGAPORE

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28. The French have gained a good deal of goodwill in Malaysia by these two gestures. France's principal interest in Malaysia is commercial.

29. France has shown no particular interest in developing relations with the Singapore Government since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

FRENCH/INDONESIA

30. French/Indonesian relations are mainly commercial. There are no significant political contacts.

31. France has extended no direct aid to Indonesia but the French Government has guaranteed export credits to private French firms. At the moment Indonesia owes France \$112.5 million.

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32. France stopped selling arms to Indonesia after confrontation began. We do not know whether controls are still maintained.

33. There is a very small amount of trade.

FRANCE/SOUTH VIETNAM

34. Diplomatic relations between France and South Vietnam were broken on the initiative of the South Vietnamese on 23rd June, 1965. This development arose mainly from Vietnamese reactions to publicly expressed French attitudes on the Vietnam conflict, exacerbated by the legacy of bitterness towards France among South Vietnamese following the Indo-China experience.

35. While the severance of diplomatic relations inhibits the current development of official relationships between the two countries, a strong undercurrent of sympathy towards French culture and thinking still exists in South Vietnam. French influence in the Vietnamese educational system remains strong, and there are about 350 French teachers and 45 university professors and lecturers in South Vietnam.

36. French economic interests in South Vietnam, e.g. in rubber plantations have declined greatly in the last 2-3 years.

37. The reluctance of the Vietnamese, despite the diplomatic break, to sever all ties with France, was best exemplified by the official Vietnamese announcement at the time of the break that France's economic and cultural interests would not be affected.

FRANCE/LAOS

38. Relations between France and Laos have cooled in recent years as French policy towards Indo-China has developed and hardened, and as Souvanna has moved towards closer sympathy and support for U.S. aims in South Vietnam. Over this period the influence of the United States in Laos, particularly through their massive civil aid and assistance with regard to North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao activities has grown. The French have endeavoured overtly and covertly to counteract this influence, through for example a continuing

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attempt to dominate the Laotian information media and occasional overtures to Kong Le, and their own civil aid effort.

39. Culturally, France and Laos remain very close. The French have great influence over the Laotian educational system, and in 1965 alone sent 250 teachers to Laos, mainly for secondary schools. The curricula of Laotian secondary schools accords completely with the French system, and the cultural agreement between the two countries stipulates that all secondary instruction must be primarily in French.

40. There are 150 French service personnel in Laos in the French Military mission. However, the Laotian government has rejected French offers of military training.

FRANCE/CAMBODIA

41. France's relations with Cambodia are close and friendly, reflecting a relatively harmonious colonial association, and in recent years a broad measure of agreement on major international issues, especially those concerning Indo China.

42. In particular France has consistently supported Cambodian efforts to obtain guarantees of its neutrality and territorial integrity and has a similar attitude to the South Vietnam conflict. The current visit of de Gaulle to Cambodia is a symbol of the close relationship between the two countries.

43. France has given Cambodia substantial civil and military aid and has important commercial interests there. Closely following the repudiation of U.S. aid, the Messmer Mission to Phnom Penh in January 1964 marked a sharp increase in French aid, reported to be a trebling of the former level which ran at about \$US.6 million per annum. A squadron of tanks, 100 trucks, training and reconnaissance aircraft and training facilities, both military and civil, were important items offered by the French.

44. In February 1966 a further aid agreement covering 50 jeeps and 50 trucks was signed. France has also made available large loans and credit guarantees for major development projects including the rail link between

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Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, the Prek Thnot Dam and the Port of Sihanoukville. It has also made a valuable contribution to the establishment of colleges and the broad development of education.

FRENCH TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC

45. Separate papers have been prepared for you on matters relating to the Pacific territories should you wish to discuss this with M. Couve de Murville.

FRANCE/SEATO

46. France's role in SEATO activities has always been a minor one. They have taken part in most activities but without being at all active. With the increasing involvement of Treaty signatories in Vietnam France has avoided participation in SEATO's political activities.

47. At the Ninth Meeting, at Manila, in April, 1964, the French Delegation was unable to associate itself with the Communiqué because of political differences. On 2nd April, 1965, one month before the Tenth Council Meeting, M. Couve de Murville told our Ambassador that he would probably not be attending himself "our differences are so great and feelings of antagonism so high that it would be better not to envenom the situation further". On April 16, the French Ambassador in Bangkok informed the Secretary-General that France would not send a delegation to the London meeting and would be represented only by an observer. This practice was followed at the Eleventh Meeting, held in Canberra 27-29 June, 1966.

48. The French have continued to attend the weekly Permanent Working Group and monthly Council Representatives meetings in Bangkok and to participate in most expert study groups and seminars. (Members do not attend these meetings on any regular basis). In regard to the Intelligence Assessment Committee, France participated up to and including the Fourth Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting (February 17-19, 1965) but not in the Fifth Meeting (18-20 August, 1965) or the Sixth and Seventh Meetings.

49. French participation in the Secretariat has continued at the same level.

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50. There are three Frenchmen on the Secretariat (Australia has four) and France contributes on a regular basis to the budget.

51. France no longer participates fully in SEATO military exercises, although they send military observers to some of these.

52. (Thailand, supported to some extent by the Philippines, has suggested the exclusion of France and Pakistan from the Organization. Thailand would prefer SEATO to become a closer group concentrating on Thailand's problems and Indo-China).

FRENCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ASIA

53. France's trade with the region is small in relation to France's total trade - exports to non-Communist Asia (including Australia and New Zealand but excluding other Oceania) amounted to about US.\$300 million in 1965 (about 3 per cent of total exports) while imports from the region totalled about \$453 million (approximately 4.5 per cent of total imports). Moreover, trade with the area has failed to keep pace with the overall growth in French trade in recent years - in particular, French imports from the Asian region as a whole have shown virtually no increase over the last six years.

54. France's main export markets in the region are India, Japan and Australia; the main suppliers are Australia (by far the most important), Japan, Malaysia and India. South Vietnam was formerly one of France's more important trading partners in the area but the total value of trade has fallen sharply over the last six years to less than half its previous level.

55. France has a favourable balance of trade with French Oceania but exports to their territories account for less than 1 per cent of total exports.

56. French aid is largely concentrated in the franc area - principally in Africa. The only countries in the Asian region which receive aid in the form of grants or official long term loans are Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. Total disbursements to these countries amounted to U.S.\$9.2 million in 1963, \$16.8 million in 1964 and \$16.0 million in 1965. Over half of this aid

is for technical assistance.

57. Assistance to other countries is in the form of government guarantees for private export credits - the main beneficiaries being India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Korea. France is a member of the I.B.R.D. Consortia for India and Pakistan. (Credits to India and Pakistan consist mainly of guaranteed extended medium term credits with subsidised interest financed by the budget).

58. Aid to French Oceania amounted to U.S.\$27.0 million (disbursements) in 1965. Of this \$18.2 million was in the form of grants and \$8.8 million in official loans.

FRANCE/ECAFE

59. France is a foundation member of ECAFE and one of the five members "from outside the region". Although its role has not been as significant as that of the U.S.A. or Britain, France has participated actively in ECAFE in the sense that she has consistently sent representatives to a wide range of ECAFE meetings. France, to some extent has used ECAFE to fashion a new relationship with the region, including a commercial stake, following the loss of her Asian colonies. In this connection the interest of France in the Mekong project should be noted. France has contributed some \$2.8 million to the Mekong Development Scheme and associated projects. However, France has not pledged any financial contribution to the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning (the only two non-regional members participating are the Netherlands and U.S.A). However France made available an expert (on national accounting) for the Institute's training programme in 1964/65 and has agreed to provide another expert for the programme. So far as ECAFE is concerned we might express our pleasure that France is continuing to play an active part in the work of the organization. France is a country with the type of background of knowledge and expertise that could be very useful to the region.

FRANCE/ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

60. France has not so far indicated any interest in becoming a party to the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank. (The Bank's articles provide for membership by non-regional countries and the following have pledged subscriptions to the Bank: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal German Republic, Finland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Britain and the United States.) Switzerland has offered to subscribe \$US.5 million to the Bank but as it did so after the deadline dates for signature on 31st January, 1966 it cannot become a member until after the Bank comes into existence in October, 1966.

61. The Australian Government has made representations about Bank membership to the Bank on two occasions but without success. The French who have not become parties to the African or Latin American Development Banks have indicated that they do not at this stage intend to participate in the Asian Development Bank.

62. A final decision would not be taken however until after the Bank was definitely established.

63. Membership of the Asian Development Bank would involve France in regional economic and financial matters, and would help to stimulate and keep alive France's interest and presence in the region.

64. We might usefully continue to express to France our hope that she will become a member. In making such representation we could emphasise :-

- (i) the Asian character of the Bank;
- (ii) the need for funds outside the region to be attracted to the region and the fact that other European countries have joined and;
- (iii) the important contribution which France could make to the Bank in the context of France's financial and economic experience, and her historical association

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with the region.

65. French membership of the Bank in the foreseeable future is however unlikely, especially in view of her belief that the Bank is an American creation.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN F.E.O.F. (LAOS)

66. French participation in F.E.O.F. has been of very little value in the long-term to the Laotian economy. This is because the French have been using the local currency generated by their contribution to F.E.O.F. to pay much of the cost of the French presence in Laos. In effect they have been profiting from their membership of the Fund in that this enables them to obtain kit at half the normal price. The benefits of French participation are two fold:

- (i) the funds generated by the French contribution are not used immediately and thus there is some time lag in the subsequent generation of financial pressure and
- (ii) the Americans agreed to match the contributions of other donors, including the French.

67. France has so far contributed \$1.3 million (U.S.) to the Fund this year. It seems likely that the French contribution for the whole year will rise to about \$1.7 million - equalling their withdrawal use of Laotian currency.

68. Sisouk has asked the French to contribute an additional \$1 million this year (thus bringing their total 1966 contribution up to approximately \$2.7 million). There is less optimism now, than there was a week ago, on this score.

FRANCE AND THE ANTARCTIC

69. Australia has an important link with France through the fact that both have claims to Antarctic territory and each has recognized the claim of the other. Only Britain, New Zealand and Norway certainly recognize these claims. Our approach on a number of significant issues affecting Antarctica should therefore broadly be similar and our mutual interests will no doubt best be

served by working closely together on such issues. Co-operation with France may be of particular importance now that Britain has decided that the concept of territorial claims in the Antarctic ought to be abandoned. Moreover, Norway, also a claimant, has suspended all its Antarctic activities.

70. The main French Antarctic base is at Kerguelen Island, in the Southern Indian Ocean. It is not excluded that Kerguelen may in the future attain some strategic importance.

71. Australia is also, as matters stand at present, dependent for a large extent for carrying out its Antarctic programme upon French goodwill and co-operation, in that we sub-charter from the French expedition our second ship, the "Thala Dan". If this ship were not available to us we should be unable to carry out important elements of our programme. The possibility of future co-operation with France at the expedition level also exists in connection with the use of the newly developed Breguet S.T.O.L. aircraft to and from the French station at Dumont d'Urville. If French use of the Breguet in the Antarctic is successful it might well be that Australia will wish to use similar aircraft for its Antarctic expedition and that through both using the same type of aircraft opportunities for mutual co-operation might well increase. Already the French have made some very tentative and so far undefined suggestions that we may be able to work together on air operations.

72. We have in mind the possibility of conducting some informal discussions with the French later this year to ascertain their views on current developments on Antarctica and to sound them out on the claims issue with a view to confirming our assumption that, if the Antarctic Treaty were to break down, the French would not wish to give up their claim.

73. You may wish to mention to M. Couve de Murville, should the opportunity occur, our mutual interest in Antarctica and express the hope that we might maintain and develop further our contacts on Antarctic matters.

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FRENCH INTERESTS EAST OF SUEZ

THE MINISTER
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5. Similar considerations apply, in varying degree, to Australian strategic interests in the Pacific. Attached are notes which may be useful to you when you see M. Couve de Murville. For convenience the region in this case has been defined to include French Somaliland, the Malagasy Republic and the Comoro Archipelago, the Indian Ocean and the states on its northern littoral, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Indochina and the French Pacific territories.

2. Australia's main strategic interests in Africa and the Indian Ocean stem from:-

1. Military sea and air communications and major trade routes, together with facilities required to support these.
2. Access to strategic materials, particularly oil.
3. The maintenance of the political climate to enable the continuance and development of allied military facilities.
4. The denial of military facilities and reinforcement routes to potential enemies.
5. Preserving and developing United States and United Kingdom interests.

3. There is no discernible pattern (except perhaps a vague paternalism towards the French possessions) in present French attitudes and policies towards countries in the region. For example, unlike Britain, the French have neither a significant military presence nor large economic interests there. All French territories are constitutionally linked with metropolitan France.

4. Despite the enormous expanse of the Indian Ocean area, there are relatively few places within it which have the potential for development of port facilities or air fields and considerable advantage accrues merely from access rights to existing ports and harbours. Given the considerable strategic significance of the area for Australia, it is important that such facilities as are in French hands should so remain. Furthermore, in the case of the French territories, there may be more security of tenure in the long term than elsewhere (compare Réunion with Mauritius, for example). The denial factor of the continued French presence is thus significant.

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FRANCE/MALAGASY

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Although the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connections with France which retains dominant influence there. These connections relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable.

5. Similar considerations apply, in varying degrees, to Australian strategic interests in the Indian Pacific Ocean area. But French cooperation could be useful in influencing the francophone African states, particularly Malagasy, in support of any Anglo-American establishment which may be set up in the

6. A significantly increased direct French contribution to defence of the region appears to be excluded, on political grounds, in the immediately foreseeable future. But French cooperation could be useful in influencing the francophone African states, particularly Malagasy, in support of any Anglo-American establishment which may be set up in the Indian Ocean.

7. Prospects for a more active French role in the region appear to lie rather in the economic and cultural aid fields than in defence. (The French have generally shown more interest in bilateral than in multilateral aid projects.) A surveying ship are usually stationed there. There are frequent visits by other units of the French Fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a graving dock.

(A.P. Renouf)

3. The Malagasy First Assistant Secretary to 4000
Division IV
men, including infantry, artillery, armour, engineers and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Europe Section No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

4. Malagasy has a small air force of six transport aircraft and one helicopter. Elements of the French Air Force are also based there.

COMORO ARCHIPELAGO

5. The Comoro Archipelago, which lies about 200 miles west of the northern tip of Malagasy, commands the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel (between Malagasy and the mainland). The French have been established there since 1943, and since 1961 the islands have formed an Overseas Territory of the French Republic.

6. The territory is governed under a French High Commissioner by a Council of Ministers responsible to a

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FRANCE/MALAGASY

Although the Malagasy Republic became independent in 1960, it has traditionally close connexions with France which retains dominant influence there. These connexions relate to defence and monetary, judicial and education affairs. French aid is considerable. A considerable number of senior government officials, senior officers in the army, gendarmerie and police, and virtually all secondary school and university teachers are French. Nearly 70% of the country's trade is with the franc zone. The population of 5.6 million includes 50,000 French citizens.

2. The small Malagasy navy comprises a coastal minesweeper, a small patrol vessel, and five coastguard patrol craft. It works in close co-operation with the French navy, which has its Indian Ocean headquarters at Diego Suarez. A French frigate and a surveying ship are usually stationed there. There are frequent visits by other units of the French fleet. The French base facilities at Diego Suarez include a graving dock.

3. The Malagasy army is being built up to 4000 men, including infantry, artillery, armour, engineers and signals. France also has a defence agreement with Malagasy and supplies a military aid mission. The French Overseas Defence Zone No. 3, which covers Malagasy and French possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has its headquarters at Tananarive. There are some French troops stationed in Malagasy.

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local Chamber of Deputies. It is represented in the National Assembly by 2 deputies and in the Senate by 1 senator. An Arab minority forms an aristocracy which provides most of the administrators and political leaders.

7. The economy of the Comoro Islands is mainly agricultural, producing rice, manioc and bananas for domestic consumption and vanilla, essences and perfumes, copra and sisal for export. The only industries are preparation of sisal for export and distillation of essences.

8. There are no ports of any significance, though small lighters and launches can use various landing places.

9. Responsibility for defence rests with France, but we have no information about defence installations, if any.

REUNION

10. Réunion, an island 420 miles east of Madagascar and some 180 miles south-west of Mauritius, is an Overseas Department of the French Republic. It has belonged to France since 1642. It is administered by a Prefect, and an elected general council of 36 members. It has three representatives in the French National Assembly^{and} (one of whom is M. Michel Debré, the French Minister for Economy and Finance).

two Senators

11. The chief products are sugar, rum, manioc, vanilla, essences.

12. We have no information about any defence facilities there, but port facilities are available.

FRENCH SOMALILAND

13. French Somaliland is an Overseas Territory within the French Republic. The French control foreign exchange relations and defence, but otherwise the country is largely self-governing. The French claim that the majority of inhabitants are satisfied with their present status - there does not appear to be any immediate threat to French rule, in spite of the recent disturbances during President de Gaulle's visit, but his reported statement that the status of the territory could change only in democratic conditions suggests that he would not be opposed to a change in status if the majority of the population expressed a

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desire for it in a democratic consultation.

14. French Somaliland has very little industry and no mineral deposits. There are no viable exports and the economy of the country rests on its transit trade with Ethiopia and the expenditure of the French armed forces.

15. The French Navy maintains a small establishment at Djibouti. The shore base, 80 strong, has a wireless telegraphy station and provides limited repair facilities. Two patrol craft and some small landing craft are permanently stationed at Djibouti, which is also used as a refuelling port by larger naval units on passage to the Indian Ocean.

16. The French military forces stationed in French Somaliland number approximately 3000 and consist of a semi-motorized battalion group of colonial troops, a Foreign Legion infantry unit and a base battalion. The battalion group includes an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron with armoured cars and light tanks, an artillery battery and supporting services. French officers, NCOs and technicians command and serve with these units.

17. There is no air force. There is, however, a small French Air Force detachment of some 350 men with transport and ground-attack aircraft.

18. The impending departure of the British from Aden has spurred the French to speed up certain developments in French Somaliland. The port facilities in Djibouti are being enlarged; roads, schools and hospitals are being built in the interior; Djibouti is experiencing a boom in trade and investment. There is every indication that the French are determined to stay on in spite of a growing liberation movement, and that they will seek to prevent intervention by the United Nations by emphasizing the legal position that French Somaliland is a part of the French Republic. In this they are likely to continue to find a silent partner but a sure ally in Ethiopia (which fears that, in the event of the French departing, the country would be taken over by Somalia and Ethiopia's main access to the sea would be cut off.)

FRANCE/SOUTH ASIA

19. France has had a limited interest in the South Asian area as a whole. Over the last few years, however, it has developed an increasing interest in India,

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and to a lesser extent Pakistan. This has been accentuated by the Gaullist drive to extend French international influence. There is also a cultural link with Afghanistan, where the ruling group has traditionally been French-educated, but in the other South Asian countries - Burma, Ceylon and Nepal - French involvement has remained small.

20. (a) INDIA

There has always been a high degree of interest in India and its problems. In the first instance this was mainly cultural and economic, while France also generally approved of India's policy of non-alignment, (in spite of French membership of SEATO). The question of the French establishments in India (Pondicherry etc.) was settled amicably in 1956, and a further agreement in 1963 regulated their transitional status, including the question of the retention of the French language.

From about 1962, France began to take a more active interest in India. In 1962 France became a member of the Aid India Consortium and her annual contributions have since been between \$20-\$40 million. This is not a very large contribution relatively (it is about the same as Canada's), but it has been supplemented by scholarship and training programmes. France has also given some emergency food aid to India over the last two years (although not as much as Australia). There has also been an active and increasing programme of cultural exchanges, and a cultural agreement is at present under consideration. There have been negotiations regarding possible French co-operation in India's nuclear programme; France has the advantage of not being inhibited by the issue of safeguards.

Following the Chinese attack against India in 1962 France showed sympathy with the Indian position and made available a token quantity of military aid. France has since sold military equipment, including helicopters, to India. Machinery has also been established for consultations on trade and economic matters.

In the last two years the process of developing relations has been stepped up through exchanges of visits between French and Indian leaders. In February, 1965, a French Prime Minister (Pompidou) visited India

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(and Pakistan) for the first time, providing the occasion for a declaration of the two countries' mutual regard and their concern for international security, including the desirability of the political solution in Indo-China. France's intention to continue an increased air aid to India was also stated. In March, 1966 Mrs. Gandhi visited France, and again the identity of interests of the two countries, including their attachment to democratic ideals, was stressed. President de Gaulle referred to India as "one of the essential elements of the modern world" while Mrs. Gandhi praised French foreign policy. There have also been a number of other visits by Indian Ministers to France, including particularly the Finance Minister in connection with India's external aid requirements, and arrangements have been made for periodic consultations between officials on matters of mutual interest.

According to French officials these expanded contacts are part of a French effort to reassert its influence in Asia and to promote a better understanding of French international policies. It would seem that these policies are being presented to India and other countries as a viable alternative to the policies of the United States and its supporters, which in the French view are promoting a dangerously rigid division of the world into two rival blocs. The French probably believe, with some justification, that their policies receive a high degree of approval in India. French influence, however, is not likely to become a dominant factor as long as the value of its aid and the scope of its economic relations remain well below those of other major powers.

21. (b) PAKISTAN

French influence in Pakistan has developed along somewhat similar lines, although it is apparent that the French do not regard Pakistan as having the same importance as India. France is also a member of the Aid Pakistan Consortium, and has given training and developed cultural relations as with India. It has recently agreed to supply Pakistan with up to three submarines.

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France would presumably approve recent trends in Pakistan's foreign policy, e.g. in respect of SEATO and Vietnam. It would also not regard Pakistan relations with Communist China as inimical to Western interests. The French are impressed by President Ayub (who has sometimes been described as the "Asian de Gaulle"), and Ayub is also impressed by the strong leadership of the present French Government. Pakistan appears to have followed the French lead in regard to its association with SEATO, and would probably also like to adopt a similar general international stance, but is inhibited by its dependence on American aid.

22. KASHMIR

France has had little difficulty in its Indian and Pakistani contacts in side-stepping the issue of Kashmir, but has, if anything, leaned slightly towards the Pakistan point of view. It has not made any major move to help resolve India/Pakistan problems

23. (c) CEYLON

French interest in Ceylon is not significant. However, France has given some economic aid and is taking a minor role in the current Ceylon Rescue Operation. Mr. Senanayake visited France early this year (the first visit of a Ceylon Prime Minister), but the visit did not receive much attention and his attempts to secure additional French aid were apparently not successful.

24. (d) BURMA

French interest in Burma is largely commercial. It seems likely that France would generally approve the policies of the Ne Win Government and particularly its efforts to preserve Burma's independence and neutrality. Burma has been considering the purchase of French jet fighters but it is not certain whether this will proceed.

FRANCE/THAILAND

25. France's relations with Thailand are cool and the Thais regard with distrust French aims and policies. This is partly for historical reasons, since from the mid-nineteenth century France resisted Thailand's eastward expansion into what are now the western provinces of Cambodia^{and} was instrumental in defining Cambodia's frontiers to the detriment of Thai claims.

26. Joint membership of SEATO tended to bring Thailand and France a little closer for a short period after 1959, but subsequently it has been in their attitudes to SEATO that their

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diverging approaches to South-East Asian issues have found particular expression. France's recognition of communist China and advocacy of a neutralist solution to the political problems of Indo-China also run contrary to Thai policy, based as it is on containment and isolation of China and a wish to have an anti-communist zone of buffer states on Thai frontiers. Thailand also suspects France's special position in Cambodia. France on the other hand is critical of a continuing United States military presence in South-East Asia which Thailand supports. France has minor commercial interests in Thailand.

FRANCE/MALAYSIA AND FRANCE-SINGAPORE

27. France took a co-operative attitude at the London discussions of the Consultative Group on Aid to Malaysia in May of this year (an attitude which the Malaysians contrasted with that of Britain) and in those discussions and a subsequent visit of the Malaysian Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, to Paris, agreement was reached on a French credit to Malaysia of \$M.100 million. This is likely to be used principally for the purchase of French goods. France and Malaysia are also at present negotiating a technical and cultural co-operation agreement.

28. The French have gained a good deal of goodwill in Malaysia by these two gestures. France's principal interest in Malaysia is commercial.

29. France has shown no particular interest in developing relations with the Singapore Government since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

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35. While the severance of diplomatic relations inhibits the current development of official relationships between the two countries, a strong undercurrent of sympathy towards French culture and thinking still exists in South Vietnam. French influence in the Vietnamese educational system remains strong, and there are about 350 French teachers and 45 university professors and lecturers in South Vietnam.

36. French economic interests in South Vietnam, e.g. in rubber plantations have declined greatly in the last 2-3 years.

37. The reluctance of the Vietnamese, despite the diplomatic break, to sever all ties with France, was best exemplified by the official Vietnamese announcement at the time of the break that France's economic and cultural interests would not be affected.

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attempt to dominate the Laotian information media and occasional overtures to Kong Le, and their own civil aid effort.

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44. In February 1966 a further aid agreement covering 50 jeeps and 50 trucks was signed. France has also made available large loans and credit guarantees for major development projects including the rail link between

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Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, the Prek Thnot Dam and the Port of Sihanoukville. It has also made a valuable contribution to the establishment of colleges and the broad development of education.

FRENCH TERRITORIES IN THE PACIFIC

45. Separate papers have been prepared for you on matters relating to the Pacific territories should you wish to discuss this with M. Couve de Murville.

FRANCE/SEATO

46. France's role in SEATO activities has always been a minor one. They have taken part in most activities but without being at all active. With the increasing involvement of Treaty signatories in Vietnam France has avoided participation in SEATO's political activities.

47. At the Ninth Meeting, at Manila, in April, 1964, the French Delegation was unable to associate itself with the Communiqué because of political differences. On 2nd April, 1965, one month before the Tenth Council Meeting, M. Couve de Murville told our Ambassador that he would probably not be attending himself "our differences are so great and feelings of antagonism so high that it would be better not to envenom the situation further". On April 16, the French Ambassador in Bangkok informed the Secretary-General that France would not send a delegation to the London meeting and would be represented only by an observer. This practice was followed at the Eleventh Meeting, held in Canberra 27-29 June, 1966.

48. The French have continued to attend the weekly Permanent Working Group and monthly Council Representatives meetings in Bangkok and to participate in most expert study groups and seminars. (Members do not attend these meetings on any regular basis). In regard to the Intelligence Assessment Committee, France participated up to and including the Fourth Intelligence Assessment Committee Meeting (February 17-19, 1965) but not in the Fifth Meeting (18-20 August, 1965) or the Sixth and Seventh Meetings.

49. French participation in the Secretariat has continued at the same level.

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50. There are three Frenchmen on the Secretariat (Australia has four) and France contributes on a regular basis to the budget.

51. France no longer participates fully in SEATO military exercises, although they send military observers to some of these.

52. (Thailand, supported to some extent by the Philippines, has suggested the exclusion of France and Pakistan from the Organization. Thailand would prefer SEATO to become a closer group concentrating on Thailand's problems and Indo-China).

FRENCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ASIA

53. France's trade with the region is small in relation to France's total trade - exports to non-Communist Asia (including Australia and New Zealand but excluding other Oceania) amounted to about US.\$300 million in 1965 (about 3 per cent of total exports) while imports from the region totalled about \$453 million (approximately 4.5 per cent of total imports). Moreover, trade with the area has failed to keep pace with the overall growth in French trade in recent years - in particular, French imports from the Asian region as a whole have shown virtually no increase over the last six years.

54. France's main export markets in the region are India, Japan and Australia; the main suppliers are Australia (by far the most important), Japan, Malaysia and India. South Vietnam was formerly one of France's more important trading partners in the area but the total value of trade has fallen sharply over the last six years to less than half its previous level.

55. France has a favourable balance of trade with French Oceania but exports to their territories account for less than 1 per cent of total exports.

56. French aid is largely concentrated in the franc area - principally in Africa. The only countries in the Asian region which receive aid in the form of grants or official long term loans are Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. Total disbursements to these countries amounted to U.S.\$9.2 million in 1963, \$16.8 million in 1964 and \$16.0 million in 1965. Over half of this aid

is for technical assistance.

57. Assistance to other countries is in the form of government guarantees for private export credits - the main beneficiaries being India, Pakistan, Indonesia and South Korea. France is a member of the I.B.R.D. Consortia for India and Pakistan. (Credits to India and Pakistan consist mainly of guaranteed extended medium term credits with subsidised interest financed by the budget).

58. Aid to French Oceania amounted to U.S.\$27.0 million (disbursements) in 1965. Of this \$18.2 million was in the form of grants and \$8.8 million in official loans.

FRANCE/ECAFE

59. France is a foundation member of ECAFE and one of the five members "from outside the region". Although its role has not been as significant as that of the U.S.A. or Britain, France has participated actively in ECAFE in the sense that she has consistently sent representatives to a wide range of ECAFE meetings. France, to some extent has used ECAFE to fashion a new relationship with the region, including a commercial stake, following the loss of her Asian colonies. In this connection the interest of France in the Mekong project should be noted. France has contributed some \$2.8 million to the Mekong Development Scheme and associated projects. However, France has not pledged any financial contribution to the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning (the only two non-regional members participating are the Netherlands and U.S.A). However France made available an expert (on national accounting) for the Institute's training programme in 1964/65 and has agreed to provide another expert for the programme. So far as ECAFE is concerned we might express our pleasure that France is continuing to play an active part in the work of the organization. France is a country with the type of background of knowledge and expertise that could be very useful to the region.

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FRANCE/ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

60. France has not so far indicated any interest in becoming a party to the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank. (The Bank's articles provide for membership by non-regional countries and the following have pledged subscriptions to the Bank: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal German Republic, Finland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Britain and the United States.) Switzerland has offered to subscribe \$US.5 million to the Bank but as it did so after the deadline dates for signature on 31st January, 1966 it cannot become a member until after the Bank comes into existence in October, 1966.

61. The Australian Government has made representations about Bank membership to the Bank on two occasions but without success. The French who have not become parties to the African or Latin American Development Banks have indicated that they do not at this stage intend to participate in the Asian Development Bank.

62. A final decision would not be taken however until after the Bank was definitely established.

63. Membership of the Asian Development Bank would involve France in regional economic and financial matters, and would help to stimulate and keep alive France's interest and presence in the region.

64. We might usefully continue to express to France our hope that she will become a member. In making such representation we could emphasise :-

- (i) the Asian character of the Bank;
- (ii) the need for funds outside the region to be attracted to the region and the fact that other European countries have joined and;
- (iii) the important contribution which France could make to the Bank in the context of France's financial and economic experience, and her historical association

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with the region.

65. French membership of the Bank in the foreseeable future is however unlikely, especially in view of her belief that the Bank is an American creation.

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN F.E.O.F. (LAOS)

66. French participation in F.E.O.F. has been of very little value in the long-term to the Laotian economy. This is because the French have been using the local currency generated by their contribution to F.E.O.F. to pay much of the cost of the French presence in Laos. In effect they have been profiting from their membership of the Fund in that this enables them to obtain kit at half the normal price. The benefits of French participation are two fold:

- (i) the funds generated by the French contribution are not used immediately and thus there is some time lag in the subsequent generation of financial pressure and
- (ii) the Americans agreed to match the contributions of other donors, including the French.

67. France has so far contributed \$1.3 million (U.S.) to the Fund this year. It seems likely that the French contribution for the whole year will rise to about \$1.7 million - equalling their withdrawal use of Laotian currency.

68. Sisouk has asked the French to contribute an additional \$1 million this year (thus bringing their total 1966 contribution up to approximately \$2.7 million). There is less optimism now, than there was a week ago, on this score.

FRANCE AND THE ANTARCTIC

69. Australia has an important link with France through the fact that both have claims to Antarctic territory and each has recognized the claim of the other. Only Britain, New Zealand and Norway certainly recognize these claims. Our approach on a number of significant issues affecting Antarctica should therefore broadly be similar and our mutual interests will no doubt best be

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served by working closely together on such issues. Co-operation with France may be of particular importance now that Britain has decided that the concept of territorial claims in the Antarctic ought to be abandoned. Moreover, Norway, also a claimant, has suspended all its Antarctic activities.

70. The main French Antarctic base is at Kerguelen Island, in the Southern Indian Ocean. It is not excluded that Kerguelen may in the future attain some strategic importance.

71. Australia is also, as matters stand at present, dependent for a large extent for carrying out its Antarctic programme upon French goodwill and co-operation, in that we sub-charter from the French expedition our second ship, the "Thala Dan". If this ship were not available to us we should be unable to carry out important elements of our programme. The possibility of future co-operation with France at the expedition level also exists in connection with the use of the newly developed Breguet S.T.O.L. aircraft to and from the French station at Dumont d'Urville. If French use of the Breguet in the Antarctic is successful it might well be that Australia will wish to use similar aircraft for its Antarctic expedition and that through both using the same type of aircraft opportunities for mutual co-operation might well increase. Already the French have made some very tentative and so far undefined suggestions that we may be able to work together on air operations.

72. We have in mind the possibility of conducting some informal discussions with the French later this year to ascertain their views on current developments on Antarctica and to sound them out on the claims issue with a view to confirming our assumption that, if the Antarctic Treaty were to break down, the French would not wish to give up their claim.

73. You may wish to mention to M. Couve de Murville, should the opportunity occur, our mutual interest in Antarctica and express the hope that we might maintain and develop further our contacts on Antarctic matters.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No.
17th August, 1966


25/1/1

MR PIPER
MR CURTIS
MR ASHWIN
MR FLANAGAN
MR JAMES
MR FORSYTH
MR LAVETT
MR PHILLIPS
MR HARDING
MR DAN
MR DALRYMPLE
MR EVANS
MISS KING


FRENCH ROLE EAST OF SUEZ

Notwithstanding that the number of international political matters which may usefully be discussed with the French is shrinking, the Minister is anxious to maintain as far as possible a dialogue with the French on international affairs. He has suggested that one topic which might be taken up with the French in an effort to stimulate further exchanges is the future French role East of Suez.

2. I should appreciate having, at your earliest convenience, your written comments on this proposal, to the extent that it is relevant to your Section, with a view to holding shortly an intra-departmental meeting to decide whether the topic is one which might be taken up with the French, probably by the Minister with M. Couve de Murville at the forthcoming meeting of U.N.G.A.


(B.W. Woodberry)
Europe Section

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Amended - delivered to B. Lowman 29/6
Unclassified
FILE NO. *F 25/1/1*
DATE *21st July, 1966*

SUBJECT French Foreign Policy

FOR MR REYNOLDS

F 25/1/1

You may care to see the attached article for Current Notes on French Foreign Policy.

2. The problem has been to finish up with an article which meets the ~~standards~~ of Current Notes for being factual and devoid of controversial comment.

3. We have tried to meet this problem by quoting extensively from President de Gaulle's own writings and speeches.

H.W. Bullock
(H.W. Bullock)

requirements

→

Seems O.K. to me
Mr 2/6

E.A.M.E.C. Branch
H.W. Bullock:MPR

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

26

The direction of French foreign policy since 1958 has been strongly influenced by President de Gaulle's long-held belief in France's innate capacity to be a great power and his sense of a French mission in the contemporary world. His entry into office marks a turning point after a long period of decline as a result of two world wars, colonial problems and continued political instability. "Let us recognise that having once been a colossus of a people by virtue of population, wealth and power, we are returning from afar to play our international role once more. For, one hundred years ago, our demographic and economic growth, and consequently our strength, began to decline. Then came, one after the other, the two world wars which ruined and decimated us, while two great countries, the United States and Russia, in their turn rose to the summit. In a situation of diminished strength, at that time, the temptation to give up - which is to a weakened people what apathy is to a humiliated man - could have drawn us toward a decadence from which there would be no return... The vital fact... is that we have resisted the sirens of surrender and have chosen independence" (1). As long as the French government had been unable to make the decisions necessary for granting independence to its former colonies, and had been involved in long and wasteful struggles abroad - above all in Algeria - "self-renouncement" had been the only possibility for France in its dealings in the international sphere. But once the colonial questions had been settled, France had undergone a process of recovery which enabled it once again to play a significant role in international affairs. "We are a people that is rising as are rising the curves of our population, our production, our foreign trade, our monetary reserves, our standard of living.. Our government shows evidence of a stability and effectiveness that, for so very long, had not been known of it. Lastly, throughout the world, France's capabilities, what she does, what she wants to do, are at this time arousing an attention and consideration that sharply contrast with the indifference or the commiseration which, in the past, to often surrounded here. In

(1) Address by General de Gaulle over French radio and television

short, we can and consequently we must, have a policy that is our own". (1)

The gauge of France's national recovery thus becomes the reassertion of her independence in the foreign policy sphere. This implies a rejection, on the one hand, of a dependence on the United States, which President de Gaulle sees as based on an interpretation of East-West relations which no longer corresponds to present realities. And on the other hand, it leads to a refusal to subordinate France's international relations to what the President refers to as criteria linked to political, economic and social systems. In other words, the fact that a certain country is Communist does not necessarily inhibit France's relations with that country. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries offers the rationale for this new trend in French foreign policy. President de Gaulle is opposed to Russian domination of Eastern Europe, to the American "hegemony" in Western Europe, and to UN peace-keeping operations in the Congo and elsewhere, for all of these involve infringement in one form or another of the principle of non-intervention.

He sees France's independent approach to foreign policy as uniquely qualifying her to act as a mediator between East and West: "Indeed, the independence thus regained is enable France to become, despite the ideologies and hegemonies of the collossi, for all the racial passions, and prejudices, above and beyond the rivalries and ambitions of nations, a champion of co-operation, failing which, the results, the interventions, the conflicts that lead to world war would go on spreading. Now France is, par excellence, qualified to act in this way. She is so by her nature, which leads her to human contacts. She is so through the opinion that has historically been held of her and that opens to her a sort of latent credit when the universal is involved.. She is so finally, because she appears to be a nation with free hands whose policy is not being determined by any pressure from without" (2)

(1) Twelfth Press Conference held by President de Gaulle, September 9, 1965.

(2) Twelfth press conference held by President de Gaulle, September 9, 1965.

President de Gaulle condemns the attitude of those countries which choose to see in French policy the expression of a "Political machiavellism" and in France's independent approach to present political realities think that France is a risk, however minimum, to the general peace? In reality our country has, with the end of the Algerian affair settled the last of its great problems... It has no ambitions outside, unless to participate in the construction of a real Europe, to work everywhere for equilibrium and peace.. Naturally it is concerned about its independence, even when it involves its alliances, but this concern is accompanied by strict respect for the independence of all and a scrupulous policy of non-intervention in the affair of other". (1)

Recognising that France cannot, of itself, hope to wield an influence on a par with that of the two super-powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., President de Gaulle has taken the lead in supporting the creation of a united Europe. In his view a Europe which succeeded in defining and affirming its policy could play an essential role in the contemporary world, comparable in importance moreover to that played by the United States or the U.S.S.R. The monolithic structure of the Communist world is in process of disintegration, due in part to the obvious deficiencies of a rigidly controlled political and economic system, and in part also to the Sino-Soviet conflict. The world is no longer clearly divided into two opposing and irreconcilable camps. "The result of all these new factors, complicated and inter-related is that the division of the world into two camps led by Washington and Moscow respectively corresponds less and less to the real situation. With respect to the gradually splitting totalitarian world or the problems posed by China the conduct to be adopted towards many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, or the remodelling of the United Nations Organisation that necessarily ensues, or the adjustment

(1) Speech in French National Assembly by M Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, April, 14th 1966.

of world exchanges of all kinds, (it appears that Europe, provided it wishes it,) will henceforth be called upon to play a role which is its own. Undoubtedly it should maintain an alliance with America, in which, in the North Atlantic, both are interested so long as the Soviet threat remains. But the reasons which for Europe, made this alliance a form of subordination are fading away day by day. Europe must assume its share of the responsibilities" (1). A united Europe must provide a balance between East and West and thus open up to the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the example of a political and economic revolution which does not result in inevitable alignment with one or other of the major blocs. "The result of this transformation of that of the Communist world and of the accession to full sovereignty of dozens of formerly colonised countries - shall be a new world equilibrium, assuredly more stable than that of the cold war because it will have more natural foundations, and whose final form is perhaps being shadowed by certain regional groupings (that of the European states being among them) which are beginning to appear". (2)

President deGaulle's conception of a united Europe is determined very largely by his views on national sovereignty and on the principle of non-intervention. He is resolutely opposed to the idea of a coalition of European states, headed by a supranational legislative and executive, in which, as he sees it, the states would lose their national personalities. He proposes instead the creation of a loose confederation of sovereign states linked to one another by a unity of national policies on essential matters. The path to be followed would be that of organised co-operation leading, perhaps to confederation. Definition and practice of a common external policy becomes then a necessary preliminary to political union. "According to we French, it is a question of Europe's being made in order for it to be European.

(1) Tenth press conference held by President de Gaulle
July 23 1964

(2) Policy statement by M Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the National Assembly, November 3, 1964.

A European Europe means that it exists by itself for itself, in other words in the midst of the world it has its own policy.. We have seen many people, quite often, what is more, worthy and sincere, advocate for Europe not an independent policy, which in reality they do not visualise, but an organisation unsuited to have one, linked in this field as in that of defence and of the economy, to an Atlantic (in other words American) system and consequently subordinate to what the United States calls its leadership.. A policy is an action that is to say a body of decisions taken, of risks assumed, all of this with the support of a people. The governments of nations alone can be capable of and responsible for making policy. It is of course not forbidden to imagine that a day will come when all the peoples of our continent will become one and that then there could be a government of Europe, but it would be ridiculous to act as if that day had come" (1) While the President is unable to predict specifically what form European union will eventually take, he regards the establishment of the Common Market and provision for regular inter-governmental meetings to discuss external policy as steps in the right direction.

Organised co-operation between states as the basis for a union of European states leaves the way open for the entry of the United Kingdom and Spain, without loss of sovereignty being the unacceptable price for this entry. (It would be an unacceptable price for France also). By a further extension it allows for the eventual entry of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. However this latter development can only be brought about within the context of a final settlement of the problem of German reunification. "For twenty years now, Europe has been forced to accommodate itself to this situation (i.e. a divided Germany) Despite periodic commotion, it must resign itself to living in the provisional.. But we all know that the future must not be defied, and that consequently the time will come when the German people

(1) Tenth press conference given by President de Gaulle, July 23, 1964.

will be reunified in accordance with the principles of self determination and within the framework of a well-established European security. This will of course have to take place in peace, and by a general agreement between East and West. Since the division of Germany is born of the division of Europe, the prerequisite condition for the elimination of one is the elimination of the other. This means a profound and necessarily gradual transformation of the present situation. France for her part is, in our opinion, making a positive contribution to this task by gradually renewing confident relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, most of which are for her friends of long standing" (1). President de Gaulle believes that the final resolution of the problem of German reunification, which will be accomplished within the frame-work of a general detente between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe will lead to lasting peace and stability on the continent and ultimately to the creation of a united Europe stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals".

Algeria

President de Gaulle's most urgent task on becoming President was to find a solution to the Algerian conflict, which had already lasted for six years and which amongst other things was imposing a heavy financial burden on the French economy. In a radio broadcast on September, 16 1959, he recognised the right of the Algerians to choose their own political future. In January 1961 - as a result of strident opposition throughout the previous year by right wing supporters of *Algerie française* (continued integration of Algeria in France) - President de Gaulle called a referendum to gain a reaffirmation of public support for his Algerian policy. The results showed a three to one majority in favour of his self-determination policy and of a proposed bill authorising changes in the administration of Algeria pending self-determination.

Secret discussions were held during December 1961 and January 1962 with members of the provisional government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). Further talks began at Evian in France on 7th March, 1962, between M. Joxe, Minister for Algerian Affairs and M. Krim Belkacem, Deputy Premier of the GPRA. These concluded on 18th March, when both parties signed a cease-fire agreement and a general declaration on future policy. France accepted the formation of an independent sovereign state in Algeria and guaranteed its territorial integrity. It also approved declarations on Cultural, Technical and Economic and Financial Co-Operation between the two countries.

European Economic Community

On 25th March, 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed by France and five other European states. Its key aims were "to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples" and "to ensure economic and social progress by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe". The Six agreed to create by stages a single market with a common tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries, and to inaugurate common agricultural and transport policies.

In 1963 France vetoed an application by the United Kingdom to join the Common Market primarily on the grounds that the latter country's Commonwealth commitments prevented her from complying fully with the terms of the Treaty of Rome. Official statements since that time give no firm indication that there has been any substantial change in the French position.

On 30th June, 1965, following on the failure of the EEC Council of Ministers to agree on a system of financing the common agricultural policy in the transitional period 1965/70 and on what the French considered an attempt by the Commission to exceed its powers as defined in the Treaty of Rome, France temporarily withdrew from further participation in the meetings of the EEC. A further meeting of the Council of Ministers, some seven months later, resulted in a compromise which permitted the various institutions of the EEC to begin functioning again but which involved no change in the French attitude towards the Commission. "This agreement between the six governments is of great and auspicious significance. Indeed, for the first time since the common market got under way, one openly departed from that sort of fiction in which the economic organisation of Europe had to emanate from an authority other than that of the States... By the very fact that it was handled successfully between the Foreign Affairs Ministers and outside of Brussels, it was explicitly recognised that to succeed in the economic sphere, political foundations and decisions are necessary, and that those foundations and decisions spring from the States and from them alone..." While President de Gaulle recognises the value of co-

operation between the Six on an economic level, he appears to be¹⁸
determined to block any development towards supranational com-
munity institutions in the political sector.

The Atlantic Alliance

Early in March 1966 President de Gaulle gave notice to the other member countries of NATO that France could no longer participate in NATO headquarters activities (SHAPE), that it would withdraw its forces from NATO command and that all NATO forces on French soil would have to be placed under French command. He indicated however, that France would continue to adhere to the Atlantic Alliance even after 1969, when it becomes due for renewal. "If France considers today still, that it is useful for her security and to that of the West that she allied with a certain number of states, particularly with America, for their defence and hers in the event of aggression against one of them; if the declaration made in common on this subject, in the form of the Atlantic Alliance Treaty signed in Washington on 14th April, 1949, still remains valid in her eyes, at the same time she recognises that the measures for implementation taken subsequently no longer correspond to what she deems satisfactory, with respect to herself, in the new conditions" (1) These new conditions as seen by President de Gaulle are firstly the diminution of the Russian threat to Europe, which no longer forms, as it did in 1949, the focal point for the East-West conflict. Secondly, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery by the Soviet Union which has led to French doubts as to the reliability of the American nuclear guarantee. There is a possibility that, in the event of a Russian nuclear attack on Western Europe, the United States would refrain from retaliation because of the inevitable destruction that would be called down on its own population. Furthermore, if the prospects of a war breaking out on account of Europe are diminishing, there remains the danger for Europe of becoming implicated in various extra-European conflicts in which the United States is at present engaged. And lastly, as an atomic power France now has to assume independent political and strategic responsibilities.

At the same time as he announced his decision to withdraw French forces from the integrated command, President de Gaulle intimated that he would be prepared to enter into bilateral defence agreements with the other NATO members. "In addition, she will hold herself ready to arrange with one or another of them (her NATO allies).. the practical relations for co-operation that will appear useful on both sides, either in the immediate present or in the eventuality of a conflict".(1)

1. Thirteenth press conference President de Gaulle
February 21 1966.

Federal Republic of Germany

France's policy on Germany is identical in most respects to that of the other two former occupation powers, the United Kingdom and the United States. It does not recognise the East German regime and considers the government of the Federal Republic as the only government freely and legitimately constituted and hence the only German government entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs. As regards the status of Berlin, it holds that the occupation rights of the Western powers are guaranteed under the Quadripartite Agreements of 5th June, 1945, and by formal recognition by the Soviet Union as a result of the Foreign Ministers' Conference of May 1949, after the Berlin blockade.

France regards the reunification of Germany as essential to future peace and stability in Europe. From the beginning of his term in office President de Gaulle has sought to create closer ties between France and Germany in keeping with his grand design for a united Europe. On September 14, 1958, President de Gaulle and the West German Chancellor, Dr Adenauer, issued a joint declaration, stating, inter alia, that close co-operation between France and Germany was the basis of all constructive work in Europe. Relations between the two countries continued to improve during the following years: a communique issued on July 2, 1962, at the end of a visit to Paris by Dr Adenauer, formally proclaimed final reconciliation between France and Germany and he announced that the two countries would henceforth work together to organise the political unity of Europe. And on January 22nd, 1963, President de Gaulle and Dr Adenauer signed a Franco-German Treaty of Co-operation, agreeing to work for the co-ordination of the policies of both countries in foreign affairs, defence, information and cultural affairs.

Recently however, France and German attitudes on matters affecting both countries have tended to diverge quite sharply, as basic differences in outlook become more apparent. France has found no support from the Germans for her withdrawal from NATO and French moves to promote better relations with the

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

14

Since 1958 President de Gaulle has encouraged an increasing number of contacts in the technical, commercial and cultural fields with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is his view that German reunification, which is the key to lasting peace and stability in Europe, can only be brought about within the context of a general East-West detente. "A European settlement, quite as much as a German settlement, means an agreement between the East and West of Europe ... there must be a radical transformation in the relations between all the European countries, whether they belong to one or the other of the two halves of the continent between which the iron curtain was once lowered. A transformation which will lead to the establishment among all, in a regained equilibrium, of relations which may be termed normal and peaceful from the Atlantic to the Urals.. Such an evolution obviously pre-supposes far-reaching changes in Russia and in the countries of Eastern Europe. In any event France, insofar as it is concerned, has now resumed with those Eastern countries, formerly its traditional friends, effective relations". (1)

On October 30, 1964, France signed a long term trade agreement for 1965/9 with the Soviet Union, providing for an increase of 45 per cent in the level of trade. During 1965 a Franco-Soviet Agreement was concluded on the SECAM Television system and a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Zorin, was appointed as the new Ambassador. Over the last three years there have been a number of discussions between French and Soviet scientific delegations on various topics including the development of Franco-Soviet collaboration in space research. President de Gaulle began an official visit to the Soviet Union on June, 20, 1966.

Over the last three years there have been increasing numbers of bilateral contacts between France and the Eastern bloc countries. On July 27 1964, the Rumanian Prime Minister, M. Maurer made an official visit to Paris, during the course of

(1) Speech by M Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, before the French National Assembly, June 16, 1965.

which an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation was concluded.

On December, 10, 1964 a five-year Franco-Rumanian Trade Agreement was signed, covering the years 1965/9 and on January, 11, 1965, a five-year Cultural Co-operation Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of France and Rumania, which provided for regular exchanges of scientists, lecturers and teachers. There are, of course, reasons for France's present good relations with Rumania. France has important traditional links with Rumania and the Rumanians themselves have of late been showing an increasingly independent attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. But France is also trying to improve relations with Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. During the visit of M Couve De Murville, to Bulgaria in April 1966, it was agreed that bilateral cultural consular and technical agreements should be negotiated between the two countries. (France is at present Bulgaria's third largest Western trading partner and there is a heavy trade imbalance in her favour). And during a similar visit to Poland in May 1966 he concluded five year cultural agreement and an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation with the Polish government.

As long as the problem of German reunification remains unresolved, however, there must be limits to the extent of the co-operation in other than the commercial sphere between France and the Eastern bloc countries, limits imposed by those countries continued reliance on Russian military protection, and even in this sphere the dependence of the Eastern European countries on the Comecon organisation, which links their economies closely to that of the Soviet Union, is likely to preclude any really large increase in trade with France.

Communist China.

On January 27, 1964 France established diplomatic relations with Communist China. Subsequently President de Gaulle pointed out that this in no way implied approval of China's political system and justified no action, on the grounds that it was senseless to continue to disregard the presence of a country of 700 million people on the world political scene. In his opinion China had all the attributes of sovereignty indispensable for its recognition by another state. "In fact, there is in Asia no political reality, notably with regard to Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam, or to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, or to Korea or Soviet Union or Japan, etc., which does not concern or affect China. There is in particular neither a war nor a peace imaginable on this continent without China's being implicated in it. Thus it would be absolutely impossible to envisage, without China, a possible neutrality agreement relating to the South East Asian States" (1)

French trade with China has not increased appreciably since recognition and it appears that co-operation between the two countries will be restricted for some time to come to the technical and cultural fields. There are at present a small number of Chinese students studying in Paris.

On June 1, 1966, France and China signed an agreement establishing a regular air route between Paris and Shanghai.

Since 1964 France has supported the entry of China to the United Nations. It maintains that it is not a question of "admitting" China but of allowing the Government of Peking to appoint the Chinese representatives to the United Nations.

Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia

France is opposed to American intervention in Viet Nam and has stressed the need for a negotiated solution based on the 1954 Geneva Accords and leading to the neutralisation of the whole Indo-China area. "Lacking a decision by war, it is peace which thus must be made. Now, this implies returning to what was agreed on ten years ago and, this time, complying with it; this implies that in North and South Viet Nam, in Cambodia and Laos, no foreign power any longer intervene in any way in the affairs of these unfortunate countries. A meeting of the same order and including, in principle, the same participants as the former Geneva conference would certainly be qualified to make a decision and organise an impartial control... This meeting to which each must come without conditions or recriminations, would successively deal with the international aspects of the Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese situation, of which the essential is, in advance, their neutrality. No other road can be visualised which can lead to peace in South-East Asia, provided that once the theoretical agreement is concluded, if it is to be... the powers which directly or indirectly bear a responsibility in what was or is the fate of Indo-China and which are France, China, the Soviet Union and America, be effectively resolved to be involved there no longer." (1)

Of recent years France has withdrawn from effective participation in the military activities of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, as it considers that this organisation is too closely involved in the Viet Nam conflict (South Viet Nam is a protocol state of SEATO and has requested aid from countries like Australia in accordance with the provisions of the Manila Treaty). It has disassociated itself from SEATO communiques, on Viet Nam and has reduced the level of its representation at Council meetings to that of Observer.

(1) Tenth Press Conference held by General de Gaulle as President of the Fifth Republic.

The United Nations

President de Gaulle sees the United Nations not as an organisation of states ^{theoretically on an equal} gathered together on a footing of ^{but in actual} equality as one in which the Americans exert a predominant influence. ^{fact dominated by American influence. Accordingly he is unwilling to have French freedom of action compromised on major political issues by decisions of the General Assembly} Others, invoking either arbitrary theories or the convenience of interests, profess that our country should efface ^{over which the French have no control (as they do in the Security Council through the power of veto)} its personality in international organisations made in such a way that the United States can exercise in them, from within or without, a preponderant action, with which by definition we have only to conform. It is in this way that those people conceive our participation in the United Nations" (1)

He strongly opposed U.N. intervention in the Congo on the grounds that this constituted an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a state, and subsequently refused to pay France's share of the costs for the operation. It was argued that the General Assembly, on whose authority the operation had been undertaken, could only make recommendations and that it lay within the province of the Security Council to make the final decision. Furthermore, these recommendations were not legally binding on the states which did not vote in their favour. The French would not compromise on their stand, even when threatened with loss of their voting rights under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter.

The French make a distinction however, between peace-keeping operations and clearly specified supervisory operations, such as in Palestine or Kashmir which they support by voluntary contribution.

France holds that only those countries actually possessing nuclear weapons are qualified to take part in discussions on disarmament. It opposed the 1962 decision of the General Assembly to add the representatives of eight neutral or non-aligned countries to those of the ten members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact already on the Disarmament Committee and declined to occupy its seat at the ensuing "Conference of the Eighteen".

President de Gaulle originally established the

(1) Twelfth Press Conference held by General de Gaulle as President of the Fifth Republic

French "force de frappe" to end dependence on American nuclear weapons in the event of a war in Europe. He has on several occasions since then offered to destroy France's nuclear arsenal if the other nuclear powers would do likewise. But he refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty, as he considered it a senseless measure as long as the United States and the USSR retained large stockpiles of atomic weapons. The French position on the recent discussions on non-dissemination is a further reflection of the same basic policy on disarmament. "If it were truly a matter of disarmament, the first concern would be to prevent what exists from growing, and then to reduce it. In other words, it is the atomic powers that are involved. Once they would consent to limiting their manufacture, to diminishing their stockpiles gradually and to submitting themselves to the appropriate controls, dissemination would appear clearly to be what it really is, that is, a by-product of and not the root of the evil". (1) The French Government will conduct atomic tests in the Pacific Ocean, South of Tahiti.

(1) Address by M Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the Twentieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 29th September, 1965.

Africa

On June 26, 1956, the French National Assembly passed the "loi-cadre" or law for constitutional advancement, which set out the broad framework for the introduction of a greater degree of internal self-government in its African colonies. Executive councils were established to enable elected representatives to take part in the work of the government, increasing numbers of African officials were employed in the civil service, and universal suffrage and a common electoral roll were introduced.

In the constitutional referendum of 1958 of all the former African colonies except Guinea elected for internal autonomy within a French-African Community.

Subsequently on June 4, 1960 the French Constitution was amended to allow the new states to become independent republics without forfeiting Community membership. France has a multiplicity of economic, military and cultural ties with her former colonies. She maintains considerable numbers of advisers in education and the civil service and, in addition, France has the exclusive right to form supply and train an indigenous force in each republic. France assures most of its former colonies guaranteed markets for their tropical products and they in turn reciprocate by reserving large portions of their markets for French goods.

France has mutual defence agreements with eleven of its fifteen former colonies.

In 1963 there were some ten thousand French technicians working in Africa and over seven thousand African students studying in France.

Latin America

7

France traditionally has had strong cultural ties with the countries of Central and South America. But its investment in this area, which had reached a pre-1914 level of about \$1,200 million, tended to decline thereafter, due mainly to the two world wars and France's colonial commitments, General de Gaulle's accession to the presidency marked a renewal of French interest.

In October, 1962 the French government offered Mexico a loan of \$150 million for investment in its petro-chemical industry (the first time since 1914 that France had agreed to government to government credits with a country which was not within the French "sphere or influence". On 16th March, 1964 President de Gaulle arrived in Mexico on a three day state visit. A communique issued at the end of the visit announced plans for increased technical and commercial co-operation between the two countries and promised France's support at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development for formulas favourable to Latin America and other lesser developed countries. In September of the same year, President De Gaulle made a highly successful visit to all 10 South American countries. He offered cultural, scientific and technical co-operation and the prospect of increased trade with France. It is not clear that any tangible benefits were derived by France as a result of this visit.

6
CONFIDENTIAL

FRANCE : FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE

F25/1/1

President de Gaulle accepts that France cannot hope by itself to achieve a position of power comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. or the United States. But he believes that historical circumstances - notably the Sino-Soviet split and the disintegration of the monolithic structure of the communist world including, of course, Eastern Europe - now permit a united Western Europe to play a significant independent role in world affairs.

2. His plan is for a united Western Europe with France in a pre-eminent position to take the form of a loose confederation of independent states linked by a series of bilateral (rather than multilateral or international) agreements and with concerted policies on political, economic and defence matters. Distrust of any form of political integration is implicit in his plan. He regards the political integration of European states as involving, besides the loss of national identity, perpetuation of American "hegemony". (This is reflected in present French policies on the E.E.C. and NATO)
3. Opposition to American influence in Europe is a continuing factor in French policy.
4. The General considers that a final settlement of the problem of German reunification can be reached within the context of a general detente between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The object of such a detente would be the conclusion of a pact establishing a concert of Eastern and Western European powers to supervise and contain a reunified but non-nuclear Germany. (In effect this would mean a permanent second-class status for Germany which is the strongest power on the continent, west of Russia. It is scarcely conceivable that such a proposal could find general acceptance but it panders to the genuine fear of Eastern Europe of German "revanchism" and militarism.)
5. The General also hopes that settlement of the German problem would lead ultimately to the fulfilment of what he regards as his grand design: the union of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" under the joint leadership of France and the U.S.S.R. and to the exclusion of the United States.



CONFIDENTIAL

May 23, 1966

F-25/1/1

The Ben Barka Fester

By Ray Alan

SECTION XIV: Scandals and "affaires."

... 4) PR procedure.

a.) If police or special services involved.

Phase one: Clam up, clamp down. Phase two: Blame the Americans (or British). Phase three: Blame the press. Phase four: Sit tight while the public becomes bored and forgets the whole thing.

PARIS

THERE ARE times when one is tempted to suspect that some such procedure is outlined in the manual of *Instructions officielles* issued to senior French officials. It was a routine of the Fourth Republic; it is still resorted to under the Fifth. The Ben Barka affair has provided what might be a textbook example of the technique.

Mehdi Ben Barka was the leader of a vaguely Left-wing Moroccan political party, the "National Union of Popular Forces." A few minutes after noon on October, 29, 1965, he was accosted in the center of Paris by two men who identified themselves as policemen and asked him to go with them. He stepped into their car and was driven away. He has

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not been seen or heard from since by anyone friendly to him. Had he not been accompanied by a Moroccan student, whom the policemen seem to have ignored, even the circumstances of his kidnapping might have remained obscure. As it happened, the student was able to alert Ben Barka's brother Abdel-Kader who contacted the police and informed the press.

During the next few weeks it was learned that the two policemen had handed Ben Barka to a gangster named Georges Boucheseiche who held him prisoner until General Mohammed Oufkir, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, arrived in Paris to take him over. The coordinator of the operation appears to have been a government employee named Antoine Lopez, an agent of the SDECE (*Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage*), a secret service concerned with certain aspects of France's foreign relations but independent of, and mistrusted by, the services of the Quai d'Orsay. (SDECE men organized the successful counter-coup in Gabon and the unsuccessful coup in Guinea and are said to have played a part in bringing together opponents of Kwame Nkrumah.) Boucheseiche and his associates were prosperous men with good po-

litical and police contacts in both Paris and Rabat; in the 1950s they were employed by the French police and *barbouzes* (official strong-arm squads) against political undesirables, and made a killing, on the side, swindling Europeans in North Africa who wished to transfer capital to France or Switzerland.

Most of the gang left Paris soon after Ben Barka's disappearance, but one man, the neurotic Georges Figon, stayed behind, alternately boasting of the influence of the Gaullist deputy, Pierre Lemarchand, whom he claimed to be his "protector," and threatening to sell his story to the press if the organizers of the kidnapping failed to pay him his due.

Figon had taken an active part in two earlier attempts to murder Ben Barka, was in this plot from the start, and met the deputy Lemarchand soon after the kidnapping. Later he contacted journalist acquaintances and even posed for a photo outside police headquarters. He claimed to have seen Oufkir torturing Ben Barka. But it was two months before the police made any serious effort to apprehend him, and the results of such other inquiries as were made during November were hushed up. The natural inclination of French officialdom to put

The New Leader

- "Create a mechanism that can apply these principles to the realities of a changing world, from time to time, and recommend the necessary changes and adjustments in the specific application of such principles.

- "Recommend that a plebiscite be held, under the laws of Puerto Rico, in which the three forms of status be submitted in consultation to the electorate of Puerto Rico, and express the conviction that participation in that plebiscite is a responsibility of *all* parties advocating a status formula and of all citizens to vote." (Some segments of both the *independentista* and statehood factions have threatened to boycott such a plebiscite).

"Nothing else," concluded Sánchez, "can satisfy the need of Puerto Rico in this modern world and in the future." Other Commonwealth government leaders have also been stressing, in recent months, the need for a status solution and more autonomy. On April 6, Puerto Rican Secretary of State Carlos J. Lastra told business and government leaders at a luncheon that Puerto Rico is "doomed not to grow at the pace we should unless we have flexibility in wages, in transportation and in other economic areas."

What the PDP calls "culminated Commonwealth" is based upon a need for Puerto Rico to be sovereign, and to enter into a real compact with the United States by what Muñoz Amato has called "democratic participation," not "passive consent." In 1952 when Puerto Ricans voted in favor of Commonwealth status, they had little choice. Voting against it implied a desire to keep Puerto Rico as it was: a colony of the United States.

Commonwealth government leaders are reticent as to what specific steps they would take were Puerto Rico to achieve sovereignty within its association with the U.S. They feel that the new relationship would take "at least a generation to jell," but that Puerto Rico could gradually

assert itself and become a key economic and cultural force in the burgeoning Caribbean area. Real autonomy would also allow Puerto Rico to soften the sometimes brutal impact of the U.S. economy upon nascent native industries.

Perhaps the most mordant comment with respect to more sovereignty for Puerto Rico was made by Puerto Rico Independence Movement leader Juan Mari Bras at the outset of the 1964 elections: "I don't see why the U.S. should hesitate to grant sovereignty or even outright independence to Puerto Rico. If Puerto Rico were independent the U.S. would arrange for it to immediately join the Organization of American States and it could control us anyway."

A Commonwealth government official was recently asked: "What if the STACOM simply doesn't go along with Governor Sánchez's request; or what if the U.S. Congress simply ignores STACOM's hopefully favorable recommendations, and continues to insist that Puerto Rico is still nothing more than an 'island belonging to the United States'?"

"Then," he said grimly, "both we and the United States would have to face some harsh decisions. But it's absurd to even entertain such a possibility. You cannot just invalidate what has existed for 14 years. It would be absurd."

ONE OF THE "harsh decisions" the Puerto Rican government would have to make is what to do about possible disintegration of the powerful Popular Democratic Party. For if the "culminated" Commonwealth concept were rejected by the U.S. Congress, a split in the PDP would be almost a certainty. The party is composed, to a great extent, of moderate *independentistas* who are willing to be associated with the U.S. for economic reasons. The other large faction is composed of individuals who insist on permanent association with the U.S. and, without Commonwealth, might shift

to the statehood movement. Such a shift could polarize the Puerto Rican voting public into two enormous groups—pro-independence and pro-statehood—and make impossible a consensus in the near future.

No one can confidently predict what STACOM will recommend, although—since three of Puerto Rico's six STACOM members favor Commonwealth—it is likely to come out with a pro-Commonwealth conclusion. But it is even riskier to predict the reaction of a U.S. Congress beleaguered by Vietnam, the War on Poverty, the "Red Chinese Menace," turmoil in Latin America, riots in Watts, and the constant demands of constituents.

For years Puerto Rico has stood politely by, patiently awaiting the solution to its status problem. The island government has taken great pains to demonstrate its affection for the United States. A few months ago, the Commonwealth Legislature approved by a near unanimous vote (only one against) President Johnson's policy in Vietnam, prompting a local critic to observe that Puerto Ricans seemed even more patriotic than Americans on the mainland, where Vietnam is subject to the criticism of a vociferous minority.

Will Puerto Rico's polite request be heard amid the maelstrom of a confused, violent world? "We'd get all sorts of attention," one Puerto Rican official said recently, "if a bunch of us decided to start fighting and yelling and demonstrating and picketing against U.S. colonialism. But that's simply not the way most of us are used to being. We're essentially a peaceful people, we always have been, who believe in legislation, law and order."

That is the beauty—and in some ways the tragedy—of this small island, which has been turning the other cheek for centuries. Perhaps the meek *shall* inherit the earth. But it is hard to prove by the history books, or the daily headlines. In the case of Puerto Rico, only time, and the U.S. Congress, can tell.

wrapped the affair was reinforced by editorial considerations. If the public had known last December what has since been revealed about the comportment of certain official services and Gaullist personalities General de Gaulle might not have been re-elected President of the Republic.

PHASE TWO was opened on December 22, 1956, by General de Gaulle's Minister of Justice, Jean Foyer. Asked by a delegation of the France-Maghreb committee why the police were not making a more energetic effort to get to the bottom of the Ben Barka affair, he replied in approximately these words: "It is a delicate business. The General wishes it handled with care. There are indications that American secret services were behind the kidnapping."

Foyer may have jumped the gun. This line was not adopted by other ministers until mid-January. On January 17, 1966, the Paris police had been given the address at which Figon was hiding. Forced to act, they went about their task (in the words of a distinguished group of lawyers) "with a deployment of forces sufficient to alarm even the most inoffensive of citizens." They found Figon dead, shot behind the ear. With suspect haste, the *Procureur* decided overnight that Figon had shot himself, and the dossier was closed. But rumor insisted that the bullet hole was bigger than it ought to have been, if produced by the weapon found beside Figon's body. A friend of the dead man announced that Figon had told him that if ever he committed suicide he would shoot himself through the palate. Frenchmen were reminded of other timely suicides in their recent history.

With scandal spreading like a brushfire, some diversion was desperately needed. On January 21, Roger Frey, the Minister of the Interior, informed a group of "leftish Gaullists" at the home of Fran-

çois Mauriac, the Catholic novelist and publicist, that he could now confirm that the Americans were behind the Ben Barka affair. Premier Pompidou admitted to receptive journalists that all was not well with the SDECE (the secret service involved) and he added that the Americans had undoubtedly succeeded in infiltrating it.

The first publicist of note to enlighten public opinion on this point was François Mauriac. He had performed a similar service in November 1960, after Gaullist officials had expressed disquiet over the popular-

that, in my opinion, we are in any danger [from him] so long as, in Paris, two stars shine on a sleeve [that of General de Gaulle]."

On January 27, 1966, in his column in the weekly *Figaro Littéraire*, Mauriac wrote:

"Shortly after or shortly before the murder of Ben Barka (I forget the exact date) a well-informed Moroccan friend spoke to me of General Oufkir's close ties with the American secret services. . . . For once these American services have brought off a magnificent double success — against the Afro-Asian world, in getting rid of Ben Barka, and against de Gaulle. If the Americans are innocent in this affair, then the devil must have been acting for them."

This was aimed at an "intellectual" readership — which is as cruel a reflexion as one could make on the intellectual condition of de Gaulle's France. The logical leaps imposed on the less sophisticated browsers of *Paris-Match* a few days later by "Major X, a former SDECE officer," were more engaging:

"General Oufkir promised [the kidnappers] 50 million francs but was unable to pay. . . . Lopez was in touch with the U.S. Narcotics Bureau . . . as were the two policemen [Raymond] Voitot and [Louis] Souchon. Lopez claims to have warned Le Roy [his SDECE chief] of what was being plotted last May; one may assume that he also tipped off the U.S. Narcotics Bureau which would immediately alert the CIA which still maintains a training-center, guarded by Polish mercenaries and Alsatian dogs, and officially known as U.S. Base 313, at Poteau, in the Landes. . . . Ben Barka was notoriously pro-Chinese. . . . It is not unthinkable that while the Americans took care to play no direct part in the neutralization of Ben Barka, an event they wished to bring about, they provided the funds without which the operation could not have succeeded. Five hundred million are said to have been promised,



MOHAMMAD OUFKIR

ity of President-elect Kennedy in France. On that occasion, in a passage so often quoted that anthologists already have their eyes on it, he wrote:

"Do not let us forget that in 1944 the Americans coldly crushed and pulverized our villages, our churches. They could have spared them. . . . Have you observed carefully the face of their new President? His famous charm impresses me less than his powerful jaws, his slightly slanted eyes beneath their heavy lids, and his strong voracious teeth. The day he judged it necessary to strike, he would strike, do not doubt. Not

and 40 million actually paid. It can be assumed that most of this sum was paid — discreetly — in dollars."

UP TO a year ago almost the entire French press, from *Le Monde* down, would have leaped on these "revelations" with glee. Only a year ago, when the Quai d'Orsay was having one of its periodic bouts of concern and affection for Syria and Lebanon, *Le Monde* obliged with an editorial assertion that it was Winston Churchill who ordered the bombardment of Damascus (by the French Army!) in 1945. But this time *Le Monde* was not playing, and even the anti-American *Carnard Enchaîné* mocked official efforts to implicate the U.S. Far from chasing the government's red herring, the liveliest papers set about disentangling the chains of command and complicity that connected Ben Barka's kidnappers with the secret services and the Gaullist political hierarchy.

There was no lack of insiders — and ex-insiders — willing to talk. In their years of intrigue against the Fourth Republic, and the purges and vendettas of the first few years of the Fifth, the Gaullists had given many hostages to fortune. The secret services had been split into Left-wing and Right-wing factions by the appointments of successive governments. (One of the early directors of the SDECE, Henri Ribière, for example, was a Socialist. After writing a report severely criticizing his Gaullist predecessor, he was involved in a serious road-accident. Before dying he told his parents that the accident had been arranged so as to liquidate him.)

Thus the press was able to establish that Antoine Lopez was a conscientious agent whose reports (responsible for the capture of Ben Bella and his companions in 1956) were taken seriously; that Lopez had warned his SDECE superiors as long ago as May 17, 1965, that Oufkir was plotting to seize Ben

Barka, and on September 29, 1965, had given some details and the names of those involved; and that the channel of communication along which Lopez's information was passed led to Jacques Foccart, a veteran Gaullist strategist and "network" organizer, who since 1958 has been coordinator of the main security services and personal adviser of the President. Lopez's only political contacts were two UNR (Gaullist party) personalities: Lemarchand and Carcassonne-Leduc, both collaborators of Foccart's and organizers of semi-secret Gaullist activist "networks" which still exist, now financed by the state.

Lemarchand, whom Figon claimed to be his "protector," would have made a splendid Ian Fleming character. In 1961-62, acting on the orders of Roger Frey, Minister of the Interior, and under cover of the Gaullist *Mouvement pour la Communauté*, he organized official anti-OAS terrorist squads in Algeria. When these squads had outlived their usefulness, their 20 or so leaders were called to a meeting in an Algiers villa. They were all devoted Gaullists, but (unlike the rank and file, who were mainly mercenaries recruited from the underworld and the police) they knew too much about the Administration's responsibility for a number of killings and bomb explosions which a future, more liberal, French government might decide to investigate one day. During the meeting a big crate, supposedly containing printing equipment sent to the villa by Lemarchand, exploded, killing most of those present. One of Lemarchand's rewards for his many services rendered was a seat in the National Assembly as UNR deputy for the department of Yonne. To facilitate his election his principal opponent was arrested nine days before the poll.

The press also discovered that General Oufkir had been a SDECE informant, and still exchanged information and services with it occasionally; and that, on November 3,

1965, in Paris, his guests — dinner included two senior members of the personal cabinet of Roger Frey — although the fact that Oufkir had personally taken delivery of the kidnapped Ben Barka four days earlier was known not only to the police and the SDECE but to Frey and (as Frey himself revealed to Mauriac and his friends on January 21) to General de Gaulle. Frey is a close friend of the colorful Lemarchand, who passed on to him Figon's account of the kidnapping on November 2. Frey has since admitted — privately — that on November 2 he also knew the names of the two French policemen who had helped Ben Barka's kidnappers. Yet on November 12 he was still denying — in an official communiqué — that French policemen were involved.

Blaming the Americans having proved fruitless, it was decided, at an exalted level, to put as much blame as possible on the press. The press is a favorite scapegoat of French governments. As a writer in *Le Monde* observed recently, "Everyone knows that it is the press which provokes scandals by reporting them, loses wars by demoralizing the nation, and endangers national unity by criticizing the government." In the classic currency-trafficking scandal of 1953, in which the usual mishmash of senior officials, politicians, secret agents and gangsters were involved, the only man against whom the law moved at all vigorously was the journalist who wrote a book exposing it all; and during France's embroilments in Indochina and North Africa far more journalists were punished for denouncing the use of torture than torturers for applying it. General de Gaulle's strictures, during his last TV address, on the role of the press in the current scandal aroused echoes of Guy Mollet in the 1950s and Henri Queuille in the 1940s.

The French press has rarely attained inspiring heights of probity. Few Paris dailies are self-supporting; most provincial papers are dis-

mally, a reformist; government subsidization is the rule and the only permitted press agency is the official AFP. But a few Paris weeklies are commendably vigorous, and in the Ben Barka affair their vigor shamed normally sluggish dailies into action. The press came as near as it could to filling the gap in the nation's life caused by the government's emasculation of parliament, radio and TV.

Phase four ("Sit tight . . .") then opened. Three senior officials who were either investigating the affair or involved in it developed mysterious illnesses. One, at least, was a secret illness: "We are not at liberty to reveal the nature of his illness," said a SDECE official when asked about the health of M. Morvan, two steps above Lopez in the SDECE hierarchy, who fell ill the day the Ben Barka scandal broke. Marcel Le Roy (also known as "Colonel Finville"), Lopez's immediate superior, was arrested but fell back on his SDECE secrecy oath. Louis Zollinger, the examining magistrate, closed his inquiry and handed his dossier to the *parquet* (public prosecutor's office) in what *Le Monde* called "an atmosphere of renunciation and resignation." The affair was already drifting out of public focus.

THE FRENCH often strike one as having extraordinarily short memories for political matters. (I write this diffidently, aware that I dismiss all such generalizations as stupid when other people make them. Can it be that the strongly nationalistic bias of French education stimulates a subconscious urge to forget political events of an unflattering nature?) Whatever the explanation, few Frenchmen have any clear recollection of even such recent and resounding scandals as the *trafic des piastres* (1953), the *affaire Dides* (1954), the bazooka murder plot (1957), the *Algérie française* and Gaullist conspiracies of 1958, the beatings and killings of

North Africans by the Paris police in 1960-61, and the rest. Who, apart from Madame Audin, remembers that the parachutist officer who tortured to death Maurice Audin, a university professor, on June 21, 1957, is still unpunished? No civil court in France can handle the case; and the officer's chief, one of the men who brought de Gaulle to power, is now a five-star general. Who remembers the kidnapping of Colonel Antoine Argoud by Gaullist agents in Munich just three years ago — in circumstances similar to the kidnapping of Ben Barka? Will anyone remember Mehdi Ben Barka in even one year's time?

Perhaps. At the end of April, in one of those sudden decisive moves that revive one's trust in the French judicial machine just as one is despairing of it, the *chambre d'accusation* of the Paris court of appeal ordered that the inquiry be reopened. This initiative was taken — despite the opposition of the *parquet* — in response to a petition from the legal representatives of Abdel-Kadar Ben Barka. Among the new witnesses to be heard will be a waitress, a former employe of the gangster Boucheseiche, who claims to have seen Souchon, one of the policemen who kidnapped Mehdi Ben Barka, and a senior police officer named André Simbille dining with Boucheseiche at his home. Both Souchon and Simbille told Judge Zollinger, during his first inquiry, that they had never met Boucheseiche. At the beginning of May, after receiving an anonymous telephone call, the police began searching for Ben Barka's body in an area of marshland and ponds favored by Boucheseiche for fishing parties.

There has been a slight revival of public interest in the affair, but many Frenchmen are still convinced that the authorities will never allow the full story to be told. Antoine Lopez and his chief, Marcel Le Roy, are in prison, but it is generally assumed in Paris that they are still on the payroll of the SDECE and

carefully obeying orders. Blown secret-service men who wish to stay alive rarely have any other option. It is thought that these two officers will reveal just enough of what they know to implicate themselves and insure that inquiries can decently be halted at Le Roy's level of responsibility. They will be imprisoned for a short while, paid off, and allowed to retire to some modest but agreeable backwater.

General de Gaulle himself suggested this formula when his secret-service chief, André Dewavrin ("Colonel Passy"), founder of the SDECE was accused of embezzling official funds in 1945-46. The leading bazooka plotters are now sunning themselves in the Balearic islands. The refuge for heads of the Gaullist *barbouze* squads who get themselves "burnt" (the French term) is said to be in Bolivia. Figon was waiting for Lemarchand to obtain papers allowing him to go to Bolivia when the police finally closed in on him. By an intriguing coincidence, France's present Ambassador to Bolivia, Michele Ponchardier, was in 1962 the liaison between the SDECE and Lemarchand's *barbouze* set-up.

For the man in the street, the affair is above all an advertisement of General de Gaulle's failure to eradicate the kind of corruption and intrigue his spokesmen denounced so extravagantly in the days of the Fourth Republic. The more reputable Gaullists dreamed of building a clean new France. But they employed too many dirty hands and too much shoddy material; they overthrew *le Système* (the Racket), as they called the Fourth Republic, only to establish *la République des barbouzes* (the goon squads' Republic) — a *Canard Enchaîné* headline that has become a national catch-phrase. The dream is now ending, and the Ben Barka affair has contributed to the awakening. Ben Barka may never have a tombstone but the founders of the Sixth Republic should raise a small monument to him.

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FRANCE -- FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE

President de Gaulle accepts that France cannot hope by itself to achieve a position of power comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. or the United States. But he believes that historical circumstances -- notably the Sino-Soviet split and the disintegration of the monolithical structure of the ~~United States~~ communist world including of course, Eastern Europe -- now permit a united Western Europe to play a significant independent role in world affairs. He envisages France as pre-eminent in a united Western Europe.

2. His plan for a united Western Europe ^{is} takes the position -- ^{- with France in a pre-eminent}
to take the form of a loose confederation of independent states linked by a series of bilateral (rather than multilateral or international) agreements and ^{with} ~~that~~ ^{on} concerted policies of political and economic ^{+ defence + on defence} matters. Distrust of any form of political integration is implicit in his plan. (This ^{is} reflected in present French policies on the E.E.C. and NATO.) He regards the political integration of European states as involving, besides the loss of national identity, perpetuation of of American hegemony in the fields of defence, trade and foreign policy.

3. Opposition to American influence in Europe is a continuing factor in French policy.

4. The General considers that a final settlement of the problem of German reunification can be reached within the context of a general detente ~~upon~~ between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The object of the detente would be the conclusion of a pact establishing a concert of Eastern and Western European powers to supervise and contain a reunified but non nuclear Germany (in ^{effect} fact this would mean a permanent second-class status for Germany which is the strongest power on the Continent west

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of Russia. It is scarcely conceivable that such a proposal could ~~be accepted~~ ^{find general acceptance} but it panders to the ~~definite~~ ^{genuine} fear in Eastern Europe of German revanchism and militarism).

5. The General also hopes that settlement of the German problem would lead ultimately to the fulfilment of what he regards as his grand design: the union of the countries of East ^{ern} and Western Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" under the ^{joint leadership} ~~control~~ of France and the USSR and to ^{the} ~~exclusion~~ of the United States.

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